Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects

132 Pages·2018·1.9 MB·English

by  Marc Champagne

Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 19
Marc Champagne
Consciousness
and the
Philosophy of
Signs
How Peircean Semiotics Combines
Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Eff ects
Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind
Volume 19
Series Editors
Henrik Lagerlund, The University of Western Ontario, Canada
Mikko Yrjönsuuri, Academy of Finland and University of Jyväskylä, Finland
Board of Consulting Editors
Lilli Alanen, Uppsala University, Sweden
Joël Biard, University of Tours, France
Michael Della Rocca, Yale University, USA
Eyjólfur Emilsson, University of Oslo, Norway
André Gombay, University of Toronto, Canada
Patricia Kitcher, Columbia University, USA
Simo Knuuttila, University of Helsinki, Finland
Béatrice M. Longuenesse, New York University, USA
Calvin Normore, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6539
Marc Champagne
Consciousness and the
Philosophy of Signs
How Peircean Semiotics Combines
Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects
Marc Champagne
Department of Philosophy
Trent University
Peterborough, ON, Canada
Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind
ISBN 978-3-319-73337-1 ISBN 978-3-319-73338-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73338-8
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017964606
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To Serge, Henry, and Ahti, for believing
in my work, in Alexander Bain’s sense
of belief.
Acknowledgments
I want to thank the following people for reading the manuscript and offering helpful
feedback: Jake Beck, Tyler James Bennett, Vincent Colapietro, Chris Green, Henry
Jackman, David Jopling, Kalevi Kull, Cathy Legg, Christine McKinnon, and David
Skrbina (naturally, I bear sole responsibility for any mistakes or errors in the book).
Kristin Andrews and David Stamos gave me good tips in the early stages of this
project. Jelena Issajeva organized a stimulating symposium on the book at the 2015
Toward a Science of Consciousness Conference. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen enabled a
productive year of research at the University of Helsinki. My colleagues at Trent
University fostered a supportive work environment. I want to thank David Chalmers
for his words of encouragement. I also want to thank Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko
Yrjönsuuri for curating this exciting series in philosophy of mind. Parts of this book
have appeared, in different versions, in the following venues:
Champagne M (2016) Can pragmatists believe in qualia? The founder of pragma-
tism certainly did… Cybernetics and Human Knowing 23(2): 39–49
Champagne M (2015) Poinsot versus Peirce on merging with reality by sharing a
quality. Versus 120: 31–43
Champagne M (2014) Referring to the qualitative dimension of consciousness:
Iconicity instead of indexicality. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review
53(1): 135–182
Champagne M (2013) Choosing between the long and short informational routes to
psychological explanation. Philosophical Psychology 26(1): 129–138
Champagne M (2012) Russell and the Newman problem revisited. Analysis and
Metaphysics 11: 65–74
Champagne M (2009) Explaining the qualitative dimension of consciousness:
Prescission instead of reification. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review
48(1): 145–183
vii
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Calling on the Helpful Resources of Semiotic Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 Separating Qualities from Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Philosophy of Signs’ Long Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Peirce’s Major Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Tone-Deaf no More . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3 Using Prescission and the Type/Token/Tone Distinction . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1 Block’s Real Separation of Phenomenon and Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Prescission in Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3 Prescission in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4 The Stream and Still Pools of Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Enlarging the Menu of Referential Options to Include Icons . . . . . . . . 51
4.1 The Indexical Phenomenal Concept Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 Getting in Touch without Touching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3 How Low can we Go? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.4 Focusing on What Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5 Seeing Things as They Are . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.1 Peirce’s Merger Versus Poinsot’s Buffer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.2 Un-Lockeing a Coloured World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.3 The Argument from Subjective Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.4 Colours and the Soggy Grey Brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
ix
x Contents
6 Informational Flow Implies Informational Pause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.1 Informational Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.2 Informational Pause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.3 Can a Pragmatist Accept this? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.4 Classifying the Peircean Stance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Chapter 1
Introduction
Abstract In this introductory chapter, I preview how philosophy of signs can
advance current debates about consciousness. Many philosophers have urged us to
distinguish between what an experience does and what an experience feels like.
This distinction seems sensible enough, but it renders scientific inquiry insufficient,
insofar as experimental methods can only track an experience’s detectable effects.
However, Charles Sanders Peirce, the polymath who coined the term “qualia,” saw
no tension in this function/quality distinction. Peirce was the founder of American
pragmatism and a professional scientist, so he clearly valued tangible verification.
Still, his philosophical system countenanced intrinsic qualities under the heading of
“Firstness.” Since qualia are usually considered to be at odds with pragmatic verifi-
cation, I set out to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both
ways. The key, I suggest, is to see how we can sometimes insert distinctions between
features that are always bound together. Such “prescissive” distinctions are essential
to understanding how signs work. So, while semiotics is currently the least known
branch of philosophy ending in –ics, a better understanding of that branch can rem-
edy much of the current puzzlement about qualia.
The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the
gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive
action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those
two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.
Charles Sanders Peirce, “Pragmatism as the Logic of
Abduction,” lecture delivered at Harvard on May 14, 1903
(Reprinted in Peirce 1998, 241)
Each quale is in itself what it is for itself, without reference to
any other.
Charles Sanders Peirce, “Quale- Consciousness,”
unpublished notes, circa 1898
(Reprinted in Peirce 1931–58, 6.224)
© Springer International Publishing AG 2018 1
M. Champagne, Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs, Studies in the
History of Philosophy of Mind 19, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73338-8_1