Table Of ContentDEMOCRACY, EAST AND WEST
Democracy finds itself in rather quizzical circumstances in our time. In
the United Nations, anti-Western blocks of nations are using vener
able Western parliamentary institutions. to subvert the perceived
interests of Western democracies. In the military sphere, on the other
hand, these Western democracies, perceiving communism as a mortal
enemy, are propping up brutal or corrupt dictators who happen to be
anti-communist, or supporting the subversion of Marxist governments
which happen to be supported by the majority of their citizenry. But
then again, many Marxist governments, aiming for the demo
cratic-egalitarian ideal of a classless society and control by workers of
their own lives, find themselves perpetuating new species of class
privileges and quashing legitimate workers' movements.
Obviously democracy, which during the eighteenth-century
Enlightenment seemed to offer a much-desired escape from arbitrary
class structures and oppressive governments, has not proven to be a
sure formula or simple solution. An awareness of the true complexities
of democracy requires an understanding of a perennial dialectic
residing at the heart of democracy, and manifesting itself in specific
dialectical relationships: between elitism and populism, liberty and
equality, smallness and bigness, religion and secular life, politics and
economics, etc. Such dialectical relationships, originally most explicit
in particular nations, are now becoming unmistakably manifest in
international relations.
An awareness of this larger dialectic, in which the 'Western',
'communist', and 'third-world' blocs are all unavoidably involved at
present, supplies an important prerequisite for the consideration of
specific ideological problems arising out of current impasses. For
example, should the Western democracies disband the current United
Nations organisation and reestablish an organisation whose member
ship would be limited to liberal democracies? Since nuclear annihila
tion threatens the continued existence of all nations, is it not
imperative to accept any plan with high probability for halting the arms
race, even if this requires 'non-democratic' measures? And in view of
all the problems apparently endemic in democracy, is it still justified to
subscribe to democracy as 'the last best hope' of mankind?
Dr Howard P. Kainz is a Professor of Philosophy at Marquette
University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and specialises in German philo
sophy, political philosophy and philosophical anthropology. His
previous books are Hegel's Philosophy ofR ight, with Marx's Commen
tary, The Unbinding of Prometheus, Ethica Dialectica, The Philo
sophy of Man and Hegel's Phenomenology Parts I and II. He was a
National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow in 1977-78 and a
Fulbright Fellow in Germany in 1981-82.
DEMOCRACY
EAST AND WEST
A Philosophical
Overview
Howard P. Kainz
M
MACMILLAN
ISBN 978-1-349-17598-7 ISBN 978-1-349-17596-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-17596-3
© Howard P. Kainz 1984
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1984978-0-333-37022-3
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission
First published 1984 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
Typeset by
Wessex Typesetters Ltd
Frome, Somerset
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Kainz, Howard P.
Democracy, east and west.
I. Title
321.8'01 JC423
Contents
Acknowledgements vi
Introduction: Democracy and Political Philosophy 1
1 Towards a Definition of Democracy 13
2 Equality 24
3 Equality vs. Liberty? 36
4 Fraternity? - An Inquiry 52
5 Majority Rule and the 'Voter's Paradox' 61
6 The Two-Party System: Some Qualified Advantages 73
7 The Economics of Democracy 80
8 Religion in"'a Democracy 96
9 The Future of Democracy in the International Sphere 108
10 Is Democracy the Best Form of Government? 125
Bibliography 138
Subject Index 142
Author Index 146
v
Acknowledgements
A Marquette University Summer Faculty Fellowship in 1974 gave me
the opportunity for initial research on this book. I received some very
useful critiques of earlier versions of the book from my colleagues in
philosophy, Bill Starr and the late Thomas Davitt, S. J. The final
version was read and critiqued by Wayne Wheeler of the Department
of Political Science at Marquette and by Jim Dougherty of the
Department of Politics at St Joseph's College in Philadelphia, indexed
by A. J. Thomas of Des Plaines, Illinois, and proofread by Brad
Wronsky, a Marquette University graduate fellow. For the imperfec
tions still remaining after all this much-appreciated expert assistance, I
assume full responsibility.
VI
Introduction: Democracy
and Political Philosophy
The purpose of this book is to re-examine some of the pivotal concepts
considered essential to, or frequently associated with, democracy, and
the way in which these concepts are applied in contemporary political
systems. However, when we consider the various contenders in the
worldwide pursuit of democratic orthodoxy, it becomes immediately
obvious that the term, 'democracy', is being used to describe almost
every species of political system now prevalent except for an out-and
out non-socialist dictatorship. Thus we must be aware at the outset of
the danger of developing a definition of democracy so diluted that it
becomes meaningless.
American democracy, one of the largest and most committed
democratic systems, can at least offer us a convenient starting point (if
not the paradigm that it claims to offer) for our consideration of
modern, 'Western', liberal democracy. The latter political form is
sometimes described, and possibly idealised, as a form of government
which prides itself on its recognition of, and commitment to, individual
freedoms and personal property rights. Whether or not in practice it
really champions these values, at least in such a way as not to
compromise other values and principles to which it is equally
committed, is another question - which we will also take up. But we
must not ignore the fact that there are other paradigms, besides what
Americans might call 'liberal' democracies, and many other claimants
to the title of 'democratic'. And so, while returning frequently to the
situations and problemat ics in the American model, I will also consider
European, Israeli, and Marxist versions of democracy, and even
investigate whether (per impossible) they might possibly have certain
things in common.
But to compare the American model of democracy with other
models will be a formidable undertaking, should we wish to bring in to
the reckoning certain commonly held American ideological 'givens'.
For among political scientists nowadays, it is generally accepted that
1
2 Democracy, East and West
American 'political philosophy' is almost an 'extinct species' in our
intellectual milieu, although we sometimes try to delude ourselves that
we have a viable political philosophy. For example, Daniel Boorstin
observes that 'no nation has ever believed more firmly than America
that its political life was based on a perfect theory. ' .. and yet no nation
has ever been less interested in political philosophy or produced less in
the way of theory'.1 Boorstin believes there would be a fundamental
inconsistency in our asking any other country to adopt our philosophy
of government because purely and simply we 'have no philosophy
which can be exported'. Robert Dahl, whose Preface to Democratic
Theory has had an important impact on political thought in the last
couple of decades, concurs in Boorstin's indictment: 'There is. no
democratic theory,' Dahl tells us, 'only democratic theories' a
,2
pluralistic mass of conflicting ideological claims or nostrums, none of
which can be taken to portray democracy absolutely. Neal Riemer inA
Revival of Democratic Theory includes an extensive survey of current
consensus in political science - the opinions of thinkers such as Hans
Morganthau and Leo Strauss - to the effect that what is called 'political
theory' in the democratic tradition now simply amounts to an account
of past thought ('classical' political theories) and has altogether
abandoned what used to be considered the central question in political
philosophy: 'what is the best political order?'3 He traces this unconcern
for theory to the negative overreaction in the democratic 'West' to the
exaggerated emphasis on highly systematised theories found in
totalitarian political systems. Arnold Brecht sees this generally
antagonistic attitude towards political theory as particularly a
twentieth-century development, and ascribes the trend to the general
upsurge in the use and prestige of the supposedly axiologically neutral
and philosophically 'unprejudiced' 'scientific method' in all areas of
thought.4 The political scientist is supposed, namely, to focus on the
actually given facts and quantities in the political sphere, and eschew
'theory-making' in the old-fashioned, classical sense.
Lest we take these samples as indications of a concerted agreement
about the demise of political philosophy proper, however, we must
advert to a definite equivocity from all quarters regarding the precise
meaning of 'political philosophy'. For some, the terms 'political
philosophy' and 'political theory' seem to be rather synonymous, while
others describe a 'political theorist' as a kind of high-level tactician
who mediates between the strict empiricist and the linguistic 'political
philosopher', the latter being one who applies 'linguistic analysis' to
political matters.s Others see political philosophy as the 'normative'
Introduction 3
sub-division of the more all-encompassing 'political theory', which is
supposed to integrate empirical, normative and prudential aspects (the
'is', the 'ought' and the 'science of the possible').6 Many analytic
philosophers understandably enough tend to reserve the term 'politi
cal philosophy' for what they themselves are doing - namely,
subjecting political needs and principles to a straightforward concep
tual and/or linguistic analysis.7 Some analysts, however, such as Rawls
and Nozick, have made noteworthy attempts to rise above these
conventional restrictions, often by a reversion to Kantian norms of
moral rationality.
If we were to concentrate just on the latter, and on political thinkers
outside the analytical tradition, and search for a consensus concerning
the meaning of 'political philosophy', without making any mention of
the term, 'political theory' - we would probably come up with a
'majority opinion' to the effect that political philosophy is legitimately
concerned with the non-empirical, 'normative' aspects of the political
sphere - the 'ought', including moralistic and utopian as well as all
value-oriented political thinking.
It is customary, among those who strive to define more precisely
what is meant by political philosophy as a normative or 'prescriptive'
approach to the study of politics, to contrast this approach with the
strictly empirical or 'descriptive' observation and analysis of political
structures and activities characterizing 'political science' proper. There
is, however, a goodly portion of the weeds of contemporary myth
growing up alongside of the sapling 'reality' of political science, and it
is necessary to distinguish these weeds from the real thing, with a view
to separating the two, once that recognition is accomplished.
In sociology and psychology, as well as in political studies, it has long
been thought that the use of strictly scientific procedures after the
pattern of the physical sciences would provide the key to unlimited
human progress. In the eighteenth century, pathfinders such as
Beccaria and Condorcet tried to develop a mathematically precise and
empirically based science of human organisation and progress, mod
eled after Newton's approach to physics.s In the nineteenth century,
August Comte, Vilfredo Pareto and others, using a more Baconian
model, inaugurated a social science which distanced itself abruptly
from classical political philosophy by insisting on the use of the
methods which were standard in the physical sciences - observation,
experimentation, and systematic logical induction from facts. At the
turn of the century there were attempts to counterbalance static
descriptive studies of institutions with a Darwinian perceptiveness
