Constructing the U.S. rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: from ''red menace'' to ''tacit ally''

316 Pages·2004·3.21 MB·English

by  Evelyn Goh

ConstructingtheU.S.RapprochementwithChina,1961–1974
From“RedMenace”to“TacitAlly”
WithNixon’shistoricreconciliationwithChinain1972,Sino-American
relations were restored, and China moved from being regarded as
America’s most implacable enemy to being a friend and tacit ally.
Existing accounts of the rapprochement focus on the shifting balance
ofpowerbetweentheUnitedStates,China,andtheSovietUnion,but
inthisbookGoharguesthattheycannotadequatelyexplainthetiming
andpolicychoicesrelatedtoWashington’sdecisionsforreconciliation
withBeijing.Instead,sheappliesamorehistoricallysensitiveapproach
that privileges contending official American constructions of China’s
identity and character. This book demonstrates that ideas of reconcil-
iation with China were already being propagated and debated within
official circles in the United States during the 1960s. It traces the re-
lated policy discourse and imagery, examining their continuities and
evolution into the early 1970s and the ways in which they facilitated
Nixon’s new policy. Furthermore, the book analyzes the implementa-
tionofthepolicyofrapprochementanddemonstrateshowthetwosides
constructedthebasisforthenewrelationshipbasedonfriendlymutual
images, shared interests, and common enemies. It reveals how, begin-
ning in 1973, Nixon and Kissinger pursued the policy of supporting
Chinaasa“tacitally”againsttheSovietUnion.
Evelyn Goh is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She
graduatedwithfirst-classhonorsingeographyfromOxfordUniversity
and also obtained an M.Phil. in environment and development from
Cambridge University. In 2001, she completed a doctorate in inter-
national relations at Nuffield College, Oxford. Dr. Goh has been a
Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington, D.C., where
she received the 2004 Southeast Asian Fellowship. Her main research
interests lie in the areas of U.S. foreign policy, U.S.–China relations,
andAsia-Pacificsecurityandinternationalrelations.Shehaspublished
onthediplomatichistoryofU.S.–Chinarelations,U.S.strategyinthe
Asia-Pacific region, the implications of 9/11 on U.S. power, and envi-
ronmentalsecurity.

Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement
with China, 1961–1974
From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally”
EVELYN GOH
NanyangTechnologicalUniversity
  
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
Cambridge University Press
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Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
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© Evelyn Goh 2005
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Contents
ForewordbyRosemaryFoot pageix
Acknowledgments xi
ListofAbbreviations xiii
1 Introduction 1
part i. competing discourses, 1961–1968
2 “RedMenace”to“RevolutionaryRival”:Recastingthe
ChineseCommunistThreat 17
The“RedMenace”:CommunistChinaasExpansionistMilitary
Aggressor 20
“RevolutionaryRival”:CommunistChinaasIndependent
MilitantChallenger 30
3 “TroubledModernizer”to“ResurgentPower”:
RevisionistImagesofthePRCandArgumentsforaNew
ChinaPolicy 46
“TroubledModernizer”:ChinaasanUnderdevelopedCountry 47
“ResurgentPower”:ChinaasFrustratedReemergingMajorState 61
4 TheRevisionistLegacy:TheDiscourseofReconciliation
withChinaby1968 82
CompetingDiscourses 84
TheDiscourseofReconciliationwithChina,1968 92
part ii. discursive transitions, 1969–1971
5 Nixon’sChinaPolicyDiscourseinContext 101
“ToughCoexistence”:Nixon’sChinaPolicyThinkingasVice
President,1952–1960 102
v
vi Contents
Chinaas“KeyPlayer”:TheDevelopmentofNixon’sChina
Strategy,1960–1968 106
PresidentNixon’sChinaPolicyDiscourse,1969–1971 112
Nixon’sDiscourseofReconciliationinContext 121
6 DebatingtheRapprochement:“ResurgentRevolutionary
Power”versus“ThreatenedMajorPower” 124
NewOpportunitiesandOldDoubtsattheBeginningofthe
NixonAdministration 125
“RevolutionaryResurgentPower”:TheStateDepartment
RethinksChinaPolicy 128
“ThreatenedMajorPower”:TheWhiteHouse
ReconceptualizesChina 136
DebatesandDepartures:TheRenewedWarsawTalks,1970 142
Conclusion 147
part iii. discourses of rapprochement in practice,
1971–1974
7 “Principled”RealistPower:LayingtheDiscursive
FoundationsofaNewRelationship,July1971to
February1972 153
Kissinger’sNewRepresentationoftheChinese 155
NewIdentity,NewInterests:ArticulatingtheCommonGround
foraNewRelationship 164
Conclusion:DiscursiveFoundations 182
8 PrinciplesinPractice:PolicyImplicationsoftheU.S.
DecisionforRapprochement 184
TestofFriendship:The1971SouthAsianCrisis 185
NegotiatingPrinciples,PostponingResolution:U.S.Policy
towardTaiwan 192
DiscursiveReconstructionsandPolicyOutcomes 204
9 “Selling”theRapprochement:TheNixon
Administration’sJustificationoftheNewChinaPolicy 206
“RealistResurgentPower”:ExplainingtheFormerEnemy 207
Chinaas“theEnemyofMyEnemy”:RealpolitikfortheRight 215
Conclusion 220
10 “TacitAlly,”June1972to1974:ConsolidatingorSaving
theU.S.–ChinaRapprochement 222
TriangularPolitics,June1972toFebruary1973:FormerEnemy
toTacitAlly? 223
MaintainingMomentuminU.S.–PRCRelations,
July–November1973 236
Stalemate:U.S.–PRCRelationsin1974 247
Conclusion:TriangularBalanceofPowertoTacitAlliance 252
Contents vii
11 Conclusion 256
Bibliography 269
DramatisPersonae 285
Index 295

Foreword
Thisbookisimportantforthreemainreasons.First,itenhancesourun-
derstandingofoneofthemostimportantbilateralrelationshipsofourera.
Sino-Americanrelationshavemovedinregularcyclesbetweenperiodsof
hostility and somewhat grudging coexistence since the establishment of
thePeople’sRepublicofChinain1949.Mostoftherestoftheworldhas
been affected by the changing state of those relations: they have had a
majorimpactonregionalsecurity,ongreatpoweralignments,andonthe
centralnormsoftheglobalsystemthatinvolvemattersofwarandpeace.
Intheearlytwenty-firstcentury,wehavearrivedatapointwheretherela-
tionshipisperceivedtohavestabilized.Forsome,itwarrantsthedescrip-
tionthatitisthebestithaseverbeen,oratleastthebestsincePresident
Nixon’s landmark visit to China in 1972. Dr. Goh’s study offers an op-
portunitytoreflectonthatcomparison,usefullyremindingusofsomeof
thefactorsthatcontributetoacontinuingfragilityinthosebilateralties.
Aboveall,herworkhelpsustounderstandwhathasmadeitpossiblefor
negativeU.S.imagesofChinatobetransformedintodescriptionsofthe
country that are positive enough to permit bilateral cooperation in the
threemajordomainsofsecurity,economics,andculture.
Second, the study is particularly valuable because of its approach. In
thepast,therelationshipbetweenthesetwocountrieshasalmostentirely
beenexaminedthrougharealistlens,withshiftsinthebalanceofpower
regardedasthekeytoexplaininghowperiodsofconflicthavegivenway
to eras of cooperation. Dr. Goh’s book, however, shows that there were
severaloptionsavailabletoU.S.administrationsastheystruggledtomake
sense of the opportunities provided by the Sino-Soviet split. Instead of
relying on balance-of-power logic, she takes the ideas that underpinned
ix