Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea's best interest. September/October 2017 PF ...

368 Pages·2017·1.29 MB·English

Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is
in South Korea’s best interest.
September/October 2017 PF Brief*
*PublishedbyVictoryBriefs,POBox803338#40503,Chicago,IL60680-3338. EditedbyJami
Tanner. Contributions by Matt Salah, Alex Chin, Annie Zhao, Austin Hopkins, and Abe
Fraifeld. Forcustomersupport,[email protected].
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Contents
1 TopicAnalysisbyMattSalah 5
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Whosemissiledefense? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.2 Whichmissiledefense? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.3 Howmuchmissiledefense? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 ProArguments/Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 SafetyfromNorthKorea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.2 TheUS-ROKAlliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 ConArguments/Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.1 ChineseBacklash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.2 AngeringNorthKorea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2 ArgumentGuidesbyAustinHopkins 19
2.1 ArgumentGuide1: THAADcanprotectSouthKoreafrommissiles. . . 19
2.1.1 THAADhasahighlikelihoodofinterceptingmissiles . . . . . . 19
2.1.2 Responsesto“THAADhasahighlikelihoodofinterceptingmis-
siles” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1.3 Defenseof“THAADhasahighlikelihoodofinterceptingmissiles” 24
2.2 ArgumentGuide2: THAADUpsetsChina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.1 THAADupsetsChina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.2 Responsesto“THAADUpsetsChina” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.3 Defenseof“THAADUpsetsChina” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3 ArgumentGuide3: Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.1 China’sunofficialsanctionshavehurttheSouthKoreaneconomy 36
2.3.2 Responses to “China’s unofficial sanctions have hurt the South
Koreaneconomy” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.3 ChineserelationsarekeytoNorthKoreansanctions. . . . . . . . 39
2.3.4 Responsesto“ChineserelationsarekeytoNorthKoreansanctions” 41
2
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Contents
2.3.5 Defenseof“ChineserelationsarekeytoNorthKoreansanctions” 43
2.4 ArgumentGuide4: THAADasabargainingchip . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4.1 THAADcanbeaneffectivebargainingchip . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4.2 Responseto“THAADcanbeaneffectivebargainingchip” . . . . 46
2.4.3 Defenseof“THAADcanbeaneffectivebargainingchip” . . . . 47
3 ProEvidence 51
3.1 NorthKorea/SouthKoreaConflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1.1 Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1.2 SouthKorea’sInterests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.1.3 THAADProtectsSouthKorea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.1.4 SouthKorea’sInterests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.1.5 THAADDetersNorthKoreanAttacksonSouthKorea . . . . . . 71
3.1.6 NorthKoreanNuclearWeaponsPoseaSeriousThreat . . . . . . 75
3.1.7 NorthKoreanCollapse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.1.8 SafetyfromNorthKorea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.1.9 OtherAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
3.2 US-SouthKoreaAlliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.2.1 US-SouthKoreaRelations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.2.2 SouthKoreannuclearization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
3.3 PreemptiveStrike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
3.3.1 StrategicPatience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
3.3.2 THAADEnablesFirstStrike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
3.4 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
3.4.1 ChinaPrecedent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
3.4.2 ChineseNuclearization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
3.5 Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
3.5.1 JapaneseMilitarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
3.5.2 JapanNuclearization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
3.6 OtherImpacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
3.6.1 MilitaryIndustrialComplex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
3.6.2 EnvironmentalHarm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
3.6.3 ArmsRaces(General) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
4 ConEvidence 238
4.1 MissileDefenseDoesn’tDefendSouthKorea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
4.1.1 NorealisticmissilesystemcandefendSouthKorea . . . . . . . . 238
3
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Contents
4.1.2 THAADDoesn’tWorktoProtectSouthKorea . . . . . . . . . . . 241
4.1.3 MissileDefenseHasWeakTheoreticalBacking . . . . . . . . . . . 244
4.1.4 MissileDefenseEncouragesTheDevelopmentofCountermeasures246
4.1.5 Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
4.2 UnitedStates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
4.2.1 PreemptiveStrikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
4.2.2 OnSite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
4.2.3 MilitarismLinks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
4.2.4 Militarismimpacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
4.2.5 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
4.2.6 ChineseArmsRace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
4.2.7 ChineseEconomicSanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
4.2.8 ChineseSanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
4.2.9 Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
4.3 MissileDefenseCausesArmsRaces(VariousCountries) . . . . . . . . . 321
4.3.1 NorthKorea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
4.3.2 Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
4.3.3 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
4.3.4 Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
4.4 SouthKoreanPublicOpinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
4.4.1 PeopleofSKdon’twantTHAAD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
4.4.2 Protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
4.5 OtherImpacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
4.5.1 RussiaChinaAlliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
4.5.2 SpaceMilitarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
4.5.3 EnvironmentalImpacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
4
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1 Topic Analysis by Matt Salah
Matt Salah debated for four years at the Nueva High School in San Mateo,
California. Asamemberofthefirstgraduatingclassofhishighschool,Matt
played a large role in founding and establishing the debate team at Nueva.
Some of his most notable accomplishments include championing the Tour-
nament of Champions (2017), the ASU Invitational (2017), and the Bronx
ScienceTournament(2015). HewillbeginschoolatSwarthmorecollegethis
fall,whereheplanstostudypoliticalscience.
1.1 Background
The2017September-OctoberPublicForumresolutionisshockinglyrelevant. Sincethe
beginning of the summer, North Korea has launched four missile tests (including two
intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs), developed the capacity to strike most of
the continental United States, and threatened to attack the US military base in Guam
(onlytolaterwithdrawalthethreat),SouthKoreahashalteddeploymentandlaterrede-
ployedthecontroversialanti-missilesystemknownasTHAAD,andTrumphassworn
to make North Korea sorry by bringing down “fire and fury.” Major news networks
have aired round-the-clock coverage of the Korean threat, journalists have compared
thesituationtotheCubanMissileCrisis,andJohnOliverwovetogetheraninformative
expose of Kim Jong Un’s motivations (follow the footnote to find the video, it’s a fun
waytostartthinkingaboutthetopic).1
Howdidwegethere? BBCNewsoffersaninsightfulchronologyoftheNorthKorean
threat(I’monlyincludingsnippets—followthefootnotebelowtoreadthefulltimeline):
1946-NorthKorea’sCommunistParty,calledtheKoreanWorkers’Party,in-
augurated. Soviet-backedleadershipinstalled,includingRedArmy-trained
1LastWeekTonight. “NorthKorea: LastWeekTonightwithJohnOliver(HBO),”YouTube. 8-13-2017,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrS0uNBuG9c
5
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1 TopicAnalysisbyMattSalah
KimIl-sung.
1950 - South declares independence, sparking North Korean invasion and
theKoreanWar.
1953-ArmisticeendsKoreanWar.
1972-NorthandSouthKoreaissuejointstatementonpeacefulreunification.
1985-NorthKoreajoinstheinternationalNuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty,
barringthecountryfromproducingnuclearweapons.
1993 - International Atomic Energy Agency accuses North Korea of violat-
ingtheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatyanddemandsinspectorsbegiven
accesstonuclearwastestoragesites. NorthKoreathreatenstoquitTreaty.
1994 October - North Korea and the US sign an Agreed Framework under
whichPyongyangcommitstofreezingitsnuclearprogrammeinreturnfor
heavyfueloilandtwolight-waternuclearreactors.
1996April-NorthKoreaannouncesitwillnolongerabidebythearmistice
thatendedtheKoreanWar, andsendsthousandsoftroopsintothedemili-
tarisedzone.
1998August -North Korea fires a multistage long-range rocket which flies
overJapanandlandsinthePacificOcean,wellbeyondNorthKorea’sknown
capability.
2000 June - Landmark inter-Korean summit takes place in Pyongyang be-
tween Kim Jong-il and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, paving the
way for the reopening of border liaison offices and family reunions. The
Southalsograntsamnestytoover3,500NorthKoreanprisoners.
2003January-NorthKoreawithdrawsfromtheNuclearNon-Proliferation
Treaty,markingthebeginningofaseriesofsix-partytalksinvolvingChina,
theKoreas,theUS,JapanandRussiatotrytoresolvethenuclearissue.
2006 October - North Korea conducts its first nuclear weapons test at an
undergroundfacility. TheUNimposeseconomicandcommercialsanctions
onNorthKorea.
2007July-NorthKoreashutsdownitmainYongbyonreactorafterreceiving
50,000tonsofheavyfueloilaspartofanaidpackage.
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1 TopicAnalysisbyMattSalah
2009May-NorthKoreacarriesoutitssecondundergroundnucleartest. UN
SecurityCouncilcondemnsmoveinJune.
2011December-DeathofKimJong-il. KimJong-unpresidesatfuneraland
takesoverkeypostsbyApril.
2013 February - UN approves fresh sanctions after North Korea stages its
thirdnucleartest,saidtobemorepowerfulthanthe2009test.
2016November-UNSecurityCouncilfurthertightenssanctionsbyaiming
tocutoneofNorthKorea’smainexports,coal,by60percent.
2017 July - Pyongyang test fires a long-range missile into the Sea of Japan,
withsomeexpertsstatingthemissilecouldpotentiallyreachAlaska.
2017 August - Tension rises in war of words with US over North Korean
threattofireballisticmissilesnearUSPacificterritoryofGuam.2
While this timeline is far from all-encompassing, it demonstrates the trajectory of the
NorthKoreanthreat: whileattemptstoreducethethreatandmendrelationshavesuc-
ceededinisolatedinstancesinthepast,thosesuccesseshaveshort-livedandthethreat
hascontinuedtogrow.
One response to North Korea that isn’t mentioned in the BBC’s chronology is the mili-
tarydecisiontodeployanti-missilesystemstodefendSouthKorea—thesubjectofthe
September/October resolution. The basic objective of missile defense is both to deter
missiles(nuclearorotherwise)frombeinglaunchedinthefirstplaceandtoshootdown
missiles in the case that they are fired. Each anti-missile system uses a slightly differ-
ent mechanism to destroy missiles and is designed to counter different range missiles
(short, medium, intermediate, or intercontinental). Most missile defense systems also
includeextensiveradarsnetworkstodetectincomingprojectiles. Intheframeworksec-
tionbelowIdiscussthespecificsofthepertinentanti-missilesystems,buttheapproach
generallyconsistent: preventenemymissilesfromhittingtheirtargets. Theresolution
isaskingifthatresponsetotheNorthKoreanthreatisgoodforSouthKorea.
2BBC News. “North Korea profile,” BBC News. 8-17-2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-
15278612
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1 TopicAnalysisbyMattSalah
1.2 Framework
1.2.1 Whosemissiledefense?
This resolution, like many recent public forum resolutions, is vague enough to give
rise to a variety of framework debates. One of the first questions that comes to mind
is who’s deploying the missile defense? Nothing in the resolution specifies that South
Korea is the country deploying the anti-missile systems, which may lead many teams
to get creative and advocate for or condemn Japanese or even Iranian missile defense.
WhileIthinkthisinterpretationoftheresolutionisgrammaticallyvalid,Iwouldcaution
teamsagainstthisapproachforanumberofreasons.
First, I think the wording of the resolution strongly implies that teams should be dis-
cussingSouthKoreanmissiledefensebecauseit’smostdirectlyconnectedtoSouthKo-
rea’s best interests. For example, most people would agree the resolution “eating an
appleisinmybestinterest”indicatesthatwearedebatingwhetherornotIshouldeat
anapple. Moreover,itseemssillytodebatewhetheradecisioncompletelyoutofSouth
Korea’scontrol(suchaswhetherornotChinadeploysmissiledefense)isintheirbestin-
terest. Second,evenifunderthisresolutionwecoulddebateglobalanti-missilesystems,
I think debaters need very good justifications for why we should. Absent this justifi-
cation, it seems most sensible to default to a discussion of South Korean anti-missile
systems. It’s also unclear that specific examples prove the resolution true in the gen-
eral sense. This is especially true for the negative, as the affirmative can simply argue
theydon’thavetodefendbadexamplesofmissiledefense. Finally,thereiscompelling
evidencethattheframersintendedthistopictobecenteredaroundSouthKoreanmis-
sile defense. Many members of the topic committee even went as far as to detail their
thoughtprocesswhencomingupwiththeresolutiononalengthyFacebookthread.
Soinconclusion,Ithinkmostdebateswillandshouldbecenteredaroundanti-missile
systemsthatSouthKoreadeploys,butdebatersshouldbepreparedtoanswerarguments
(withframeworkorsubstance)aboutothercountries’missiledefense.
1.2.2 Whichmissiledefense?
SoifwearetalkingaboutSouthKoreananti-missilesystems,whichones? Fortunately,
themostoftheargumentsI’mawareofonthistopicdon’trelyheavilyonspecifictech-
nological details but rather support or criticise missile defense in general. That said,
8
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1 TopicAnalysisbyMattSalah
it is very important that debaters have a basic knowledge of the types of anti-missile
systemsthataffectSouthKorea’snationalsecurity.
Whilethereareavarietyofanti-missilesystemsthatdefendSouthKorea,mostdebates
will center around the deployment of the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense(THAAD)system. IbelievethatTHAADwillbethefocusbecauseitcontinue
tobeahot-buttonissue(aGooglesearchofSouthKoreanmissiledefenserevealspages
and pages of results about THAAD) and because we are in the midst of THAAD’s de-
ployment, while other anti-missile systems have existed for many years or will not be
feasible until far into the future. Callum Paton at Newsweek provides a detailed sum-
maryofTHAAD’spurposeandcapabilities:
Developed by the U.S. the THAAD is a land-based anti-ballistic missile
system that is capable of shooting down missiles inside or just beyond
the earth’s atmosphere.The Missile Defense Agency that oversees the
development of THAAD states the weapon system can intercept and
destroy ballistic missiles at any trajectory in their flight, either in the final,
or terminal, phase as they move towards their target. The THAAD uses
kinetic energy, instead of carrying an explosive component, to destroy
incoming warheads. Yvonne Chiu, an expert on military policy, told
CNN that because the THAAD interceptors do not carry a warhead and
destroy missiles by colliding with them, they are “potentially safer” and
lesslikelytocauseanuclearexplosion. “Ifyouhitanuclearballisticmissile
with a missile with no warhead, it would hopefully not cause a nuclear
explosion,”shesaid. Similarly,thehigh-altitudeinterceptcapabilitylessens
the effects of weapons of mass destruction before they reach the ground.
The anti-ballistic launcher is truck mounted and carries eight reloadable
interceptors. Its radar is the largest air transportable high-frequency radar
in the world, according to the Missile Defense Agency. Developed by the
primary contractor Lockheed Martin, the THAAD was first proposed as
a response to the threat of Scud missile attacks by the Iraqi armed forces
during the First Gulf War in 1991. The U.S. first deployed the anti-missile
systemin2009inHawaiitocounterthethreatofaNorthKoreanattack.3
However, THAAD is not the only missile defense system that might be discussed in
rounds. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, used by the US Navy to shoot
3CallumPaton.SouthKoreaissettodeploytheTHAADmissiledefensesystem:Whatisit?,”Newsweek.
4-26-2017,http://www.newsweek.com/thaad-missile-system-south-korea-590197
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1 TopicAnalysisbyMattSalah
down intermediate-range ballistic missiles, is also likely to come up as the US has a
largenavalpresencenearSouthKorea. Similarly,KM-SAM(alsoknownasCheolmae-
2, Cheongung or M-SAM) is an indigenous system (developed locally in South Korea)
designed to counter medium-range missiles. Finally, Korea Air and Missile Defense
(KAMD) has announced plans to create a more extensive and integrated indigenous
anti-missile system, and while those plans have been complicated by the deployment
ofTHAAD,theyarepotentiallystillreasonablegroundfordebate.
1.2.3 Howmuchmissiledefense?
Thefinalandperhapsmostunclearframeworkissue: whatdotheaffirmativeandneg-
ative worlds look like? As has been a trend with recent resolutions, the framers seem
to want debaters to answer the question as a normative statement: does this trend of
missiledefensedeploymentsmakeSouthKoreabetteroff? Inmyopiniontheproblem
withthistypeofresolutionisthatwithoutaclearly-delineatedpolicyaction,itquickly
becomesdifficulttoknowforcertainwhatchangesoccurwhenyouaffirm(ornegate).
Andwithoutthatknowledge,it’snearlyimpossibletoprovetheresolutiontrueorfalse.
For this resolution, I think there are two potential approaches to this topic. The first
(andlikelymorecommonapproach)istoequatetheaffirmativewithaspecificmissile
defense system (usually THAAD). Under this framework, affirming deploys THAAD
(or potentially some other system) while negating halts THAAD’s deployment. In the
case of THAAD, the affirmative appears to be the status-quo, while with other anti-
missile systems the negative is likely to be the status-quo. The second approach is
to significantly broaden the topic and ask if South Korea would be better off with or
without missile defense as a whole. Under this framework, the negative criticises all
anti-missilesystemsandisthusaradicaldeparturefromthestatus-quo,whiletheaffir-
mativesupportsthecontinuedexistence(andperhapsexpansion)ofmissiledefensein
SouthKorea.
Ibelievetheseapproachesareequallyvalid—thefirstoneleadstoamoreclear-cutde-
bate while the second one perhaps answers the entire resolution more completely. In
somecases,thisframingquestioncanmakeorbreakanargument,andothertimesitis
relativelyinconsequential. Regardless,debatersshouldbepreparedtoengageinthese
highlydivergentinterpretationsoftheresolution,andshouldcometotournamentspre-
paredtodefendtheirframework.
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