Contemporary nuclear debates: missile defense, arms control, and arms races in the twenty-first century

346 Pages·2002·0.73 MB·English

by  Alexander T. Lennon

Praise for Contemporary Nuclear Debates
“For those tired of the old arguments, welcome to the new arguments.
No matter what your position, Contemporary Nuclear Debates is a trea-
sure trove of informed analysis and new thinking on some of today’s
most critical issues.”
—Joseph Cirincione, Director,
—Carnegie Endowment Non-Proliferation Project
“Over the last decade the United States and the Russian Federation,
through the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative, have deactivated
nearly 6,000 nuclear warheads. Yet the weapons of the Cold War con-
tinue to threaten peace and stability. One of the tremendous ironies of
the post-Cold War world—and an important focus of this book—is that
our countries may face a greater threat today than we did at the height
of the Cold War.”
—U.S. Senator Richard Lugar
“Could missile defense and arms control advance the U.S. and interna-
tional security in the new century? Contemporary Nuclear Debates is a
remarkable contribution to the current deliberation.”
—Dingli Shen, Professor and Deputy Director,
—Center for American Studies, Fudan University, China
“Contemporary Nuclear Debates succeeds admirably in presenting a wide
range of views on traditional nuclear questions recast in the current in-
ternational environment. Especially noteworthy is its treatment of the
potential impact of a limited U.S. national missile defense.”
—Dean A. Wilkening,
—Center for International Security and Cooperation,
—Stanford University
Contemporar y
Nuclear Debates
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A W Q R
ASHINGTON UARTERLY EADER
Contemporar y
Nuclear Debates
M D ,
ISSILE EFENSE
A C ,
RMS ONTROL AND
A R
RMS ACES IN THE
T -F C
WENTY IRST ENTURY
EDITED BY
A T. J. L
LEXANDER ENNON
T MIT P
HE RESS
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
The contents of this book were first published in The Washington Quarterly (ISSN 0163-
660X), a publication of The MIT Press under the sponsorship of The Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS). Except as otherwise noted, copyright in each article is
owned jointly by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and CSIS. No article may be
reproduced in whole or in part except with the express written permission of The MIT
Press.
Michael Nacht, “The Politics: How Did We Get Here?” TWQ23, No. 3 (Summer 2000);
Stephen J. Hadley, “A Call to Deploy,” TWQ 23, No. 3 (Summer 2000); Richard L. Garwin,
“A Defense That Will Not Defend,” TWQ23, No. 3 (Summer 2000); Hans Binnendijk and
George Stewart, “Toward Missile Defenses from the Sea,” TWQ25, No. 3 (Summer 2002);
Kevin McLaughlin, “Would Space-Based Defenses Improve Security?” TWQ25, No. 3
(Summer 2002); James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Missile Defense after the
ABM Treaty,” TWQ25, No. 3 (Summer 2002); Francois Heisbourg, “Brussels’s Burden,”
TWQ23, No. 3 (Summer 2000); Yoichi Funabashi, “Tokyo’s Temperance,” TWQ23, No. 3
(Summer 2000); Brahma Chellaney, “New Delhi’s Dilemma,” TWQ23, No. 3 (Summer
2000); Efraim Karsh, “Israel’s Imperative,” TWQ23, No. 3 (Summer 2000); Scott Snyder,
“Pyongyang’s Pressure,” TWQ23, No. 3 (Summer 2000); Anoushiravan Ehteshami,
“Tehran’s Tocsin,” TWQ23, No. 3 (Summer 2000); Michael McDevitt, “Beijing’s Bind,”
TWQ23, No. 3 (Summer 2000); Alexander A. Pikayev, “Moscow’s Matrix,” TWQ23, No.
3 (Summer 2000); Leon Fuerth, “Return of the Nuclear Debate,” TWQ24, No. 4 (Autumn
2001); Keith B. Payne, “Action-Reaction Metaphysics and Negligence,” TWQ24, No. 4
(Autumn 2001); Bruno Tertrais, “Do Arms Races Matter?” TWQ24, No. 4 (Autumn
2001); Leon Sloss, “The New Arms Race,” TWQ24, No. 4 (Autumn 2001); Harold Brown,
“Is Arms Control Dead?” TWQ23, No. 2 (Spring 2000); James Schlesinger, “The Demise of
Arms Control?” TWQ23, No. 2 (Spring 2000); Brad Roberts, “The Road Ahead,” TWQ
23, No. 2 (Spring 2000); Thomas Graham, “Strengthening Arms Control,” TWQ23, No. 2
(Spring 2000); Stephen Cambone, “An Inherent Lesson,” TWQ23, No. 2 (Spring 2000);
Rose Gottemoeller, “Arms Control in a New Era,” TWQ24, No. 3 (Summer 2001); John
Steinbruner, “Renovation through Reassurance,” TWQ23, No. 2 (Spring 2000).
Selection and introduction, copyright © 2002 by The Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage
and retrieval system, without permission in writing from The MIT Press. For information,
please address The MIT Press, Journals Department, Five Cambridge Center, Cambridge,
MA 02142.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Contemporary nuclear debates: missile defense, arms control, and arms races in the twenty-
first century / edited by Alexander T.J. Lennon
—p.—cm. — (A Washington quarterly reader)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-262-62166-5 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Ballistic missile defenses—United States–2. Nuclear weapons.–3. Arms race.–
4. Nuclear arms control.–5. World politics—21st century.–I. Lennon, Alexander T.–
II. Series.
UG743 .C65 2002
358.1'74'0973—dc21
2002026437
C
ONTENTS
vii Introduction: Modernizing Strategic Nuclear Debates ■
Alexander T. J. Lennon
P I: U.S. N M D : W H ?
ART ATIONAL ISSILE EFENSE HEN AND OW
3 The Politics: How Did We Get Here? ■ Michael Nacht
12 A Call to Deploy ■ Stephen J. Hadley
29 A Defense That Will Not Defend ■ Richard L. Garwin
48 Toward Missile Defenses from the Sea ■ Hans Binnendijk
and George Stewart
65 Would Space-Based Defenses Improve Security? ■
Kevin McLaughlin
83 Missile Defense after the ABM Treaty ■ James M. Lindsay
and Michael E. O’Hanlon
P II: G P M D
ART LOBAL ERCEPTIONS OF ISSILE EFENSE
101 Brussels’s Burden ■ François Heisbourg
110 Tokyo’s Temperance ■ Yoichi Funabashi
122 New Delhi’s Dilemma ■ Brahma Chellaney
133 Israel’s Imperative ■ Efraim Karsh
141 Pyongyang’s Pressure ■ Scott Snyder
151 Tehran’s Tocsin ■ Anoushiravan Ehteshami
158 Beijing’s Bind ■ Michael McDevitt
171 Moscow’s Matrix ■ Alexander A. Pikayev
P III: D A R M A ?
ART O RMS ACES ATTER NYMORE
183 Return of the Nuclear Debate ■ Leon Fuerth
197 Action-Reaction Metaphysics and Negligence ■ Keith B. Payne
213 Do Arms Races Matter? ■ Bruno Tertrais
226 The New Arms Race ■ Leon Sloss
P IV: I A C D ?
ART S RMS ONTROL EAD
245 Is Arms Control Dead? ■ Harold Brown
251 The Demise of Arms Control? ■ James Schlesinger
256 The Road Ahead ■ Brad Roberts
273 Strengthening Arms Control ■ Thomas Graham
290 An Inherent Lesson ■ Stephen Cambone
304 Arms Control in a New Era ■ Rose Gottemoeller
321 Renovation through Reassurance ■ John Steinbruner
Alexander T. J. Lennon
Introduction:
Modernizing Strategic
Nuclear Debates
D
o nuclear weapons matter anymore? By opening this book, you
have already acknowledged that the answer is “yes”; but the reasons
why nuclear weapons raise concern and the terms of debate about their
future have changed dramatically during the last ten to fifteen years.
Contemporary threats derive primarily from smaller states or terrorists
getting access to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Yet, ironically, many of the same debates that have taken place in
the past continue: Should the United States build a national (or strate-
gic) missile defense system? How would our friends and former, or even
current, adversaries react? Are arms races still a concern? Can arms con-
trol help? One may wonder if these debates are still relevant or if in-
ertia drives them.
This book turns to some of the world’s most prominent defense and
nuclear experts to update these strategic nuclear controversies. Al-
though the questions may remain the same and their salience is undi-
minished, the answers are dramatically different.
Part I asks: How should the United States build national (or strate-
gic) missile defense? This section does not address in great detail
whether a national missile defense should be built. Michael Nacht ex-
plains some of the political reasons that made missile defense inevitable
at the turn of the twenty-first century, tracing the debate as far back as
Alexander T. J. Lennon is editor-in-chief of The Washington Quarterly, and is
pursuing his Ph.D. in policy studies, part-time, at the University of Maryland’s
School of Public Affairs.
Contemporary Nuclear Debates vii
l
Lennon
the Johnson administration in the 1960s. Steven J. Hadley, who has
since become deputy national security adviser in George W. Bush’s ad-
ministration, introduces some of the threats and concerns about de-
ploying national missile defense. Concluding this section, James M.
Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon argue that the September 11 terror-
ist attacks have entrenched the consensus in favor of missile defense,
but that the Bush administration has not yet decided what system to
deploy.
The other three chapters in Part I examine this next, and even more
contentious, discussion: How should the United States deploy national,
or strategic, missile defense? This question will dominate the future
policy debate. At what stage should a missile defense attempt to inter-
cept a missile? Where should the United States base a missile defense
system? Muddling these separate questions is extremely easy but distin-
guishing them is critical.
Richard L. Garwin outlines arguments for a boost-phase missile de-
fense, which many of the other authors in this section subsequently
evaluate. The first questions to ask are whether a missile defense sys-
tem should provide a boost-phase capability—or the ability to intercept
a missile early while it is accelerating into the atmosphere, generally
within three to five minutes of its launch—and when such a system
might be technologically deployable.
The other issue discussed within Part I focuses on where to base
such a defense system. Although Bill Clinton’s administration proposed
a ground-based system, Hans Binnendijk and George Stewart sketch
the arguments for sea-based systems, and Kevin McLaughlin addresses
space basing. The choices about whether to base systems on the ground,
at sea, or in space are not mutually exclusive, nor does this book intend
to imply that dilemma. For one thing, different elements of a system
may be located in different places. Where one bases a system’s “eyes”
(radars and sensors) may not be where one bases the interceptors them-
selves. Although even this introduction may lead some readers to fear
getting lost in a sea of technological jargon, these articles concentrate
on strategic arguments to inform readers not well versed in the termi-
viii Contemporary Nuclear Debates