Crises in the Atlantic Alliance: Affect and Relations among NATO Members

206 Pages·2012·0.75 MB·English

by  Lucile Eznack

Crises in the Atlantic Alliance
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Crises in the Atlantic Alliance
Affect and Relations among NATO Members
Lucile Eznack
crisesintheatlanticalliance
Copyright©LucileEznack,2012.
Allrightsreserved.
Firstpublishedin2012by
PALGRAVEMACMILLAN®
intheUnitedStates—adivisionofSt.Martin’sPressLLC,
175FifthAvenue,NewYork,NY10010.
WherethisbookisdistributedintheUK,Europeandtherestofthe
World,thisisbyPalgraveMacmillan,adivisionofMacmillanPublishers
Limited,registeredinEngland,companynumber785998,ofHoundmills,
Basingstoke,HampshireRG216XS.
PalgraveMacmillanistheglobalacademicimprintoftheabove
companiesandhascompaniesandrepresentativesthroughouttheworld.
Palgrave®andMacmillan®areregisteredtrademarksintheUnited
States,theUnitedKingdom,Europeandothercountries.
ISBN:978–1–137–28931–5
PartsoftheIntroductionandChapters1,2,3and5areadaptedfromanarticle
previouslypublishedas“CrisesasSignalsofStrength:TheSignificanceofAffect
inCloseAllies’Relationships.”SecurityStudies20,no.2(2011):238–65.
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Eznack,Lucile.
CrisesintheAtlanticalliance:affectandrelationsamongNATO
members/LucileEznack.
p. cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN978–1–137–28931–5(alk.paper)
1. NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization. 2. Security,
International. I. Title.
JZ5930.E962012
355(cid:2).031091821—dc23 2012024714
AcataloguerecordofthebookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.
DesignbyIntegraSoftwareServices
Firstedition:December2012
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
ToJan
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Contents
Preface ix
Introduction 1
1 AffectandtheAtlanticAlliance 13
2 AffectandTransatlanticCrises 29
3 TheSuezCrisis 47
4 The1966Crisis 69
5 TheIraqCrisis 87
Conclusion 115
Notes 127
Bibliography 177
Index 187
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Preface
When the crisis between Paris and Washington over the Iraq War blew
upin2003,Iwaswritingmymaster’sthesis.ThisthesiscoveredFrance’s
policy of alignment with the United States in cases of war since 1945.
What struck me about the dispute opposing these two historical allies
wasnotFrance’srefusaltosupporttheUSplanofmilitaryattack,assim-
ilarrefusalshadoccurredinthepast.Itwastheviolenceofthereproaches
andrecriminationsexchangedbyofficialsfrombothsidesoftheAtlantic,
as well as the alarmist content of many predictions made at that time,
andinthemonthsthatfollowedthecrisis,astothefutureoftheFrench-
USrelationshipandoftheAtlanticallianceasawhole.Ascommentators
and scholars seemed to be increasingly pessimistic, I started to wonder:
Werewereallywitnessingtheendofanera?Wasthelong-termdeteriora-
tionofthetiesbindingFranceandtheUnitedStates,andoftransatlantic
relations altogether, such an inescapable outcome? If this was the case,
thenwhatcouldbemadeoftheapparentsignsofgoodwillandreconcili-
ationshownbyPresidentsChiracandBushattheG8SummitinEviana
fewmonthsaftertheIraqWarstarted?Wastherelationshipbetweenthe
twocountriesalreadybetter,andifyes,howwasthispossible?
Tryingtoanswerthesetypesofquestionsledmetofocusonthecon-
ceptofrelationalrepairinmyPh.D.dissertation.Yet,tounderstandhow
allies such as France and the United States could repair their relation-
ships after crises such as the dispute over Iraq, I also had to understand
why these types of crises occurred in the first place. What was it that
triggered such passionate negative reactions? And why did the United
States seem much angrier at the behavior of France than at other coun-
tries that also opposed the war, such as Russia, for instance? Was the
violence of the US reaction related, in one way or another, to its status
as a close ally and friend of France? And how didthisinfluence the evo-
lution of the relationship between these two countries? These questions
ledmetodigdeeperintothecharacteristicsofthetiesbindingthesetwo
countries, and friendly interstate relations more generally. What was so