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1-
DIALECTIC
AND DIALOGUE
PI at o's Pr act i c e of
Philosophical
Inquiry
Francisco J. Gonzalez
Northwestern University Press
Evanston, Illinois
L
Northwestern University Press
Evanston, Illinois 60208--4210
Copyright ©-J 998 by Northwestern University Press.
Published 1998. All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN 0-8101-1529-8 (cloth)
ISBN 0-8101-1530-1 (paper)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gonzalez, Francisco J.
Dialectic and dialogue: Plato's practice of philosophical inquiry
/ Francisco J. Gonzalez.
p. cm.-(SPEP studies in historical philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8101-1529-8 (alk. paper).-ISBN 0-8101-1530-1 (pbk.:
alk. paper)
1. Plato. 2. Dialectic-History. I. Title. II. Series.
B398.D5G66 1998
184-dc21 98-27564
CIP
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the
American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper
for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.
For Sabra
Contents
Preface ix
1. Introduction: The Need for a Reexamination of Plato's Dialectic
Part I: Dialectic in Between Ordinary and Sophistic Discourse
2. Dialectic at Work in the Laches and the Charmides 19
3. The Cratylus on the Use of Words 62
4. Dialectic and Eristic in the Euthydemus 94
5. Philosophical Imitation 129
Part II: The Method of Hypothesis
6. Failed Virtue and Failed Knowledge in the Meno 153
7. A Second Sailing in the Phaedo 188
8. Idealization and the Destruction of Hypotheses in the Republic 209
9. Conclusion: Dialectic in the Seventh Letter 245
Notes 275
Works Cited 389
Index 405
vii
Preface
I think that Homer said it all in the line, "Going in tandem,
one perceives before the other." Human beings are simply more
resourceful this way in action, speech and thought. If someone
has a private perception, he immediately starts going around and
looking until he finds somebody he can show it to and have it
corroborated. (Protagoras 348c7-<l5; trans. Lombardo and Bell)
T
he_ stud_y of ~e Plato~ic dialogues should ideally be itself a dialogue,
pnmarily with the dialogues themselves, but also with others who
. have seriously studied them. Althoug,!1 the present study is devot~d
mamly to a conversation with the texts, it is my hope that the reader will
also benefit from the conversations with other scholars in the extensive
notes. Given the number of unorthodox positions I defend, as well as the
extremely controversial character of the texts I discuss, much of what I
have to say about the work of others is critical. This should not, however,
hide, but rather confirm, my debt to them: in many cases they have seen
something before I have; in other cases, they have helped me corroborate,
either positively or negatively, what I have seen for myself. It has also been
my aim to make the dialogue as inclusive as possible, in reaction to what
I sadly perceive to be a growing insularity in Platonic studies, especially
among English-speaking scholars: extremely helpful and worthy work is
ignored simply because it is not in the right language or school.
Then there is my debt to those who have read and commented on
this manuscript in its many mutations during the past few years. Its first
form was a dissertation written for the University of Toronto. The keen
and critical eye of my supervisor,John Rist, saved me from many an error
and exuberant exaggeration. He was the Hans Sachs to my Walter von
Stolzing. Paul Gooch, my sympathetic advisor, gave me the benefit of his
stimulating and enjoyable conversation, both in and out of class, and
Drew Hyland, my external reader, kindly provided me with valuable and
ix
l
,ftlFACl
encouraging written comments. My oral exam, in which the examiners
included Brad Inwood and Thomas Pangle in addition to the above, was
uncommonly helpful. Among readers of this book in its later incarna-
tions, my greatest debt is to Walter Watson, who commented on both
the general project and important details: specifically, he spotted and
enabled me to correct some errors in the Meno chapter. Gerald A. Press
read the manuscript, made some helpful comments, drew my attention
to the work of Stefanini and, most important, provided moral support for
the way of reading Plato pursued here. I have greatly profited not only
from Rafael Ferber's published work (as the numerous references in the
notes demonstrate) but also from extensive correspondence with him on
the issue of nonp ropositional knowledge. I have a very special debt to my
friend and undergraduate mentor Michael Gelven: he first sparked in
me a love for Plato's dialogues in certainly one of the best Plato seminars
anywhere; our many conversations throughout the years have been the
closest I have come to the ideal of philosophical sunousia described in
the Seventh Letter. Needless to say, genuine dialogue is not the same as
agreement, and therefore none of those acknowledged here should be
seen as endorsing any of the positions I defend in what follows.
Last, but by no means least, I must thank my wife, Sabra Sanwal,
to whom the book is dedicated. My debt to her is immeasurable and
ranges from the tangible to the intangible: from her extraordinary feats
of weight lifting in delivering to my advisor several corrected copies of .
the dissertation to her ability to cope with the infidelity of a husband who
often spends more time with Plato than with her. Finally, I must express
the hope that my daughter Shivani, born at the same time this book was
accepted for publication, will one day understand why her father so often
prefers staring at funny lights on a screen high up in the air to joining
her in playing with more tangible objects on the floor.
FJ.G.
Saratoga Springs
July 1997
Introduction: The Need for a
Reexamination of Plato's Dialectic
[W]e find the seeds of all philosophical systems in Plato's
thought with · · lf ·
. • . out it use bemg one of these systems; it is the
idea of philosophy, the crucible in which the different forms
of philosophy are born, the unchanging sun in the middle of
philosophy's planetary movements and formations ... . Plato
philosophizes where others indoctrinate, he lifts one's spirit to
~e pure essence of the Idea where others degrade and confine
it to the letter of a system. This is why Platonism is the very spirit
of philosophy or Philosophy Itself (F. Ast; trans. FJ.G.)
T
here are many specific questions which Plato's dialogues, to the
great chagrin of interpreters, have so far refused to answer con-
cI_usively. The result is the cacophony that still characterizes much
Platomc scholarship. Yet while specific issues within Plato's philosophy
have been hotly debated, there has been much too little explicit debate
and discussion concerning what is perhaps the greatest source of discord:
Plato's conception of philosophy. What, in Plato's view, are we doing
when we philosophize? Exactly what kind of knowledge are we seeking
to acquire, and what are the means by which we can acquire it? Since the
dialogues normally identify philosophy with "dialectic," these questions
also concern the nature of dialectic. What kind of a process, what form
of argumentation, is dialectic? And what exactly can this process achieve?
What is the nature of the knowledge possessed by the dialectician?
Even if it does not explicitly raise these questions, every study of
Plato presupposes some kind of answer to them. What happens, there-
fore, when little or no effort is made to arrive at Plato 's1 answer is that each
scholar assumes his or her own conception of philosophy as the model
for formulating and discussing specific questions in Plato's philosophy.
We may have an example of such an assumption in the very attempt
to compartmentalize Plato's thought by discussing dialectic under the
F
tH All ( fl C ANO OIAlOOUl
heading of •methodology" or "1ogic, thus sharply distinguishing it from
his "physics/ "ethics," or "ontology." In this case Plato's thought is inter-
preted according to a model of philosophical knowledge not necessarily
his own. Since the specific model assumed can be anything from modern
natural science, mathematics, or formal logic to Hegelian dialectic, exi~
tentialism, or deconstructionism, the variance between the ways in which
different scholars approach Plato's works is great indeed.
The present study seeks to get at the root of this variance by ad-
dressing precisely Plato's conception of philosophy or dialectic. Because
a thorough examination of how dialectic is found and understood in
all of Plato's dialogues is hardly manageable in one book-length study
and because the "late" dialogues are a very distinct group presenting
problems of their own, the scope of the present work is confined to what
are normally considered the "early" and "middle" dialogues.2
I do not believe that a detailed study of this length on Plato's
"earlier dialectic" requires any apology. In the first place, as just noted,
an understanding of Plato's conception of philosophy must provide the
foundation for any interpretation of his specific views. Before we can
know how to read the dialogues, before we can interpret any of the claims
made in the dialogues, we must have some general idea of what Plato sees
himself doing as a philosopher. Second, to this day the most thorough
and influential treatment of Plato's "earlier dialectic" is to be found in
Richard Robinson's book of that name, first published in 1941 and then
revised in 1953.3 Apart from the fact that Robinson's book could not
benefit from the more than forty years of Platonic scholarship appearing
since its publication, its basic approach to the examination of dialectic
is fq_nda~ ntally flawed. Robinson's bookjul boo~ on_ logic. He thus
treats dialectic as a purely formal method of constructing arguments and
accordingly believes that he can define dialectic in total abstraction from
the content of Plato's philosophy.4 The result is that dialectic, understood
as the exchange of questions and answers, is rendered accidental to this
content and thus without real point or purpose.5 A related problem is
that Robinson focuses on the more technical descriptions of dialectic in
the dialogues without making any attempt to relate these descriptions to
dialectic as actually practiced, to a greater or lesser degree, in the dialogues
(in fact, he sees little relation here).6 Thus one finds in Robinson's
book no interpretations of whole dialogues, but only detailed analyses
of passages taken out of context. But can one truly understand Plato's
dialectic if one refuses to examine in detail how he depicts dramatically,
throughout the course of a whole dialogue, the methods and results of a
philosophical conversation? Is not a Platonic dialogue simply a dramatic
portrayal of dialectic at work? In not even considering this possibility,
3
INtllOOUCflON IHI NIIO ,011 A
lltl XAMINAtlON Of ,LATO 'S DIALECTIC
Robinsm, has provided w1w ilh at best Lhc bleached skeleton of dialectic.
Howc\'er. Robinson has not simply failed to say aJI that can be said. As r
show throughout the course of the present study, in abstracting from the
content and dramatic life of dialectic, Robinson distorts its nature and
answers incorrectly the important questions: what kind of knowledge does
dialectic provi<;ie and how does it do so?
A detailed reexamination of Plato's earlier dialectic is therefore
long overdue. However, it is made especially timely by the present state
of Platonic scholarship. Since the publication of Robinson's book, two
new and antagonistic movements have emerged in Platonic scholarship
and are gaining increasing acceptance. I will call one the "nondoctrinal"
interpretation of Plato and the other the "esotericist" interpretation
( "unwritten doctrines"). In showing the origin of these two movements
as well as what is at issue in their opposition, I hope to make clear just how
great the need is for a new interpretation of Plato's dialectic. The account
of Platonic scholarship that follows is schematic and therefore suffers
from the defects of any "schema." Nevertheless, I think it is important,
even at the risk of oversimplification, to have in view the main outlines
of this otherwise complex spectacle.
The modern era of Platonic scholarship can be said to have begun
with the publication in 1804 of Friedrich Schleie.rmacher's general intro-
duction to his new German translation of Plato's dialogues. Such has been
Schleiermacher's influence that his interpretation of Plato's philosophy
has provided the foundation for both sides of the debate mentioned
above.7 The two main principles of this interpretation are the following:
first, the content of Plato's philosophy is inseparable from the artistic
form of the written dialogue;8 this principle has as a corollary the view
that Plato's philosophy is completely contained in the written dialogues.
Second, the content of Plato'.s philosophy is systematic.9 These two claims
are the guiding principles of much Platonic scholarship to this day.
It is true that Schleiermacher's view that the dialogues are a gradual
presentation of a philosophical system that remained constant through-
out Plato's career has been widely rejected. This view has been thought to
be incompatible with the obvious existence of contradictions and gaps in
the dialogues taken as a whole. However, the view that has come to take
its place, namely, that the dialogues are records of an..emlutioqjn PJato's
philosophical~yste!P (o r of failed attempts to build such a system), shares
the same presuppositions. First, the unity of form and content is main-
tained in the view that the differences between one dialogue and another
reflect actual changes in Plato's thought occurring between the dates at
which the two dialogues were written. Thus the great importance which
