Table Of ContentContributions to Political Science
Cristina Dallara
Democracy and
Judicial Reforms
in South-East
Europe
Between the EU and the Legacies of the
Past
Contributions to Political Science
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Cristina Dallara
Democracy and Judicial
Reforms in South-East
Europe
Between the EU and the Legacies of the Past
CristinaDallara
ResearchInstituteonJudicialSystems
NationalResearchCouncil
Bologna,Italy
ISBN978-3-319-04419-4 ISBN978-3-319-04420-0(eBook)
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-04420-0
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Foreword
The present expansion of judicial power in Europe—a worldwide phenomenon
successfully labeled some years ago by Neal Tate and Torbjo¨rn Vallinder as the
“judicialization of politics”—is related not only to long-term social and political
changesbutalsotoaspecificsetofreformsoftheinstitutionalsettingofthejudicial
system carried out in the last decades. In fact, the introduction and diffusion of
constitutional review and the strengthening of judicial independence have
supported the expansion of the role played by courts in the political system.
Thesereformshavetobeunderstoodaspartofageneraltrendtowardstrengthening
citizens’ guarantees against abuses on the part of the political branches: the
executive and the legislative. As a result, an institutional transformation has
followed with the legal dimension of contemporary democracies coming out
enhanced,althoughoftenattheexpenseofitspoliticalcomponent.
This trend has been supported by different groups with different perspectives:
simplifying a much more complex landscape, judicial power is often seen by
neo-liberal (or, better, conservative) groups as a way of introducing a powerful
checkagainstexcessiveStateinterventionintheeconomyandthesociety.Onthe
other hand, also progressive, neo-constitutional circles tend to support powerful
courts,butinthiscasewiththeviewofentrustingthemwiththetaskofenforcinga
wideningsetofsocioeconomicrights.Theseviewpointsreflectthemselvesalsoin
theroleofinternationalpowerfulactors:forinstance,withtheWorldBankseem-
inglymoreinfluencedbytheneo-liberalvisionandtheCouncilofEuropenearerto
the neo-constitutional outlook. However, although with rather different perspec-
tives,allfavorastrongerroleforcourtsinthepoliticalsystem.
ItthereforeshouldnotcomeasasurprisethefactthatalsointheEuropeanUnion
thetrendtowardastrongerjudicialpowerhassurfaced:afterthedecisiontakenin
1993bytheEuropeanCouncilinCopenhagen,therespectfortheruleoflaw—and,
atleastdefacto,themembershipoftheCouncilofEurope—hasbecomeaprereq-
uisiteforaccessiontotheUnion.Inthiscontextreformsofthejudicialorganization
aiming atstrengtheningjudicialindependencehave acquiredanincreasingsignif-
icance. The argument behind the reforms is rather straightforward. Institutional
judicial independence—i.e., all those arrangements aiming at protecting judges
v
vi Foreword
from improper outside pressures—is deemed to be an essential tool for achieving
the “independence on the bench,” in other words genuine judicial impartiality. In
turn,judicialimpartialityisanecessaryconditionfortheestablishmentoftherule
of law: only impartial judges can guarantee a fair application of the law and
therefore the enforcement of the fundamental rights of citizens. Thus, judicial
independence must be considered a necessary part of the implementation of the
ruleoflaw.
TheworkbyCristinaDallaraaimsatanalyzingthisprocessofjudicialreformin
South-EasternEurope,thegeo-politicalareawhereitismorelikelythattheEUwill
expanditselfinthenextfuture.ItconcernssomenewaccessedEUstates(Croatia,
Romania, and Slovenia) as well as a candidate country (Serbia): all have experi-
encedinthepastalongperiodofcommunistrule.Thus,Dallara’analysiscontrib-
utes to the general discussion on institutional reforms in post-authoritarian and
post-totalitarian states. In fact, the cases considered offer a good possibility of
testing the impact of deep institutional reforms on a quite diversified set of
democratizingcountries.Itisthesortofthe“naturalexperiment”pointedouttwo
decades ago by Jon Elster. Its results can provide useful knowledge also for
prospectivenewcandidatemembers,sincetheareaislikelytoprovideinthefuture
morecandidates(Macedonia,Montenegro,oreven Albania).Finally,heranalysis
highlights also important and often neglected new phenomena like the judicial
networks—i.e.,transnationalgroupsoflegalandjudicialactors—thatplayacrucial
roleintheprocessofreformdesign,approval,andimplementation.
Although some of the reforms are still in the course of implementation and
additional time is needed for a comprehensive evaluation, the work of Cristina
Dallara offers already some useful evidence to be taken into account. First of all,
laundrylists—alsoofpotentiallypositivechanges—arenotenough:thecontentof
reformsmustbewellcoordinatedandrelatedtothegoalssought.Forinstance,the
traitsofjudicialindependencemustberelatedtothegoalssought,i.e.,improving
judicialimpartialityand,inthisway,theoverallperformanceofthejudicialsystem.
Therefore, judicial independence should not impair the establishment of effective
checksontheprofessionalqualitiesofjudges.
The analysis by Dallara is also a useful reminder that designing and passing a
lawisnotenough.Implementationisalwayscrucial:theriskofreformsthatremain
whollyorinpartonpaperisalwayshighandespeciallysowhenaimedatradically
overhauling awell-entrenched institutional tradition(inthiscasecharacterizedby
persistent intrusions by politics on the administration of justice). In any case, the
factnottobeforgottenisthatjudicialreformsarenotjustatechnicalissue:theyare
amatterof“highpolitics,”becausecourts—especiallywhenprovidedwithconsti-
tutionalreviewandinstitutionalindependence—cannotbuthaveastrongimpacton
politics.Itfollowsthattheactorsinvolvedintheprocessofreformimplementation
mustalwaysbetakenintoaccount:asDallaraemphasizes,nationalactors(“change
agents”)playacrucialrole.Successfulreformsneedthemobilizationofpowerful
nationalactorsinterestedinindependentandwell-functioningcourts.
Thelastconsiderationsremindusofthecomplexityoftheproblemsinvolved.In
fact,whiletheindispensableroleofnationalchangeagentmustberecognized,the
Foreword vii
factthattheirinterestscouldnotalwayscoincidewiththegoodfunctioningofthe
judicial institutions should also be considered: the risk of corporatist interests
havinganexcessiveroleintheimplementationofjudicialreformis concrete. For
instance,inthecaseofRomania(andverylikelyalsointhatofBulgaria)reforms
havebeen“captured”bysectorsofthejudiciaryinordertoprotecttheirimmediate
interests,oftenattheexpenseofthegoodperformanceofthejudicialsystem.
Atthesametime,weshouldnotforgetthatthenewsignificantroletakenoverby
courtscallforappropriateprofessionalskillsonthepartofthejudges:infact,the
performance of more complex tasks calls for an increasing sophistication of the
cultureofcontemporaryjudges.Thus,itcouldbequestionedwhetherthetraditional
legaltrainingstillcharacterizingmostEuropeanjudgescanbeapttothenewtasks.
The fact that judicial training be increasingly entrusted to judges-controlled insti-
tutionscannotbeconsideredbyitselfsatisfactory.
Apart from these considerations, it remains thatthe present strategy ofjudicial
reformsimpliesamountingroleofnon-electiveinstitutionsthatcannotbepursued
indefinitely.Theproblem ofthe “democraticdeficit”does notregardonly theEU
but also, at least to some extent, independent courts and the political systems in
whichtheyact.Somebalancebetweenthecompetingneedsofpopularsovereignty
andtheruleoflawmustbereached,fornootherreasonsthatcourtscannotbefor
longoutofstepfromtheattitudesprevailinginpoliticalsystemwithouttriggering
strongtensionsandpossible,dangerousbacklash.
Therefore, this book explores in depth the process of judicial reforms and its
implications in some significant transitional countries, providing in this way a
welcome contribution to the analysis of the complex role of institutional reforms
intheprocessofdemocraticconsolidation.
Bologna,Italy CarloGuarnieri
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About This Book
The book analyzes the topic of judicial reforms in four countries of South-East
Europe,focusingontwospecificfactorsthathaveinfluencedthereformsinthepast
twodecades:theroleplayedbytheEuropeanUnioninlightoftheeastEnlargement
process and the legacies of the communist regimes. Specifically, the aim is to
accountforsimilarities anddifferencesinthereformpathsofSlovenia,Romania,
Croatia, and Serbia. In each country, in fact, the influence of the EU policies has
been differently mediated by national factors that, broadly conceived, may be
considered as expressing the legacies of the past regimes. In some cases, these
legacieschallengedjudicialreformsandinhibitedtheinfluenceoftheEU;inother
cases, they were positively overcome by following the route suggested by the
EU. Some explanatory factors for these differences will be proposed drawing
fromdemocratizationstudies,Europeanizationliterature,andcomparativejudicial
systems.
The book focuses on countries having different status vis-a`-vis the EU and
differently involved, in term of timing, in the EU accession process: some of
them are new member states entered in 2004 (Slovenia) or in 2007 (Romania);
others were, until recently, acceding countries (Croatia) or candidates to the
membership (Serbia). This comparison allows investigation of the power of EU
conditionalityindifferentphasesoftheEUenlargementprocess.
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