Table Of ContentDIVISION AND COHESION IN DEMOCRACY
PUBLISHED FOR THE PRINCETON CENTER
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
A list of other Center publications appears
at the back of the book
D I V I S I O N
A N D C O H E S I O N
I N D E M O C R A C Y
A Study of Norway
BY HARRY ECKSTEIN
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
1966
Copyright © 1966 by Princeton University Press
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Published by Princeton University Press,
Princeton and London
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-17700
ISBN 0-691-05611-0 (hardcover edn.)
ISBN 0-691-01070-6 (paperback edn.)
First PRINCETON PAPERBACK Edition, 1974
This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of
trade, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise disposed of without the
publisher's consent, in any form of binding or cover other than that in
which it is published.
Printed in the United States of America
by Princeton University Press
Preface
IF THIS STUDY were intended to be a detailed, comprehensive
account of Norwegian politics, of the sort that country special
ists generally write, it would not only be much longer but an
impertinence. It is based on only four and a half months' stay in
Norway, a limited number of interviews with Norwegian aca
demics and political figures, and considerable, but far from
comprehensive, reading of Norwegian historical, political, and
sociological studies. Such a background hardly suffices for a sure
and comprehensive treatment of the manifold details of any
political system.
The essay, however, is differently conceived. My overriding
interest as a political scientist is not in any particular polity but
in the comparative study of political systems and in problems
that can be dealt with only through such study. This interest
does not originate in a belief that configurative studies of par
ticular countries are without value. Those who produce such
studies have done much distinguished and necessary work—
necessary most of all to the generalizes who can hardly learn
everything for himself, but must draw on configurative studies,
with confidence in the powers of those who produce them to
get things right. My interest in comparative study, however,
does arise from the view that the materials produced by con-
figurative case studies must be used, among other things, for
more general purposes, such as the construction of typologies of
political systems, the formulation of general propositions about
such systems, and the solution of special problems in regard to
which data from a single case, or from a very limited number of
cases, cannot be conclusive. It is also premised on the conviction
that the theoretical fruits of broader studies can sharpen one's
understanding of particular cases, much as psychoanalytic
theory, laboriously derived from many case studies, sharpens
inquiry into further cases to which it is applied. The end of po
litical inquiry, as I see it, is a close joining of broad and deep
studies; but doing both on the scale ideally required is beyond
vi Preface
any single work or any single scholar. What is needed is a long,
deliberate, and mutually sympathetic dialogue by those whose
tastes run to the general and those who prefer to deal with
special cases.
Either mode of study entails shortcomings. The generalizer
sacrifices sure mastery of detail, the narrower scholar relevance
to theory and the excitement of imagination that comes from
broad horizons. For that reason alone the work of using
specific studies to inform general ones, and of the latter to in
form the former, can never be fully and finally done. Especially
in the early stages of inquiry, the special studies available for
pursuing any broad concern are likely to be very incomplete and
to a large extent irrelevant. That problem can be progressively
reduced only by a serious interest in general theory on the part
of those preferring to work on special cases, but is unlikely ever
to be removed completely. Then too, when special studies are
used for general purposes, it is only too possible that the gener-
alist (who, like any human being, is limited in time, energy,
and background) will misunderstand or be merely superficial,
or be misled by mistakes or biases of specialists that he cannot
detect himself. Only constant criticism by specialists will help
reduce this problem, provided that they understand the gener
alises concerns and that the latter is willing to take well-informed
criticism into account. Hence the interplay of general and
special work in political study must be unrestrained, sym
pathetic, and above all continuous. But to continue, it must
begin. And to begin one must be prepared to write on a level of
great tentativity and very insufficient knowledge, hoping that
others will not misunderstand one's intentions.
The present essay is conceived in that manner—as a tenative
"theoretical case study." It grows out of an interest in dis
covering the conditions that produce stable or unstable rule,
especially in democracies. I have long been impressed by the
shortcomings of interpretations bearing on that problem that
have been arrived at by specialists on particular countries; none
of these survive for long when taken as generalizations. I have
Preface vii
also been dissatisfied by the fact that the problem of the con
ditions of stable democracy has been closely studied in very few
instances, and by the superficialities of generalists attempting to
deal with large numbers of relevant cases. This study represents
a first attempt toward a more satisfactory treatment of the
problem through a combination of the genres of specialists and
generalists. It tries to use detailed studies (and my own obser
vations) of Norway, a country unfamiliar to practically all stu
dents of democracy, for the purpose of applying, testing, and
revising theories developed in studies of other cases or in com
parative studies. But it is only a beginning, using as yet insuffi
cient, and not always directly relevant, materials to examine
tentative theories. It should not be regarded as an attempt at
anything more ambitious.
Perhaps this discussion will generate interest in, and provide
some knowledge of, a country about which most of us know
little, but which, I feel, holds many lessons for democratic and
general political theory. Perhaps it will even illuminate matters
previously dark to specialists on Norway or raise for them new
questions and perspectives. If it has these results, so much the
better. But these would be happy by-products, not essential to
my purpose. I neither can nor will claim to be an "expert" on
Norway, but claim only to have taken here a small step toward a
remote destination: the union of comparative generalizations
and configurative data in well-formulated theories resting on a
sound empirical base.
I fully intend to take further steps in that direction, if possible
along with others who see the point of my approach. Many
other unfamiliar cases must be examined as Norway is examined
here. Many familiar cases need reexamination as the work of
developing empirically solid theory unfolds. More hypotheses
than those treated here need consideration. Theories of stable
democracy need to be made congruent with larger theories of
political structure and society and to be subjected to special
testing. Not least, a great deal of empirical work, informed by
theoretical concerns like those expounded in these pages, still
viii Preface
needs to be done in Norway itself, among many other countries.
In the last of these tasks, I myself hope to participate in
some manner, not least because I liked the country and was
stimulated by its political scientists. In this connection I particu
larly ask indulgence of my Norwegian friends, many of whose
studies are represented here—I hope without much distortion.
I trust that they will bear in mind that in this essay I grope
through territory that they intimately know, but which to me is
new, insufficiently charted, and crowded with as many obstacles
to progress as their rugged and beautiful land. No doubt there
are errors and misinterpretations in the study, despite pre
cautions. But I trust that they are minor, and that they will not
impugn, or divert attention from, my major arguments.
ONE fundamental misimpression to which any case study may
give rise should particularly be avoided by readers: namely,
that I consider Norway's political system or society to be, in
any substantial sense, unique. This misimpression may arise be
cause of the very fact that this is not a systematic comparative
study, and because, for reasons stated in the last chapter, the
passing references to other democracies generally point out
differences between them and Norway, not similarities. No
doubt, Norwegian politics and social life do have distinctive
characteristics, as do all concrete phenomena, be they persons,
relationships, objects, or events; it is after all the distinctiveness
of concrete phenomena that permits one to recognize them as
such in the first place. The ways in which and extent to which
Norway is peculiar can, of course, be established only by
thorough comparisons that are not, and could not, be made
here. But the fact that this is a "theoretical case study" neces
sarily implies a strong assumption on my part that Norway is
not unique, in one or both of two senses: first, that what is the
case in Norway may also be substantially the case elsewhere,
however exotic some aspects of Norwegian life may seem;
second, that there are general principles which can account for
Preface ix
any distinctive characteristics of Norway and for the un
doubtedly distinctive general configuration of the whole society.
It is the search for just such principles that animates this study.
Although I do not systematically compare Norway with any
other democracy here, I have, of course, tried throughout to
juxtapose Norwegian experience on one hand and empirical
generalizations on the other; in that sense the study is certainly
comparative: it compares a case with a body of theory perti
nent to it. More often than not, alas, the theories fail to fit. And
in so far as those that run counter to Norwegian reality seem
plausible generalizations and are deeply entrenched in the re
ceived opinion of social theory and common sense, the im
pression that Norway is very singular, hence mysterious, will be
especially enhanced—above all, perhaps, in Chapter III, which
deals with Norway's political divisions. It may be, however,
that Norway raises puzzles—as it certainly did for me—only
because our current theories are so widely at variance with
reality. And it may be that aspects of Norway which at first
sight seem uncommon will, on further consideration, turn out
to be quite usual. If so, all the better, for my object here is not
to generate mysteries but to dispel them. This despite the fact
that the organization of this study represents my own history
of puzzlement, as well as what I take to be gradually growing
comprehension, as I searched through Norwegian realities with
the all too feeble interpretative guides provided by contempo
rary comparative politics.1
1After this preface was written, an article appeared that comes ex
traordinarily close to arguing for just such a research approach as I
follow in this study: Barney G. Glazer and Anselm L. Strauss, "Dis
covery of Substantive Theory: A Basic Strategy Underlying Qualitative
Research," American Behavioral Scientist, VIII, 6 (February 1965),
5-12. To make sense of the conception of this study, that article should
by all means be consulted, despite the fact that the authors' ideas differ
from mine in some minor respects. A book similar to mine in concep
tion is Lucian Pye's case study of Burma, Politics, Personality and Na
tion Building (New Haven, 1962). Both Pye's work and mine are de
signed to cope with a dilemma that Max F. Millikan discusses in a fore
word to Pye's book: that between case studies which emphasize the
