Table Of ContentDefinite Descriptions
OXFORD STUDIES IN SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS
general editors: Chris Barker, New York University, and Chris Kennedy,
UniversityofChicago
published
1 DefiniteDescriptions
PaulElbourne
2 LogicinGrammar:Polarity,FreeChoice,andIntervention
GennaroChierchia
in preparation
WeakIslandSemantics
MártaAbrusán
SubjectivityandPerspectiveinTruth-TheoreticSemantics
PaulLasersohn
AHistoryofFormalSemantics
BarbaraPartee
Definite
Descriptions
PAUL ELBOURNE
1
3
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,ox26dp,
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Contents
Preface ix
1 Introduction 1
2 SituationSemantics 17
2.1 OnSituationSemantics 17
2.2 IntroductiontotheFormalSystem 21
2.3 TheFormalSystem 32
2.4 SomeSituation-SemanticTechnicalities 36
3 TheDefiniteArticle 42
3.1 DefiniteDescriptionsinFregeandStrawson 42
3.2 AFregeanTheoryoftheDefiniteArticle 46
4 Presupposition 52
4.1 Introduction 52
4.2 PresuppositionProjection 57
4.3 PossibilityModals 58
4.4 ConditionalsandDisjunction 60
4.5 Negation 67
4.6 PresuppositionObviation 80
4.7 Conclusion 102
5 ReferentialandAttributive 104
5.1 Introduction 104
5.2 AProblemforRussell? 106
5.3 AProblemforFregeandStrawson? 112
5.4 PredicativeUse 116
5.5 Conclusion 119
6 Anaphora 120
6.1 Introduction 120
6.2 ADonkeySentencewithaRelativeClause 121
6.3 ADonkeySentencewithaQuantificationalAdverb 124
6.4 C-CommandedBoundDefiniteDescriptions 125
6.5 Conclusion 132
7 Modality 133
7.1 Introduction 133
7.2 TheDeRe/DeDictoAmbiguity 133
viii contents
7.3 GoingBack 142
7.4 AfterCresswell1990 146
7.5 AfterKratzer2010 148
7.6 Conclusion 149
8 ExistenceEntailments 150
8.1 Introduction 150
8.2 HKE’sObjectiontoRussell 151
8.3 KN’sResponsetoHKE 152
8.4 AFirstResponsetoKN’sResponse 152
8.5 ASecondResponsetoKN’sResponse 155
8.6 TheFregeanTheory 157
8.7 OtherDeterminers 159
8.8 PossibilityModals 167
8.9 Conclusion 169
9 Incompleteness 172
9.1 ImplicitContentandIncompleteDescriptions 172
9.2 FiveTheoriesofIncompleteDescriptions 174
9.3 AnArgumentfromSloppyIdentity 179
9.4 Conclusion 189
10 Pronouns 191
10.1 Introduction 191
10.2 TheSyntaxandSemanticsofPronouns 193
10.3 Anaphora 194
10.4 ReferentialPronouns 197
10.5 DescriptiveIndexicals 201
10.6 VoldemortPhrases 205
10.7 SloppyReadings 209
10.8 AnaphoratoFactsandPropositions 212
10.9 ProblemswithFocus 223
10.10 PsycholinguisticEvidence 224
10.11 Conclusion 229
11 Conclusion 231
Bibliography 232
Index 249
Preface
This book argues that definite descriptions have more or less the
semantics attributed to them by Frege (1892) and Strawson (1950). As
I relate briefly in the Introduction, this view has had something of a
chequered career in recent years, with some theorists thinking it too
obviouslyfalsetomeritdiscussionandotherstakingittobeplausibly,
or even uncontroversially, true. If nothing else, I do hope to convince
people,withthisbook,thattheviewatleastmeritsdiscussion.
Potentialreadersshouldnoteattheoutsetthatthisbookisnotmeant
toserveasanintroductiontothestudyofdefinitedescriptions.Inthat
respect,Icannothope,anddonotintend,tocompetewiththeexcellent
vade mecums written by Stephen Neale: his classic (1990) monograph
Descriptions, which manages to give a thorough and lucid grounding
in the subject while presenting many influential innovations; and his
editorial introduction, written at a somewhat more rarefied level, to
the special number of the journal Mind celebrating the centenary of
Russell’s ‘On denoting’ (2005, volume 114, number 456). I should like
to take this opportunity of acknowledging my great debt to Neale’s
scholarship and acumen, even though he will not, I suspect, greet all
the conclusions I draw with acclamation. My own Introduction, in
thecurrentvolume,isrelativelybriefanddiveswithmercilessrapidity
into issues both technical and polemical; and the book as a whole
presupposesacertainfamiliaritywiththegeneralmethodsandresults
ofcontemporaryformalsemantics.
For valuable discussion of parts of this book I am grateful to David
Adger,RayBuchanan,PaulDekker,MichaelGlanzberg,PollyJacobson,
Ezra Keshet, Stephen Neale, Gary Ostertag, Barbara Partee, at least
twoanonymousLinguisticsandPhilosophyreviewers,andexactlythree
readersforOUP.IamverygratefultoChrisBarkerandChrisKennedy,
the editors of this series, for their insightful comments; and to John
Davey, of OUP. Various versions of Chapter 8 were presented as talks
at the 1st Lisbon Workshop on Semantics (Peter of Spain Philosophy
Institute, University of Lisbon, October 2006) and at the Philosophy
Faculty at Oxford University. Chapter 9 has been presented as a talk
at the Oxford University Philosophy Faculty, at an Aporo philosophy
of language workshop at University College Dublin (May 2009), and
