Table Of ContentConsciousness as Complex Event
Consciousness as Complex Event: Towards a New Physicalism provides
a new approach to the study of consciousness. The author argues that what
makes phenomenal experiences mysterious is that these experiences are
extremely complex brain events. The text provides an accessible introduction
to descriptive complexity (also known as Kolmogorov Complexity) and then
applies this to show that the most influential arguments against physicalism
about consciousness are unsound. The text also offers an accessible review
of the current debates about consciousness and introduces a rigorous new
conception of physicalism. It concludes with a positive program for the future
study of phenomenal experience. It is readable and compact and will be of
interest to philosophers and cognitive scientists, and of value to advanced
students of philosophy.
Key Features
• Provides a new approach to the study of consciousness, using information
theory.
• Offers a valuable discussion of physicalism, of use in other disciplines.
• Contains an introduction to the main literature and arguments in the debate
about consciousness.
• Includes an accessible overview of how to apply descriptive complexity to
philosophical problems.
Craig DeLancey is Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New
York. He is the author of Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about
Mind and Artificial Intelligence (2001) and A Concise Introduction to Logic
(2017).
Consciousness as Complex
Event
Towards a New Physicalism
Craig DeLancey
First published 2023
by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
and by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa
business
© 2023 Craig DeLancey
The right of Craig DeLancey to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval
system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN: 978-1-032-33450-9 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-34131-6 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-32068-5 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003320685
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
For Aletheia and Lorena
Contents
Preface ix
1 Complexity in Mind 1
2 The Inadequacy Claims 38
3 Strong Physicalism 69
4 Refuting the Anti-Physicalist Arguments 94
5 Subjectivity and the Sample Bias 141
Afterward: Consciousness as Complex Event 157
Bibliography 159
Index 166
Mortal, that thou mayest understand aright,
I humanize my sayings to thine ear,
Making comparisons of earthly things,
Or thou mightst better listen to the wind,
Whose language is to thee a barren noise,
Though it blows legend-laden thro’ the trees.
—Keats
Preface
0.1 Key Claims of the Text
This book defends a theory about consciousness. My concern is with the quali-
tative nature of consciousness and, in particular, with a class of phenomenal
experiences that I call the “paradigmatically mysterious phenomenal experi-
ences.” By this, I mean the kinds of phenomenal experiences that philosophers
typically cite as mysterious. The theory rests on three claims.
1. Paradigmatically mysterious phenomenal experiences have constitutive
properties that are extremely complex.
2. Our current theories, and our current observations, about phenomenal
experiences do not include all the information required to explain those
experiences. These theories and observations are much less complex than
the properties that constitute the phenomenal quality of paradigmatically
mysterious phenomenal experiences.
3. Our judgments about a paradigmatically mysterious phenomenal experi-
ence, and our memories of that experience, cannot include all the infor-
mation required to explain that experience. Rather, our judgments and
memories typically include sufficient information to distinguish the kind
of experience from relevant other kinds of experiences.
These claims require significant clarification, but if correct, they show that our
theories and beliefs are not sufficient to enable accurate judgments about what
is possible with respect to phenomenal experiences. As a result, the contem-
porary arguments against physicalism about phenomenal experience all fail.
The notion of complexity used here will be explained at some length in the
text, drawing upon that branch of logic variously known as descriptive com-
plexity or Kolmogorov complexity, and which is closely related to minimal
description length (MDL) theory.
These are empirical claims, and ultimately their defense must rest upon fur-
ther corroboration. However, I give a number of reasons to believe that each
is true. Furthermore, one reason to pursue the theory is because of its produc-
tivity and utility. Most of my work in this book is to explore the implications
