Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism: Omniscience

374 Pages·1991·40.09 MB·English

by  William Lane Craig

BRILL'S STUDIES
IN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
General Editor
A. J. VANDERJAGT, University of Groningen
Editorial Board
M. COLISH, Oberlin College
J. I. ISRAEL, University College, London
J. D. NORTH, University of Groningen
R. H. POPKIN, Washington University, St. Louis — UCLA
VOLUME 19
'68^>
DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE
AND HUMAN FREEDOM
The Coherence of Theism: Omniscience
BY
WILLIAM LANE CRAIG
NEG/*
E.J. BRILL
LEIDEN · NEW YORK · K0BENHAVN · KÖLN
1991
The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Com
mittee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library
Resources.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Craig, William Lane.
Divine foreknowledge and human freedom: the coherence of theism:
omniscience / by William Lane Craig.
p. cm.—(Brill's studies in intellectual history, ISSN
0920-8607; v. 19)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 90-04-09250-1
1. God—Omniscience. 2. Free will and determinism. 3. Theism.
I. Title. II. Series.
BT131.C88 1990
212'.7—dc20 90-42346
CIP
ISSN 0920-8607
ISBN 90 04 09250 1
© Copyright 1991 by E.J. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or
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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
For
WILLIAM MALLORY JOHN
"mon fils unique"

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
Introduction
Coherence and Rationality
Problems of Omniscience
I. THEOLOGICAL FATALISM
A. N. Prior
Nelson Pike
II. REDUCTION OF THEOLOGICAL TO LOGICAL FATALISM
III. LOGICAL FATALISM
Richard Taylor
Taylor's Response to his Critics
IV. SUGGESTED ESCAPES FROM FATALISM
Denial of the Principle of Bivalence or the Law of Exclu
ded Middle
Status of the Principle of Bivalence
Grounds for Denying Bivalence of Future Contingent
Propositions
Grounds for Affirming Bivalence of Future Contingent
Propositions
Bivalence of All Propositions
Falsity of All Future Contingent Propositions
Logical Form of Future Contingent Propositions . . . .
Unidentifiability of Future Individuals
Timelessness of Truth
Tensed vs. Tenseless Truth-Bearers
Omnitemporal vs. Atemporal Truth
Conclusion
V. "WITHIN ONE'S POWER"
Taylor on "Within One's Power"
Nécessitas consequentiae and Personal Power
Conditions and Consequences
Fatalism about the Past vs. Fatalism about the Future .
Changing the Past vs. Changing the Future
Causing the Future vs. Causing the Past
viii CONTENTS
VI. BACKWARD CAUSATION 94
PART I: THE ALLEGED LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF
RETRO-CAUSATION 94
Dummett's Defense of Backward Causation 94
The Logical Objection to Backward Causation 100
Antony Flew 100
Michael Scriven 101
Richard Gale 102
Richard Swinburne 103
Assessment of the Logical Objection 103
Two Words of Caution 104
Assessment 105
Logical and Metaphysical Modality Ill
PART II: PURPORTED INSTANCES OF RETRO-CAUSA­
TION 113
Neural Physiology 114
Particle Pair Creation/Annihilation 115
Classical Electrodynamics 116
Tachyons 120
Superluminal Particles and Backward Causation .... 120
The Reinterpretation Principle 122
The Logically Pernicious Self-Inhibitor 127
A Perspectival Special Theory of Relativity 128
Precognition 131
Experimental Evidence 131
Retro-Causal Explanation 133
Difficulties in Retro-Causal Explanation 136
Time Travel 139
A Word of Caution 139
The Possibility of Time Travel 140
Stock Objections to Time Travel 141
The Logically Pernicious Self-Inhibitor 143
Circular Causation 149
PART III. THE METAPHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF RE­
TRO-CAUSATION 150
The Α-Theory and Backward Causation 150
Superiority of the Α-Theory 153
Application to Purported Instances of Backward Causa­
tion 154
Conclusion 156
CONTENTS ix
VII. "WITHIN ONE'S POWER" ONCE MORE 158
Power and Counterfactual Openness 158
Failure of Fatalism 160
Conclusion 161
/III. TRANSITION TO THEOLOGICAL FATALISM 162
Prior 162
Pike 165
Conclusion 171
IX. TEMPORAL NECESSITY 172
Contemporary Debate from Pike to Plantinga 172
John Turk Saunders vs. Nelson Pike 172
Marilyn Adams 173
John Fischer 175
Alfred J. Freddoso 179
Alvin Plantinga 183
Assessment of the Debate 186
Toward Understanding Temporal Necessity 186
Backward Causation and Intuitions of the Past's Neces
sity 191
Fatalism and Ability 195
Conclusion 203
X. NEWCOMB'S PARADOX 205
The Puzzle Conditions 205
Theological Implications 206
Nozick's Dilemma 208
Divine Foreknowledge and the One-Box Strategy 210
Objections to the One-Box Strategy 211
Backward Causation 211
Backtracking Counterfactuals 212
Newcomb's Paradox and Freedom 220
Conclusion 221
XI. FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM OF GOD 222
Foreknowledge and Human Deliberation 222
Foreknowledge and Divine Deliberation 223
Conclusion 225
XII. THE BASIS OF DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE 226
God's Ability to Know Future Contingents 226
Knowledge vs. True Belief 229
Conclusion 235
χ CONTENTS
XIII. MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE 237
The Doctrine of Middle Knowledge 237
Natural, Middle, and Free Knowledge 237
Theological Ramifications 240
Grounds for Affirming Middle Knowledge 242
Objections to Middle Knowledge 246
The Object of Middle Knowledge 246
Middle Knowledge and Passivity in God 270
Middle Knowledge and Divine Freedom 275
Conclusion 278
APPENDIX I: Is THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY
FATALISTIC? 279
NOTES 287
BIBLIOGRAPHY 337
INDEX 354