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Cover illustration: Frans Hals, Regentessen Oude lvIannenhuis, 1664, Frans
Halsmuseum Haarlem Table of Contents
Preface 9
1 The State of the Art in Argumentation Theory II
Frans H. van Eemeren
1.1 The Study of Argumentation 11
1.2 Some Crucial Concepts 17
1.3 Overview of the Book 23
Bibliography 25
2 Points ofYiew 27
Peter Houtlosser
2.1 Introduction 27
2.2 Different Approaches to Points ofV iew 28
2.2.1 Classical and Formal Dialectic 28
2.2.2 Pragma-Dialectics 30
2·2.3 Socio-Psychological Research of Persuasion 33
Cover design: Jaak Crasborn bno, Valkenburg aid Geul 2·2.4 Cognitive Research on Reasoning 34
Lay-out: Adriaan de longe,Amsterdam 2.2·5 Argumentative Discourse Analysis 35
2.2.6 Structuralist Informal Logic 36
NUGl 941 2.2·7 Procedural Informal Logic 38
ISBN 90 5356523 x 2.2.8 Advocacy and Debate 39
2·2.9 Communicative Action Theory 40
© Sic Sa t, Arnsterdani, 2001 2·3 Starting Points for Further Research 42
/\
Bibliography 48
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyrights reserved above, no
part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopy,
recording, or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner
and the author of this book.
3 Unexpressed Premises 51 5 Argumentation Structures 101
Susanne Gerritsen
A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
3.1 Introduction 51 5·1 Introduction 101
3.2 Two Traditional Approaches 52 5·2 Historical Overview 102
3.3 The Deductive-Inductive Distinction 55 5.2.1 Classical Rhetoric 103
3.3.1 Pluralism 55 5·2.2 Enlightenment Rhetoric 105
3.3.2 Modern Deductivism 57 5·2·3 The EarlyTextbooks 107
3.3.3 Neither Pluralist, nor Deductivist 59 5·3 Current Approaches 111
3-4 The Nature of the Unexpressed Premise 61 5·3·1 The Textbook Distinctions III
3+1 Confusion over Definitions 61 5·3·2 TheoreticalApproaches 119
3-4.2 The Unexpressed Premise as a Gap-Filler 65 5·4 Methods ofA nalysis in Doubtful Cases 124
3-4.3 Used or Needed Premise 67 5·5 Conclusion 126
3.5 The Role of Context 68 Bibliography 132
3.5.1 The Meaning of'Context' 69
3.5.2 The Position of the Analyst 71
3.6 Argument Schemes 72 6 Fallacies 135
3·7 Conclusion 74 Frans H. van Eemeren
Bibliography 76
6.1 Introduction 135
6.2 Brief History of the Study of Fallacies 136
4 Argument Schemes 81 6.2.1 The Aristotelian Approach to Fallacies 136
Bart Garssen
6.2.2 Idols and Sophisms 141
6.2·3 The Ad Fallacies 142
4.1 Introduction 81 6.2-4 Syllogistic and Inductive Fallacies 144
4.2 Argument Schemes and Finding Arguments 82 6.2·5 The Treatment of Fallacies in Logic Textbooks 145
4.2.1 The Classical Topical Tradition 82
6·3 Modern Theoretical Approaches to the Fallacies 149
4.2.2 Whately's Rhetoric 83 6.3.1 Hamblin's Criticisms of the Standard Treatment 149
4.2.3 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric 84 6.3.2 Post-Hamblin Treatments of the Fallacies 153
4.3 Argument Schemes and the Evaluation of Argumentation 86 6·3·3 The Woods-Walton Approach 154
4.3.1 American Textbooks on Academic Debate 86 6·3-4 The Formal-Dialectical Approach 156
4.3.2 Hastings' Classification of Types of Warrants 87 6·3·5 The Pragma-DialecticalApproach 157
4.3.3 Schellens' Reasonable Argument Forms 89 6·3·6 Walton's Pragmatic Approach 159
4.3-4 The Pragma-Dialectical Typology ofA rgument Schemes 91 Bibliography 161
4-4 Argument Schemes and the Description of Argumentative Discourse 93
4·5 Conclusion 94
Bibliography 98
7 Argument Interpretation and Reconstruction 165 Preface
M. Agnes van Rees
7.1 Introduction 165
7.2 Argument Interpretation 166 . .
7.2.1 General Characteristics of Discourse OrgamzatIOn
7.2.2 Features of Argumentative Discourse 170
7.2.3 Cognitive Processes 175 All argumentation theorists' contributions to the study of argumentation,
7.3 Argument Reconstruction 177
from whatever perspective they originate and whatever approach they advo
7.3.1 Logic 178 cate, are aimed at furthering the development of argumentation theory.
7.3.2 Informal Logic 179
Some of these contributions involve purportedly original and creative ampli
7.3.3 Rhetoric 183 fications of the discipline. They are all of vital importance to the advancement
7.3-4 Pragma-Dialectics 185
of the study of argumentation. Other contributions such as translations of
7.4 Conclusion 190 scholarly insight and research findings from argumentation theory into lay
Bibliography 193 language, course books for students and surveys that offer would-be re
searchers a systematic overview of central parts or aspects of the field, are also
indispensable to the vitality of the discipline but serve the discipline in a dif
8 Argumentation in the Field of Law 201
ferent way: Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theoryaspires to belong to this
Eveline T. Feteris
last category.
The research group of the Department of Speech Communication,
8.1 Introduction 201
Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric at the University ofA msterdam intends
8.2 Different Approaches to Legal Argumentation 203 to contribute to the theoretical advancement of the study of argumentation
8.2.1 The Logical Approach 203 by developing a pragma-dialectical approach to argumentative discourse.
8.2.2 The Rhetorical Approach 204 Among the results of their efforts published in English are Speech Acts in Ar
8.2·3 The Dialogical Approach 208 gumentative Discussions and Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies
Topics in the Research of Legal Argumentation 209
8·3 (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984 and 1992, respectively), Analysing
8.3.1 The Philosophical Component 209 Complex Argumentation (Snoeck Henkemans 1992), Studies in Pragma-Di
8.3.2 The Theoretical Component 210 alectics (edited by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst in 1994) and Recon
8.).3 The Analytical Component 211 structing Argumentative Discourse (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, together
The Empirical Component 212
8·3·4 with Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, 1994). An introductory course book
The Practical Component 213
8·3·5 based on pragma-dialectical insight is Argumentation by van Eemeren, Groo
8.4 Conclusion 214 tendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2001). And a general overview of the vari
Bibliography 216
ous theoretical approaches to the study of argumentation from the past to the
present is provided in Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory, an interna
tional co-production by Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henke
Index of Names 227
mans with contributions by J. Anthony Blair, Ralph Johnson, Christian Plan
tin, Douglas N. Walton, Charles A. Willard, John Woods, and David Zarefsky
Index of Terms 230
(1996). The book was later followed by its legal equivalent, Fundamentals of
LegalArgumentation (Feteris 1999).
The Contributors 237
Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory relates most closely to publica-
9
8 TABLE OF CONTENTS
tions intended to be helpful to students of argumentation such as Argumenta
tion and Fundamentals. The book consists of a series of overviews of the state 1 The State of the Art in Argumentation Theory
of the art in prominent research areas in the study of argumentation. The au
Frans H. van Eemeren
thors, Frans H. van Eemeren, Peter Houtlosser, Susanne Gerritsen, Bart
Garssen, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, M. Agnes van Rees and Eveline T.
Feteris, aim to provide readers with accurate surveys of the main views and
approaches favored in argumentation studies. Most of the contributions have
already been published in an earlier version of the journal Argumentation.
They have all been revised considerably for this book. The authors would like 1.1 The StudyofA rgumentation
to thank all of their colleagues in the community of argumentation scholars
constituted by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation A survey of crucial concepts in argumentation theory cannot proceed with
OSSA) for their help in the shaping of their ideas and texts. With regard to the out a short introduction regarding the state of argumentation scholarship.
current project, they are particularly grateful to J. Anthony Blair, Trudy Govi What is the subject matter of the study of argumentation? Argumentation
er, Hans Hansen, Scott Jacobs, Erik C.W. Krabbe, Michael Leff, Leah Polcar, can be defined as a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a
Douglas N. Walton and John Woods, and to Paul Nagtegaal for his invaluable reasonable critic oft he acceptability ofa standpoint by advancing a constellation
technical help in preparing the manuscript for publication. May Crucial Con ofp ropositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint
cepts in Argumentation Theory be a helpful aid and resource for students of ar (Van Eemeren et aI.1996). This definition does justice to the "process-product
ambiguity" of the word "argumentation" because it not only refers to the ac
gumentation.
tivity of advancing reasons but also to the shorter or longer text that results
from it.
Frans H. van Eemeren
One of the essential characteristics of argumentation is that it always per
Amsterdam, January 19, 2001
tains to a specific point of view with regard to a certain issue. The speaker or
writer who advances argumentation defends this "standpoint" to a listener or
reader who doubts the acceptability of the standpoint or has a different stand
point. The subsequent argumentation is aimed at convincing the listener or
reader of the acceptability of the standpoint. When someone advances argu
mentation, that person makes an appeal to reasonableness and silently as
sumes that the listener or reader will act as a reasonable critic when evaluating
the argumentation. Otherwise it would not make sense to advance a certain
line of argumentation.
It is the task of argumentation theorists to determine which soundness cri
teria should be satisfied for the argumentation to be called r~asonable. Many
argumentation theorists inspired by logic, study argumentation for norma
tive purposes. There are also argumentation theorists however who pursue
merely a descriptive goal. Linguistically oriented scholars in textual and dis
course analysis are often only interested in describing how, with varying de
grees of success, language users make use of argumentation to convince oth
ers. Although in current research practice both extremes are represented,
most argumentation theorists take a middle position. Their starting point is
that the study of argumentation has a normative as well as a descriptive di
menSIOn.
11
10 PREFACE
The study of argumentation has thus far not resulted in a universally accepted Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's contribution to argumentation theory con
theory. The current state of the art is characterized by the co-existence of a va sists, first of all, of an extensive list of elements that can serve as a point of de
riety of approaches, differing considerably in conceptualization, scope and parture or as an argument scheme when constructing the argumentation that
degree of theoretical refinement, albeit that all the modern approaches are should convince or persuade the audience. With the help of a "quasi-logical"
strongly influenced by classical and post-classical rhetoric and dialectic. To argument scheme, which resembles a logically valid argument form in some
gether with approaches of a more limited scope or a less developed research way, one can, for instance, sometimes achieve the effect that the public con
program, the most important approaches are discussed in considerable detail siders the standpoint defended in a reasonable way. Another way of justifying
in Fundamentals ofA rgumentation Theory (Van Eemeren et aI.1996).As an in a standpoint is the use of an argument scheme, such as analogy, "that struc
troduction to the great variety in the field, I shall present a brief overview of tures reality;' so that the audience will conclude that the defended standpoint
these theoretical contributions. is in a similar way acceptable as a different kind of standpoint that they al
ready accept.
Toulmin's Model ofA nalysis
Informal Logic
Toulmin's The Uses ofA rgument, which appeared in 1958, is known mainly for
the model of argumentation presented in this book. This model represents Because some researchers were dissatisfied with the way argumentation was
the "procedural form" of argumentation or the various steps that can be dis being treated in introductory logic textbooks, an approach to argumentation
tinguished in the defense of a standpoint or claim. According to Toulmin, the known as. informal logic was propagated in Canada and the United States in
soundness of argumentation is primarily determined by the degree to which the early seventies. Since 1978, the journal Informal Logic, edited by Blair and
the warrant, which connects the data adduced in the argumentation with the Johnson, has been the voice of the informal logic movement. Informal logic is
claim that is defended, is made acceptable by a backing. not a new kind oflogic, but an approach to the normative study of argumen
The procedural form of argumentation is in Toulmin's view"field indepen tation in ordinary language which remains closer to the practice of argumen
dent." This means that the steps that are taken - and which are represented in tation than formallogic (Blair and Johnson 1987).
the model-are always the same, irrespective of the subject the argumentation Informal logicians would like to develop norms and procedures for inter
refers to. The type of backing required, however, is dependent on the field to preting, assessing and construing argumentation. Their starting point is the
which the question at issue belongs. An ethical justification, for instance, re notion that argumentation should be sound in a logical sense. Apart from the
quires a different kind of backing than a legal justification. Toulmin thus con fact that it is clear that something else is meant by this than that the arguments
cludes that the evaluation criteria for determining the soundness of argu used must be valid in a formal-logical sense, it is not yet clear,however, exactly
mentation are "field dependent." what. It is clear, however, that informal logicians are primarily interested in
the relations between premises and conclusions in arguments and it is also
clear that their interest is not restricted to reasoning aimed at convincing.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric Johnson and Blair (197711993) have indicated what they have in mind when
they refer to an informal logical alternative for the formal criterion of deduc
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in La nouvelle rhetorique (1958, English trans tive validity. In their view, the premises of an argument have to meet three cri
lation 1969) provide an inventory of frequently-used "argumentation tech teria: (1) relevance (2) sufficiency and (3) acceptability. These criteria are in
niques." They regard argumentation as sound if it adduces (greater) assent troduced in Logical Self-Defense; they are adopted, sometimes under different
with the standpoint that is defended among the audience the argumentation names, by other informal logicians (e.g., Govier 1987). When considering
is aimed at. Thus, in the new rhetoric, the soundness of argumentation is "relevance," the question is whether there is an adequate substantial relation
measured against its effect on the target group. This target group may consist between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. While in the case of
of a "particular audience;' but it can also be the "universal audience": the peo "sufficiency", the question is whether the premises provide enough evidence
ple who, for the speaker or writer, are the embodiment of reasonableness. for the conclusion; in the case of "acceptability'; whether the premises them
selves are true, probable, or in some other way trustworthy.
12 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY 13
te~pt to formula~e :'problem-sound" rules that are instrumental in resolving
RadicalArgumentativism a dIfference of opmlOn. These rules must also be "conventionally valid" in the
sense that they are inter-subjectively acceptable (Barth and Krabbe 1982: 21-
Ducrot and Anscombre, in the early seventies, developed in a number of - al
22). When designing a procedure for language users who would like to resolve
most exclusively French - publications a linguistic approach to language use
a dispute by means of a critical dialogue, the "new dialecticians" make use of
and argumentation. Because Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) believe that all
the ideas put forth by Crawshay-Williams and Naess as well as the ideas of
verbal utterances that lead the listener or reader to a certain conclusion - of
Lorenzen, Lorenz and other members of the Erlangen School.
ten implicitly _ always involve argumentative relations, they refer to their the
The first initiatives towards a new dialectic have already been presented by
oretical position as radical argumentativism.
Barth and Krabbe. In From Axiom to Dialogue they described a "formal-di
Ducrot and Anscombre's descriptive approach is characterized by a great
interest in words such as « only», « no 1e ss t ha)n), «(b ut),) " even",( ( st 'Il l", «b ecause " alectical" procedure to determine whether a standpoint can be maintained in
the light of certain starting points or "concessions." The term formal dialectics
and "so", which can serve as argumentative "operators" or "connectors" and
was introduced earlier by Hamblin (1970). The indication "formal" refers to
give the utterances a certain argumentative force and argumentative direction.
the strictl~ regimented character of the dialogue games. In dialogue logic an
In a certain context, the sentence "The ring costs only one hundred euros" can
argum~~t IS prese~ted as a dialogue game between a "proponent" and an "op
point to a conclusion such as "Buy that ring", Meanwhile, the sentence "The
ponent of a theSIS. Together these two parties try to establish whether the
ring costs no less than one hundred euros" points instead to a conclusion such
thesis can be defended successfully against critical attacks. In the defense, the
as"Do not buy that ring". . propo~ent can make use of the propositions the opponent is prepared to
Another observation made by Ducrot andAnscombre is that a word such as
commIt to. The proponent attempts to bring the opponent into a contradic
"but" only determines the direction of the conclusion that is suggested by the
tory position by skillfully exploiting these concessions. If the proponent suc
sentence, not the content of this conclusion. This content is also dependent
ceeds, the thesis has been successfully defended given the concessions (ex con
on the context and the situation in which the sentence is uttered. Whatever
cessis).
conclusion may be drawn in a specific context, the presence of the word "but"
in all cases causes this conclusion to be the opposite of, and also stronger than,
Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst
the conclusion that has to be drawn from the part of the sentence preceding
(1984) developed a theory of argumentation called pragma-dialectics, which
"but". According to Ducrot and Anscombre, the opposite standpoints sug
immediately connects with formal dialectics, but is also different. The agree
gested by"but" in a sentence such as "Paul is rich, but he is married", select two
ment is expressed in the term dialectics; the replacement of formal by pragma
different "argumentative principles" which are on a par with the topoi of clas
(for "~rag~atic") refers to the differences. The pragmatic elements in prag
sical rhetoric (Van Eemeren et al. 1996). N0lke (1992), in this example, as
ma-dialectlcs concerning speech acts and discourse analysis are primarily in
sumes that these are "The more someone has the property of being rich, the
spired by insights of "ordinary language philosophers"; the dialectical ele
more attractive it is for a woman to get to know him better" and "The more
ments are inspired by the insights from the work of" critical rationalists" such
someone is tied to another woman, the less attractive it is for a woman to get
as Karl Popper.
to know him better': In this case, the latter topos is a stronger argument than . I~ the ~ragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical'discussion, four stages are
the first, which is as it were put aside - overruled - by the latter. Thus, the last
dIstmgUlshed. In the confrontation stage, a participant in the discussion puts
topos determines the eventual argumentative direction of the sentence, which
forward a standpoint while a second participant either expresses doubt con
leads to an implicit conclusion such as "It is no use trying to get to know Paul
cerning the acceptability of the standpoint or he or she contradicts it. In the
better". opening stage, which is in practice often largely implicit, the participants who
ac~ept the roles of "protagonist" and "antagonist" of the standpoint deter
mme what the discussion's point of departure is. Here the question becomes
Modern Dialectical Approaches what are the common starting points and which rules are being observed?
The prot~gonist begins to advance an argument in the argumentation stage to
To modern dialecticians, argumentation is part of a procedure to resolve a
defend hIS or her standpoint and adds, if necessary, new arguments to answer
difference of opinion by means of a regulated discussion. Dialecticians at-
THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY 15
14 FRANS Ii. VAN EEMEREN
further critical reactions. If the advanced arguments lead to the acceptance of
the process of resolving a difference of opinion. They think that an argumen
the standpoint by the antagonist in the concluding stage, the difference of
tative text or discussion can be reconstructed with more subtlety, and can be
opinion has been resolved; this is also the case if the protagonist withdraws
more fully accounted for, if the strategic maneuvering that takes place in each
the standpoint because of the antagonist's critical reactions.
dialectical stage of the selection from among the "topical potential" (the pos
Besides an ideal model of the speech acts performed in the various stages of
sible discussion moves) available in the discussion stage concerned, the adap
a critical discussion by a protagonist and an antagonist who make an attempt
tation to the wishes of the audience and the use of presentational devices is in
to resolve their difference of opinion in a reasonable way, the pragma-dialec vestigated.
tical discussion procedure also includes a series of basic rules which together
constitute a code of conduct for reasonable discussants (Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1992). Each violation of a rule amounts to an incorrect discus 1.2 Some Crucial Concepts
sion move that is an impediment to the resolution of a difference of opinion.
This can happen in each stage of the discussion. The incorrectness involved
The problems involved in the production, analysis and evaluation of argu
generally resembles one or more of the well-known fallacies or a similar of
mentation are approached much differently by the various theoretical contri
fence against reasonableness.
butions to the study of argumentation. The problems argumentation theo
rists are jointly concerned with can be elucidated by explaining some con
cepts crucial to the theory of argumentation: "point of view", "unexpressed
Modern Rhetorical Approaches
premise'; "argument scheme': "argumentation structure': and "fallacy". This
book will make it clear that each of these concepts represents an indispens
In recent years, a powerful re-evaluation of rhetoric has taken place. The irra
able element in the study of argumentation. In addition, two other promi
tional and even anti-rational image of rhetoric that has evolved during the
nent problem areas crucial to the study of argumentation will be discussed:
past centuries has now been revised. Meanwhile, the sharp division between
"methods of argument interpretation and reconstruction" and "argumenta
rhetoric and dialectic made in the past appears in need of blurring. Several ar tion in the field of law':
gumentation theorists have become aware that rhetoric as the study of per
suasive techniques is not per se incompatible with maintaining a critical ideal
of reasonableness. Points ofV iew
It is remarkable that the rehabilitation of rhetoric in the study of argumen
tation began at about the same time in various countries. A considerable time
It is important to recognize that verbal expressions are not "by nature" stand
after the pioneering work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, several argu
points, arguments, or other units of language use which are interesting to
mentation scholars in the United States began to defend the rational qualities
argumentation theorists, but only when they occur in a context where they
of rhetoric. Wenzel (1980), for one, prefers to fully credit rhetoric, but then
serve a specific function in the communication process. This means that these
emphatically in relation to logic, particularly dialectics. In France, Reboul
utterances must be specifically instrumental in achieving a certain goal. An
(1990) prefers to view rhetoric as second only to dialectics in importance. He
oral or written expression is, for instance, a pointof view, if it expresses a cer
regards rhetoric and dialectic as different disciplines that display some over
tain positive or negative position with respect to a proposition, thus making it
lap. Rhetoric applies dialectic to public discussions while dialectic is also a
clear exactly what the speaker or writer stands for.
part of rhetoric because dialectic provides rhetoric with intellectual tools. In
In ordinary discourse, explicitness is the exception rather than the rule.
Germany, Kopperschmidt (1989) takes it a step further. He argues, viewing
Sometimes the communicative function of an utterance becomes clear after
things from a historical perspective, that rhetoric is the central concern of ar
the event, when this function is identified by a participant ("So, that is your
gumentation theorists. In the Netherlands, Van Eemeren and Houtlosser
standpoint then, eh?'; "You have heard my major arguments"), but more of
(1999) have pursued the integration of rhetoric's insight into their "pragma
ten than not, no explicit identification is offered, while, moreover, the propo
dialectical" method for analyzing argumentative discourse. In their view,
sitional content of the utterance remains ambiguous.
there is a rhetorical goal corresponding with each of the dialectical stages of
Fortunately, there are some verbal indicators which specifically refer to
16 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY
17
standpoints and argumentation, such as "therefore'; "hence", "so", "thus", logical analysis, an attempt is made to reconstruct the argument as one that
"ergo'; and "since'; "for" and "because': Some of them, like "for:' are used ret has a valid argument form; in the pragmatic analysis, the unexpressed
rogressively to refer to a preceding standpoint; while others like "so", are used premise is then more precisely defined on the basis of contextual information
progressively, and precede the standpoint, and some such as "because:' can be and background knowledge. The logical analysis is thus instrumental to the
used either way ("I cannot do it because I am ill" and "Because I am ill I cannot achievement of a satisfactory pragmatic analysis.
do it"). The fewer the number of verbal pointers, the more necessary it is to In the absence of any contextual information or background knowledge,
make use of verbal and non-verbal contextual clues. Usually, some back the pragmatic identification of unexpressed premises will be hard to accom
ground knowledge of the context and the type of speech event involved, and plish. A logical analysis must then suffice. Otherwise, there is a danger that the
even some knowledge about the world, is necessary to detect these clues and added premise oversteps the mark, attributing more to the speaker than he or
she is actually committed to. With unexpressed standpoints we are on safer
put them to good use.
Confusingly, formulations of standpoints and reasons may be presented in ground. Starting from the explicit premises, a logical analysis of the underly
speech acts that are, at first sight, non-assertive, as in "Let's take an umbrella, ing argument usually leads to an unequivocal determination of the conclu
or do you want to get wet?" Taken literally, what the speaker does here is con sion representing the unexpressed standpoint that is being advocated.
front the listener with a proposal, followed by a question. The (rhetorical)
question, however, must be interpreted as a reason to accept the implicit
standpoint that the two should take an umbrella. To correctly determine the Argument Schemes
speaker's commitments, one must analyze this discourse as containing an im
plicit (and indirect) standpoint defended by an implicit (and indirect) rea II t sh2!lld!12tpe !,*~!!J2!JQ·~nt~d th~t an..YQ!le who puts forward an argument
son: "We should take an umbrella,for we do not want to get wet". In the analy is automatically attempting to logically derive the conclusion from ili--;;
sis of such implicitness (and indirectness), and in the justification of this p~;~et, in some way or another, a transfer of acceptance from the ;x
analysis, an important role is usually played by general standards for reasoned plid!: premise to the standpoint must be aimed for. On this point, thus far, for
discourse and by the context (in its broadest sense) of the specific discourse mal logic does not have much to offer. Modern logicians, even when they are
under analysis. cgE:,~~rn~~~~pin&~!ternative systems such as non-monotonic logic
and defaultlogic, seem almost unanimous in their concern with formal valid
i!y~ertIiansuDStailtive"reraUonSb-etWeenpremises and conclusions. ~-:.
ceEc!rating on thSJ!.J:.Ilbklm of imRlication and truth, they tend to ignore tb;
Unexpressed Premises
p~o~~I!1~_ of pl~usible inference and the transmission of acceptanc~
Unexpressed elements that are only implicitly present in the discourse are in The speaker or writer who puts forward an argument aims to effect a trans
practice often the pivotal points of an argument. This is particularly true for fer of acceptance from the premises to the standpoint that makes the listener
unexpressed premises and unexpressed standpoints. In ordinary arguments, or reader accept the standpoint. Hence, the speaker attempts to design the ar
usually one of the premises is left unexpressed. In some cases, the identifica gument in such a fashion that it will convince the listener. Take the following
tion of the elements implicit in enthymematic argumentation is quite simple. argument: "Daniel will certainly be concerned about the costs, because he is
It is obvious, for example, that in "Amos is pig-headed because he is a teacher" an American:' When looking for an argument to defend the standpoint that
the premise that is left unexpressed is "Teachers are pig-headed': In "I am sure Daniel will be concerned about the costs, the arguer may, for example, have
that Amos is pig-headed, since all teachers are pig-headed", it is just as clear entertained an unfriendly thought like "It is typical of Americans that they are
materialistic." From this thought, the arguer's standpoint may have been
that the unexpressed premise is: "Amos is a teacher".
There are also cases in which the identification of unexpressed premises backed up by the argument, the unexpressed premise being "Americans are
may cause more problems - usually, because there are several possibilities. In inclined to care a lot about money." By arguing in this manner, the speaker or
order to determine what the commitments of an arguer are, the analyst must writer is relying on a more or less ready-made argument scheme.
not only carry out a logical analysis, based on a formal validity criterion, but Argument schemes are conventionalized ways of displaying a relation be
also a pragmatic analysis, based on standards for reasoned discourse. In the tween that which is stated in the explicit premise and that which is stated in
THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY 19
18 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
the standpoint. The internal organisation of each single argument can be The structure of argumentation is sometimes clearly indicated by the use of
characterized by the argument scheme being employed. Because an argu connecting expressions such as "apart from X, Y", "Y, moreover X", and "for,
ment scheme characterizes the type of justification or refutation provided for because Y, X" respectively. Or the structure may be clear from the content of
the standpoint in a single argument by the explicit premise for the stand the arguments. Often, however, a problem in the analysis of complex argu
point, an analysis of the argument schemes used in a discourse produces in mentation arises because the literal presentation makes insufficiently clear
formation regarding the principles, standards, criteria, or assumptions in how the argumentation is structured. To solve this problem, again, all kinds of
volved in a particular attempt at justification or refutation. In most cases, contextual and other pragmatic factors need to be taken into account.
some interpretative effort is required to identify the argument scheme that is
being em ployed, i.e., to discover the topos on which the argumentation rests.
In this endeavor, again, pragmatic knowledge must be brought to bear. !\!~ Fallacies
ment schemes are ~l!&1hes;ml~s:.P!?.s!udi<:<!Y!~~!1§iY<iYJ:!y~\l2E.~nta!io~ __
l-iheon~;te-a com lementar alternative to the formal . 0 Another concept argumentation theorists are especially interested in is that
I
t~ndtheir v~~y !2~~Jhe point of de~arture in these studies is generally of the fallacies. \Ti!!ually ~,,-erJ:'.l!9rfQi!tive ths:ory of argumentation incll!des<!.
that in argumentative discourse, dependmg on the argument scheme used, treatment of the fallacies. In some sense the quality of a normative theory of
various types of argumentation can be distinguished and that each type of argumentation canevenbeTudged from the degree to which it makes it possi
argumentation requires that specific critical questions are answered. ble to provide an adequate analysis of the fallacies. Conversely, it stands to
reason that offering an analysis of notorious fallacies can be conducive to the
examination of the norms of sound argumentation.
According'to the standard definition, a fallacy is an argument that seems
Argumentation Structures
valid but is not (Hamblin 1970: 12). Well-known objections to this definition
A central problem in the analysis of argumentative discourse is determining point out that a great number of the generally recognized fallacies are not ar
the structure of the argumentation. The argumentation structure of a te:x0t-, guments (e.g., "many questions") and others (in modern interpretations) are
speech or discussion is determined by the way the reasons advanced hang not invalid arguments (e.g., petitio principii) or the fallaciousness is not due
gether and jointly support the defended standpoint. An adequate evaluatIOn to the invalidity of the argument (e.g., argumentum ad verecundiam, argu
of the argumentative discourse cannot take place as long as it is unclear what mentum ad populum, argumentum ad hominem). Therefore, these types of
the structure of the argumentation is. What kind of structural relations can fallacies are not covered by the definition.
One explanation why fallacy theorists stuck with this definition, even
be distinguished?
Argumentation for or against a standpoint can be simply "single argumen- though many fallacies remain outside its scope, is that until recently most ap
tation", which consists of one reason for or against the standpoint. But the proaches to fallacies have been restrictively logico-centric. However, if the old
argumentation can also have a more complex argumentation structure, de definition is dropped, as most modern argumentation theorists have done,
pending on the way the defense of the standpoint has been organized in view and fallacies are ~.!1ceive.Q.2..f~~discu~si~ moves which in some way damage
of (anticipated) doubts or criticism. In a more complexly structured t~ual~~_~_~~~~~!~~.~sc<?~~~.~~~~~~i;~3~~IiEEiE~~~~lJ~~fulli~:~
argumentation several reasons are put forward for or against the same stand c~~2ut t~El· F~r this P~T?.!~:~:~,:~~:. . o.~:.~~,~_~~£!~!_~lJ.ll,~l.~.::=:~:!-
point. These reasons can be alternative defenses of the standpoint which are ated vie. QL~ a pragmatIC approach that makes allowances for the
unrelated ("It is impossible that you saw my mother last week in Sheringham communicative and interactional context in which fallacies occur is required.
in Marks and Spencer's, because my mother died two years ago and She ring Without taking pragmatic knowledge into account, many fallacies cannot be
ham does not have a Marks and Spencer's"), but they can also be interdepen satisfactorily analyzed.
dent, so that there is a "parallel chain" of reasons which mutually strengthen In the study of fallacies, a set of norms must be developed for distinguishing
or complement each other ("We have to dine out because there is nothing left between acceptable and unacceptable moves in argumentative discourse. The
athome and all the shops are closed"), or a "serial chain" of reasons ("I cannot criteria used in deciding whether such a norm has been violated, should also
help you with painting next week, because next week I have no time because I be investigated. For determining if these criteria are satisfied in specific cases,
have to study for an exam").
20 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY 21
