Table Of ContentDiscourse in Cognitive Grammar*
RONALD W. LANGACKER
Abstract
Cognitive Grammar presupposes an inherent and intimate relation between
linguistic structures and discourse. Linguistic units are abstracted from
usage events, retaining as part of their value any recurring facet of the
interactive and discourse context. Linguistic structures thus incorporate
discourse expectations and are interpretable as instructions to modify the
current discourse state. There are multiple channels of conceptualization and
vocalization, including the symbolization of attentional framing by intona¬
tion groups. An expression is produced and understood with respect to a
presupposed discourse context, which shapes and supports its interpreta¬
tion. Particular contextual applications of linguistic units become entrenched
and conventionalized as new, augmented units. As discourse proceeds,
conceptual structures are progressively built and modified in accordance
with the semantic poles of the expressions employed. While initially mani¬
festing the specific conceptual structuring imposed by these expressions, the
structures assembled undergo consolidation to reflect the intrinsic conceptual
organization of the situations described. This conceptual organization has to
be distinguished from grammatical constituency, which is flexible, variable,
and in no small measure determined by discourse considerations.
Keywords: discourse; Cognitive Grammar; intonation unit; grounding;
structure building; constituency.
1. Introduction
The grounding of language in discourse and social interaction is a central
if not a defining notion within the functionalist tradition. This is no less
true for cognitive linguistics than for other strains of functionalism where
the concern is often more visible. My objective here is to elucidate the
Cognitive Linguistics 12-2 (2001), 143—188 0936-5907/01/0012-0143
© Walter de Gruyter
144 Ronald W. Langacker
connection between the expressions in a discourse, on the one hand, and
their structures as described in Cognitive Grammar, on the other. The
goal is necessarily modest, since I cannot claim any serious expertise in
regard to discourse, nor any extensive familiarity with the vast literature
in this area. I will not be presenting any actual discourse data or any
detailed analysis. My concern is rather to articulate how Cognitive
Grammar and discourse might be brought together, as a matter of
principle. I would be very pleased if this were a catalyst for scholars with
the proper expertise to investigate their relationship more systematically.
2. Abstraction from usage events
Most fundamentally, Cognitive Grammar makes contact with discourse
through the basic claim that all linguistic units are abstracted from usage
events, i.e., actual instances of language use. Each such event consists of
1
a comprehensive conceptualization, comprising an expression’s full con¬
textual understanding, paired with an elaborate vocalization, in all its
phonetic detail.
The conceptualization inherent in a usage event includes the inter¬
locutors’ apprehension of their interactive circumstances and the very
discourse they are engaged in. It thus incorporates their apprehension
of the ground (G) and the current discourse space (CDS). The ground
consists of the speech event, the speaker (S) and hearer (H), their
interaction, and the immediate circumstances (notably the time and place
of speech). The CDS is defined as the mental space comprising those
elements and relations construed as being shared by the speaker and hearer
as a basis for communication at a given moment in the flow of discourse.
The ground and the CDS are among the cognitive domains capable of
being evoked as the conceptual base for the meanings of linguistic
elements.
The various facets of a usage event are spelled out more fully in
Figure 1. A usage event is an action carried out by the speaker and hearer.
2
The speaker (S) acts in an initiative capacity, the hearer (H) being
responsive; but whether their role is active or reactive, each has to deal with
both a conceptualization and a vocalization, the two basic “poles” of an
utterance. The speaker’s and hearer’s action involves the directing and
focusing of attention (--->). In successful communication, they manage to
coordinate this action and focus attention on the same conceived entity.
Of course, we can only conceive of so much at any one time. We have
a limited visual field, taking in only so much of the world at any given
instant. Analogously, we have a limited “conceptual field”, delimiting
how much we can conceptualize or hold in mind at any given instant.
Discourse in Cognitive Grammar 145
Figure 1.
Metaphorically, it is as if we are “looking at” the world through a window,
or viewing frame. The immediate scope of our conception at any one
moment is limited to what appears in this frame, and the focus of
attention—what an expression profiles (i.e. designates)—is included in that
scope.
A usage event takes place in an immediate context of speech, inter¬
preted broadly as including the physical, mental, social, and cultural
circumstances. The ground is at the center of the context of speech, and
one element of this context is the very fact that the speaker and hearer are
engaged in a coordinated viewing of some facet of the world. In this sense
the “window” they are looking through is part of the speech context.
Crucially, however, what appears in this window—the content of their
coordinated conception—can be anything at all. We are able to conceive
and talk about situations in any world (real or imagined), at any time, in
any place. The viewing frame can be directed anywhere. The circumstance
in which it is directed at the context of speed itself (e.g., This cup is cracked)
is just a special (though privileged) case.
Besides the context of speech, the CDS includes a body of knowledge
presumed to be shared and reasonably accessible. It also includes the
speaker’s and hearer’s apprehension of the ongoing discourse itself: a
series of previous usage events, as well as subsequent events that might
be anticipated. Any facet of this can be drawn upon or alluded to in the
current utterance.
Usage events are bipolar, comprising both conceptualizing and vocalizing
activity.3 Moreover, as shown in Figure 2, at each pole we can reasonably
posit multiple channels, which have a certain amount of independence
but are nonetheless coordinated in complex ways. Under information
146 Ronald W. Langacker
Figure 2.
structure, I include such factors as emphasis, discourse topic, and status
of information as given versus new. Speech management pertains to
such matters as turn taking and holding or relinquishing the floor. The
various conceptualization and vocalization channels are shown as occur¬
ring within the viewing frame. This is, however, a matter of degree if
we understand the viewing frame as delimiting the general locus of atten¬
tion (the “onstage” region, so to speak). At the conceptualization pole,
the objective situation is generally more substantive, more concrete, and
more at the center of our attention than the other channels. At the
vocalization pole, segmental content is comparably salient.
I have so far talked only about usage events, i.e., actual utterances in
an actual discourse context. What about a language and the individual
linguistic units of which it consists? To think about linguistic units in
isolation from usage events is at best an analytical convenience, and at
worst a serious distortion. All linguistic units are abstracted from usage
events. Conversely, they are applied to and manifested in usage events.
They are best thought of as schematized patterns of action that are
immanent in usage events rather than distinct entities. A unit emerges by
the reinforcing and progressive “entrenchment” of a commonality
(apparent at some level of abstraction) that recurs in a sufficient number
of events. A linguistic unit is thus a multifaceted cognitive routine which
can be activated and carried out when occasion arises (like the ability to
shoot a free throw or to sign one’s name).
What kinds of elements are capable of being abstracted from usage
events and conventionalized as linguistic units? Cognitive Grammar
takes the straightforward position that any aspect of a usage event, or
even a sequence of usage events in a discourse, is capable of emerging
as a linguistic unit, should it be a recurrent commonality. A unit can
thus incorporate specifications concerning any portion(s) of the overall
Discourse in Cognitive Grammar 147
configuration sketched in Figure 1, including any of the channels detailed
in Figure 2. Precisely the same cognitive process— the progressive
entrenchment of recurrent commonalities—is therefore held responsi¬
ble for the emergence of linguistic units of diverse sorts, including those
pertaining to pragmatics and discourse. To the extent that such units are
conventional in a speech community, excluding them from a “language”
or “linguistic system” is arbitrary.
Maximally, therefore, a linguistic unit can correspond to an entire
series of usage events constituting a discourse sequence. Figure 3 shows
a recurring discourse configuration coalescing as an established unit,
thereby being incorporated as part of the linguistic system (i.e., the
inventory of schematized patterns of actions controlled by speakers). Since
units always originate in this way, in principle they contain all the sectors
depicted. However, most units are highly schematic with respect to many
or most of these sectors, so that for all practical purposes we can ignore
Figure 3.
148 Ronald W. Langacker
them. Typically, only certain sectors are characterized with any degree of
specificity.
Let us consider a few examples. Figure 4 represents the filler uh in
English. By means of this device, the speaker can briefly pause while
4
signaling the intent to hold thefloorand keep talking. Its relatively specific
content is limited to just two channels: the conceptualization channel of
speech management, and the vocalization channel of segmental content.
Most sectors of the overall structure are highly or fully schematic.
Figure 5 represents the familiar form of the pronoun you, in a
language like Spanish with a familiar/formal distinction. Conceptually,
it profiles the hearer as the focused element in the objective situation.
Hence the viewing frame is directed at the ground itself, i.e., a facet of
the ground appears onstage as the focus of attention. The hearer’s dual
role is indicated by a dotted correspondence line connecting the mani¬
festations of H in two different sectors. In regard to vocalization, this unit
specifies the sequence tu as its segmental content. Beyond this, as part
Figure 5.
Discourse in Cognitive Grammar 149
of the speaker/hearer interaction in the ground, the unit conveys a rela¬
tionship of familiarity or solidarity (represented diagrammatically by a
double line connecting S and H). All other channels and sectors are fully
schematic.
Consider next the sentence-initial use of therefore, as in (1).
(1) He’s very rich and powerful. Therefore I like him.
As shown in Figure 6, therefore introduces and profiles a relationship in
which one proposition, labeled P2, follows from another, P1. Moreover,
P1 is identified as the proposition expressed in the previous usage event,
just earlier in the flow of discourse.
For a last example, consider a strong demonstrative use accompanied
by a pointing gesture as in (2).
(2) I want THAT $ one.
Besides segmental content, the vocalization (broadly construed, as
including all channels of symbolization) includes a pointing gesture on
the part of the speaker. Observe, however, that the pointing is not merely
a facet of the vocalization, but also part of the expression’s conceptual
content— an essential part of its conceptual meaning is that the speaker
is pointing and that the intended referent is the entity the speaker is
pointing to, typically selected from other contextually available alter¬
natives (given as circles in Figure 7). Hence the speaker has a role in three
sectors: as part of the ground, and as the individual pointing in both the
gesture channel and the objective situation. Likewise, the entity pointed
to functions as such in two sectors.5
What about a typical lexical item, e.g., tree? I have often described it
as a symbolic unit, as shown in Figure 8a. Phonologically it comprises a
particular segment sequence. Semantically it profiles a thing which has
Figure 6.
150 Ronald W. Langacker
Figure 7.
Figure 8.
various properties abbreviated as T. Yet a fuller description would show
these as merely the nonschematic facets of a much more elaborate over¬
all structure, as shown in Figure 8b. Minimally, it shares with other kinds
of units the very notion that the expression is being employed by the
speaker and hearer, in the context of speech, as part of a discourse. Because
this much is common across usage events, the abstracted value of every
Discourse in Cognitive Grammar 151
unit includes the full schematic framing depicted in these diagrams, even
if only a few sectors are specified in any detail.
3. Discourse expectations
Any aspect of a single usage event or a sequence of them in a discourse is
capable of being abstracted as a conventional linguistic unit. Thus many
units make detailed specifications in regard to multiple events within a
sequence. Such units embody established discourse patterns and depen¬
dencies. When associated with particular elements, e.g., therefore in
Figure 6, they amount to discourse expectations engendered by those
elements. We can find regularities in discourse sequences of any size,
viewed at any level of organization. What level we examine determines
the scope of the patterns and dependencies described, and what counts as
a single usage event for this purpose. It is equally a matter of discourse
expectation that a preamble will be followed by a main body of text, that
a conditional protasis will be followed by an apodosis, and that a prefix
will be followed by a stem. A unified approach is thus adopted for lexical
items, grammatical constructions, and discourse patterns of any size.
Following a suggestion by Harder (1996), we might think of linguistic
structures (of whatever size) as instructions to modify the current dis¬
course space in particular ways. Each instruction involves the focusing
of attention within a viewing frame. A discourse comprises a succession
of frames each representing the scene being “viewed” and acted on by
the speaker and hearer at a given instant. A sequence of frames in a dis¬
course, each corresponding to one updating of the CDS, can be repre¬
sented as in Figure 9. Heavy lines enclose the frame currently being acted
on, which might be called the focus frame. I will also call this the zero
frame, preceded by a minus frame and followed by a plus frame.
Reference to a sequence of frames is incorporated as part of linguistic
units. A particular linguistic element can be retrospective, in the sense of
making a specification concerning the prior discourse, and/or prospective,
by virtue of evoking the subsequent discourse. Illustrating a retrospec¬
tive element, making a specification in its minus frame, is therefore, as
Figure 9.
152 Ronald W. Langacker
seen in Figure 6. Illustrating a prospective element, making a specification
in its plus frame, would be a topic marker (e.g., Japanese wa), diagrammed
in Figure 10. A topic marker refers schematically to the thing profiled
by the noun phrase with which it combines; this nominal referent is
represented as a circle in the focus frame. Such a marker is prospective
by virtue of signaling that the profiled entity will function as a conceptual
reference point for purposes of interpreting a subsequent proposition, as
shown in the plus frame. But it is also retrospective, in the sense that the
6
topic needs to be an entity already accessible in the prior discourse. Thus
the profile is shown as corresponding to a thing present in the minus frame.
The size and nature of these discourse frames depends on what level
and dimension of linguistic organization we examine. There are discourse
dependencies of one sort or another at every level, from the most local to
the most global, and to one extent or another we attend to them all, more
or less concurrently, when engaging in coherent discourse. Moreover,
the same structural element can carry discourse expectations at multiple
levels. Figure 6, for instance, shows therefore as inducing the expecta¬
tion of a proposition that would normally be expressed in the previous
sentence, as in (1). But at a lower level of organization, therefore also
carries the expectation of a following clause, which it serves to introduce.
Each of these expectations is a schematized remnant of the discourse
contexts—at different levels of structure— from which the element in
question is abstracted by the reinforcing of recurring commonalities.
Each constitutes a structural frame (or constructional schema) which the
element participates in and evokes as part of its conventional linguistic
value.
Consider the constructional schema for if ... then sentences, sketched
in Figure 11. If is taken as designating the selection of one proposition,
P , on a hypothetical basis, from a range of possible alternatives— i.e., it
1
evokes a hypothetical mental space. It further induces the expectation that
another proposition (P ) will be valid in that space. Then designates
2
the relationship wherein one proposition, P , follows from another, P
2 1
(cf. Dancygier and Sweetser 1997). At the lowest level of constituency,
if combines with afiniteclause, which expresses a proposition and profiles
Figure 10.
