D-Day: Operation Overlord from Its Planning to the Liberation of Paris

220 Pages·1999·20.853 MB·English

by  Bernard C. Nalty, Russell A. Prichard

'OPERATION OVERLORD'
FROM ITS PLANNING TO THE
L'IBERATION OF PARIS
FOREWOfo BY Wl Churchill
Classic
Conflicts

Classic Conflicts
D-DAY

Classic Conflicts
<
D-DAY
'OPERATION OVERLORD'
FROM PLANNING TO THE
ITS
LIBERATION OF PARIS
^
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CONTENTS
THE SECOND FRONT DEBATE 7
Charles Kirkpatrick
PREPARATION FOR OVERLORD 23
Stephen Badsey
THE GERMAN DEFENCES 38
DetlefVogel
OPERATION NEPTUNE 57
Edward Marolda
D-DAY 79
Roger Cirillo and Stephen Badsey
THE BUILDUP 101
Charles Kirkpatrick
THE AIR BATTLE 116
Alfred Price
THE NORMANDY BATTLEGROUND
131
Nigel de Lee
THE BREAKOUT
154
Nigel de Lee
THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE 168
Bernard Nalty
PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 184
RogerCirillo
INDEX 203

THE SECOND FRONT DEBATE
an address to students at the US Army War College in the mid-
In
1920s, Brig. Gen. Fox Conner harshly characterized the business of
fightingas partofan alliance.Whileservingin Franceasanoperations
officer on Gen. John J. Pershing's staff, he had witnessed the perpetual
inability of the Allied and Associated powers to settle on a common
strategy against the Germans or even to i^ree on allocation ofresources.
The incessant pursuit of purely national interests, in his opinion,
prevented the Allies fi-om bringing the fiill weight oftheir military and
economicpowerefficientlyto bear gainst their common enemy.Thus, as
he pondered the problem for the benefit ofthe Army's future strategists,
Conner concluded that, ifhe had to go to war again, he would prefer to
go to war against an alliance, rather than against a single power.
Connerwas a considerable scholarofthemilitaryart, buthis strictures
on the perils ofalliances had already been voiced centuries before by Sun
Tzu, theancientChinesephilosopherofwar,whowarnedagainstentering
into alliances without being entirely certain ofthe war aims ofthe poten-
tial ally. Hastily conceived agreements. Sun Tzu suggested, could easily
founder because two powers fighting a common foe might themselves
have conflicting intentions. His was sound advice, for whenever two or
more nations combined their efforts in war during the succeeding
THE SECOND FRONT DEBATE
centuries, bitter disagreements, ratiier than concord, were often the rule.
In fact, one of the pecuharities of alHances is that successftil ones have
always tended to disintegrate in discord as fast as unsuccessful ones. That
certainly was the American experience ofWorld War I, the first major
occasion since the Revolution when the United States had waged war in
concert with allies. As isolationism and the depression jointly spiraled
through the 1930s, a residuum ofsuspicion was directed even against the
United Kingdom. There were those, both in the Army and out, who
believed American naivety had been cold-bloodedly exploited in 1917 in
awar to preserve the British Empire.
The Anglo-American alliance ofWorld War II stood in contrast to
the experience of 1917-18 as perhaps the most successful coalition in
the history of modern warfare. From the very beginning, the United
States and the United Kingdom adopted the defeat ofGermanyas their
common goal. Agreement on ultimate aims nonetheless did not imply
agreement in detail, and the progress ofthewarwas marked byperiodic
disputes. Among the most famous was the occasionally acrimonious
debate between Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Sir Bernard L.
Montgomery about the proper strategy to be employed on the Euro-
pean continent: the "broad front" or the "knife-like thrust." The
springs ofsuch disagreements arose from the gradually evolving leader-
ship ofthe coalition. Until 1943, Britain was the dominant partner and
consequently more powerfully influenced the course of the alliance.
After 1943, however, the United States, by virtue ofits contribution of
the greater mass of manpower and economic power, became senior
partner. The Second Front debate, more than any other, was emblem-
atic ofthat shift in coalition leadership. It was, furthermore, the most
significant difference of opinion that arose between the United States
and Britain during the war. Both nations agreed that Germany had to
be assaulted, but the specific agreement that the assault would be
launched from England, across the English Channel, to the coast of
France, was reached only after extended discussion. At its root, the
Second Front debate was the question of whether the alliance would
adhere to a long-term plan for a cross-channel attack, or would retain
the flexibility to take advantage ofthe military situation at the time of
attack to strike where Germany was weakest. Economic, political, and
military differences, as well as differences in national styles ofwaging
war, complicated the debate.