Table Of ContentCONSTRAINING DICTATORSHIP
How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems,
while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive
constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability?
To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, this book studies the
emergenceofconstitutionaltermlimitsandsuccessionprocedures,aswellas
elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. Anne Meng argues that
institutionscrediblyconstrainleadersonlywhentheychangetheunderlying
distribution of power between leaders and elites by providing elites with
access to the state. She also shows that initially weak leaders who
institutionalizearelesslikelytofacecoupattemptsandareabletoremainin
office for longer periods than weak leaders who do not. Drawing on an
originaltime-seriesdatasetof46countriesinSub-SaharanAfricafrom1960
to2010,formaltheory,andcasestudies,thisbookultimatelyillustrateshow
somedictatorshipsevolvefrompersonaliststrongmanruletoinstitutionalized
regimes.
AnneMengisAssistantProfessorintheDepartmentofPolitics,Universityof
Virginia. Her research centers on authoritarian politics and institutions.
ProfessorMeng’sworkhasbeenpublishedintheBritishJournalofPolitical
Science, The Journal of Theoretical Politics, Columbia Law Review, and
Studies in Comparative International Development, and has won the “Best
PaperAward”fromtheDemocracyandAutocracysectionatAPSA.
Published online by Cambridge University Press
Published online by Cambridge University Press
political economy of institutions and decisions
SeriesEditors
JeffryFrieden,HarvardUniversity
JohnPatty,EmoryUniversity
ElizabethMaggiePenn,EmoryUniversity
FoundingEditors
JamesE.Alt,HarvardUniversity
DouglassC.North,WashingtonUniversityofSt.Louis
Otherbooksintheseries
AlbertoAlesinaandHowardRosenthal,PartisanPolitics,DividedGovernment
andtheEconomy
LeeJ.AlstonandJosephP.Ferrie,SouthernPaternalismandtheRiseofthe
AmericanWelfareState:Economics,Politics,andInstitutions,1865–1965
LeeJ.Alston,ThrainnEggertssonandDouglassC.North,eds.,EmpiricalStudies
inInstitutionalChange
JamesE.AltandKennethShepsle,eds.,PerspectivesonPositivePolitical
Economy
JosephineT.Andrews,WhenMajoritiesFail:TheRussianParliament,1990–1993
JeffreyS.BanksandEricA.Hanushek,eds.,ModernPoliticalEconomy:Old
Topics,NewDirections
YoramBarzel,EconomicAnalysisofPropertyRights,2ndedition
YoramBarzel,ATheoryoftheState:EconomicRights,LegalRights,andthe
ScopeoftheState
RobertBates,BeyondtheMiracleoftheMarket:ThePoliticalEconomyof
AgrarianDevelopmentinKenya
JennaBednar,TheRobustFederation:PrinciplesofDesign
CharlesM.Cameron,VetoBargaining:PresidentsandthePoliticsofNegative
Power
KellyH.Chang,AppointingCentralBankers:ThePoliticsofMonetaryPolicyin
theUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanMonetaryUnion
TomS.ClarkTheSupremeCourt:AnAnalyticalHistoryofConstitutional
DecisionMaking
PeterCowheyandMathewMcCubbins,eds.,StructureandPolicyinJapanand
theUnitedStates:AnInstitutionalistApproach
Published online by Cambridge University Press
GaryW.Cox,TheEfficientSecret:TheCabinetandtheDevelopmentofPolitical
PartiesinVictorianEngland
GaryW.Cox,MakingVotesCount:StrategicCoordinationintheWorld’s
ElectoralSystem
GaryW.Cox,MarketingSovereignPromises:MonopolyBrokerageandthe
GrowthoftheEnglishState
GaryW.CoxandJonathanN.Katz,ElbridgeGerry’sSalamander:TheElectoral
ConsequencesoftheReapportionmentRevolution
TineDeMoore,TheDilemmaoftheCommoners:UnderstandingtheUseof
Common-PoolResourcesinLong-TermPerspective
AdamDean,FromConflicttoCoalition:Profit-SharingInstitutionsandthe
PoliticalEconomyofTrade
MarkDincecco,PoliticalTransformationsandPublicFinances:Europe,
1650–1913
MarkDinceccoandMassimilianoGaetanoOnorato,FromWarfaretoWealth:
TheMilitaryOriginsofUrbanProsperityinEurope
RaymondM.DuchandRandolphT.Stevenson,TheEconomicVote:How
PoliticalandEconomicInstitutionsConditionElectionResults
JeanEnsminger,MakingaMarket:TheInstitutionalTransformationofan
AfricanSociety
DavidEpsteinandSharynO’Halloran,DelegatingPowers:ATransactionCost
PoliticsApproachtoPolicyMakingunderSeparatePowers
KathrynFirmin-Sellers,TheTransformationofPropertyRightsintheGold
Coast:AnEmpiricalStudyApplyingRationalChoiceTheory
ClarkC.Gibson,PoliticiansandPoachers:ThePoliticalEconomyofWildlife
PolicyinAfrica
DanielW.Gingerich,PoliticalInstitutionsandParty-DirectedCorruptionin
SouthAmerica
AvnerGreif,InstitutionsandthePathtotheModernEconomy:Lessonsfrom
MedievalTrade
JeffreyD.Grynaviski,PartisanBonds:PoliticalReputationsandLegislative
Accountability
StephenHaber,ArmandoRazo,andNoelMaurer,ThePoliticsofProperty
Rights:PoliticalInstability,CredibleCommitments,andEconomicGrowthin
Mexico,1876–1929
RonHarris,IndustrializingEnglishLaw:EntrepreneurshipandBusiness
Organization,1720–1844
AnnaL.Harvey,VotesWithoutLeverage:WomeninAmericanElectoralPolitics,
1920–1970
Published online by Cambridge University Press
ShigeoHiranoandJamesM.Snyder,Jr.PrimaryElectionsintheUnitedStates
MurrayHorn,ThePoliticalEconomyofPublicAdministration:Institutional
ChoiceinthePublicSector
JohnD.Huber,RationalizingParliament:LegislativeInstitutionsandParty
PoliticsinFrance
SeanIngham,RuleofMultipleMajorities:ANewTheoryofPopularControl
JohnE.Jackson,JacekKlich,andKrystynaPoznanska,ThePoliticalEconomyof
Poland’sTransition:NewFirmsandReformGovernments
JackKnight,InstitutionsandSocialConflict
MichaelLaverandKennethShepsle,eds.,CabinetMinistersandParliamentary
Government
MichaelLaverandKennethShepsle,eds.,MakingandBreakingGovernments:
CabinetsandLegislaturesinParliamentaryDemocracies
MargaretLevi,Consent,Dissent,andPatriotism
BrianLevyandPabloT.Spiller,eds.,Regulations,Institutions,andCommitment:
ComparativeStudiesofTelecommunications
LeifLewin,IdeologyandStrategy:ACenturyofSwedishPolitics(Englishedition)
GaryLibecap,ContractingforPropertyRights
JohnLondregan,LegislativeInstitutionsandIdeologyinChile
ArthurLupiaandMathewD.McCubbins,TheDemocraticDilemma:Can
CitizensLearnWhatTheyNeedtoKnow?
ChrysostomosMantzavinos,Individuals,Institutions,andMarkets
MathewD.McCubbinsandTerrySullivan,eds.,Congress:StructureandPolicy
GaryJ.Miller,AbovePolitics:BureaucraticDiscretionandCredibleCommitment
GaryJ.Miller,ManagerialDilemmas:ThePoliticalEconomyofHierarchy
IliaMurtazashvili,ThePoliticalEconomyoftheAmericanFrontier
DouglassC.North,Institutions,InstitutionalChange,andEconomic
Performance
ElinorOstrom,GoverningtheCommons:TheEvolutionofInstitutionsfor
CollectiveAction
SonalS.Pandya,TradingSpaces:ForeignDirectInvestmentRegulation,
1970–2000
JohnW.PattyandElizabethMaggiePenn,SocialChoiceandLegitimacy
DanielN.Posner,InstitutionsandEthnicPoliticsinAfrica
J.MarkRamseyer,OddMarketsinJapaneseHistory:LawandEconomicGrowth
J.MarkRamseyerandFrancesRosenbluth,ThePoliticsofOligarchy:
InstitutionalChoiceinImperialJapan
Published online by Cambridge University Press
StephanieJ.RickardSpendingtoWin:PoliticalInstitutions,Economic
Geography,andGovernmentSubsidies
MeredithRolfe,VoterTurnout:ASocialTheoryofPoliticalParticipation
Jean-LaurentRosenthal,TheFruitsofRevolution:PropertyRights,Litigation,
andFrenchAgriculture,1700–1860
MichaelL.Ross,TimberBoomsandInstitutionalBreakdowninSoutheastAsia
ShankerSatyanath,Globalization,Politics,andFinancialTurmoil:Asia’s
BankingCrisis
NormanSchofield,ArchitectsofPoliticalChange:ConstitutionalQuandariesand
SocialChoiceTheory
NormanSchofieldandItaiSened,MultipartyDemocracy:Electionsand
LegislativePolitics
AlbertoSimpser,WhyGovernmentsandPartiesManipulateElections:Theory,
Practice,andImplications
AlastairSmith,ElectionTiming
PabloT.SpillerandMarianoTommasi,TheInstitutionalFoundationsofPublic
PolicyinArgentina:ATransactionsCostApproach
DavidStasavage,PublicDebtandtheBirthoftheDemocraticState:Franceand
GreatBritain,1688–1789
CharlesStewartIII,BudgetReformPolitics:TheDesignoftheAppropriations
ProcessintheHouseofRepresentatives,1865–1921
GeorgeTsebelisandJeannetteMoney,Bicameralism
GeorgVanberg,ThePoliticsofConstitutionalReviewinGermany
NicolasvandeWalle,AfricanEconomiesandthePoliticsofPermanentCrisis,
1979–1999
StefanieWalter,FinancialCrisesandthePoliticsofMacroeconomicAdjustments
JohnWaterbury,ExposedtoInnumerableDelusions:PublicEnterpriseandState
PowerinEgypt,India,Mexico,andTurkey
DavidL.Weimer,ed.,ThePoliticalEconomyofPropertyRightsInstitutional
ChangeandCredibilityintheReformofCentrallyPlannedEconomies
Published online by Cambridge University Press
CONSTRAINING
DICTATORSHIP
FromPersonalizedRuletoInstitutionalizedRegimes
ANNE MENG
UniversityofVirginia
Published online by Cambridge University Press
UniversityPrintingHouse,Cambridgecb28bs,UnitedKingdom
OneLibertyPlaza,20thFloor,NewYork,ny10006,USA
477WilliamstownRoad,PortMelbourne,vic3207,Australia
314–321,3rdFloor,Plot3,SplendorForum,JasolaDistrictCentre,
NewDelhi–110025,India
79AnsonRoad,#06–04/06,Singapore079906
CambridgeUniversityPressispartoftheUniversityofCambridge.
ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof
education,learning,andresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence.
www.cambridge.org
Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108834896
doi:10.1017/9781108877497
©AnneMeng2020
Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception
andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,
noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten
permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.
Firstpublished2020
PrintedintheUnitedKingdombyTJInternationalLtd.PadstowCornwall
AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.
isbn978-1-108-83489-6Hardback
isbn978-1-108-79247-9Paperback
CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof
URLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication
anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain,
accurateorappropriate.
Published online by Cambridge University Press
CONSTRAINING DICTATORSHIP
How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems,
while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive
constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability?
To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, this book studies the
emergenceofconstitutionaltermlimitsandsuccessionprocedures,aswellas
elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. Anne Meng argues that
institutionscrediblyconstrainleadersonlywhentheychangetheunderlying
distribution of power between leaders and elites by providing elites with
access to the state. She also shows that initially weak leaders who
institutionalizearelesslikelytofacecoupattemptsandareabletoremainin
office for longer periods than weak leaders who do not. Drawing on an
originaltime-seriesdatasetof46countriesinSub-SaharanAfricafrom1960
to2010,formaltheory,andcasestudies,thisbookultimatelyillustrateshow
somedictatorshipsevolvefrompersonaliststrongmanruletoinstitutionalized
regimes.
AnneMengisAssistantProfessorintheDepartmentofPolitics,Universityof
Virginia. Her research centers on authoritarian politics and institutions.
ProfessorMeng’sworkhasbeenpublishedintheBritishJournalofPolitical
Science, The Journal of Theoretical Politics, Columbia Law Review, and
Studies in Comparative International Development, and has won the “Best
PaperAward”fromtheDemocracyandAutocracysectionatAPSA.
Published online by Cambridge University Press
Published online by Cambridge University Press
