Contemporary Russian Messianism and New Russian Foreign Policy

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by  Maria Engström.

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Contemporary Russian
Messianism and New Russian
Foreign Policy
Maria Engström
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To cite this article: Maria Engström (2014) Contemporary Russian Messianism and
New Russian Foreign Policy, Contemporary Security Policy, 35:3, 356-379, DOI:
10.1080/13523260.2014.965888
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Contemporary Russian Messianism and New
Russian Foreign Policy
MARIA ENGSTRO¨ M
Abstract: This article aims to explore the connection between the new 2013 Foreign Policy
ConceptoftheRussianFederationandChristianmessianismincontemporaryRussianintellec-
5
1 tualthought.The‘conservativeturn’inRussianpoliticsisassociatedwiththereturntothecul-
0
2 tural and political ideologeme of Katechon, which is proposed by several right-wing
y intellectualsasthebasisfortheRussia’snewstateideologyandforeignandsecuritypolicy.
a
M ThetheologicalconceptofKatechon(fromtheGreeko´Kat1´xvn,‘thewithholding’)thatpro-
6 tectstheworldfromtheadventoftheAntichristoriginatesintheByzantineEmpire.InRussian
1
7 tradition,thisconceptispresentedinthewell-knowndoctrineofMoscowastheThirdRome,
2
3: datingbacktothe16thcentury.Theterm‘Katechon’incontemporaryRussianpoliticaldis-
0 courseisrelativelynewandcanbetracedtothepost-SovietreceptionofCarlSchmitt’spol-
at iticaltheology.TheconceptofRussiaasKatechonisdirectlyconnectedtothenationalsecurity
]
s anddefencepolicy,becauseitisusedastheideologicalgroundforthenewwaveofmilitar-
e
vic ization and anti-Western sentiment, as well as for Russia’s actions during the Ukrainian
r crisis. This analysis puts the internal political and cultural debate on Russia’s role in inter-
e
S national affairs and its relations with the West into historical perspective and demonstrates
y
r theright-wingintellectualcircles’influenceontheKremlin’snewdomesticandforeignpolicy.
a
r
b
Li
E
S Introduction
L
[
y The current conflict and growing ideological gap between Russia and the West
b
d require a comprehensive analysis of the re-ideologization of Russian domestic,
e
ad foreign and security policy. This re-ideologization was already visible at the begin-
o
nl ning of Vladimir Putin’s third term as president of Russian Federation in 2012, but
w
o started to get more attention in connection with the Ukrainian crisis and ascension
D
of Crimea to the Russian Federation in March 2014.
In this article, I argue that Putin’s so-called ‘conservative turn’ is in full accord
with the political doctrine developed in numerous right-wing intellectual circles
and think tanks, which identify themselves as neoconservative. This doctrine main-
tainsthatastatewithoutideologycannotbeconsideredsovereign.The‘proclamation
ofsovereignty’wasmostexplicitinthewordsofAlexeyPushkov,theheadofDuma
committeeforforeignaffairs,whostatedon10August2013that‘Washingtonhasto
realizeduringthe“pause”intherelationsbetweentheRussiaandtheUnitedStates
that Russia is nolonger a “political colony” of the USA’.1
The intellectuals of the conservative camp have long since maintained that the
ban on state ideology in Russia (Chapter 1, Article 13 of Constitution of the
Russian Federation) and the Kremlin’s orientation towards the concept of realism
areextremelyharmfulforRussia’snationalinterestsandsecurity.Afterthecollapse
ContemporarySecurityPolicy,Vol.35,No.3,2014,pp.356–379
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.965888#2014Taylor&Francis
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN MESSIANISM 357
oftheSovietUnionandtherejectionofMarxismtherewasnoideologicalalternative
totheliberalmodelofdomestic,foreignandsecuritypolicy,untilnow.Thisnewcon-
servative narrative is characterized by strong messianism and anti-Western (anti-
American) sentiment.
My analysis will focus on the concept of Russia as Katechon, as the world’s
‘shield’ against the apocalyptic forces of chaos. This concept was widely discussed
in the influential right-wing intellectual circles during the last two decades. It was
offered to the Kremlin (without using the term ‘Katechon’) as the basis for
Russia’snewstateideologyduringtheprotestsofRussiannon-systemicliberaloppo-
sition 2011–2012 and Putin’s 2012 presidential campaign. I believe that certain
internal political processes of recent years and important domestic events which
5 lately stirred the international community, such as a demonstrative rhetoric of
1
0 ‘Russian traditional values’, the concept of a ‘Russian approach to human rights’,
2
y the new law initiatives of 2013, the hunt for ‘agents of influence’, and the actions
a
M againstNGOs – allthesehavetobeunderstoodinthelightofthe‘Katechonic’ideol-
16 ogy.Usuallytheseprocessesaredescribedinthemediaandeveninseriousscholar-
7 ship as an ‘authoritarian turn’ in Russian politics or as a result of Russian
2
3: ‘backwardness’,andnationalistoreven‘fascist’propaganda.Theuseofthesenega-
0
at tive terms reflects the understandable Western criticism of today’s Russian regime
s] but doesn’t really help to understand what exactly is going on in Russia and why
e
vic people aresupporting the Kremlin’s‘ideological turn’.2
er Thephenomenonofpost-Sovietconservatismandtheriseofpoliticaltheologyin
S
y contemporaryRussiahavedrawntheattentionofscholarsfromdifferentdisciplines,3
r
ra buttheconceptofKatechonhasnotyetbeenstudied.Myresearchwithintheemer-
b
Li gingdiscursive fieldofnewRussianconservatismfocusesonthehistoricalanalysis
E of the traditions of state messianism in Russian culture as well as the study of the
S
L WesternrootsofcontemporaryRussianconservativedoctrine.Iseetheactualization
[
by of the messianic Katechon-ideologeme and the extensive use of collective cultural
ed memory in contemporary political discourse as one of the main factors accounting
d
a forthepopularityofPutin’spoliticsof‘ideologicalsovereignty’inforeignandsecur-
o
nl ity policy amongthe elite and ordinary Russian citizens.
w
o DuringtheUkrainiancrisisnumerouspoliticalanalystsandjournalistsstartedto
D
see the resemblance between Putin and the American neoconservative politicians,
callingPutin‘Russianneocon’or‘Russianhawk’andtalkingaboutthe‘unholyalli-
ance’betweenPutinandAmerica’sChristianright.4Russianpoliticalphilosophersof
theconservativecampsincethelate1980shaveopenlydeclaredthattheyarefollow-
ing in the steps of the European New Right as well as the American neocons. The
influenceofAmericanneoconservatismontheformationofpost-Sovietconservative
thought in Russia is examined in several works by prominent philosopher Boris
Mezhuev.5ContemporaryRussianmessianismisseenbyitsproponentsasanalterna-
tivetothedoctrineofAmericanexceptionalismandasanimportantideologicaltool
for openly challenging Western hegemony and creating a new polycentric world
order. They also argue that the real cause of the current new ‘ideological Cold
War’betweenRussiaandtheUnitedStatesisthecollisionoftwomessianicprojects
with commonroots in Christian eschatologyand European political thought.
358 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
The article consists of three parts. The first part is a short presentation of post-
Soviet neoconservatism, its origins, its development, and its main representatives. I
also comment on the most important right-wing think tanks. The second part is
also short and examines the changes in the text of the new 2013 Foreign Policy
Concept of the Russian Federation in comparison to the previous version from
2008.Finally,inthethirdandmostimportantpartofthisarticleIfocusontheKate-
chon narrative where Russia is seen as a ‘shield’ that is protecting the world from
Anomia,andtheideologyof‘AtomicOrthodoxy’,whichtiestogetherChristianmes-
sianism with nuclear defence policy.
5
1 Right Wing Intellectual Circles and the Phenomenonof Post-Soviet
0
2 Conservatism
y
a
M NewRussianconservatism,neoconservatism,andpost-Sovietconservatism:allthese
16 terms are synonymous, and they signify not a political but rather a metapolitical,
7 intellectual movement, which acts at the junction of art, literature, philosophy, and
2
3: politics. Russian neoconservatives, like their European and American counterparts,
0
at act primarily indirectly through informal groups, think tanks, public debates, and
s] theirownprivatemediaandpublishinghouses.Thegoalofthesemetapoliticalcom-
e
vic munities is to influence public opinion in order to establish the dominance of pro-
er conservativepoliticalpowerand/ortointroduce‘theneworder’.Thetextsofcontem-
S
y porary radical conservatives do not represent some political programme but rather
r
ra resemble futurist manifestos and pamphlets. They openly proclaim the main task
b
Li of modern right-wing intellectuals: to create a new mythology of the empire that
E would be able to mobilize the country and its people in a new historical situation.
S
L In their metapolitical activity, the Russian neoconservatives adopt the thesis of the
[
by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) who argues that one has to achieve
ed ‘cultural hegemony’ in the collective consciousness, and only then expect some
d
a success in the political sphere. Since the mid-1980s, one of the active propagators
o
nl of the strategy of cultural hegemony has been the leader of the French New Right
w
o Alain de Benoist, who should be considered one of the influences over the Russian
D
neoconservatives.6AlaindeBenoistemphasizestheimportanceofreachingmetapo-
litical goals ‘silently’, that is, not through direct political statements, but indirectly,
using culture as a political instrument.
Following several researchers, for example, Golynko-Vol’fson,7 I interpret the
political sacred as evidence of ‘the emotional turn’, characteristic of the secular
epoch,asasignofthereturnofemotionality,andasasearchfornewformsofcol-
lectivity and commonness. The neoconservative movement can be defined as a
certain‘affectedcommunity’,whichfollowsthesetendencies,closelytyingtogether
thepoliticalandtheemotional.Thecoreoftheneoconservativeanthropologyisnota
rational citizen, but a passionate, emotional citizen.8 Likewise, right-wing intellec-
tualscriticizeliberalismmainlyfromtheaestheticandemotionalpointofview:lib-
eralismisportrayedasdeformed,empty,devoidofsacrificeandheroism,andasthe
triumphofhuckstersandthecommonherd.Inneoconservativerhetoric,liberalismis
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN MESSIANISM 359
equatedwithdullnessandboredom.AstheRussiansociologistandphilosopherAlex-
ander Filippov notes,
Liberalideasappearedtobenotsomuchunconvincingorcontradictoryasdull.
This phenomenon seems to be something new and important. Dullness is an
aesthetic category. Liberals, both moralists and utilitarianists, underestimate
aesthetics andemotionality.9
Russianneoconservativeintellectualsbelievein‘conjuration’throughwordsand
images,thatis,theybelievenotinareflectivefunctionofartbutinitscreative,ritua-
listic function. Neoconservative texts are supposed to enchant and bewitch; they
emulatethestyle ofamanifesto andarefullofmetaphors,starkepithets,andexag-
5 gerations.Theyespeciallylackanyargumentationbutinsteadexhibitapowerfuland
1
0 energetic flow of magical formulas and symbols. The sociologist and publicist
2
y Alexandr Kustarev in his paper entitled ‘Conservatism and...Conservatism’ uses
a
M thetermantisystemicconservatism,mentioningthecontradictionsinsidethismove-
16 ment:revolutionaryrhetoric,ontheonehand,andthesearchforthemodelsofsocial
7 order in the past, on the other:
2
3:
0 [...]antisystemicconservatism[...]islookingfortheidealanywherebutthe
at
] present. This unites it with the millenarian eschatological heresies of the
s
e Middle Ages.
c
vi
er [...] antisystemic conservatism of the Late Modern period is radical in its
S
y rejection of the present, which is proclaimed to be degenerate and is doomed
r
ra to perish. It is constantly looking for, and finding, signs of the coming ‘crash
b
Li of the system’. Without these apocalyptic ‘forebodings’, without the image
E oftheDoomandthecoming‘salvation’,itspasse´ismwouldlooklikeafruitless
S
L aesthetic pose[...]10
[
y
b
d Futuristicandapocalypticthemes,revolutionaryrhetoricandaspirationsfor‘the
e
d restorationofthefuture’thatKustarevmentionsarethemaincharacteristicfeatures
a
o of Russian neoconservative ideology, which requires a more detailed discussion.
nl
w
o
D
FoundingFathers
Thegodfathersofpost-Sovietconservatismarewell-knownmediafiguresinRussia:
AleksandrProkhanov,SergeiKurginyan,andAleksandrDugin.Theirprojectsforthe
futureRussia – TheFifthEmpire,TheSovietUnion2.0,andTheEurasianEmpire –
differ in detail but all promote state messianism, imperial utopianism, and anti-
Western rhetoric. They advocate the imperial way of development of Russia and
attempt to prevent the split of the patriotic camp into ‘the Reds’ (the adherents of
‘the Soviet idea’) and ‘the Whites’ (the advocates of monarchy and Orthodoxy).
The godfathers argue that present-day non-imperial Russian nationalism only leads
to the collapse of Russia as an independent state and to the disintegration of the
‘large space’ of Eurasia as a whole. Prokhanov, Dugin and Kurginyan emphasize
that Russia (the Soviet Union) has never been a monoethnic nation state and that
Russian nationalism isa post-Soviet phenomenon.
360 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
AleksandrProkhanov(born1938),awriterandjournalist,iseditor-in-chiefofthe
newspaper Zavtra [Tomorrow]. He is widely known as a member of the patriotic
opposition,as a ‘soldier of the Soviet Empire’, and as the author of the best-selling
books Gospodin Geksogen [Mister Hexogen] (2002), Krasno-korichnevyi [Red-
and-brown] (2003), Politolog [Political scientist] (2005), and others. During the
last decade, Prokhanov has frequently taken part in different TV debates, which he
as a rule wins against his liberal opponents with great support of the audience. In
summer 2013 Prokhanov made his first public appearance on the International
Youth Educational Forum ‘Seliger’, which is a token of the changed relationship
between the State and the patriotic opposition.
SergeiKurginyan(born1949)isatheatredirectorandpoliticalanalyst,thehost
5 ofthepoliticaltalkshowsHistoricalProcessandTheLawofTime,thedirectorofthe
1
0 Kurginyananalyticalcentre,theleaderofthemovementTheEssenceofTimeanda
2
y propagandist of The Red Revenge. In December 2011 he founded the Anti-Orange
a
M Committee, whose goal was to neutralize the effect of the Bolotnaia protests and
16 prevent ‘Perestroika-2’. At present Kurginyan is fighting against the existing
7 system of juvenile justice and the reform of higher education.
2
3: AleksandrDugin(born1962)isknownbothinRussiaandintheWestasageo-
0
at politicianandtheauthorofthedoctrineofneo-Eurasianism.11In1991Duginwrote
s] hisprogrammaticessay‘TheGreatWaroftheContinents’,whichbrieflypresentshis
e
vic eclectic concept of neo-Eurasian geopolitics. He has published more than 30 books
er since then; was until recently a professor at Moscow State University and Head of
S
y theDepartmentofSociologyofInternationalRelations,butwasfiredforhisradical-
r
ra ismintheUkrainiancrisis.WesternmediaoftencallsDuginPutin’sadvisor,whichis
b
Li an overstatement; Dugin’sinfluenceonthe regime ismostlikely indirect. In oneof
E hisrecentinterviews,Duginanswersthequestionabouttheinfluenceofhisideason
S
L the formation of official ideology:
[
y
b
d [...]myinfluenceismuchmoreindirectratherthandirect,thoughIdoactasa
e
d consultant.Myideasarebeingre-writtenbytheKremlin’spoliticalstrategists
a
o andstartlivingontheirown.Itdoesnotreallymatterhowtheyfunction.Iama
nl
w manofideas,soIdonotcare.Igenerateideasasarepresentativeofacertain
o
D conservativeschool.Thisisaconservativetradition,notacommunistorliberal
one,andIhavebeendoingthisforthelast25years.Itdoesnotmatterhowthis
influence is effected, but the fact of influence is undeniable.12
ThecooperationofProkhanov,Kurginyan,andDuginstartedintheearly1990sand
continues to the present day. During the 1990s they belonged to the right-wing
opposition and did not have any access to the official media. In 2003, however,
after the famous speech of Anatolii Chubais13 who had called the future Russia
a ‘liberal empire’, the ban on the word ‘empire’ was removed, which made it
possible for many imperial projects to come to light. After the ‘colour’ revolutions
in the mid-2000s, the influence of the imperial camp started to steadily grow.
Those who closely follow Russian political life know that the neoconservative
godfathers were the main organizers of a pro-Putin rally on Poklonnaia hill in
2012.
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN MESSIANISM 361
The YoungConservatives
Thegenerationofyoungconservatives,representedmainlybypoliticalscientistsand
journalistsbroughttogetherinthe1990sundertheinfluenceofDugin,becameactive
in the 2000s. In the same period neoconservatives started organizing formal groups
andorganizations.Thelastdecadesawalargenumberofconservativesocio-political
movements, think tanks and media:
. The party Eurasia, later International Eurasian Movement (leader Aleksandr
Dugin), 2003
. The Seraph Club14 (Maxim Sokolov, Aleksandr Privalov, Mikhail Leont’ev,
film director Aleksei Balabanov, Valerii Fadeev) 2003
15 . Eurasian Youth Union (leader Pavel Kanishchev) 2005
0
2 . The Russian Project (Andrei Kobiakov, Vitaly Averianov) 2005–2007
y
a . TheConservativePressClub(EgorKholmogorov,MikhailGolovanov,Vadim
M
6 Tsymburskii, KonstantinKrylov, Boris Mezhuev) 2005
7 1 . ThealmanacTheNorthernKatechonandtheclubKatechonattheDepartment
2 of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Science (Arkadii Maler, Kirill
3:
0 Frolov)2005, 2007
] at . The League of Conservative Journalists (DmitriiVolodikhin) 2006
s
ce . The journal Russian Observer (EgorKholmogorov)2008
rvi . The Centre of Conservative Research (Aleksandr Dugin)2008
e
S . The journal Odnako [However] (MikhailLeont’ev) 2009
y
ar . TheInstituteof Dynamic Conservatism (VitalyAverianov,AndreiKobiakov,
r
b AndreiFursov, Maxim Kalashnikov) 2009.
Li
E
S
L Thesecommunitiesappearedasaresponsetothe‘colourful’revolutionsandthe
[
y conflictwithGeorgiain2008.Themassprotestsof2011andtheappearanceof‘non-
b
d systemic opposition’ was interpreted by the conservatives as an attempt by foreign
e
d forcestoorganize‘theorangerevolution’andtoinitiate‘Perestroika-2’.Theconser-
a
nlo vatives reacted byorganizing the followingstructures:
w
o
D
. The movement The Essence of Time (Sergei Kurginyan) 2011
. The Izborsk Club (September 2012, Izborsk). This first Russian neoconserva-
tivethinktank,financedbytheKremlin,unifiedalmostall(namely27)promi-
nent conservative right-wing intellectuals of modern Russia, among them
Aleksandr Prokhanov, Aleksandr Dugin, Mikhail Leont’ev, Sergei Glaz’ev,
Leonid Ivashov, Natalia Narochnitskaia, Nikolai Starikov, Andrei Fursov,
Mikhail Deliagin, Maxim Shevchenko, Mikhail Khazin, archimandrite
Tikhon (Shevkunov), Maxim Kalashnikov,andVladislav Shurygin.
One of the main goals of these organizations is to unite the Red and the White
branches of the patriotic movement. The Izborsk Club members believe that the
post-Soviet identity has to encompass both the technocratic Soviet element and the
mystical Orthodoxone.
362 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
The New Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2013)
ThethirdredactionoftheForeignPolicyConceptoftheRussianFederation,signed
by Putin in February 2013, points to a critical stage in the history of foreign
relations.15 The third redaction has many parallels with the key points of Putin’s
pre-electionessay‘RussiaandtheChangingWorld’,whichwaspublishedon27Feb-
ruary2012andwasdedicatedtoforeignpolicy.Oneofhisthesesisthattheincrease
ofinstabilityintheworldisduetotheattemptsoftheWest,primarilyNATOandthe
UnitedStates,tointerferewiththeinternalaffairsofothercountries.Apartfromthat,
Putin states, the repartition of the market is the real cause of military interventions
that contravene the UN statutes. The appeals to human rights and democracy in the
contextofthis‘humanitarianintervention’are,accordingtoPutin,apuredemagogy:
5
1
0 Theyoftensaythathumanrightsaremoreimportantthanthesovereigntyofthe
2
y state. It is without doubt; crimes against humanity should be punished in the
a
M internationalcourt.However,whenthisclauseisusedtoviolatethesovereignty
16 ofthestate,whenhumanrightsareprotectedfromtheoutsideandselectively,
7 andby‘protecting’theserights,therightsofmanypeopleareviolated,includ-
2
3: ingthemostbasicandsacralone,therightoflife,thenwearefacednotwitha
0
at noble cause but witha pure demagogy.16
]
s
e The new redaction of foreign policy lacks such explicit invectives, and NATO
c
vi andtheUnitedStatesarenotnamedasthemainfactorsofdestabilization.Neverthe-
r
e
S less,theConceptcriticizestheattempts‘ofsomecountries’toignorethedecisionsof
y
r theUNSecurityCouncil,militaryinterventionsinsovereignstates,theimpositionof
a
r
b ‘theirownvalues’,whichleadstochaosinforeignrelations,andalsothe‘re-ideolo-
Li
E gization of foreign relations’. In this unstable and dangerous world Russia has a
S ‘unique role, formed centuries ago, to be a balancing element of international
L
y [ affairs and the development of the worldcivilization’.17
b
d Incomparisonwiththe2008redaction,alotofemphasisisputontheconceptof
e
d ‘softpower’,interpretedintwocontexts.Ontheonehand,softpowerisconsideredto
a
o bedestructivewhenusedinordertoexertpoliticalpressureonsovereignstatesandto
nl
w manipulate public opinion (includingfinancing humanitarian andhumanrightspro-
o
D jectsandforeignNGOs).Ontheotherhand,itisstressedthatRussiahastoinitiatean
‘ideologicaloffensive’anddevelopitsown‘softpower’.Oneofthemaingoalshere
is‘defending...Russianapproachestothehumanrightsprotection’.Itisnoteworthy
that thisstatement ismissing from the 2008 redaction.
Tosummarize, accordingtothe textof thenew Foreign Policy Concept,Russia
considersitselfontheonehandasanimportantmilitaryandeconomicpoleandasa
uniquerestrainingfactorintheworldofincreasingchaos,andontheother,asoneof
theworld’sideologicalpolesandauniquecivilization,whosevaluesshouldbetrans-
planted to the world through ‘softpower’.
ThisviewofRussiaasanalternativeandasarestrainingfactorinthechaosof
international relations is in fact a ‘bureaucratic’, secular version of the messianic
conceptofKatechon.Iwillexaminethisconceptindetailbecauseheretheinfluence
of the messianic ideology promoted by right-wing Russian intellectuals on foreign
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN MESSIANISM 363
andsecuritypolicyisespeciallynoticeable.Apartfromthat,theconceptofKatechon
explains the process of politicization of Orthodoxy, which gained much speed after
the 2012 presidentialelections.
Russia, the Restrainer asa National Idea
Katechon andAnomia
Theword‘Katechon’isfromtheGreeko´ Kat1´xvn,meaning‘thewithholding’.The
historiosophicconcept of Katechon originates in theChristian Roman Empire. This
eschatologicaldoctrineofRomeasthelastKingdomwhichprotectstheworldfrom
5 the Antichrist is common to all Christian cultures. The Byzantine teaching of the
1
0 Roman Empire as Katechon is based on the Book of Daniel about the four king-
2
y doms.18 The Christian eschatological interpretations of Katechon are based on the
a
M Second Epistleof Paul the Apostle to the Thessalonians:
6
1
7 Let no one in any way deceive you, for it will not come unless the apostasy
3:2 comes first, and the man of lawlessness is revealed, the son of destruction,
0 who opposes and exalts himself above every so-called god or object of
at
] worship, so that he takes his seat in the temple of God, displaying himself as
s
e being God. Do you not remember that while I was still with you, I was
c
vi telling you these things? And you know what restrains him now, so that in
r
e
S his time he will be revealed. For the mystery of lawlessness is already at
y
r work; only he who now restrains will do so until he is taken out of the way.
a
r
b (2 Thess. 2:3–7)
Li
E StJohnChrysostominterpretsPaul’swordsasareferencetotheEmperorandhis
S
L powerthatwithholdsandprotectstheworldfromtheadventoftheAntichrist.Inthis
[
by teaching,theRomanEmpireisanantithesisofAnomiaandwillexistuntiltheSecond
ed Advent,restrainingthechaos.Thisempirehasnoconstanttemporalorspatialcharac-
d
a teristicsandcanmanifestitselfontheterritoryofdifferentstates(translatioimperii
o
nl romani).
w
o In Russian tradition, this historiosophic concept is presented in the well-known
D
concept of Moscow as the Third Rome. It was authored by the monk Philotheus
from the Belozersk monastery in 1523–1524, and was officially recorded in the
1589 Founding Deed of the Council of Moscow, inwhich the Moscow Patriarchate
was established.19 The postulate that the Russian people are the chosen nation and
their terrifying burden is to fight against the Antichrist led to the formation of a
specificrulingstyleintheTsardomofMuscovy.AlreadyduringIvantheTerrible’s
reign it was specified that the two enemies of Moscow as the Katechon are the
external Antichrist, that is, all lands beyond Muscovy, and the internal Antichrist,
which is no less dangerous than the external one. Internal resistance to the State
under certain circumstances and especially during unstable periods is now inter-
preted as an indulgence to the powers of Anomia and chaos. This eschatological
view becomes a constant of Russian history and the Russian understanding of the
State as the Restrainer.