Table Of ContentVolume 17 |
COMBAT LEADERS
OF WORLD WAR II
The Military History of World War I: Volume 17
COMBAT LEADERS
OF WORLD WAR II
by Trevor Nevitt Dupuy
COL, US. ARMY, RET
Franklin Watts, Ln.
575 Lexington Averme, New York, N.Y. 10022
To my Moruui ann FATHER,
‘Tuts Yean or mirem Cocney Wanpixe Anant nsany
Contents
Inrnonverios
Ancenicas Ansoy Contsravniass & Texore, Arnica, ax TRACY
Aseentcan ADM ConstANDEnS 1S ASTA AND THE PACIFLG
Amemieas Navan asp Misnivr Contmaninens
Sailors of the Pacific 27
Sailors of the Atlintte and Mediterranean
The Marines 37
Ansencan Aun Force: Coxnrannins
Burtase Anaay Com status i THE BIELD
Rovat Navy Cossneaxnens a7 Sra
Ravan. Auw Ponce: Gossnat Conearanens
Leanens Anoye Tue Oren ALLIES
Russia 82
France 96
China OL
Smaller Allied Nations 94
Conenrasmunys in unt Axis Forces
Germany 96
Jopen 112
Realy 119
Inpex
96
121
Introduction
nvm sisteen previous volumes In this series, I have endeavored
to present a clear picture of all of the significant events of Worl
War IL Ln these volumes I have nit avoided expressing opinions
schere I felt these would help the reader to see the events in per-
spective, But such opinions wore secondary to the facts
he primary purpose of this volume, however, is to concentrate
‘00 opinion, withont ignoring the facts. Presented here are the julg-
ments of # military historian who pessonally tank part io the wax,
cho has painstakingly reviewed Imndreds of references in the
preparation of this series, and weho has spent the major portion of
his ife as @ aiituey prafessional
Thave endeavored to be objective and fai Ihave sought opinion
and advice from fellow military men aid historians, Bost, the see
tion of those whose names appear in the chapters of this book —
well as the opinions, comments, amd exshnatfans expressed — has
bbcen my: personal and sole responsthilty
American Army Commanders in Europe,
Africa, and Maly
SHORMLY arTER America’s enby into World War II, newly pro-
moted Brigadier General Dwight D. Tisenliower joined the War
Flans Division of the Amy Goneval Staff la Washington, Early in
1942 Army Chief of Staff General Marshall selected Eisenhower
to be the chiof uf the ifhiential Operations Division, the a0#
center through which Marshall planned and controlled all overseas
ccomibial operations of the Army. Thon in quick suvcessfon Risen
L
hhower was selected fo be cormunder of US. frees in England,
‘and commander of the combined American British army which
invaded North Africa, This was "Operation Torch,” enlminating
in the liberation of Tunisia ia May, 1943
Contimsing as the Allied commander in the Mediterranean, Bi-
seuhowor—now a foll, fourestar yenerel — eontealled the armies
sehich conquered Sicily, and which invaded Ttaly. At the Caira
Conferenoe (November, 1943} Kiscuhuwer was selected! by Roose-
velt, Churchill, and the Combined Chiels of Staff to be the Su-
pprome Allied Communder for the invasion of Furope, which bey
60 June 6, 1944, During the fallawing eleven mths his armies
berated France, Belefum, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and
Thad eserein all of western and soudhers! Genmuary af the tine of
the German uncenditional surrender on May 7, 1945, In Decem:
bor, 1944, Fisenhower had been promoted to General of the Army,
Amuiea’s highest raiitary rank.
Bisenhower's detractors claim that he had no real combat
command expericaee and was meeely x genial “chasrouan oF th
board”; a political general who could get along well with the
British and swho Teaned over Imackward to avoid interallied and
{nterservice controversies; a man who prelerted ta settle disputes
and fo solve problems by compromise rather than by decision; a
soldier who failed to understazd she basie stratexieal issves ine
volved in the Gefeat of Centany, as shosen particularly by bis
fathure to seize a clear opportunity to eapture Berlin before the
Russians. His admirers agree that he ondeestood polities! affairs,
Dut point oat that he sens an unparalteled military diplomat who
welded a superbly efficient American-British staff, who handled
prond and touchy’ subardlinates with finesse, and whos: steatogie
Vision and skill were primary factors in the tremendous Allied vie-
tories over the Germans in Wester Eneope.
oth of these points of view are partly sight. It took real profes
sional military abshty as well as hick and charm to rise as rapidly
in Uwe Aovesiean Aray as Kiseahower did in the curly mths ol
the war, The results which his armics and air forces achieved az
fo large pazt a tibute to his unquestioned oxganizational, as well
as his diplomatic, capabilites, Me sclected good suboedinates, gave
them great freedom of action, ht retained firm control pver them.
He id nat shvink froma mnahing dilliult devisions, ane of which
twas one of the toughest in the history of war: the mnleashing of
hhis forces for the invasion in the face of the threat of a potentially
disastrous storm, Withoot a doubt he sas one ofthe most snecess-
fil military enenanders over produced by the Cnited States,
‘There is, however, some busis for the eriticis hal Eisenhower
could not snake up his mind, Undonbtedly he was keenly aware
that he had had no command expericuee of a unit larger than a
company, belare he was commanding an army group in battle
Save possibly for his key decisinn to gp aha with tl
the lace of the storm threal, he was belter at taking advantage of
opportunities presented to him than he was in shaping events (0
snake opportunities for hiosell. He has been criticized by his snb-
ordinates Montgomere, Bradley, and Patton, not only for baving
Iniledl to make a strategic decision lor a truly decisive main effort
{in Westem Furupe bnt also for hesitaney in euerying out the more
cautious decisions which he did snake, ©
“The must conteavensal of Eisenhower's command decisions was
that of stopping his onrushing armies xt the Elk Hiver when they
oul alinost cerlainly hase entered Berlin before the Russians
Instwud, he tuened the advice ify southern Germany for the
purpose ol preventing the Nazis from estublishiog a so-called
“Alpine Redonibt” Grities say that i should have Been obsinas
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