COMMENTARIES No Place for Nostalgia in Science: A Response to Arkes and Tetlock

32 Pages·2005·0.47 MB·English

Psychological Inquiry Copyright © 2004 by
2004, Vol. 15, No. 4,279–310 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
COMMENTARIES
No Place for Nostalgia in Science: A Response to Arkes and Tetlock
MahzarinR.Banaji
Department of Psychology
Harvard University
Brian A.Nosek
Department ofPsychology
University of Virginia
Anthony G. Greenwald
Department ofPsychology
University of Washington
Ask an attitude expert about the major shifts in prejudicearealsolikelytorevealhigherlevelsof
thinkingabouttheconceptofprejudicesince1954,and implicitprejudice.Inthedomainofsocialgroup
the answers will likely contain the following assess- attitudestheserelationsaresometimesobserved
mentsaboutthebroad, modern scientificunderstand- tobeashighasr=.50(Cunningham,Nezlek,&
ing of the concept: Banaji,inpress;Nosek,2004),andimplicit–ex-
plicitcorrelationsmoregenerallyhavebeenob-
1. Prejudice and other attitudes were assumed to served to be as high as r = .86 (Greenwald,
operatelargelyinconscious(explicit,deliberate,con- Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). The psychologically
trollable, intentional) mode. Now they are generally and pragmatically interesting cases are those in
viewedasalsooperatinginalessconscious(implicit, which a significant correlation still reveals two
spontaneous, uncontrollable, unintentional) mode separate factors at work (Cunningham, Nezlek,
(Eagly&Chaiken,1993;Fazio,Sanbonmatsu,Powell, et al., in press).
&Kardes,1986;Greenwald&Banaji,1995;Wilson, d. Discriminatory behavior is predicted by
Lindsey,&Schooler,2000).Fromthisconceptualshift bothexplicitandimplicitmeasures,butpredic-
other changes have followed: tion by implicit measures tends to be stronger
(Poehlman, Uhlmann, Greenwald, & Banaji,
a. Historically, attitudes were almost exclu- 2004).
sively assessed through self-report measures.
Now, more indirect methods have been added, 2. Psychologists used to think of the concept of
notablyresponselatenciestoobject+evaluation prejudiceasprominentlycontainingthepropertyofan-
pairings(Fazio,etal.1986).Thesemeasuresare imusorantipathy,butthatisnolongerassumedtobea
thoughttoreveallessaccessible,moreautomatic necessary condition (Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, in
forms of attitudes. press;Glick&Fiske,2001a,2001b;Jackman,1994).In
b. Explicitandimplicitattitudescanbedisso- arelatedvein,theconstructsofattitudeandstereotype
ciated,suchthatoneformoftheattitudecanbe wereoftenconflated,asevidencedinthewidelyshared
evaluativelypositive,theothernegative.Forin- butincorrectassumptionthatevaluationsofwomenare
stance,individualswhoendorseegalitarianval- negative. Eagly (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; see also,
uesbroadly,and(honestly)endorsefavorableso- Eagly&Diekman,inpress)correctedthiserrorshow-
cial group attitudes, can nonetheless show ing that attitudes toward women are positive even
negativity on implicit measures (Greenwald & though stereotypes of them in particular roles can be
Banaji, 1995). strikingly negative.
c. Atthesametime,explicitandimplicitatti- 3. More generally, human behavior was once re-
tudescanbeassociatedsuchthatthoseindividu- gardedasmotivatedbyrationalthought,butnowmany
als who tend to report higher levels of explicit exceptions are recognized (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, &
COMMENTARIES
Tversky,1982;Simon,1983).Computationsthatunder- priming (Fazio et al., 1986; Greenwald, McGhee, &
lie social attitudes and judgment, even those that have Schwartz, 1998), linguistic style (von Hippel,
moral bearing, are no exception (Banaji & Bhaskar, Sekaquaptewa,&Vargas,1997),assessmentsofargu-
2000).Thinkinginthiswaydemystifiesotherwisetrou- ment quality (Saucier & Miller, 2003), motor (arm
blesome concepts like prejudice by placing them flexion) measures (Cacioppo, Priester, & Bernston,
squarelywithinthepurviewofordinarycognition. 1993),oranyofamultitudeofotherindirectmethods.
Further, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) reviewed atti-
In this response to Arkes & Tetlock’s (this issue) tudedefinitionsandnotedthat,evenhistorically,such
critique,weraisethreeissues.First,wechallengethe definitions avoided assumptions of introspective ac-
notionofattitudeandprejudiceasconstructsthatoper- cess,awareness,orcontrollability,suggestingthatatti-
ateonlyinconsciousform.Weseenoreasonforthis tudetheoristshavealwaysbeenopentothepossibility
burdentobebornebysomeconstructslikeattitudeor that attitudes operate at differing levels of conscious-
prejudiceandnotbyothersmentalconstructssuchas ness. The historical reliance on self-report measures
attention, perception, and memory. Just as we speak may have been more from convenience and a lack of
about explicit and implicit memory measures or sys- alternativemeasuresthanastrongtheoreticalcommit-
tems,somightweprofitablyspeakofexplicitandim- mentthatattitudesoperateonlyasconsciousentities.
plicitattitudemeasuresorsystems.Inparticular,Arkes Themainpointhereisthatlackofintrospectiveaccess
andTetlockdonotaccuratelyrepresentthepositionof andlackofconsciouscontroloverthecontentsofcon-
thosewhostudyimplicitsocialcognition.Theyinvoke sciousness—features that are more characteristic of
anoxymoronbyusingthetermendorsementtoreferto implicit than explicit attitudes—preclude endorse-
the workings of implicit, less conscious or controlla- ment.Tospeakofimplicitattitudesasendorsedwould
ble, attitudes. beasnonsensicalasspeakingaboutadogendorsinga
Second,weshowthatitisnotpossibletosetaside bone.
theconceptofimplicitprejudicebysuggestingthatit A theme that runs through Arkes and Tetlock’s
reflects mere association—unless Arkes and Tetlock (thisissue)articlehasitsoriginsinanarticlefromthe
(this issue) wish to admit that mere associations pro- mid-1980s (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986), whose au-
duceconvergent(anddiscriminant)validitywithmea- thors criticized the then-emerging notion of a mod-
suresofprejudiceaswellasrapidlyemergingdataon ern, as opposed to old-fashioned, racism because
criterionvalidity.Finally,intheworkofothers,theno- such thinking took away from genuine prejudice—a
tion of prejudice as antipathy has been broadly chal- deep-seated, irrational insistence on the inferiority of
lenged, and Arkes and Tetlock questions have the Blacksandcontemptandhostilityandtowardthem.”
benefitofalertingscholarstotheongoingredefinition (p. 186). Almost twenty years later the same idea is
of the concept. expressed when Arkes and Tetlock bemoan the fact
that although so much progress has been made in
Black emancipation, these social and political
Genuine, 100% Prejudice, Please changes appear not to be recognized by some social
psychologists, including us. Arkes and Tetlock re-
GreenwaldandBanaji(1995)definedimplicitatti- mindreadersoftheswiftandvastprogressinAmeri-
tudesas“introspectivelyunidentified(orinaccurately can society, that Black and White Americans can
identified)tracesofpastexperiencethatmediatefavor- now“drinkfromthesamefountain,sleepinthesame
ableorunfavorablefeelingstowardanattitudeobject” hotel room, attend the same schools, or intermarry,
(p.6).ArkesandTetlock(thisissue)statedthatimplicit there is now close to consensus at the level of both
attitudesare“anattitudeoneendorsesatsomelevel” mass and elite opinion that de jure segregation is un-
(emphasisadded).Thesetwodefinitionsareatoddsin acceptable.” That shift is what is genuine, they say,
onesense,althoughGreenwaldandBanajiwouldagree and that is notable and to be appreciated.
thatArkesandTetlock’sdefinitionisaperfectlyfinede- Quaintasthesesentimentsmaysoundasmarkersof
scriptionoftheconstructofexplicitattitude. progressintwenty-first-centuryAmerica,thequestion
The term endorses means “to give approval of or ofsocialandpoliticalprogressisneitherourexpertise
supportto,especiallybypublicstatement”(American norofrelevancetotheargumentaboutthenatureofat-
HeritageDictionary,1992),or“toapproveopenly;es- titudes.Weonlyrestateourpositionabouttheattitude
pecially:toexpresssupportorapprovalofpubliclyand construct,whywebelievethatdifferingformsofatti-
definitely” (Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, tudesarealllikelytobegenuine,andtheevidencethat
2004;italicsinoriginal).Inherentlythen,endorsement leadsustoconsiderthemasunique,butinterdependent
is a characteristic of explicitly stated attitudes. En- constructs.
dorsementisnotacharacteristicofindirectassessment Fromtheearliestdaysofourworkonimplicitso-
tools—whether it be response latency measures such cial cognition, we have taken the position that im-
as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) or evaluative plicitandexplicitattitudesrevealpredictiveutilityin
280
COMMENTARIES
differing circumstances, a view that naturally flows used— priming, linguistic markers, motor responses,
from the assumption that the two represent psycho- and the IAT (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams,
logically differentiated constructs. A recent 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998)— as revealing prefer-
meta-analysisbyPoehlmanetal.(2004)supportsthis ences,attitudes,feelings.Itwouldbeakintoaskingthe
idea by showing that implicit attitudes do not only FullerCourtofPlessyv.Ferguson(1896)toacceptthe
predictbutthattheypredictbetterthanexplicitmea- Warren Court’s Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
sureswhenthetargetmeasureissocialgroupdiscrim- decision.ThePlesseyjudges(minusHarlan)wouldin-
ination; on the other hand, explicit attitudes predict deedbepuzzledastowhyemancipationaftertheCivil
significantlybetterthanimplicitoneswhenthetarget warwasbeingignoredandwhyitisthatdejuresegre-
objectsareconsumeritems.Assuch,wehavenoten- gation was being viewed as genuine prejudice.
dorsedthesuggestionbyFazioetal.(1995)thatauto- IfArkesandTetlock’s(thisissue)pointisthatex-
maticattitudesarea“bonafide”pipeline,althoughwe plicit and implicit forms of prejudice should not be
understandthereasoningbehindhisuseofthatmeta- blurred,wewouldconcur.Explicitprejudiceisdistinct
phor.WeequallycannotendorseArkesandTetlock’s fromimplicitprejudice,hencethedifferentterms,with
(thisissue)notionthatgenuineprejudiceisonlycon- fullrecognitionofthesimplificationthatanysuchdi-
sciouslyreportableprejudice,andthatitallbutvan- chotomy imposes (Banaji, 2001a). We also concur
ishedwhenBlackAmericanswerealloweduseofall withArkesandTetlockthat“apersoncanrefrainfrom
publicwaterfountains. explicit prejudice despite having implicit prejudice,
Attitudemeasuresarekeepingpacewithadvances but this might require a vigilant effort to prevent the
in technology to allow previously hidden aspects of implicitprejudicefrommanifestingitselfinovertbe-
mental function to be observed, with replication, havior.”Oneofus(Banaji,2001b)infactusedeternal
acrosslaboratories.Theresultingphenomenamaynot vigilanceasonepracticalsolutiontorestoringfairness
alwayslookandfeelliketheirmorefamiliarcounter- in decision making. Moreover, at the most public
parts,butthiscannotbeareasontorejectthattheyex- venueinwhichouropinionisexpressed,westateinre-
ist and have influence. Moving from Newtonian sponsetoFAQ#7(“IfmyIATshowsautomaticWhite
physicstoquantummechanicsrequiredlargeshiftsin preference, does that mean that I’m prejudiced?”):
assumptions,technology,andunderstanding.Thereis
noreasontoassumethatthesmallerstepsinanysci- Answer:Thisisaveryimportantquestion.Socialpsy-
ence that move away from the familiar and comfort- chologistsusetheword“prejudiced”todescribepeo-
able(here,theviewofprejudiceasonlyconscious)is plewhoendorseorapproveofnegativeattitudesand
any different. To consider only changes in expressed discriminatory behavior toward various out-groups.
attitudeasgenuinemarkerswouldbenodifferentthan ManypeoplewhoshowautomaticWhitepreference
arguing that memory as measured by free recall is ontheBlack–WhiteIATarenotprejudicedbythisdef-
inition.Thesepeopleareapparentlyabletofunctionin
moregenuinethanmemoryrevealedbypriming.Both
nonprejudicedfashionpartlybymakingactiveefforts
are real. Both are genuine.
topreventtheirautomaticWhitepreferencefrompro-
Althoughtheissueofoldversusmodernprejudice
ducingdiscriminatorybehavior.However,whenthey
is addressed by other commentators in this issue, we
relaxtheseactiveefforts,thesenonprejudicedpeople
also speak to it because Arkes and Tetlock’s (this is-
maybelikelytoshowdiscriminationinthoughtorbe-
sue)pointencompassestheworkonimplicitattitudes havior.Thequestionofrelationbetweenimplicitand
withwhichweareassociatedinauniqueway.Given explicitattitudesisofstronginteresttosocialpsychol-
theirposition,ArkesandTetlock’sexpressedirritation ogists, several of whom are doing research on that
with us is understandable. If the logic underlying the questionforrace-relatedattitudes.(“ProjectImplicit,”
Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986)—to de- n.d.)
velop scale items that no longer asked about whether
drinking fountains should be desegregated but to ac- Despitethisclearposition,accessiblesincetheWeb
commodate to new standards of attitude and behav- site’s launch in September 1998, Arkes and Tetlock
ior—is viewed by Arkes and Tetlock as a step in the (thisissue)repeatedlycharacterizetheauthorsofIAT
wrong direction, getting away from tapping genuine and priming research as using their results to brand
prejudice,thenmeasuresofmentalspeedassessingas- those who show modal results as guilty of prejudice.
sociationsinmemorycanonlysignaltheapocalypse. Ourconclusionhereistoencouragethinkingabout
This difference is a fundamental one separating us attitudes as multiply determined and multiply ex-
from Arkes and Tetlock. Given their position that (a) pressed.Alongtimeago,WilliamJames(1902/1958)
genuine attitudes are those that are consciously ex- spoke about layers of consciousness in a manner that
pressed and (b) that modernized items on self-report suits the present discussion well:
measuresarenotnecessarilymeasuresofprejudice,it
would be a stretch for Arkes and Tetlock to accept Ournormalwakingconsciousness,rationalconscious-
manyofthemeasuresofattitudethatarenowroutinely nessaswecallit,isbutonespecialtypeofconscious-
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COMMENTARIES
ness,whilstallaboutit,partedfromitbythefilmiestof plicit attitudes as “mere association,” then the effect
screens,thereliepotentialformsofconsciousnessen- maybequitetheoppositebecauseofthemanyfunda-
tirelydifferent.Wemaygothroughlifewithoutsus- mental contributions that are “mere” or “associa-
pectingtheirexistence;butapplytherequisitestimu-
tive”—mereexposure,associativelearninginclassical
lus, and at a touch they are there in all their
conditioning,andsoon.Iftheirintentionistoindicate
completeness,definitetypesofmentalitywhichprob-
thatsomethingthatisa“mereassociation”cannotbean
ablysomewherehavetheirfieldofapplicationandad-
attitude,thenareasonedanalysisofsuchaclaimmust
aptation.Noaccountoftheuniverseinitstotalitycan
contendwithevidencefromDasgupta,McGhee,Green-
befinalwhichleavestheseotherformsofconscious-
nessquitediscarded.Howtoregardthemistheques- wald, and Banaji (2000; Dasgupta, Greenwald, &
tion,—for they are so discontinuous with ordinary Banaji,inpress)showingthat“merefamiliarity”cannot
consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes accountforimplicitattitudesmeasuredbytheIAT.Ifby
thoughtheycannotfurnishformulas,andopenare- mereassociationArkesandTetlockmeanthatnothing
gionthoughtheyfailtogiveamap.Atanyrate,they ofimportanceisbeingmeasured,wewouldpointtothe
forbidaprematureclosingofouraccountswithreality work of others showing that implicit measures do in-
(p. 388).
deedpredictdiscriminatorybehavior.Here,Fazioetal.
(1995) led the way by showing that the strength of
Evidence accumulated over the last 2 decades
negativityontheraceprimingmeasurepredictednon-
showsthemannerinwhichbothconsciousanduncon-
verbalnegativitytowardAfricanAmericans.Poehlman
sciousmentalstateshavetheirfieldsofapplication,in
etal.(2004)presentstudiesthatshowthattheextentof
attention and perception, in memory and judgment,
negativityontheIATpredictsarangeofbehaviorssuch
andinthesocialmanifestationsoftheseprocesses.The
as unfriendliness toward African Americans and gay
authorsofthisarticlearenotaloneinexperiencingper-
men,ratingaBlackauthor’sessaynegatively,selecting
sonallyandunderstandingprofessionallytheevidence
aBlackpartner,willingnesstocutthebudgetforJewish
thatourownconsciouspositiveattitudescannotbere-
or Asian student organizations, criminal sentence
liedoninallcircumstances.Thatunendorsedandeven
strength for Hispanics, discriminating against female
disapproved of attitudes are ones that exist and can
jobapplicants,andphysicalproximitytoBlackpartner.
havetheirfieldofapplicationisamplydemonstratedin
As Poehlman et al. (2004) noted in their review of 86
psychology broadly speaking (see Fiske, 1998), and
samplesthatincludevalidationmeasuresfortheIAT,in
wehavesummarizedthevalidationoftheIATinpre-
thecontextofsocialgroupdiscrimination,implicitatti-
dictingbehaviorandcorrelatingwithsubcorticalbrain
tudesoutperformexplicitmeasuresinprediction.Data
activityknowntotapemotion(Cunninghametal.,in
from implicit measures are also consistent with data
press;Greenwald&Nosek,2001;Phelpsetal.,2000;
fromexplicitmeasures(Cunningham,Nezlek,etal.,in
Poehlmanetal.,2004).Giventheevidence,itwouldbe
press; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). Predicted
disingenuous, if not in flagrant opposition to the evi-
features of attitudes such as attitude strength and
dence,toholdthatifprejudiceisnotexplicitlyspoken,
self-presentationmoderatetherelationbetweenimplicit
it cannot reflect a prejudice.
and explicit attitudes (Hofmann, DiBartolo, Holaway,
Someyearsago,oneofuswroteachaptertoaddress
Heimberg,2004;Nosek,2004).
the questions raised in the early responses to the IAT
Ultimately, Arkes and Tetlock’s (this issue) view
(Banaji,2001a).Inthatarticle,reasonswereofferedfor
that implicit attitudes are mere associations must ad-
callingtheempiricalphenomenabeingobservedanim-
dresstheevidenceonconstructandcriterionvalidity.
plicit attitude. We argued from first principles that (a)
WouldArkesandTetlockdisagreethatthenowclassic
these phenomena fit with definitions of attitude and
experimentbyWord,Zanna,andCooper(1974)does
prejudice, (b) that lessons from research on human
notrevealprejudicebecausetheexpressionsaremere
memory,indicatingasimilarprogressionfromthinking
speech,facialandbodymusclemovements?Certainly
about conscious forms to both conscious and uncon-
noexplicitprejudicewasexpressedbytheinterview-
sciousformsofmemorycouldserveasamodel,and(c)
ers who nevertheless discriminated against African
multipledemonstrationsoftheconstructvalidityofim-
Americans.IfArkesandTetlockacceptthosedataas
plicitattitudesareconsistentwiththenotionofattitudes.
evidenceofprejudice,theywouldalsoacceptthedata
The arguments offered there still hold, with improve-
we review here. If they do not consider the evidence
ment:Therearenowmanymorepublishedinstancesof
from Word et al. to be a type of prejudice, then we,
construct and criterion validity available in print (see
along with many other contemporary theorists and
Greenwald&Nosek,2001;Poehlmanetal.,2004).
their evidence, have been collectively banished.
“Mere” Association For the Love of Antipathy
If Arkes and Tetlock (this issue) mean to derogate Arkes and Tetlock’s (this issue) critique also in-
implicit social cognition research by referring to im- cludesacontestedcomponentoftheconceptofpreju-
282
COMMENTARIES
dice,thatis,whetherprejudicemustinvolveanimusor not seem to accompany broad systems of discrimina-
antipathy. In support of their argument that prejudice tion, they asked, what might be the psychological
(of the genuine variety) must involve animus, Arkes states that produce the quiet coercion that maintains
andTetlocklistthreedefinitionsthatwouldleadread- theevidentinequality?Theircoreconcerniswiththe
ers to believe that research on this topic died in the presenceofdiscriminationintheabsenceofantipathy.
mid-1900s. It is true that in midcentury investigators Thelogicherebearssimilaritytoargumentsofferedby
defined prejudice as involving animus, including the some justices like William Bennett, Thurgood Mar-
influentialviewofGordonAllport(1954)thatreferred shall,andRuthBaderGinsburg,thatsolutionstodis-
toitas“anantipathybasedonafaultyandinflexible criminationshouldbeguidedbyassessingtheirimpact
generalization”(p.9).Butaschaptersinanewvolume ratherthantheexplicitintenttoharm.Ifapolicyisde-
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Allport’s monstrably discriminating in its impact (positive or
TheNatureofPrejudice(Dovidioet.al.,inpress)tell negative)onsocialgroups—thatistosay,itproduces
thestory,inthatplaceandtime,Allportcouldnotcon- disparate impact—that ought to serve as the basis of
ceive of prejudice without the antipathy component, remedies. Other justices such as William Rehnquist
but that view is not in agreement with the modern andAntoninScaliahavearguedthatdisparateimpact
stance.Threecontributionshavebeeninstrumentalin isnottheway,butthatexplicit,orgenuineprejudiceas
bringingaboutachangeinthinkingabouttheanimus they may even say, must be demonstrated to redress
component and demonstrating yet again that what harm.Wetakenodirectpositiononthisissuehere,al-
seemsintuitivemaynotholdupunderthelensofnew though it is clear that the work reviewed previously
theoryandnewevidence.Allthreeemergefromobser-
wouldcautionagainstassumingthatharmcanonlybe
vationsofgenderrelationsandextensionsofthoseob-
computed based on the presence of antipathy. Our
servations to other power relations.
sensefromArkesandTetlock’s(thisissue)positionsis
In The Velvet Glove, Mary Jackman (1994) pro-
that there would be no place for paternalism in their
videdasweepingargumentfortheroleofpaternalism
concept of prejudice and that they would side with
ingender,class,andracerelationsinwhichsheargued
thosejusticeswhodemandevidenceofgenuinepreju-
against the view that intergroup relations in each of
dice. This is a difference of opinion among us and
thesecasesismarkedbyhostilityandconflict.Rather,
ArkesandTetlock,muchasitisadifferenceofopinion
sheidentifiesthe“coercivegleamofpersuasion”(p.1)
amongothergroupsofcolleaguessuchasthejustices
as underlying these major systems of inequality that
of the U.S. Supreme Court.
playoutwiththeconsensualinvolvementofboththe
dominantandthedominated.GlickandFiske(2001a,
It Wasn’t Me
2001b)showed,viaameasureofpersonality,thecom-
ponentofbenevolenceasopposedtohostilityinthink-
ArkesandTetlock(thisissue)arenotaloneinstrug-
ing about women. With datasets that impressively
glingwiththequestionofhowandwheretolocateim-
coverseveralcountriesacrosstheworld,theyshowed
plicit attitudes. Others such as Karpinksi and Hilton
that“BenevolentSexism,thoughakinderandgentler
(2001) and Olson and Fazio (2004) reported similar
from of prejudice, is pernicious” (p. 117).
worriesindicatingattheveryleastthatunderstanding
Likewise,EaglyandMladinic(1989;seeEagly&
the locus of implicit attitudes is a difficult issue. The
Diekman, in press) changed the minds of many by
problemcanbestatedthus:Implicitattitudes—andin
pointing out the inaccuracy of the field’s assumption
OlsonandFazio’scase,implicitattitudesasmeasured
thatdiscriminationagainstwomenoccursbecauseatti-
bytheIATspecifically—arenotmeasuresofattitude
tudes toward women were negative (misogyny). In
per se; that is, they are not measures of the person’s
fact,attitudestowardwomenareoverwhelminglypos-
ownattitudebutrathertheperson’sknowledgeofthe
itive. Eagly and colleagues point out that discrimina-
environment(i.e.,somethingabouttheculturelocally
tionagainstwomen(inspiteofpositiveattitudes)can
orglobally).Weunderstandtheurgetocreatedistance
result particularly when women violate expected so-
fromdatathatdonotpaintaprettypictureofourselves,
cialroles.Withsuchanalyses,thefieldhasmovedbe-
and because we have spoken about this issue before,
yond the old-fashioned, comfortable, and inaccurate
werestatethepositionexpressed(evenendorsed!)by
view that prejudice necessitates animus. These three
Banaji(2001a):
perspectives have had widespread impact and to find
themmissingfromArkesandTetlock’s(thisissue)re-
Thefindingofapro-WhiteeffectamongWhiteAmer-
port is puzzling.
icanshaspersistentlyraisedthepossibilitythatwhat
For individual scientists such as Eagly, Fiske,
theIATdetectsisnotareflectionoftheindividual’s
Glick,andJackman,observationsofdiscriminationin
ownimplicitattitude,butratherapreferencethatre-
thepresenceofpositiveattitudeswerepivotalinseek- sidesinsomeclearlyseparablecultureoutthere.Cul-
inganunderstandingofhowsuchpsycho-socialsitua- tureisofferedbothastheoriginoftheautomaticpref-
tionscouldarise.Ifmanifesthostilityandconflictdid erence, the font of the pro-White bias. But further,
283
COMMENTARIES
someculturalattitudeisalsowhattheIATisassumed popularunderstandingofattitudes—asthingsthatare
tobemeasuring.Iregardthefirstpartofthisassess- under conscious awareness, intention, and control.
menttobetrueandthesecondtobefalseinaparticular And this is a meaningful experience and distinction
sense.ItistruethattheIATreflectsalearnedprefer- thatconsciouslyheldattitudescertainlyallow.Thatis,
enceinthesamewayinwhichothertypesoflearning onecanconsciouslyhavethecompellingexperience
reflecttheinfluenceofculture—thereis,inthatsense, ofholdingabelieforattitudethatisdiscrepantwith
nothingspecialaboutit.Forexample,asemanticprim- thoseofindividualothers(e.g.,“Mysenatorlikesthe
ing task roughly detects repeated cultural pairing NRA,butIdon’t”)orbeliefsthatarediscrepantfroma
(moderatedthroughindividualexperience)ofsaythe culture, or subculture (e.g., “97% of all Americans
conceptsdoctorandnurse.Inthesameway,theIAT (and95%ofphysicians)believeinGod,butIdon’t”).
roughlydetectsrepeatedculturalpairing(moderated Thehumanabilitytoconsciously“know”one’sown
throughindividualexperience),ofBlack+bad/White attitudeorbelief,andto“know”itsseparationfromthe
+good,mostclearlyamongnon-Blackinhabitantsof attitudesandbeliefsofothers,isanimportantmarker
theUnitedStates.Butjustasthestrengthofassocia- ofconscioussocialcognition.Theabilitytobeableto
tionbetweendoctorandnurseinagivenpersonre- consciouslyreflectonone’sownmind,afundamen-
flectshowthoseconstructshavecometobepairedin tallyuniquehumanability,iswhatappearstobecaus-
themindofaparticularindividual,sodoesvariationin ingtheconfusionregardingimplicitattitudes.Wede-
pro-Whitebiasreflectthestrengthofassociationbe- siretoseeaseparationbetweencultureandpersonin
tweenWhite+goodinanindividualmind,however thesamewaywithimplicitattitudesaswedowithex-
culturally “caused.” plicitattitudesandweimposethisdistinctiononthe
data,sopowerfulistheassumptionofindividual-cul-
Thefollowingexampleshouldclarifythereasonfor tureseparation(foraclearexampleofthisfallacy,see
themistakenbeliefthatthepreferencebeingmeasured Karpinski & Hilton, 1999).1 The expectation is that
has little to do with an individual’s preference. It justasconsciousattitudesaremalleablebyvolition,so
shouldsurprisenoonewhenwesaythatitisthrough mustbethecasewithautomaticattitudes.Whenim-
culturallearningthatchildreninSouthIndialearnto plicitattitudesdonotrespondtothecalloffreewill,
eatandloveveryhotpickles(eventhoughallinfants, thesourceoftheattitudebecomessuspect—whoseat-
includingSouthIndianones,spitthemoutwithvigor). titudeisit?”Notmine,”istheanswer,“Ican’tseemto
Whatisinterestingis“whose”attitudetowardpickles controlit,andsurelyifitweremine,Iwouldbeableto
wethenbelievetheeventualadultattitudetobe.I’dar- doso.”Addtothistheunpalatablenatureoftheob-
guethatweseethisattitudeasbelongingtotheindivid- served dissociation between conscious and uncon-
ual(i.e.,asSuparna’sattitude,orKavitha’sattitude), sciousraceattitudes,andwemayseewhyamanufac-
howeverobviousmaybetheculturalinfluence.Asa tureddistinctionbetweenselfandculturecanseemso
field,webelieve,thatattitudes,althoughshowingcul- compelling, even if incorrect.
turalvariation(e.g.,someAmericanslikenthetasteof
Indianpicklestothatofgasoline,whereasmillionsof Perhapsthestruggletofindaplacetopointthefinger,
Indianscan’tgetthroughamealwithoutthem),also totaketheburdenofpossessionoffone’sself,comes
reflectstheattitudeoftheindividualembeddedinthat from the inherently political nature of such assess-
culture.Andtosocialpsychologists,itistheindividual ments.Wecertainlydon’tseethesameagitationwhen
differencesinthoseattitudesthatareimportantandin- wecan’tseemtorememberalistofwordsforwhich
teresting,inadditiontogroupdifferences.Indeed,itis weshowintactpriming.Individualsarethetransduc-
individualvariabilitythatisatthecoreoftheconstruct ersofculturalexperience—theyprovidethephysical,
of attitude. social,andpsychologicalshellthroughwhichculture
speaks.Yetwhenrevealedattitudesarenotpalatable,
Butwhyistheresuchacompellingsensethattheim- the reaction is to look for an answer elsewhere, and
plicitattitudethatisbeingpickedupisnotone’sown? pointingtoculture(notastheenvironmentinwhich
Thefallacymayarisefromassumingabrightlinesep- theattitudeislearned,butratherasthe“thing”whose
aratingselffromculture,anassumptionthatisbecom- attitude is being measured), is perfectly understand-
inglesstenableaswediscoverthedeepreachofcul- able and perfectly wrong.” (pp. 138–141)
tureintoindividualminds(Fiske,Kitayama,Markus,
&Nisbett,1998).Implicitattitudes,asIseeit,reflect Recently,thisdebatehasmovedtotheempiricalarena
tracesofexperienceswithinaculturethathavebecome whereversionsoftestsareusedthatareallegedlymore
sointegralapartoftheindividual’sownmentaland orlesslikelytotappersonalattitudesorculturalasso-
socialmake-upthatitisartificial,ifnotpatentlyodd,to
ciations (Nosek & Hansen, 2004; Olson & Fazio, in
separate such attitudes into “culture” versus “self”
press)butourbasicpointremainsthatitislesssensible
parts.
Butthemoreimportantobservationheremaybethis: 1ThemanuscriptbyKarpinskiandHilton(1999)citedhererefers
Theexperiencethatimplicitattitudes,asmeasuredby
toacirculatedmanuscriptpriortopublicationoftheirpaper.Thecita-
theIAT,maynotreflectanindividual’sownattitude
tionmaynotexactlymatchtheirviewsastheyfinallyappearedin
butratherthatoftheculturemaylieinthedominant print.
284
COMMENTARIES
to think of an sharp line between person and culture of traitors were beheaded in 17th-century T’ang
when thinking about implicit cognition. We reiterate China)areregardedbythestandardsofcontemporary
thepointthatifsuchassociationsdidnotreflectanatti- democraciestobebarbaric.Inthiscentury,socialsci-
tude it would fail to produce the correlations it does enceresearchinwhichbeliefsaboutgroupshavebeen
withbehavior.Mostrecently,wehaveobservedstrong showntoinfluencejudgmentsofindividualshasbeen
correlations between IAT measures of race bias and increasingly interpreted as representing bias. This in-
degree of spontaneous smiling to black versus white terpretationarisesnotfromaconcernwiththecorrect-
targets (Olson, Carney, & Banaji, 2004). Such rela- nessofperceivers’beliefsaboutthegroup,butbecause
tionshipswouldbehardtoexplainbasedontheclaim theapplicationofgrouplevelknowledge(SomeXare
that what such measures detect is knowledge of the Y) to individuals (X is Y) is deemed to be wrong.
culture rather than one’s attitude. Ifthetaskistoidentifycriminals,aguilt-by-associ-
ation position holds that the greater identification of
BlackthanWhiteisrationalanddefensibleonthebasis
Nineteenth-century Rationality? ofbase-rateinformation.Ontheotherhand,manyper-
sonal and social codes of ethics hold that judgments
Giventhemanymeaningsofthetermrationaland about individuals should be based on an individual’s
thecomplexityoftheissues,itisnotpracticaltogive ownbehaviorwithoutattentiontogroupmembership
thisissuetheattentionthatitdeserveshere,otherthan (guilt-by-behavior position). According to this posi-
offerafewobservations.ItispossiblethatArkesand tion,itisimplausibleorincorrecttoinferthatthepar-
Tetlock (this issue) make the mistake of conflating ents of murderers are more likely to be murderers
reasonablewithrational.Ifso,theremaybenodebate becausetheybelongtothesamesocialgroup(i.e.,fam-
here. We borrow directly the arguments offered by ily) or that because police officers are convicted of
BanajiandBhaskar(1999)aboutthemeaningsofra- crimes at a higher rate than the population (Uviller,
tionality as used in contexts such as Arkes and 1996), that Officer X is a criminal. This belief that
Tetlock’scritiqueanditsapplicationtounderstanding guilt-by-associationismorallyrepugnantissofunda-
the role of using group knowledge in assessments of mental that it occupies a central place in all codes of
individuals.2 justice from Ptahotep (Ptahotep, 2300 B.C.) to
When stereotypes are unconsciously activated and Hammurabi to Asoka (259 B.C., see Nikam &
reliedon,therearetwodirectchallengestotheimple- McKeon,1958)totheAssizeofClarendon(1166;see
mentationoffairnessthatareposed:(a)Perceiversand Plucknett, 1956) to all modern constitutions (with a
targets are unaware of the rendering of consequential smallnumberofEuropeanexceptionsinthiscentury).
judgmentsthataffectthelivesofboth,and(b)thedeci- These general principles provide relevant context for
sioninvolvesknowledgeaboutthesocialgrouprather considering the so-called rationality of stereotypes.
thanthetargetsalone.Thesetwoconcernsraiseissues
offairnessarenotinventionsofmodern,20th-century
conceptsofjustice.Itisafundamentalprincipleofjus- Not Classically Rational
tice,nowalmostathousandyearsoldinAnglo-Ameri-
can jurisprudence (Assize of Clarendon, 1166; Letussaythatthetaskofthesubjectistoidentify
Plucknett,1956),thatindividualsshouldbecognizant namesofcriminalsgivenalistofnamesthatimplyeth-
ofthechargesagainstthemsoastoensurethatjudg- nicity.ArkesandTetlock’s(thisissue)viewisthatareli-
mentsarenotbasedonfactualerror,althoughadeeper anceonracetomakesuchadecisionissimplyrational.
principleisalsoinvolved,thatjusticeisbetterserved Followingnearlyfiftyyearsofresearchinpsychology,
when an opportunity to be heard exists (Ptahotep we show that the behavior of participants performing
scrolls, 2400 B.C.). Judges who are unaware subvert suchataskdoesnotadheretoclassicalrationality.Table
this principle because those who are judged under 1 illustrates a partial list of the many possible utility
thesecircumstancesaredeniedtheopportunitytocon- functionsthatparticipantsmightchoose(iftheywere
test, contradict, or modify the judgment. rational),andaninspectionofthesesuggestswhyanyof
Itisanequallyhoaryandfundamentalprincipleof themareunlikelydescriptorsofbehavior.Notonlydo
justicethatjudgmentsaboutindividualsmustbebased theutilityfunctionsrequirecomputationsthataretoo
onindividuals’ownbehavior,notthoseofotherswho complex for subjects unequipped with a calculator to
arerelatedtotheminanyway.Societiesinwhichpun- perform,theyalsorequiredatathatevensubjectskeenly
ishmentwasbasedonassociation(e.g.,whenfamilies awareofthedomainareunlikelytohave(e.g.,relative
frequencyofBlacksandWhitesinAmericaasawhole,
ofBlacksandWhitesconvictedofcrimes,ofarrested
2Thissectionisdirectlyborrowedfromapreviousarticle(Banaji
BlacksandWhites,ofincarceratedBlacksandWhites,
&Bhaskar,2000).Becauseinsomecasesthelanguageiseditedor
ofBlackandWhitenamesinnewsreports,numberof
slightlychanged,wecannotattributeexactquotation.However,we
note that this material is not original to this article. TypeIandTypeIIerrorsinnewsreports,etc.).Wedo
285
COMMENTARIES
Table1.Possibleutilityfunctionsforparticipantsinrace/criminalityexperiments
Minimize[(Black names/White names) - (Black names/White names) ]
sample population
Minimize[(Black names/White names) - (Black names/White names) ]
sample arrested
Minimize[(Black names/White names) - (Black names/White names) ]
sample convicted
Minimize[(Black names/White names) - (Black names/White names) ]
sample incarcerated
Minimize[(criminal proportion) - (criminal proportion) ]
sample population
Minimize[(criminal proportion) - (criminal proportion) ]
sample arrested
Minimize[(criminal proportion) - (criminal proportion) ]
sample convicted
Minimize[(criminal proportion) - (criminal proportion) ]
sample incarcerated
Notes. Utilityfunctions1through4arerace-consciousutilityfunctions.Utilityfunctions5through8arerace-neutral.Alltheutilityfunctions
requireawarenessofthepropertiesofnamesinthegeneralpopulation,suchastheabsoluteandrelativenumbersofcriminalsandnon-criminals,
andsoon.Eachoftheutilityfunctionsalsorequiresaparticipanttodecidehowmanynamestocirclebasedontheseratios,usingothercriteriathat
are extrinsic to the problem representation such as which of the particular names to select given the numerical outcome of a utility function.
notdwellonthisargument,itsconclusionsfortunately Americanhistorysincehasrevealedthemajorityopin-
beingintunewithdecadesofresearchshowingthathu- ion’smoralbankruptcy,butweciteJusticeHarlanhere
manbehaviorisnotclassicallyoraxiomaticallyrational to ask whether what appeared distasteful in 1897 for
(Tversky&Kahneman,1974;March&Simon,1958; publicpolicymightseemunacceptablenowforinter-
Newell&Simon,1972;Simon,1947,1955,1983). personal and intergroup social judgments.
In the first half of this century, Walter Lippmann
(1922/1934) and Gordon Allport (1954) both empha-
sized the ordinary cognitive bases of category-based
Other Standards for Judgment judgments, and yet their writings clearly reveal their
recognitionofthefailuresinherentinsuchjudgments.
Disciplines vary in their methods for determining Most poignantly, Gunnar Myrdal (1944) showed that
error.Webroadlydefinefourcriteriatoshowthatthe Americansexperienceamoraldilemma“anever-rag-
behavior of using knowledge about the group (how- ing conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations
evercorrectitmaybe)tomakejudgmentsaboutindi- preservedonthegeneralplanewhichweshallcallthe
vidual members is best characterized as erroneous: ‘American Creed,’ where the American thinks, talks,
universality of social practice, logic, intention, and and acts under the influence of high national and
analogy.Becauseofitsmostdirectrelevance,thefirst Christian precepts, and on the other hand, … group
isgiventhemostattention.Theotherthreearebriefly prejudiceagainstparticularpersonsortypesofpeople
mentionedandarediscussedingreaterdetailinBanaji … dominate his outlook” (p. xlvii). A half century
andBhaskar(2000). later,Devine’s(Devine,Monteith,Zuwerink,&Elliot,
Socialpracticeacrosstimeandculturehasuniver- 1991; Zuwerink, Devine, Monteith, & Cook, 1996)
sallyrecognizedthemoraldiscomfortinherentincate- work strikingly shows the continued existence of the
gory-based social judgments. In the last century, moraldilemmaintheformofheightenedguiltamong
JusticeHarlan’sdissentinPlessyv.Ferguson(1896), American students confronting their prejudice.
amongthemostcitedopinionsoftheSupremeCourt, When stating a stereotype in the form of a logical
states eloquently that category-based judgments in- proposition, the appropriate logical quantifier is some,
volving race are immoral and cannot be the basis of several, many, a few, but almost never all. The type of
public policy. In his dissent, he wrote: logical deduction revealed by experimental participants
is of the following kind: “Some members of the set ×
Ourconstitutioniscolor-blind,andneitherknowsnor havecharacteristicΩ.Object#<22310>isamemberof
toleratesclassesamongcitizens.…Thelawregards the set ×. Therefore object #<22310> has characteristic
manasman,andtakesnoaccountofhissurroundings Ω.”Toconfusethelogicalquantifiersomewiththelogi-
orofhiscolorwhenhiscivilrightsasguaranteedby calquantifierallinthefirststatementisthekindoferror
thesupremelawofthelandareinvolved.Itistherefore
known in logic as a confinement law error (Kalish &
toberegrettedthatthishightribunal,thefinalexposi-
Montague,1964),orinpsychologythe“atmosphereef-
torofthefundamentallawoftheland,hasreachedthe
fect” (Woodworth & Sells, 1935). Premises containing
conclusionthatitiscompetentforastatetoregulate
somecreateanatmosphereforacceptinginferencesthat
the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely
actuallydeservetheanswer“can’tsay—nospecificcon-
uponthebasisofrace.Inmyopinion,thejudgmentthis
dayrenderedwill,intime,provetobequiteasperni- clusionfollowsfromthepremises.Ifapersonacceptsa
ciousasthedecisionmadebythistribunalintheDred specificconclusionforaninvalidsyllogism,thatisaner-
Scott Case. ror in reasoning, and such errors frequently conform to
286
COMMENTARIES
predictions based on the atmosphere hypothesis” withthelargecontemporarybodyofevidenceonatti-
(Bourne,Dominowski,&Loftus,1979,p.277). tudes and prejudice.
Inadifferentapproach,formanycircumstancesan
outcome is considered incorrect if it is inconsistent
with one’s intention. Intending to drive on the right
Notes
sideofaroad,butendingupontheleftisanerror.In
a similar way, intending to feel and behave in line
This work was supported by grants from the Na-
with one’s values, but failing to do so can be consid-
tionalScienceFoundationandtheNationalInstituteof
ered an error. In fact, recognizing the inconsistencies
MentalHealthtoM.Banaji,A.G.Greenwald,andB.
between ought and actual is apparently what ac-
A. Nosek. It was also supported by a grant from the
countsforthediscomfortexpressedwhenamismatch
Third Millennium Foundation and a fellowship from
between desired feelings and behaviors versus actual
the Rockefeller Foundation to M. R.Banaji.
feelings and behavior are highlighted (Devine et al.
WethankRoyRuhlingandWinmarWayforhelpin
1991).Howasocietyshouldchoosetodealwithsuch
preparing the manuscript and Dana Carney, Dolly
errors and their consequences is a separate question
Chugh, Jeff Ebert, and Jason Mitchell for their
and one that is beyond the scope of this article. Our
thoughtful comments on the manuscript.
purpose is to emphasize that conclusions about deci-
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Department of Psychology,
sion making that are disturbing ought not to be
Harvard University, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge,
mischaracterized as benign or correct.
MA 02138. E-mail:[email protected]
A final argument for considering experimental re-
sultsasrepresentingerrorcanbemadebyanalogy.In
otherareasinwhichsimilarcriteriaofincorrectnessas
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