Table Of ContentCONSTRUCTIVISM IN SCIENCE EDUCATION
Constructivism in
Science Education
A Philosophical Examination
edited by
MICHAEL R. MATTHEWS
School of Education Studies,
The University of New South Wales
SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
DORDRECHT I BOSTON I LONDON
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Constructivism in science educatlon : a phl1osophlcal examlnatlon I
edlted by Mlchael R. Matthews.
p. cm.
Includes blbliographical references and index.
ISBN 978·0·7923·4924·2 ISBN 978·94·011·5032·3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978·94·011·5032·3
1. SCience--Study and teachlng--Phl1osophy. 2. Constructivlsm
(Philosophy) I. Matthews. Mlchael R.
C181.C612 1998
507'.1--dc21 97-47347
ISBN 978-0-7923-4924-2
Printed on acid-free paper
AII Rights Reserved
© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1998
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover lst edition 1998
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
to
Wallis Suchting (1931-1997)
friend and teacher
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SOURCES viii
PREFACE ............................................................ ix
MICHAEL R. MAT IHEWS / Introductory Comments on Philosophy and
Constructivism in Science Education ..................................... 1
ERNST VON GLASERSFELD / Cognition, Construction of Knowledge, and
Teaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11
ROBERT NOLA / Constructivism in Science and in Science Education:
A Philosophical Critique ............................................. 31
WALLIS A. SUCHTING / Constructivism Deconstructed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 61
ERNST VON GLASERSFELD / Constructivism Reconstructed: A Reply to
Suchting .......................................................... 93
MARK H. BICKHARD / Constructivisms and Relativisms: A Shopper's Guide 99
RICHARD E. GRANDY / Constructivisms and Objectivity: Disentangling
Metaphysics from Pedagogy ......................................... 113
HELGE KRAGH / Social Constructivism, the Gospel of Science, and the
Teaching of Physics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 125
DENIS C. PHILLIPS / Coming to Terms with Radical Social Constructivisms . . . .. 139
PETER SLEZAK / Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Science Education 159
WALLIS SUCHTING / Reflections on Peter Slezak: and the 'Sociology of
Scientific Knowledge' .............................................. 189
MICHAEL R. MATTHEWS / Educational Constructivism and Philosophy:
Some References .................................................. 217
NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS ..................................... 225
NAME INDEX ...................................................... 227
SUBJECT INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 231
SOURCES
Matthews, M .R.: 1997, 'Introductory Comments on Philosophy and
Constructivism in Science Education', Science & Education 6( 1-2), 5-14.
Glasersfeld, E. von: 1989, 'Cognition, Construction of Knowledge and Teaching',
Synthese 80( 1), 121-140.
Nola, R.: 1997, 'Constructivism in Science and in Science Education: A
Philosophical Critique', Science & Education 6(1-2),55-83.
Suchting, W.A.: 1992, 'Constructivism Deconstructed', Science & Education
1(3), 223-254.
Glasersfeld, E. von: 1992, 'Constructivism Reconstructed: A Reply to Suchting',
Science & Education 1(4),379-384.
Bickhard, M.H.: 1997, 'Constructivism and Relativisms: A Shopper's Guide',
Science & Education 6(1-2), 29-42.
Grandy, R.E.: 1997, 'Constructivism and Objectivity: Disentangling Metaphysics
from Pedagogy', Science & Education 6(1-2), 43-53.
Kragh, H.: 1998, 'Social Constructivism, the Gospel of Science and the Teaching
of Physics', Science & Education 7(3)
Phillips, D.C.: 1997, 'Coming to Terms with Radical Social Constructivisms',
Science & Education 6( 1-2), 85-104.
Slezak, P.: 1994a, 'Sociology of Science and Science Education: Part 1', Science
& Education 3(3),265-294.
Suchting, W.A.: 1997, 'Reflections on Peter Slezak and the "Sociology of
Scientific Knowledge"', Science & Education 6(1-2), 151-195. Note:
pps. 156-170 of this 1997 article are not included in the paper published
in this anthology.
PREFACE
All of these papers, with the exception of one, have been published in the journal Science
& Education, a bimonthly research journal associated with the International History,
Philosophy and Science Teaching Group. The exception, Ernst von Glasersfeld's
'Cognition, Construction of Knowledge, and Teaching' was published in a special issue of
the journal Synthese which was prepared for the International Group's first conference at
Florida State University in 1989.
The International Group aims to improve school and university science education
by making it more informed by the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. The
Group has a particular interest in bringing history, philosophy and sociology of science into
teacher-education programmes, and in applying these disciplines to theoretical and
pedagogical issues in science education.
This book brings together the work of philosophers, historians of science, cognitive
psychologists and educators in an effort to situate the epistemological claims of
constructivism in the history of philosophical ideas, and to advance the understanding and
evaluation of constructivist claims in science education.
The Introduction mentions some of the philosophical issues raised by constructivism,
and by the spread of constructivism from its learning-theory core into epistemology,
educational theory and ethics. Ernst von Glasersjeld, formerly professor of psychology at
the University of Georgia and now a member of the Institute for Scientific Reasoning at the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, argues for a radical constructivist view of scientific
and personal knowledge, a view which traces its lineage to Vico and which is instrumentalist
and anti-realist. Robert Nola, an associate professor of philosophy at the University of
Auckland draws on the history of epistemology to provide a philosophical critique of some
constructivist writing in education. Wallis Suchling, formerly an associate professor of
philosophy at the University of Sydney, provides a detailed and critical commentary on the
radical constructivist position of Ernst von Glasersfeld. Among other things he contends
that empiricism, in any form, is an inadequate epistemology for science. Ernst von
Glasersfeld replies to this criticism by defending instrumentalism and its notion of viability
as the criterion of knowledge in science and personal life. Mark Bickhard, a professor of
cognitive science and philosophy at Lehigh University, elaborates a taxonomy of
constructivism and, as a constructivist, suggests that the position is not tied to relativism or
to idealism, both of which he claims need to be rejected. Richard Grandy, a professor of
philosophy at Rice University, addresses the important question of disentangling the
philosophy and metaphysics of constructivism from its pedagogical practice. He says that
the claims of cognitive constructivism need to be distinguished from those of metaphysical
constructivism, and that cognitive constructivism has strong empirical support and suggests
important new directions for the conduct of science education. Beige Kragh, a professor of
the history of science at the University of Aarhus, poses a number of difficulties for social
constructivist analyses of the history of science, difficulties that do not confront realist
interpretations. He maintains that the rejection of social constructivism does not entail the
rejection of social or historical studies of science, and urges the inclusion of these in the
x PREFACE
science curriculum. Denis Phillips, a professor of education and of philosophy at Stanford
University, writes critically on social constructivism, saying that strong and exciting, but
untenable, claims are advanced, and then frequently qualified to the level oftritenesss. Peter
Slezak, a senior lecturer in cognitive science and philosophy of science at the University of
New South Wales, recognises that the core claims of the Edinburgh strong programme in
the sociology of scientific knowledge, if true, have a major impact on the traditional
rationale for science education in schools, but argues that these claims are flawed. Wallis
Suchting, in a second contribution, provides a detailed analysis of Peter Slezak's argument
against social constructivism, and defends the core of David Bloor's social constructivist
account against Slezak's criticisms. Suchting sketches an epistemological position that
avoids the errors of rationalism on the one hand, and social constructivism on the other,
while embracing their respective strengths. The book concludes with a hundred-item
Bibliography of articles and books that have addressed philosophical issues in educational
constructivism.
Constructi vism is a very influential theory of science education. In the past three decades
there have been over five thousand scholarly articles published on aspects of constructivism
and education, countless conference presentations have been made, there have been scores
of books on the subject, and at least one book series devoted to exploring the ramifications
for education of constructivist learning theory and epistemology. The Preface of a 1993
American Association for the Advancement of Science anthology on The Practice of
Constructivism in Science Teaching says that 'there is widespread acceptance of
constructivism' and that constructivism represents a 'paradigm change' in science education.
Constructivism is associated with a variety of philosophical positions in epistemology,
ontology, politics and ethics. Unfortunately these philosophical aspects of constructivism
are frequently taken for granted, or asserted without argument or awareness of the tradition
or depth of debate that has occurred around them. For instance two leading constructivists
have recently written that 'the authority for truth lies within each of us'. This claim, which
goes back at least to Protagoras in the 4th century BC, if true, is truly breath-taking in its
cultural and epistemological ramifications. But the claim is made without any argument, or
any consideration of its obvious flaws.
As with most isms, constructivism has suffered its share of confused interpretations.
And, to complicate matters, there are a variety of constructivisms: there are constructivist
theories of learning - originally the personal constructivism of Piaget and the social
constructivism ofVygotsky; there are constructivist theories ofteaching that in many ways
echo ancient Socratic injunctions and the more recent appeals of progressivist pedagogy;
and there are constructivist theories of knowledge, or constructivist epistemologies. Clearly
these varied interpretations and positions need to be untangled, and then evaluated. These
are the usual tasks of philosophical analysis.
Educational constructivism - originally learning theories and theories of pedagogy - has
got caught up in larger epistemological and philosophical disputes about the nature of
science and about human knowledge. In part these are the so-called 'science wars' prompted
by the claims of many social constructivists in philosophy of science, many of the Edinburgh
'Strong Programme' in the sociology of science, and many cultural historians of science.
The flavour of these claims can be seen in a recent piece on the Scientitic Revolution by a
cultural historian who writes: 'Historians today feel the need to defenestrate science, or at
least take it off its pedestal. Knowledge is no transcendental force for progress. Historically
PREFACE xi
understood it is local, it is plural, it embodies interests, it mobilizes the claims of groups and
classes, and, above all, it is recruited, willy-nilly, on all sides in wars of truth'.
Needless to say scientists, and many philosophers of a realist persuasion, have not taken
these post-modernist claims lying down. The debate, joined by scientists Lewis Wolpert,
Paul Gross, Norman Levitt and Alan Cromer, and philosophers such as Michael Devitt,
Larry Laudan, Ernan McMullin, Ian Hacking, Mario Bunge and David Stove has been, to
put it mildly, vigorous. The widely reported hoax (a spoof postmodernist attack on science)
perpertuated on an academic journal by the physicist David Sokal is indicative of the nature
and extent of the debate. So also is the need felt by the New York Academy of Sciences to
host a symposium titled A Defense of Science and Rationality (published in 1997 by Johns
Hopkins University Press).
It is understandable that educators have got caught up in these science wars. An item in,
indeed a goal of, nearly all science curricula is 'Learning About the Nature of Science'.
Teachers are expected to teach this topic, and students are expected to learn something about
it. Indeed many think that knowledge of the nature of science is the most important legacy
of a science education. As this topic is at the very heart of the science wars, educators who
pay attention to wider intellectual issues cannot but get caught up by the debates that are
raging.
Epistemological questions do not go away even if the large-scale science wars are
ignored. Teachers are concerned with children gaining knowledge, thus they have to be
attentive, as Socrates was two-and-a-half thousand years ago, to what knowledge is. This
involves teachers in epistemology, an involvement that is increasingly recognised in the
science education community, but one for which teachers are inadequately prepared by
standard programmes of science teacher education. Whatever the responsibility of
classroom teachers to be acquainted with core philosophical questions, the responsibilities
of teacher educators is far greater. The contributions in this volume will hopefully be of
assistance to teacher educators.
Clarification of language, and of concepts, has been one of the core features of
philosophy since before Socrates asked at the beginning of his dialogues 'What do you mean
by ..... ?' Contributors to this volume acknowledge the importance of such philosophical
analysis for sensible and informed resolution of complex intellectual issues, and thus for
educational policies, curricula and programmes. This analysis requires a willingness to
become acquainted with elements of the history of philosophical and educational ideas.
In science education research and debate there is a need for patience and attention to
meaning - in other words philosophy. Too often, crucial concepts, and claims in arguments,
are ambiguous or confused. For example, a recent article has claimed that' Science Studies
has shown that science is socially determined'. Clearly a lot hinges on what is meant by
'SOCially determined' (or 'socially constructed' as it is more frequently expressed) but the
article does not elaborate this linchpin claim. In one sense - science requires social
resources for its conduct, its research activities reflect social priorities, and science is a
communal endeavour - the claim is a truism. But in another sense - that science knowledge
claims are vindicated by social agreement, not by how the world is - the claim is highly
contentious. A great deal of the argument in the article is flawed by the author's failure to
specify what sense of 'social determination' is meant. The author engages in the common
practice of 'soft-focus' writing. This assists relaxed reading, but it inhibits understanding
and the appraisal of ideas.
