Dictator Game Giving: Altruism or Artifact? - University of Alaska

12 Pages·2008·0.41 MB·English

ExpEcon(2008)11:122–133
DOI10.1007/s10683-007-9172-2
Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?
NicholasBardsley
Received:6October2006/Revised:4May2007/Accepted:8May2007/Publishedonline:29
September2007
©EconomicScienceAssociation2007
Abstract Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behav-
iour.Evidenceis presentedhere,however,thatsubjects’generositycanbereversed
byallowingthemtotakeapartner’smoney.Dictatorgamegivingthereforedoesnot
revealconcernforconsequencestoothersexistingindependentlyoftheenvironment,
aspositedinrationalchoicetheory.Itmayinsteadbeanartefactofexperimentation.
Alternatively, evaluations of options depend on the composition of the choice set.
Implications of these possibilities are explored for experimental methodology and
charitabledonationsrespectively.Thedatafavourtheartefactinterpretation,suggest-
ingthatdemandcharacteristicsofexperimentalprotocolsmeritinvestigation,andthat
economicanalysisshouldnotexcludecontext-specificsocialnorms.
Keywords Altruism·Artificiality·Experiments·Methodology
JELClassification C91·C70·D63·D64
Experimental economists have investigated unselfish behaviour with a familiar set
ofsimplegames(Camerer2003,pp.43–100).Thesimplestisthedictatorgame,in
whichsubjectshavetodecidehowmuch,ifany,ofanendowmenttogivetoanother
subject,typicallyinaone-shotanonymoussetting.Usuallytransfersareplentiful;it
is common for over 50% of subjects to give money away (Camerer 2003, pp. 57–
58).Severalmodelsofunselfishnesshavebeenputforwardwithintheparsimonious
frameworkofrationalchoicetheory.Thesetheoriescompeteoverdatafromdictator
ElectronicsupplementarymaterialTheonlineversionofthisarticle
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9172-2)containssupplementarymaterial,whichisavailable
toauthorizedusers.
(cid:2)
N.Bardsley( )
NationalCentreforResearchMethods,UniversityofSouthampton,Southampton,UK
e-mail:[email protected]
Dictatorgamegiving:altruismorartefact? 123
gamesandotherexperiments,andincludemodelofinequalityaversion(Boltonand
Ockenfels1998;FehrandSchmidt1999),altruism(AndreoniandMiller2002),ego-
centrism(Coxetal.2002)andRawlsian“socialwelfare”preferences(Charnessand
Rabin2002).Suchmodelscontinuetoattractintensiveresearcheffort.
Whilstdictatorgivinghasprovenhard,thoughnotimpossible,toeradicateinthe
lab, some experimentalists still express unease about the results.1 A common con-
cernisthatpeoplecouldalwaysmakeanonymousdonationstorandomstrangersin
everydaylife,forexamplebymailingcashtopersonssampledfromthetelephonedi-
rectory,butfewifanychoosetodoso.Transfersaremadeinsteadtofamilymembers,
specificorganisationsorface-to-facetopeoplerequestingmoney.Sincewefacethe
dictatorgamealldayeveryday,itcouldbeargued,theexperimentaldesignwouldap-
peartoscorehighlyonconventionalstandardsofex-anteexternalvalidity.Itpresents
afamiliarsetofopportunitiesinataskwhichmakesminimalcognitivedemands.Yet
theresultsappeartobemisleadingabouttheextentoffacelessinterpersonalaltruism.
Giving is also notoriously sensitive to experimental treatments. This adds to
the uncertainty about how the results from dictator games generalise to naturally-
occurringcontexts.See,forexamples,EckelandGrossman(1996)onanonymityand
charitiesversusindividualsasrecipients,Hoffmanetal.(1996)andBohnetandFrey
(1999) on social distance, Cherry et al. (2002) on earned versus unearned income,
andHaleyandFessler(2005)onvisualsuggestionsofobservation.Theevidencehas
tendedtobethatgivingissensitivetofactorsforwhichtheorymakesnoprediction,
orwhichcanbeexplainedbytheory.Intriguingly,theoretically-motivatedsensitivity
tests reported by Andreoni and Miller (2002), found that rational choice theory fits
dictatorgamedatasurprisinglywell.
On the other hand, there is evidence from related games that behaviour is also
sensitivetofactorswhichareirrelevantaccordingtoconsequentialisttheories,such
as intentions. For example, in ultimatum games Falk et al. (2003) find that re-
spondents’ behaviour depends on payoffs to the proposer in avoided subgames.
Similar results are offered by Brandts and Solà (2001). In a variant on dicta-
tor games, Dana et al. (2005) find that introducing uncertainty over the recipi-
ent’s outcomes reduces egalitarian choices even when the uncertainty can be cost-
lessly resolved. This result is discussed further in Sect. 3 below and seems to in-
dicate that much giving is not motivated by a desire for fairer outcomes for their
own sake, but for a further motive. Because of this kind of data, orthodox ac-
counts of social preferences might be better seen as attempts at reasonable ap-
proximations of specific motivations, for limited domains, than at literal general
truths.
Theabovesynopsisoftheexistingevidencesuggeststhatdictators’givingisprob-
ably more volatile than a literal interpretation of social preference theories might
suggest,anddoesnottranslatestraightforwardlyintoinsightsaboutbehaviourinthe
field.However,thepossibilitystillappearsopenthatdictatorgamedataisexplained
bysubjects’underlyingtastes,values,goalsandsoon,impartingvalue,whetherdi-
rectlyorindirectly,totheother’spayoff.Theexperimentsreportedbelowinvestigate
1IrefertoremarksmadebyArthurSchramatthe2003UniversityofNottinghamworkshopon“TheRole
ofExperimentalMethodsinEconomics”anddiscussionwithRobertSugden.
124 N.Bardsley
directlywhetherdictatorgamesmeasuresocialattitudes,inthisbroadersense.Much,
perhapsevenmost,ofthedictatorgamesliteraturesupposesthatsubjectsarriveatthe
labwithsuchdispositions,whichthendeterminetheirsatisfactionwiththeinitialal-
locations.Ifthisprocessexplainsgiving,subjectsshouldalsowanttogiveiftaking
ispossible.Theexperimentscomparedictatorgamesto“taking”gameswhichintro-
ducetakingoptions;theproportionofsubjectswillingtogiveshouldbeunchanged.
Thispredictionisquiteintuitive,butisalsoanimplicationofrationalchoicetheory,
asshowninSect.1below.
Incontrastwithmanystudiesofdictatorgames,butincommonwithAndreoniand
Miller(2002),thepresentstudyisatheoretically-drivensensitivitytest.Itfocuseson
asubject’swillingnesstogive,inabstractionfromtheamountgiven.Thetreatment
manipulationisineffectiveassumingthattheendowmentisconsistentlyregardedas
eithertooselfish,toogenerousorjustrightalongbudgetlineswhichimplementthe
samepriceoftransfers.Incontrasttopreviousstudies,therefore,ittestsabasicqual-
itative proposition implied by common readings of the design. The bold claim that
agivensocialpreferencetheoryisconfirmedbythedatarequiresthispostulateand
more, for there subjects’ attitudes determine a well-behaved indifference map over
outcomes.Thetestconductedislenienttowardsweakersocialpreferencesexplana-
tions of giving, since it allows gifts to vary in size, as predictably occurs with any
changeintheenvironment,withoutrejectionofthenullhypothesis.Thenullisonly
rejectedifthereisevidencethatsomesubjects’willingnesstogivecanbecompletely
eliminatedbytakingoptions.
1 Design
Three experiments were conducted, with two treatments in each. The design com-
paresadictatorgame(treatment1;T1)toa“takinggame”(treatment2;T2),which
introducestakingoptions.ThetreatmentsarerepresentedinFig.1below.Let(a,b)
representanallocationof£a toadictatorand£b toherpartner,Bdenoteadictator
Fig.1 Dictatorandtakinggamebudgetlines
Dictatorgamegiving:altruismorartefact? 125
game budget line and e the endowment point. B has the same gradient and endow-
(cid:2) (cid:2)
ment point as the budget line in T2, denoted B, but B extends to the south east
ofB.2
Socialpreferencetheoriespositconvexindifferencecurvesin(a,b)space.Points
on a budget line further away from the optimum in a given direction lie on pro-
gressivelylowerindifferencecurves.Supposeasubjectstartingate,facingB,gives
moneybecauseheroptimumistothenortheastofe.Thensheshouldalsoliketogive
(cid:2)
facing B, since an indifference curve can be tangential with a budget line, of arbi-
trarylength,atonepointonly.Inexperiments1and2thetreatmentsprovideidentical
givingoptions,thatis,B∩B(cid:2)=B.Thepopulationproportionsgivingshouldthere-
forebeequal.Inexperiment3,incontrast,subjectscannotgiveinT2soB∩B(cid:2)=e.
(cid:2)
Sothere,iftheoptimumrepresentsapositivetransfer, e shouldbechosenfromB.
TheproportionofgiversinT1shouldthereforenotexceedthatchoosingeinT2.In
each case the null hypothesis is that of equality of the relevant proportions, with a
two-sidedalternativehypothesis.
Commonprocedureswereasfollows.Theexperimentswererunaspen-and-paper
exercises,withdictatorschoosingpayoffsfromatable.Subjectsweremixed-gender
undergraduates.Separatesampleswereusedforeachtreatmenttoeliminatedeliber-
ateresponsestoexperimentalmanipulation.T1andT2wererunatdifferenttimesof
dayfororganisationalreasons,withtheordervariedacrossexperiments.Subjectsin
oneroomwererandomlymatchedwithapartnerinanother.Subjectsinthereceiver
role did not haveany task to perform but were fully informed; they simply awaited
theoutcome.Topreserveanonymity,dictatorswereseatedapartandmadetheirde-
cisionprivately.Theexperimenterissuedinstructions,availableonthejournalweb-
site, which were also read aloud, but was not present when decisions were made.3
Assistants then administered and made payments, who were uninformed about the
design, so the experimenter and assistants were blind to individual behaviour. The
resultingdoubleanonymitybetweensubjectsandexperimenterswasemphasisedin
the instructions. T1’s instructions abridged T2’s, making only the changes required
toalterthechoiceset.Asconventionallyconceived,thisholdstheframingconstant
across treatments. Basic details of each experiment are given in Sects. 2.1–2.3; for
fullresultsandstatisticalsignificanceseeFig.2andTable1ofSect.2respectively.
2 Experiments1–3
2.1 Experiment1
Experiment1implementedequalendowments(£6each)andscaled-uptransfers,fol-
lowingCoxetal.(2002)whoprovidedinitialevidenceofdictatortaking.InT1dic-
tatorscouldtransfer£(0–4),inincrementsof£0.33p.Transfersweredoubled.InT2
2Coxetal.(2002)reportthatwhengivinginvolvesahighertransferratethantaking,kinkingthebudget
line of the taking game, dictators generally take. The authors show that in that environment orthodox
indifferencecurvesmaylicensebothtakinggametakinganddictatorgamegiving,apossibilityexcluded
here.
3Therewereminordifferencesinscriptbetweenexperiments,butneveracrosstreatmentswithinanex-
periment.Theprincipaldifferenceisthatinexperiment1subjectshadtocircleanumberonadecision
table,butintheotherexperimentstheyhadtocirclealetter.Thiswastostrengthentheinscrutabilityof
thedesigntotheassistantpayingsubjects.
126 N.Bardsley
Fig.2 Frequencydistributionsoftransfersinexperiments1–3
dictatorscouldmakethesamegifts,ortakeupto£2atthesamerate:£1receivedcost
theirpartner£2.Subjectsalsoreceived£2show-upfee.Experiment1wasconducted
inJune2004,with110subjects.T2wasimplementedbeforeT1.
InT1theproportionofsubjectsgiving, p ,was 6/26.InT2thisproportion,p ,
1 2
wasjust1/29.Thedifferenceinproportions,p −p ≡d ,issignificantlydifferent
1 2 1
Dictatorgamegiving:altruismorartefact? 127
Table1 Statisticalsignificance
Experiment Bootstrap confidence interval for difference in
proportions
1 0.0384≤d1≤0.385(95%)
2 0.041≤d1≤0.415(90%)
3 0.079≤d2≤0.667(99%)
fromzero(p<.05).4 Theextentoftheinconsistencyisunclear,however,sincefew
subjects gave in T1. This problem motivated experiment 2, using more normal dic-
tatorgameparameters.Also,experiment1suggestedthatgivingmightbeextremely
fragile; experiment 2 made taking options a smaller proportion of the choice set to
testthis.
2.2 Experiment2
Experiment2usedtransfersatarateof£1:1andunequalendowments.Subjectswere
informedtheyhadashow-upfeeof£4each.Dictatorsinbothtreatmentsweregiven
anadditional£7.InT1theycouldgive£(0–7).InT2theycouldgive£(0–7)ortake
£(0–2)oftheirpartner’sshow-upfee.Transfersweremadeinincrementsof£0.50p.
The experiment was conducted over two dates, in November and December 2004,
with130subjects.T1wasimplementedbeforeT2.
Resultswereinthesamedirectionasforexperiment1,with23/33subjectsgiv-
ing in T1 and 15/32 giving in T2, but only significant at the 10% level. However,
takingoptionsinT2constituteasmallerproportionofthechoiceset.Asternertest
ofdictatorgivingwasthereforeconductednext,removingstrictlypositivetransfers
fromT2.
2.3 Experiment3
Experiment 3 also implemented £1:1 transfers and unequal endowments. Dictators
wereinformedtheyhadanendowmentof£10andtheirpartner£5.InT1,dictators
could give £(0–3). In T2, dictators could take £(0–3), but could not give. Transfers
were in increments of £0.25p. Experiment 3 was conducted in February 2005 with
120subjects.T2wasimplementedbeforeT1.
In T1, the proportion of subjects giving was 17/31, exceeding that choosing the
status-quoinT2,p ,of5/29.Thedifferenceinproportions,p −p ≡d ,ishighly
3 1 3 2
significant (p<.01).Thepointestimateoftheproportionofgenerouschoicesthat
disappearsacrosstreatments,s≡d /p ,is0.69,indicatingthatmostdictatorgame
2 1
givers would take, were the endowment the least selfish option. The bootstrap 95%
confidenceintervalforthisestimateis0.342≤s≤0.929.
4SeeSect.2,Table1.TheZ-testforequalityofproportionsandchi-sqtestareinappropriatewhenfrequen-
ciesapproachzero.Sincealternativemethodsexistforcalculatingtwo-tailedp-valuesforFisher’sexact
test(Agresti1992)anditisunclearherewhichispreferablethebootstraptechniqueisused(Efron1979).
Anumberofdrawsequaltothesamplesizewastaken,withreplacement,10,000timesfromT1data.The
procedurewasrepeatedwithT2data,simulatingthealternativehypothesis.Two-sidedconfidenceintervals
werecalculatedwiththepercentilemethod,whichprovidethep-valuesinthetext.
128 N.Bardsley
To summarise, the three experiments show similar indications of inconsistency
betweentreatments1and2.Inexperiment1thedifferenceinunselfishbehaviouris
significantatthe5%level,inexperiment2atthe10%level,andinexperiment3at
the1%level.Themostdecisiveresults,ofexperiment3,indicatethatmostdictator
gamegiverswouldtakepresentedwithsufficienttakingoptions,despitebeingbetter
offinitially.
3 Discussion
The reversing of generosity between treatments is inconsistent with any theory of
dictatorgamegivingwhichregardsunderlyingother-regardingmotivationascausing
adesiretosharetheendowment,andthereforewithanyorthodoxsocialpreference
account.5 The evidence here is actually consistent with that presented by Andreoni
and Miller (2002), who find in favour of rational choice altruism, since they only
examine behaviour in the giving domain. It rules out their interpretation, though,
since that is inconsistent with the observed sensitivity of giving to taking options.
Further, modifications of theory to incorporate intentions à la Rabin (1993) cannot
explaintheseresultssincetheyconcernexchangesofharmsandbenefitsratherthan
theirunilateralinflictionstudiedhere.
ItisinterestingtocomparetheresultstothoseofDanaetal.(2005)whoalsocast
doubt on the other-regarding interpretation of dictator behaviour. The authors find,
relative to a dictator game in which dictators choose between monetary payoffs of
$(6,1)and$(5,5),thatfairchoicesatrophywhenthedictatordoesnothavefullre-
sponsibility for the other’s payoff. For example, in one variant the other’s payoff is
$1or$5withequalprobability,buttheuncertaintycanbecostlesslyresolvedbefore
choosing.Fewsubjectschosetoresolvetheuncertaintyandmostchose$6forthem-
selves. The authors conclude that subjects are more concerned to seem than to be
fair,sincebychoosingnottoknowtheother’spayofftheycanattributetheinferior
outcome to chance; it is the transparency of responsibility in the dictator game that
causes generosity. However, the taking observed in experiments 1–3 above occurs
where dictators are transparently responsible, so this interpretation does not seem
tenablehere.
Oneexplanationofthepresentresultsisthatdictatorgamegivingisa“Hawthorne”
effect (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939; Adair 1984; Jones 1992), that is, an arte-
factofbehaviouralexperimentation.Callthisreading1.TheHawthorneeffectmight
plausibly be interpreted as subjects’ reacting to experimental “demand characteris-
tics” (Orne 1962, 1973), meaning the cues the protocol supplies about appropriate
behaviour.6 Here, subjects might feel that the dictator game is about giving, since
theycan either do nothingor give,whilst takingoptions could introducea conflict-
ingmessage.Theattitudecausingthetreatmenteffectmaythereforebeonetowards
5List(2007)hassubsequentlyreplicatedtheresultthatwillingnesstogiveerodeswithtakingoptions.
6Given the proliferation of meanings of the term “Hawthorne effect” it is probably best avoided. The
“demandcharacteristics”terminologyisalreadyestablishedinpsychologyandconveysbetterthestruc-
turalnatureofthepurportedconfoundthan“demandeffect”,whichmayconnoteinfluenceexertedbythe
experimenterinperson.
Dictatorgamegiving:altruismorartefact? 129
theexperiment,suchasadesiretobeagoodsubject.Demandcharacteristicsdonot
appear to have been much researched by economists but psychologists sometimes
claimtoexplorethemempirically.ExamplesareFernandezandTurk(1994),Davies
and Best (1996), Faith et al. (1998), Lampinen et al. (1999), and MacLeod (1999).
Reading 1 suggests that it may not be transparency alone that accounts for Dana et
al.’s (2005) data. For the introduction of actions which less directly harm the other
mayalterthemessagetheenvironmentgivesoffaboutnormalbehaviour.
Aswithanyexperiment,however,alternativeinterpretationsofresultsshouldbe
considered. A second interpretation of the present data, reading 2, is that dictator
giving is subject to a “range” effect, in the sense of Parducci and Wedell’s (1986)
“range-frequency” model, according to which the rate of selection of an option is
affected by its location and frequency in the choice set. Here options have equal
frequencyonsubjects’decisionsheets,buttheperceivedkindnessofanactionmay
depend on its location in the range available. Consider experiment 3, for example.
Intreatment2,taking£1mightbeseenaskindsinceasubjectcould takeupto£2.
Whilst in treatment 1, giving nothing is the least kind action available, so the same
desire to be kind, judged relative to the meanest action, would result in a positive
gift. Note that the distribution of choices in experiment 3, treatment 1, resembles
atranslationtotherightofthedistributionintreatment2(Fig.2,Experiment3).If
perceptionofthekindnessofanactionisanchoredtotheavailablealternatives,thisis
inconsistentwithorthodoxsocialpreferences.Itisconsistent,though,withtheway
kindness is incorporated into Rabin’s (1993) reciprocity model, where it is judged
relativetoareferencepoint.Inthemodelthispointisleftopen,butinapplicationit
hasbeenspecifiedasfollows:anactionisneutralifitallocatestoapartnerapayoff
mid-way between the highest and lowest payoff the agent could allocate them. If it
allocatesmore(less)thanthis,itisjudgedtobekind(unkind).
If the perceived kindness of an action is subject to a range effect generally, this
shouldhavefurthereconomicconsequences.Consideroneexample,closelyrelated
tothedictatorgame.Manycharitiesnowadaysissuerequestsforregulardirectdebit
contributions,and/orspecifyamenuofdonationsatmanydifferentlevels.7 Onera-
tionale for this may be to exploit an interaction of the range effect and “mental ac-
counting” (Thaler 1999). For an extended gift menu, relative to simple open-ended
requestsforone-offdonations,mayexpandindividuals’perceptionsofthechoiceset
pertaining to the donation decision. People may thereby come to perceive smaller
donations as more selfish. A second possible consequence would be a solution to
thecrowding-outpuzzleofpublicgoodstheory.There,changesinothers’contribu-
tions to a public good and changes in income produce the same outcome. That im-
pliesstrongcrowding-outbetweenindividuals’contributionsgiventhatprivatecon-
sumptionisanormalgood,anextremeresultgeneratingpuzzlingcomparative-static
“neutrality” results (Bergstrom et al. 1986). For example, equilibrium public good
provision is invariant to the distribution of income and the number of contributors.
7See,forexample,therangeofgivingoptionstheWorldWildlifeOrganisationpresentsonitsUKwebsite:
http://wwf.org.uk.Atthetimeofwriting,April2007,thissitegivesmanyoptionsforgiving,includingreg-
ularsubscriptionsandlegacies.Theone-offdonationoptionpresentstheviewerwitharangeofdonations
from£5to£1000withadefaultgiftof£5.
130 N.Bardsley
However, if the desirability of a donation depends on its position within the choice
set,theconsequentialismdrivingtheseresultsisbroken.8
Finally,onemightinvokestochasticchoicemodelstoexplainthedata,reading3.
Therearetwoapproachesthatcurrentlypredominateintheliterature,modelsbased
onFechner’s(1966[1860])measurementerrortheory,suchasthatincorporatedinto
QuantalResponseEquilibriumanalysis(McKelveyandPalfrey1995),andthe‘ran-
dompreferences’model(LoomesandSugden1995).Considerfirstutilitymeasure-
menterror.Thispositsarandomdisturbancetoanoption’sunderlyingutility.Inthe
dictator game a utility function should select a dominant option depending on its
form: the lower bound of the choice set for a selfish agent, the upper bound for a
perfectaltruist,theequalsplitforapureegalitarianandsoon.Theerrorwouldhave
tobesuchthatitregularlyobscurestheunderlyingdifferenceindesirabilitybetween
giving,takingandmaintainingthestatusquo.Butpayoffsherearecompletelytrans-
parent,sosubstantialmeasurementerrorisjustimplausible.9Alternatively,iftheun-
certainty concerns underlying preferences themselves, we have random preferences
theory,accordingtowhichtheutilityfunctionofeachagentisrandomlydrawnfrom
asetoffunctionspriortoachoice.However,byhypothesis,thesamepopulationof
utilityfunctionsissampledinbothtreatments.Thereforetheexpectationmustbethat
ofparityofdistributionofrealisedutilityfunctions.Itfollowsthatweshouldexpect
thesamefrequencydistributionsofchoicesinT1andT2,exceptingtheimplications
ofcensoringandsamplingvariation.Thisistheequivalenttothehypothesistested,
sotherandompreferencesmodelmakesnorelevantdifferenceinthiscontext.
To distinguish conclusively between readings 1 and 2 further empirical work is
required.Thismayinvolveexploringsubjects’perceptionsoftheexperiment,since
onreading1thesedrivetheresult.Oneitherreading,theresultsconfirmthatdictator
gamegivingprovidesnoevidenceofcontext-freepro-socialbehaviouror,therefore,
orthodoxsocialpreferences.Thepresentdatafavourreading1,however,sinceinex-
periment1theproportionexercisingnorestraintappearstodifferacrosstreatments:
77% give nothingin treatment1 whilst 48% take maximallyin treatment2 (Fig.2,
Experiment 1). Also, the equal-split allocation is non-modal in experiment 1, treat-
ment 2, where it is the endowment. In contrast it is a pronounced modal choice in
experiments2 and 3 where the endowment favours the dictator,suggesting it is not
focalwhenitconstitutesthedo-nothingallocation.
8Suppose,forexample,thatonedecidestodonatetoahomelesspersononthestreet.Onemightframe
thedecisionproblemashowmuchofone’sloosechange,£c,togive.Supposeonedecidesonthemid-
point between the most and least generous action, giving £c/2 (initial hypothesis). Now suppose that
onehad£(c+1)incoinsinitially(counterfactual1).Thisshouldcauseonetomakealargerdonation;
themid-pointgiftbecomes£(c+1)/2.Nowsupposeinstead,withinitialchange£c,thatanotherperson
unexpectedlydonates£1beforeonearrives(counterfactual2).Donating£c/2isstillthemid-pointaction,
sothebeneficiaryshouldreceive£c/2+1intotal,whereasinstandardtheorytherecipientshouldreceive
thesametotalcontributionsinbothcounterfactuals.
9ThereisalsoevidencethattheFechnermodelpredictspoorlywhenoptions’relativepayoffsaretrans-
parent.Forexample,LoomesandSugden(1998)studychoicesoversimplegambles,includingpairsclose
inexpectedvaluewhereoneisdominant.There,themodelpredictsthatnoiseeclipsespreferences,but
subjectsoverwhelminglychoosethedominantgamble.Dictatorgamedecisionsareevensimplersince
thereisnouncertainty.
Dictatorgamegiving:altruismorartefact? 131
4 Conclusions
Most subjects’ generosity appears to be reversible by allowing sufficient opportu-
nitytotake.Dictatorgamegivingisthereforenotexplainedbyunselfishnesstowards
othersthatexistsindependentlyoftheexperimentalcontext.Byimplicationitisnot
explainedbyorthodoxmicroeconomicmodelsofsocialpreferences.Twointerpreta-
tionsareofferedinvolvingdifferentwaysattitudesmaydependontheexperimental
choiceset.Onreading1,dictatorgivingisaproductofexperimentaldemandcharac-
teristicsandattitudestotheexperiment,withthechoicesetcontributingtothecues
whichindicateappropriatebehaviour.Thishasmethodologicalimplicationsbutalso
potentialtheoreticalconsequences,sincestandardaccountsofsucheffectsinvokea
moresociologicalmodelofactionthaneconomistshavetraditionallyemployed.On
reading2,dictatorgamegivingstemsfromthesensitivityofdecisionstoanoption’s
location in the choice set. Reading 2 points to a psychologically-enrichedmodel of
choice.Reading1accommodatesbettertheexperimentaldataandcanaccountforthe
apparentexternalinvalidityofthedictatorgame.Itisthereforeimportanttoconsider
itsimplicationsbothforeconomictheoryandforexperimentalmethodology.
Regarding theory, responsiveness to demand characteristics of experiments may
indicatetheroleofcontext-specificsocialnormsinbehaviour.Ifso,whilst‘oneman’s
artefactisanotherman’sphenomenon’,thephenomenoninquestionwouldappearto
besociologicalincharacter.Forexample,theconceptofroleobligationseemsrele-
vantifvolunteersaremotivatedtobehaveas‘goodsubjects’.Thiscohereswellwith
certain facts about gift-giving which are opaque to orthodox microeconomics. For
example,for all their apparent efficiencycomparedto specific goods,cash gifts are
oftenregardedasinappropriateoutsidethefamily,exceptingspecificoccasionssuch
as weddings (Douglas and Isherwood 1979). And where cash is given at weddings
thisisonlyappropriateeitheratthebehestofthecoupleoraspartofaspecificcul-
turaltradition—itiscustomarytogivecashatGreekweddings,forexample,butnot
atBritishones.
Regardingexperimentalmethodology,scepticismaboutlaboratorysocialscience
sometimescentresonthesupposedlyineliminablenatureofdemandcharacteristics.
Greenwood(1982)inparticularoffersaphilosophicalcritiqueofthelabonthisba-
sis,andsimilarargumentsaregiveninHarréandSecord(1972,Chap.3)andDilman
(1996) for examples. This literature focuses on the older experimental traditions of
psychology.Itseemsthatasapurelyaprioriargumentthecritiqueclaimstoomuch.
Forifthepremiseholdsthatconsensualexperimentsnecessarilyhavedemandchar-
acteristics, it is still empirical whether they differ across treatments in a given case
and also empirical whether this causes a treatment effect.10 That implies a role for
empirical checks such as the current exercise. It is quite possible that the dictator
game is the most sensitive commonly-used game, but in the absence of checks this
is a matter of speculation. Orne’s (1962, 1973) studies contain suggestions for the
explorationof demand characteristics using independentempirical exercises. These
maymeritadoptionoradaptationforeconomicsexperiments,toprovideinsightinto
wherethereare,andarenot,likelytobeproblems.
10IowethispointtoRobertSugden.TheimplicationsofGreenwood’scritiqueforexperimentaleconomics
arediscussedinBardsley(2005).