Table Of ContentDetermining One’s Fate:
ADelineation of Nietzshe’s Conception of Free Will
N G
EL RILLAERT
Willing liberates!—thus I teach you f[reedom] o[f the] w[ill]
—KSA10.371
Introduction
N
ietzsche researchers and historians of philosophy alike rarely pay atten-
tion to the philosopher’s account of the problem of determinism and free
will.1 In like manner, in the research on determinism and free will, Nietzsche’s
view on the topic is seldom mentioned, let alone analyzed. Although the pas-
sages in which Nietzsche discusses the issue explicitly are not numerous, his
ideas are original. At face value, though, his use of the notion of free will is
inconsistent: on the one hand, he rejects free will as the ultimate cause of human
action; on the other hand, he attributes a positive connotation to freedom of the
will. The aim of this essay is to pinpoint and investigate both the positive and
negative statements on free will and to disentangle Nietzsche’s ambivalence on
this topic.
The theoretical frame and structure of the paper are inspired by the contem-
porary debate in analytical philosophy on the problem of determinism and free
will. The concept of free will is typically opposed to the idea of determinism.
The pivotal question in the historical and contemporary discussion boils down
to the following: Are humans endowed with a free will, which enables them to
act according to their own choices and purposes, independently of any external
factor, and are they therefore fully responsible for the acts they commit?
Or are humans rather determined, implying that they do not bear ultimate
responsibility for their actions? In the current discussion on determinism and
free will, two tendencies can be identified: compatibilism and incompatibilism.
Incompatibilists consider free will and determinism incongruous with each
other. Within incompatibilism one can distinguish between two opposing views,
depending on whether free will or determinism is accepted as the fundamental
principle. Libertarians refute the supposition that humans are in any way deter-
mined and establish theories in favor of the human capacity to choose and act
freely, while “diehard determinists” or no-freedom theorists,by contrast, assert
JOURNALOF NIETZSCHE STUDIES, Issue 31, 2006
Copyright © 2006 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.
42
DETERMININGONE’SFATE: 43
that humans are entirely conditioned and have no free will at all at their disposal.
Compatibilists, on the other hand, contend that freedom in every significant
sense, including free will, is coexistent with determinism (McFee 2000, 53–67;
Kane 1996, 13–16).2
In this essay, I will first discuss and contextualize Nietzsche’s negative per-
ception of free will. Second, I will treat Nietzsche’s account of determinism.
And finally, I will analyze the philosopher’s positive statements on free will and
examine his position toward the problem of determinism and free will. To this
end, I will study in detail two juvenile essays (BAW2:54–62) in which Nietzsche
deals with and provides a solution for the problem of fate and free will. These
essays are crucial for understanding Nietzsche’s positive account of free will
and thereby occupy a key position in my essay.
1. Nietzsche’s Dismissal of the Libertarian Views
In most of the texts that deal explicitly with the free will issue, Nietzsche repu-
diates the notion of a free will (KSA2.103–6; KSA6.90; KSA6.95). One major
argument against the idea of free will is that the conception of the agent as causa
sui(cause of itself) is self-contradicting (KSA5.35). For if human actions result
from choices, which in turn emanate from the will, and, supposing that the will
is determined by human nature, human actions are not caused by the agent as
such, but rather are conditioned by the way the agent is (Leiter 2001, 292–93).
Free will is generally considered a necessary condition for granting humans
moral responsibility. Humans are held to be morally responsible for actions
based on free choice (intentional, voluntary, or deliberate actions), while they
are not considered morally accountable for happenings or events that occur
without their having freely chosen for them (accidental actions) (McFee 2000,
4).3 Thus, by denying that humans are endowed with free will, Nietzsche
contends that humans are not morally accountable for their actions (KSA2.103;
KSA3.117–18; KSA6.95–96).
Traditionally, having “alternative possibilities” is taken to be a prerequisite
for free will and moral responsibility (Kane 1996, 32). The agent is free in his
choice and responsible for this choice only if he “could have done otherwise,”
if there were alternative possibilities to choose from.4 In aphorism 13 of Zur
Genealogie der Moral(first essay), though, Nietzsche contends that the idea of
alternative possibilities, as it is in common psychology associated with moral
responsibility, is typical for the morals of resentment. In his view, the weak (“the
lambs”) condemn the strong (“birds of prey”) for “choosing” to be strong, while
they praise themselves for “having decided” to be good, as if both could have
chosen otherwise. In this way, the weak arrogate the right to themselves to make
the strong morally responsible for their being strong (KSA5.278–79).
44 NELGRILLAERT
Already a decade earlier, in aphorism 39 of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches
I, Nietzsche denounces Schopenhauer’s notion of intelligible freedom as a
fable.5 Humans’belief in free will and the closely related concept of moral
responsibility can be explained in a genealogical manner: initially, actions were
granted the predicate “good” or “evil” on the basis of their useful or harmful
consequences; in the course of time, the actions themselves became “good” or
“evil”; subsequently, these moral predicates were attributed to the motives of
human actions; finally, “good” and “evil” were given the status of primary
human qualities (KSA2.62–64).
One can distinguish two fundamental arguments in Nietzsche’s critique of
free will.
FREEWILLASALINGUISTICARTIFACT
Nietzsche’s primary criticism of free will is directed against the underlying duali-
stic perception of the world, which divides the phenomena into “subjects” and
“objects.” Advocates of free will discern between the subject (substance or sub-
strate) and the act the subject causes; they believe in the omnipotence of the sub-
ject, as though the “I” or the “ego” is the only and final cause of an act’s occurrence.
Nietzsche rejects this notion of the subject as the ultimate originator of the act:
For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the
latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called lightning, so popular
morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a
neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was freeto express strength or
not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no “being” behind doing,
effecting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed
is everything (KSA5.279).6
There is no independent “subject” that lies behind human action; the dichotomy
between agent and act is artificial and deceptive. For reality does not consist of
separate, clear-cut facts; rather, it is a continuous flux (“ein beständiger Fluss”)
(KSA2.546). The belief in free will presupposes that the agent can be isolated
from the act, an idea that is absurd in the light of the constant flowing that con-
stitutes reality.
By revealing such internal inconsistencies, Nietzsche unmasks the traditional
conception of free will. By rejecting free will, Nietzsche—as Oaklander
argues—demolishes the fundaments of the related system of judgment and pun-
ishment. An agent is considered responsible and punishable for his deed only if
he acted with an intention or a reason, and not if he performed the act uncon-
sciously or under coercion. An act of free will, however, must be essentially
unintentional because it is, according to its own definition, only the product of
the internal faculty of free will and by no means affected by external causes
(reasons, motives, etc.) (Oaklander 1984, 213–14). The traditional conception
of free will thereby gets entangled in its own dogmas and definitions.
DETERMININGONE’SFATE: 45
In Nietzsche’s view, the false dichotomy between agent and act, and thereby
the concept of free will, finds its origin in our language (KSA2.547; KSA5.279).
For the grammatical distinction between subject and object is reflected upon our
perception of the world: it artificially distinguishes the agent from the act and
thus forces us to postulate a dualistic relationship between humans and their
world. Grammatical categories, words, concepts do not reflect the continuous
flux of reality. On the contrary, they reduce the complexity to isolated facts; they
represent reality on an elementary, linear level. The concept of free will is thus
a linguistic construction, a fiction, designated for disentangling the chaos in real-
ity and rendering meaning to human existence. “The belief in the freedom of
the will, that is [the belief in] the equalfacts and theisolatedfacts,—finds in
language its permanent evangelist and advocate”(KSA2.547).
FREEWILLASACHRISTIANARTIFACT
Nietzsche’s second argument against free will is that it is to a great extent con-
strued by theologians (“Theologen-Kunststück”) for burdening humans with
moral responsibility and thereby legitimizing after life judgment and punish-
ment (KSA6.95). In this critique Nietzsche lays his finger on a central theo-
logical problem. Christian theologians have established the concept of a God,
who is essentially good, omnipotent and omniscient, and who determines all
happenings in the world and thereby preconditions human fate. This idea gives
rise to some problematic questions. For does not the idea of a completely pre-
destined world result in fatalism, making every human initiative either empty
or counterproductive? Moreover, if human beings do not have final control over
their decisions and actions, how can they be considered responsible for their
deeds and rewarded or punished for these deeds in the divine hereafter? And
more important, what about the evil done by humankind? Is God to be blamed
for this? Or, in the phrasing of the theodicy, how can the idea of a good God
be reconciled with the evil in the world? As a solution to these theological rid-
dles, Christian philosophers and theologians created the concept of free will.
In this earthly life, humans are free to choose between good and evil; in the
afterlife, however, their deeds will be weighed on the divine scales and humans
will be rewarded or punished for their choices and actions. In this way, the
accountability for evil is transferred from the divine to the human level. In his
cynical association of free will with a “theological masterpiece,” Nietzsche
touches upon a problematic theological discussion.
Nietzsche thus opposes to the idea of free will because it creates a deceptive
dichotomy between agent and act, based on our grammatical differentiation
between subject and object, and it is designed for justifying the Christian doctrine
of ultimate judgment in the afterlife and for reconciling the idea of a good God
with the evil done in the world. Nietzsche’s ardent rejection of free will allows
46 NELGRILLAERT
us to conclude that his account of free will does not correspond to the libertar-
ian view. Can he be called a no-freedom theorist then? Or does he after all endorse
the compatibilist idea?
2. Nietzsche’s Dismissal of No-Freedom Theories
On the basis of Nietzsche’s denial of free will, one might suspect that he is—
in the light of the contemporary debate on this issue—a “diehard determinist”
or a no-freedom theorist. But before drawing the conclusion that Nietzsche
actually is a determinist, it is necessary to define in a preliminary and general
manner what determinism is. Determinism is the overall philosophical term for
several theories that share the belief that for every event there is a condition
that necessarily causes the event and excludes all alternative manifestations of
this event. If the determining condition occurs, then necessarily the determined
event takes place.7
Does Nietzsche subscribe to the general deterministic doctrine that an event
is the inevitable effect of a particular condition or cause and that the event is
bound to occur in a specific way and can under no circumstances be prevented?
In aphorism 21 of Jenseits von Gut und Böse,Nietzsche strikes out at the notion
of a causa sui as the underlying principle of the conception of free will. The
“reversal” of free will, however—that is, the concept of an “unfree will”
(“unfreier Wille”)—should likewise “be erased from our minds” (KSA5.5). In
Nietzsche’s view, the belief in an unfree will, that is, determinism, finds its ori-
gin in a wrong comprehension of cause and effect. In the tradition of natural sci-
ence, the concepts of cause and effect, which are initially conventional
communicative instruments, are transposed from the purely communicative to
the explanatory level. An event’s occurrence is explained by so-called “causal
connections,” “necessity,” “the effect of a cause,” etc., while these are in fact
artificial constructions (KSA 5.35–36). On the basis of the observation that a
regularly and measurably follows b,natural scientists and determinists have con-
cluded that a in all circumstances necessarily follows b. Nietzsche contends,
however, that “the mechanical necessity is not a fact [...] but an interpretation”
(KSA12.384). The course of all being, all events, cannot be put in some kind of
formula or law. Nietzsche particularly targets physical or scientific determin-
ism: “One ought not to make ‘cause’and ‘effect’into material things,as natu-
ral scientists do (and those who, like them, naturalise in their thinking—), in
accordance with the prevailing mechanistic stupidity which has the cause press
and push until it ‘produces an effect’” (KSA5.35).8 The concept of an “unfree
will” is “mythological”: in reality it is only a matter of “strong and weak wills”
(KSA5.36). The problem of determinism and free will is here reduced to a mere
gradual differentiation between strong and weak wills.9
DETERMININGONE’SFATE: 47
With the same pertinacity that he refutes the concept of free will, Nietzsche
undermines the idea of determinism. The supposition that the world can be con-
ceived of in mechanistic terms of cause and effect, that an event inevitably pro-
ceeds from an invariable cause, is as fictional as the assumption that the subject,
independently from external events, causes an act. Nietzsche is thereby neither
a libertarian nor a no-freedom theorist: “I laugh at your free will, and your unfree
will as well” (KSA10.348).
The question arises now whether Nietzsche’s account of determinism and free
will can be called compatibilist.
3. Nietzsche’s Brand of Compatibilism
In Section 1, I analyzed Nietzsche’s criticism of the idea of free will. In some
contexts, however, Nietzsche gives a positive connotation to the notion of free
will. Since he uses in both cases literally the same words (“Willensfreiheit,
Freiheit des Willens, freier Wille”), a mere lexicological study would not explain
Nietzsche’s ambivalence on this topic. In what way, then, should the positive
manifestations of free will be comprehended and distinguished from the nega-
tive? How is this ambiguity to be solved?
An analysis of the contexts in which free will is rendered a positive conno-
tation should already give a first indication of Nietzsche’s positive account of
free will. In the preface to Menschliches, Allzumenschliches,the “will to free
will” is considered the first outbreak of power, the will to self-determination
(“Selbstbestimmung”), and the autonomous creation of values (“Selbst-
Werthsetzung”)—all necessary conditions for breaking free from the traditional
morals and becoming a free spirit (“Freigeist”)—(KSA 2.16–17). In another
fragment, self-determination is again explained by and equated with “freedom
of the will,” and both are again defined as qualities of a free spirit (KSA3.83).
In a fragment in the Nachlass, free will is “the feature of the higher humankind”
(KSA 9.628). In Nietzsche’s conception, free will is equal to self-determina-
tion, to the autonomous determination and creation of one’s own values. It is
not some kind of metaphysical faculty that humans are a prioriendowed with;
it is rather an opportunity that has to be shaped and elaborated in a process of
determining oneself.
We now have a first hint of Nietzsche’s positive understanding of free will:
freedom of will means to possess the power to determine oneself. This might
seem paradoxical at face value, for does not the concept of determination, even
when it is only applied to one self, exclude free will? In what way are both
concepts compatible in Nietzsche’s philosophy?
Nietzsche already touched upon this problem in two juvenile essays, “Fatum
und Geschichte” (BAW 2.54–59) and “Willensfreiheit und Fatum” (BAW
2.60–62).10 These papers—dated April (Easter holidays) 1862—are considered
48 NELGRILLAERT
to be the first outbreak of Nietzsche’s philosophical potential (Janz 1978, 1:98)
and it seems as though his assessment of the ramifications of his thoughts fright-
ened the seventeen-year-old scholar (Safranski 2000: 26). The atmosphere of
both essays is rather dark and threatening: the metaphor of the infinite ocean,
on which Nietzsche floats without a compass and is threatened by storms, is a
returning motive in both papers.
An analysis of these papers will clarify Nietzsche’s concept of self-determi-
nation in accordance with the notion of free will, and will thereby explain what
we might call Nietzsche’s compatibilism.
As the titles indicate, the young Nietzsche analyzes the relationship between
human history and fate, on the one hand, and free will and fate, on the other
hand, two discussions that essentially deal with the same question: Is the course
of history the result of fate or rather the product of human purposes and actions?
Nietzsche participates here in a traditional philosophical and historical debate
that investigates whether events resort to fate—providence, destiny—or to the
human will. Kane identifies the notion of fate as the first of determinist doc-
trines that threatens the concept of free will (Kane 1996: 5). Already ancient
thinkers noticed a necessity or inevitability in what occurs and tried to discover
to what extent this interfered in the history of humankind.11 Traditionally, fate
is conceived either as an impersonal cosmic energy or as a divine omniscient
force that predestines human life and intervenes in it. In both conceptions, fate
is considered a transcendent force that brings about events in a way that lies
beyond the realm of purely causal or mechanistic laws; rather, it is a precondi-
tion to these laws.
Nietzsche’s conception of fate in “Fatum und Geschichte”and “Willensfreiheit
und Fatum” deviates from the common notions of fate. Areading of both essays
reveals Nietzsche’s ardent defense of free will against any type of determination
in general and the specific notion of fate in particular. It is remarkable, however,
that Nietzsche seems to conjoin different kinds of determinism together to the
one concept of fate, as if he conceives of various determining principles (educa-
tion, environment, etc.) as merely gradual differences of the overall concept of
fate. In Nietzsche’s random list of determining elements, we can detect traces
from various deterministic theories. Nietzsche mainly claims that humans are
determined by the impressions of their childhood, the influence of parents, edu-
cation, relationships, and environment (BAW2:54, 55, 58), a conception that can
be defined as psychological determinism.Another determining principle put for-
ward is “a fatalistic structure of skull and spine” (BAW2:58), which can to some
extent be related to the opinion held by physical deterministsthat human action
is subject to laws of nature and restricted by biological conditioners. Finally, the
young Nietzsche assumes a kind of preexistent condition of the soul (BAW2:61),
an opinion that echoes vaguely the view held by theological deterministsthat the
human soul is predestined. The various factors the young Nietzsche mentions as
DETERMININGONE’SFATE: 49
conditioning human behavior and constraining free will all flow together in his
conception of fate. In his view, fate is thus not merely a transcendent power, as
in most fatalistic doctrines, but an amalgam of diverse determining aspects.
Hence, Nietzsche acknowledges that humans are determined. His main
attempt is now to assure humans’free will against the background of the then-
growing faith in natural science and the related belief in mechanistic determina-
tion. In the line of idealistic philosophy, the young Nietzsche contends that the
mere act of reflecting and reasoning on free will is already evidence of humans’
free will (Safranski 2000: 27). For Nietzsche, free will is equal to the human spirit
(“der Geist”) (BAW 2:54, 59) and temperament (“das Temperament”) (BAW
2:54, 57, 58), the latter most probably meaning character or personality. By
defending free will against fate, Nietzsche aims to guarantee the individual’s
autonomy, despite his determined nature.
The first paragraphs of “Fatum und Geschichte” deal essentially with the bale-
ful influence Christian morality has had upon humankind since the earliest
beginnings, a topic that will become a central motive in Nietzsche’s later works.
Liberating man from this Christian authority is a hard and lifelong task (BAW
2:54), which in the end can only be completed by natural science and history
(BAW2:54–55). This might seem a peculiar statement at face value, but in the
course of the essay it becomes clear why Nietzsche esteems these sciences so
highly as the only certain ground, “upon which we can build the tower of our
speculation” (BAW2:55).
Everything moves in enormous, ever amplifying circles around one another; man
is one of the most inner circles. If he wants to estimate the oscillations of the outer
[circles], he should abstract from himself and from the nearest wider circles on
to more extensive ones. These nearest wider [circles] are the history of people,
society and humankind. To find the common centre of all oscillations, the infi-
nitely small circle, is the task of natural science; now we acknowledge, since man
looks for that centre in himself and for himself, what a unique meaning history
and natural science must have for us. (BAW2:57)
In contrast with his later repudiation of materialistic philosophy, the student
Nietzsche expresses here a materialistic and positivistic worldview: the core of
all organic being, out of which man, people, society, and eventually humankind
originate, can only be discovered by natural science. Nietzsche nevertheless
remains vague about the status of this inner core; he merely suggests that it must
be some kind of natural, organic entity. Finding the source of all being is thus the
task of natural science; the purpose of history, on the other hand, is to examine
the circles that spring from and are caused to oscillate by the most inner core:
man, people, society, and humankind. Humans seek the center of all being in
themselves; they perceive and categorize the world on the basis of an anthro-
pocentric worldview, not being able to transcend their own reality and apprehend
the entities beyond their existence. Only great historians and philosopher-prophets
50 NELGRILLAERT
can completely grasp universal history. They alone are capable of abstracting from
the inner circles (man and his nearest surroundings) and continuously moving to
the outer circles (in process of taking more distance from man itself, moving from
people to society and further on to humankind and universal history) (BAW2:57).
When man transcends his circle and is swept along into the circle of world
history, a battle is provoked between the individual will (“Einzelwille”)and the
collective will (“Gesammtwille”) (BAW 2:57): the individual will becomes
endangered by the general, collective will. In Nietzsche’s view, here lies the
basis of the problem that preoccupies him most: for does not man’s mergence
into a collective (people, society, and humankind) reduce or even extinguish his
autonomy? In what way can the individual both retain his free will and submit
to the general will, which in fact restricts the activity of the free will? Or, in
Nietzsche’s words, how can one legitimize the status of the individual to the
people, the people to humankind, and humankind to the world (ibid.)? In this
existential problem lies for Nietzsche the fundamental relationship of fate and
history (ibid.). Fate is the overall concept for everything that determines man
and constrains free will; the purpose of history is to abstract itself from man and
to overlook realities beyond human existence, which both condition man and
hinder the autonomy of the individual will. The objects of historical study are
in fact the various determining factors that Nietzsche brings together under the
notion of fate. Hence, Nietzsche depends on history for revealing and investi-
gating the external entities that condition man and limit free will.
Now, to what extent are humans actually determined? Is, for example, our hap-
piness in life the result of events or is it conditioned by our temperament, color-
ing these events? Do not the events provide us merely with the key to our fate,
while the strength or weakness with which these events strike us depends only on
our temperament (BAW2:57–58)? For Nietzsche, temperament is nothing other
than character or nature (“Gemüth”) “upon which the impressions of our rela-
tionships and events have become manifest” (BAW2:58). The human tempera-
ment, which conceives of and responds to reality for each individual in a unique
way, is thereby in turn conditioned and shaped by external impressions. We have
been, although unconsciously, influenced in our innermost being, but we lack the
strength to react against it or even to acknowledge this influence (ibid.).
If humans would be able to overthrow world history by their strong will
(and thus completely free themselves from all determining factors), they
would become like independent gods and consequently world history would
be nothing more than “a reverie” (ein träumerisch Selbstentrücktsein”) (BAW
2:58). Here, the young Nietzsche introduces in his discourse a specific simile
that he will later apply to the concept of the Übermensch (BAW2:59). I will
analyze this figurative correspondence below.
Finally, Nietzsche seizes upon the essence of the relationship between
fate and free will and elaborates a first stage of his compatibilist theory that
DETERMININGONE’SFATE: 51
he will develop further in “Willensfreiheit und Fatum.” In his view, free will is
“unchained,” “self-willed,” the “infinitely free, wandering, the spirit” (BAW
2:59). Fate, on the other hand, is a necessity; it is the eternal force of resistance,
of opposition against free will (ibid.). Fate and free will are two opposing, anti-
thetical forces whose specific significance and characteristic lies precisely in
this opposition. For like the notion of the spirit is inconceivable without the idea
of reality, like the concept of good cannot be separated from evil, free will is
unthinkable without fate “because only the contrast creates the quality” (ibid.).
Nietzsche’s refusal to give up the notion of free will and accept fate as the only
true principle seems to be motivated chiefly by moral considerations rather than
by philosophical reasoning. In his view, any conception of humankind that
excludes free will and thereby reduces humans to a mere plaything of unknown
forces and releases them from responsibility for their actions is morally unac-
ceptable (ibid.). He wants to rescue human beings from a fatalistic worldview.
For lack of empirical or philosophical arguments to sustain his rather intuitive
faith in free will, the young Nietzsche resorts to a hypothetical argumentation:
“Maybe, in similar manner, like the spirit can only be the infinitely smallest sub-
stance, the good can be only the most subtle development out of evil, free will
is nothing but the highest potency of fate” (ibid.). This assertion seems to con-
tradict and thereby reduce the previous expressed idea that fate and free will are
two antithetical forces. The image of free will that evolves out of fate, that might
even be the highest potency of fate, emphasizes how closely both concepts are
interwoven with each other. The young Nietzsche would disagree with a
philosophy in which the world falls apart in a dualism of determinism and free
will (Safranski 2000: 28). The unity of all being must be indemnified. He
believes, therefore, that there must be higher principles into which all distinc-
tions merge together in a great unity, as if in an enormous ocean (BAW2:59).
What Nietzsche actually means by “higher principles” is not defined; he merely
claims that there should be some higher entity in which all being is consolidated.
Nietzsche thus conceives of fate and free will as two counterbalancing forces
that complement each other in a dialectical process of opposition.
In the second essay, “Willensfreiheit und Fatum,” Nietzsche further elaborates
on the problem of free will and fate. Freedom of will is equated with freedom
of thought (“Gedankenfreiheit”) (BAW2:60).12Free will is therefore in a sim-
ilar way limited as is freedom of thought: just as thoughts can enlarge and rein-
force up to the limits determined by the specific structure of the brain, free will
is capable of increase up to the same extent (ibid.). Free will is thereby in the
end restricted by a purely physical faculty. Nietzsche does not develop this idea
at length, he merely claims that the capacity “to put the will to work” is fatalis-
tically dispensed to us (ibid.). The activity of the will is limited, but this
does not imply that fate is the dominating force. On the contrary, on the level of
