Contemporary Action Theory Volume 1: Individual Action

329 Pages·1997·22.08 MB·English

by  Georg Henrik von Wright (auth.)

CONTE~ORARYACTIONTHEORY
VOLUMEI:
INDIVIDUAL ACTION
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Managing Editor:
JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University
Editors:
DIRK V AN DALEN, University ofUtrecht, The Netherlands
DONALD DAVIDSON, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley
THEO A.F. KUIPERS, University ofGroningen, The Netherlands
PATRICK SUPPES, Stanford University, California
JAN WOLENSKI, Jagiellonian University, Krak6w, Poland
VOLUME266
CONTEMPORARY
ACTION THEORY
VOLUME 1:
INDIVIDUAL ACTION
Edited by
GHITA HOLMSTRÖM-HINTIKKA
Boston University and University 0/ Helsinki
and
RAIMO TUOMELA
Academy 0/ Finland
Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Printed on acid-free paper
ISBN 978-90-481-4914-8 ISBN 978-94-017-0439-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-0439-7
All Rights Reserved
© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1997.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1 st edition 1997
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, eIectronic or mechanicaI,
incJuding photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
PREFACE
A couple of decades aga one could speak: of a boom in the field of philosophy
of action, but in recent years this field has seemingly been leading a more quiet
life. Nevertheless, important developments have taken place not only in the
traditional philosophical and logical problems of action but also in the computa
tional aspects of action as weIl as in the new field of the theory of social
(especially multi-agent) action. To mention an example from outside philoso
phy, in artificial intelligence problems of coordination and cooperation have
recently acquired enormous importance and have led to much interesting new
theoretical work as weIl as to practical applications.
Contemporary Action Theory is a two-volume work which attempts a
comprehensive assessment of the current state of the art by leading researchers.
We believe that such an assessment is warranted in view of the most recent
developments in action theory - especially as no other similar current work is
available. The two volumes of Contemporary Action Theory are entitled
Individual Action (Vol. I) and Social Action (Vol. 11). Although there is some
overlap between the fields covered by the two volumes, the first basically
concerns the logic and philosophy of single-agent actions while all the papers
in the second one are concerned with social action. Volume I covers standard
questions in the philosophy of single-agent action, while Volume 11 is concerned
with the social aspects of human action, especially with multi-agent action.
Volume 11 contains papers not only by philosophers but also by researchers
working in artificial intelligence (or in closely related fields). The anthology
was not intended to cover contemporary action theory systematically, but in fact
it ends up doing almost that. Thus practically all central questions dealt with by
traditional philosophy and theory of action are discussed in the papers included
here.
This project has been a genuinely joint one, and the order in which the
authors are listed has only alphabetical significance. Our project would not have
been possible without invaluable support by the Academy of Finland which
facilitated not only Tuomela's contribution to the months-Iong editing process,
especially to that of volume 2, but also the practicalities of the process includ
ing the translation of G.H. von Wright's paper and the preparation ofthe index.
We are grateful to all our contributors for sharing with us the insight of their
ongoing research. We also extend our thanks to Mrs. Auli Kaipainen. Her work
was supported by Kluwer Academic Publishers, to whom we are grateful for
accepting our volumes to the series Synthese Library. Without her excellent
v
G. Holmström-Hintikka anti R. Tuomela (eds.), Contemporary Action Theory, v-vi.
vi PREFACE
copy-editing this material and carrying out the other secretarial responsibilities,
this work would not have been possible. Our thanks are also due to Mr. Pekka
Mäkelä for assistance in preparation of this anthology.
March 1997
GHITA HOLMSTRÖM-HINTIKKA RAIMO TUOMELA
Boston University and Academy 0/ Finland
University 0/ Helsinki
TAßLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ix
GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT I Explanation and Understanding of
Actions 1
REX MARTIN I von Wright and Collingwood on Causation and the Expla-
nation of Human Action 21
AUSONIO MARRAS I Metaphysical Foundations of Action Explanation 45
GEORGE WILSON I Reasons as Causes for Action 65
RISTO HILPINEN IOnStates, Actions, Omissions and Norms 83
GHITA HOLMSTRÖM-HINTIKKA I Actions in Action 109
ALFRED R. MELE I Passive Action 135
LENNART NORDENFELT I On Ability, Opportunity and Competence: An
Inquiry into People's Possibility for Action 145
DOUGLAS WALTON I Actions and Inconsistency: The Closure Problem of
Practical Reasoning 159
ROBERT AUDI I Intending and Its Place in the Theory of Action 177
MYLES BRAND I Intention and Intentional Action 197
HUGH I. MCCANN I On When the Will Is Free 219
GOTTFRIED SEEBASS I When Is an Action Free? 233
IOHN BISHOP I Naturalising Mental Action 251
DAVID-HILLEL RUBEN I Doing Without Happenings: Three Theories of
Action 267
FREDERICK ADAMS I Cognitive Trying 287
INDEX OF NAMES 315
TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOLUME 11: SOCIAL ACTION 317
vii
VOLUME I: INDIVIDUAL ACTION
INTRODUCTION
Human action never ceases to fascinate human beings and the human mind.
Ordinary people as weH as specialists in fields as diverse as philosophers,
psychologists, lawyers and theologians all take deep interest in the explanation
and understanding of actions. A layperson might simply want to understand
why someone did what she did. But so do lawyers and psychiatrists also -
although for different reasons and with certain purposes in mind. In the contem
porary philosophical literature on action theory beginning in the fifties serious
developments have taken place in this particular area. Influential in this regard
has been Georg Henrik von Wright whose Explanation and Understanding
(1971) has caused a flow of discussions and brought about numerous artieles.
Significantly enough his paper in this very volume is entitled "Explanation and
Understanding in Action". He is also subject to a comparison with Collingwood
in Rex Martin's paper "von Wright and CoHingwood on Causation and the
Explanation of Human Action". What are actions? How can we understand
actions? What causes people's actions? A causal explanation is not easy to come
up with, nor is it usually a matter of one single explanation. "Metaphysical
Foundations of Action Explanation" by Ausonio Marras and "Reasons as
Causes for Action" by George Wilson are good examples of the subtleties we
are dealing with even in the most basic matters, the causes for our actions.
Other aspects of the explanation of human action are dealt with in the
various writings on action logic, in particular the logic of individual action. In
this regard several famous logicians have forcefully developed far-going
theories on single-agent action. Be it enough here to mention only a few
representatives. Among others, Nuel Belnap, Brian CheHas, Stig Kanger,
Ingmar Pörn, Krister Segerberg, Georg Henrik von Wright and Lennart Äqvist
have all in a major way contributed to the development of this subarea of action
theory. In his paper "On States, Actions, Omissions and Norms" Risto Hilpinen
helps us to understand some of the developments in action logic and also to put
these things into perspective with regard to other modalities, in particular to
deontic concepts. One instantiation of the Fenno-Scandian tradition (Kanger
Lindahl-Pörn) mentioned by Hilpinen is Ghita Holmström-Hintikka's further
developments of her action theory based on the tripartition of agent causation.
The basic elements, ineluding actions are conditions (states of affairs) as they
are in Kanger' s theory.
Activity, passivity, competence, practical reason, all these concepts touch
upon central features in human action, features which have a bearing on
ix
G. Holmström-Hintikka and R. Tuomela (eds.), Contemporary Action Theory. Vol. I, ix-xvii.
x INTRODUCTION
people's health and weH-being as weH as to their social and legal behaviour. All
these matters are discussed in the logic group of papers appearing below.
When behaviour is being evaluated, praise and blame will depend, not only
on results accomplished or not accomplished, but also on the intentions behind
the actions. This topic can be dealt with from a theoretical point of view as by
Robert Audi or from a "practical" causal point of view as by Myles Brand.
Freedom of Action and Freedom of the Will are classical and yet always
inspiring topics. It seems as if there is always something new and interesting to
be said. These two topics support the still more specialized topics on mental
action and the Causal Theory of Action versus the Agent Causation Theory, not
to mention cognitive trying.
A SHORT PRESENTATION OF THE PAPERS IN VOLUME I
1. An important type of explanations of action makes reference to reasons, says
Georg Henrik von Wright in "Explanation and Understanding of Actions". The
author of the paper calls them "understanding explanations. " Often there are
several reasons for one and the same action - and possibly also reasons against
performing it. The fact that something is a reason for an action does not
necessarily mean that the action is performed for that reason. One must, in
other words, distinguish between the existence and the efficacy of reasons for
actions. This raises the question of the veracity of a suggested explanation when
the action is correct1y identified and the reasons for its performance are known.
The author defends a thesis that the efficacious reasons for an action are
those in the light of which we understand the action. The "tie" between the
action and the (efficacious) reason(s) is thus created by the act of understand
ing. When there is disagreement between the self-understanding of the agent
and an outside ob server, the latter may sometimes succeed in "converting" the
former to a new understanding of his motives. The nature of such "conver
sions" is discussed in the paper, and it is maintained that neither the agent nor
the outsider can claim an exclusive right to authority in the question which is
the correct explanation. The "criterion of truth" of the explanation is consensus
in the understanding of the action. It cannot be taken for granted that such
agreement of opinion can in all cases be attained even "in principle."
2. In "von Wright and CoHingwood on Causation and the Explanation of
Human Action" Rex Martin makes comparisons between the two philosophers.
Section one of this paper is concemed with setting out the views of Colling
wood and von Wright on the explanation of action. Here a single main model
or schema for the explanation of actions is identified (that is, for explanations
of actions by reference to reasons - to certain thoughts and motivations of the
agent). This model provides the root of both von Wright's notion of practical
inference and Collingwood's idea of re-enactment. In this first section the