Table Of ContentCOLLECTED
, i
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK
OF THE
EUROPEAN
WAR.
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X
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Page
^
Preface i
I. List ofPrincipal Persons Mentioned xvii
II. BritishDiplomatic Correspondence 1
III. French Yellow Book 121
IV. Russian Orange Book 265
V. Belgian Grey Book 299
Appendix regarding Anglo-Belgian relations 349
VI. Serbian Blue Book 369
Appendix containing Signor Giolitti's Speech of
5th December, 1914 399
VII. German White Book 403
Appendix containing Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg
Speech of 4th August, 1914 436
VIII. Austro-Hungarian Red Book • 441
IX. Documents published subsequently 535
Index ^ 545
S^h (-)•'/Mt/M't/U't
PREFACE.
PREFACE.
The object of this volume is to brLag together the official corre-
spondence pubhshed by the various European Governments relating
to the outbreak of the present war. The correspondence thus
collected is not new, though official translations of the Serbian and
Austrian Books now appear for the first time. Such a compilation
of documents for the most part alreadywidelyknownmayappear to
need some justification.
Theworkhasbeenundertaken, notin orderto excitenewattention,
but ratherfor the benefit of students of history and poUtics. In these
days historical evidence is apt to become rapidly overlaid by a mass
of commentary and criticism through which the student has to dig
back to the original sources. This volume is mainly designed to
facihtate such work.
With this end in view, the intention has been to repubUsh only
those original documents which the various Governments have laid
before the world as authentic records of events. Commentaries,
even when proceedingfromthe Governments themselves, are therefore
excluded. For instance, the preface to the cheap edition of the
British White Paper is not reprinted in this volume. To this rule,
however, certain exceptions have been made. For obvious reasons
it has not seemed fair to exclude from a volume published in England
the commentaries contained in the German White Book and the
Austrian Red Book. Further, the special interest attaching to the
question of Belgian neutraUty has been held to justify the publication,
in an appendix to the Belgian Grey Book, of certain commentaries,
emanating from Belgian and British official sources, on the charges
brought in Germany against the good faith of the Belgian and British
Governments. It is, however, hoped that these commentaries will
not distract attention from the original documents published in the
same appendix. The same considerations have led to the inclusion,
as an appendix to the German White Book, of Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg's speech in the Eeichstag on August 4, as containing the
German case for the violation of Belgian neutrality. Finally, the
attention excited by Signer Giolitti's speech in the ItaHan ParUamept
has seemed to justifyits inclusion as an appendixto the SerbianBook.
Documents which were not included in the collections originally
published by the various Governments but have been published
subsequently officially in the Press are given at the end of the
volume (Part X).
—
THE EUROPEAN WAK.
As historical sources these documents are of the first importance.
Taken separately, they are interesting; but taken together ana
compared, they constitute a body of evidence of quite exceptional
value. The object of the succeeding pages is to furnish a tentotive
gwiulildebetonotheaitrtceommpptaratisaonnaarnrdattiove,thefiorrvtahleuaetvieonntsasaraewnhoolwe,tooinweerUe
known. Even a full discussion of all important pomts is im-
possible within the hmits of a short preface. AH that can be done
ia to give examples of how such documents may be handled. In
a work of this kind, at this time, it is impossible to attain the im-
partiahty of the historian, but what follows is a sincere attempt to
approximate to that attitude.
II.
For purposes of comparison, the documents may be divided into
three periods :
1. The state of European politics previous to the events of last
summer.
This, the prefatory period, is only illustrated by a few documents,
namely, the first chapter of the French Yellow Book (pp. 121-143),
Signor Giolitti's speech (p. 401), the Austrian Statement as to the
past activities of the Pan-Serb movement (p. 461 et seq.), the
exchange of notes between SirE. Grey and M. Cambon in November,
1912 (pp. 80-1 and 260-1), and the original documents in the
appendix to the Belgian Grey Book (p. 350 et seq.). These docu-
ments do not, of course, pretend to give any general history of the
causes which •produced the crisis of 1914 ; they merely throw
light on certain definite points immediately connected with that
crisis itself. It is clearly impossible to deal with this period in the
present Preface, as no full official correspondence relating to it has
yet been published, and it would be improper to make statements
with regard to it without the production of the evidence on which
such statements would be based. There is, indeed, already a mass
of evidence for this period before the public on which conclusions
may well be founded, but the time hasnotarrived for its discussion
in a Government publication like the present volume.
2. The period between the murder of the Archduke and the pre-
sentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia.
For this period we have Chapter II of the French Yellow Book
(pp. 144-153), the first six numbers of the Austrian Eed Book
(pp. 448-452), Nos. 1, 2 and 161 (pp. 1 and 114) of the British White
Paper, and Nos. 1 to 31 of the Serbian Book (pp. 370-387). This
period is dealt with in the next section.
3. The period between the presentation of the Austrian Note
and the outbreak of war. The bulk of all the correspondence, except
in the case of the Serbian Book, is concerned with this period. The
books vary, however, a good deal in the point up to which they carry
the story of events. The Serbian Book ends with the declaration of
war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia on July 28. The German,
Austrian and Russian Books practically end with the declaration of
;;;
PEEFACE.
jii
war between Germany and Russia on August 1, though the Russian
Book adds the formal declaration of war with Austria-Hungary on
August6, and the Austrian Book adds twelve documents illustrating
the formal steps as the result of which Austria-Hungary found herself
^t war with the other alUed countries. The British and French Books
«arry the story down to the declaration of war between England and
(Germany at midnight on August 4, and the French Book adds the
Declaration signed at London on September 4, binding England,
France and Russia not to negotiate or conclude peace separately.
The Belgian Book carries the story down to August 5 when Belgium
finallyfoundherselfatwarwithGermanyandwasassuredofthearmed
:support of the other signatories of the Treaty of 1839, but it then
proceeds to reproduce a series of documents illustrating subsequent
«yents down to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary
on Belgium on August28. Ofthese26 papers, the two last recordthe
formal rupture between Belgium and Austria-Hungary. Six deal
with miscellaneous subjects : the neutrahty of Holland, the naviga-
tion of the Scheldt, the taking over of German interests in Belgium
by the United States, and the departure of the Belgian Minister from
Luxemburg. Seven relate to the extension of the war to the posses-
;sions of the belligerents in Africa. The remaining eleven papers
illustratethe renewed ofEer made by Germany to Belgium on August 9
and its rejection on August 12.
As a whole, therefore, the correspondence in this volume is a
minute record of the events of 10 days from July 23 to August 1.
The subject is the Serbian Question. On August 1 the scene shifts
the Ught is switched from Serbia to Belgium and the French frontier.
Tor the next four days, August 2 to 5, we have a record, equally
minute, of the attitude of England, France and Belgium on the brink
of war and of the communications received by them from the German
Government. But we have practically nothing from the other side.
ThereisthespeechoftheGermanChancellorintheReichstag(pp.436-9)
1;here is the Note handed in at Paris by Baron von Schoen on
August 2 (French Book, No. 133, p. 234) and the telegram to Prince
Lichnowsky ofAugust 4 (British Book, No. 157, p. 108) ; there is the
conversation with Herr von Below-Saleske at the Belgian Foreign
Office, at 1.30 a.m. on August 3 (Belgian Book, No. 21, p. 311)
there are finally the five telegrams semi-officially published in the
GermanPressandreprintedin the collection at theend ofthis volume
(pp. 538-541). Thatisall. " Very early "inthe morning of August2
the German troops appear on thebridgesof WasserbilHg and Remich
in Luxemburg (p. 104) ; later on the same day they are reported to
be across the French frontier at Ciry and near Longwy (p. 234) ; on
August 3 their advance guard is at Gemmerich in Belgium (p. 316).
Behind this screen of troops Berlin is almost silent. At London,
Paris and Brussels decisions are still being formed. Dehberations
continue telegrams are exchanged. But at Berlin the direction of
;
events has already passed from the Foreign Office to the General
^tafE, which does not talk and which publishes no records.
There is one other gap in the correspondence which must be noted.
Weknow practicallynothingofanythingwhichpassedbetweenVienna
(m 3649) h
"
iv THE EUEOPEAN WAR.
and Berlin during this whole period. In the German Book t^ere ie
only one comraunication between the two capitals (No. 16, P- ^-^^^
in the Austrian Book there are only eight (Nos. 33, p. 506; dS, d»,
pT.he51e5ar;li4e2s,t 4o3f,tph.es5e20is;da4t6,edp.Ju5l2y22;748(,No.p.335).24, Tahnedre57i,s,p.ind5e^e»dj,.
as we shall see, no doubt as to the general relations between the two
Governments, but from the historian's point of view this is not
enough. We are dealing with a diplomatic episode; 10 days ot
feverish'activity when new proposals and new developments followed
each other hour by hour. The only real interest of such a crisis is
to estimate how a general attitude responds toeach new factor in the
situation and thereby to gain an impression of the spirit behind the
attitude. Here the German correspondence fails us. This very
failure may not be without value as a guide to the histori_an. It has
been perhaps the secret alike of Germany's predominance and of the
strain under which Europe has Uved for a decade, that Germany has
always shown the world her power, but has never taken it into her
confidence.
III.
The Period between the Mxirdbr oe the Archduke and the
Presentation oe the Austrian Note to Serbia, June 28-
JULY 23.
First, as to the attitude of the German Government. This may be
dismissed in a few words. The German Book states, "We permitted
Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have
not participated in her preparations" (p. 406). All the Books agree
that theGerman Government professed to havenopreviousknowledge
of the terms ofthe ultimatum. How much they did know can onlybe
inferred from such documents as French Book, Nos. 9 and 21
(pp. 145 and 153), British Book, No. 1 (p. 1), Serbian Book, No. 26.
(p. 383). On the question, what part Herr von Tschirsky played
personally in the counsels of the Austro-Hungarian Government
during this period, we know only the common belief of the
representatives of the Powers at Vienna as revealed in British Book,
Nos. 32 (p. 28), 95 (p. 74) and 161, 2nd para. (p. 114) ; Serbian Book,,
No. 52, 4th, 12th and 20th paras, (pp. 394, 396 and 398) ; Eussian
Book, No. 41 (p. 281) ; and French Book, No. 18 (p. 151).
Second, the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government. This
is the vital point. After all that has been said and written lately on
the subject it is not necessary to discuss the Pan-Serb movement.
Theremaybe a question as to thetrustworthiness ofthe police reports
on Serbian propaganda contained in No. 19 of the Austrian Book
(p. 461 et seq.). But the broad fact is not in doubt. Serbia
had nationahst ambitions incompatible with the recently estabhshed
sovereignty of Austria-Hungary over Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Those ambitions are practically admitted in British Book, No. 30^
(p. 27), they are presupposed in the advice given to Serbia as
recorded in that document and in French Book, No. 26 (p. 157),
they were evident in the attitude of the Serbian Press.
The only question for Austria-Hungary was whether by her
PREFACE. V
dramatic annexation of the two Provinces in 1908, she had finally
closedagainstherselfthedoorofpeacefulsettlement. WhetherSerbia
or Austria had tried to keep that door open in t—he five years since
1909 is not a question which canbedealtwith here ^wecan onlyrefer
to the different accounts of those years given in Austrian Book, No. 8
(p. 453) and Serbian Book, Nos. 5 (p. 371) and 30, para. 10 (p. 386).
Be that as it may, Austria decided in July that the door was closed.
Probably, as indicated in Signer Giolitti's speech, she had taken
the same decision long before. Now, at all events, she made up her
mindthatwar wasinevitableandinomediatewardesirable. (Austrian
Book, No. 6, p. 450.)
Itwas onthisissuethatAustriamadewar. ThequestionofSerbian
guilt in the murder of the Archduke could not have given rise to the
Austrian ultimatum. Whatever may be the value of the evidence on
this particular question contained in Austrian Book, No. 19 (p. 461 et
seq.),fewpeople would be found to say that this evidence involved the
Serbian Government itself in a way that a jury could consider for a
moment, and no one willsaythat it could have justified an ultimatum
with a forty-eight hours' time hmit. Whatever may be the value of
thestatement in Austrian Book, No. 9, paras. 2 and 3 (p. 455), as to
thefailureofthe Serbian Governmentto investigatethemurder,onthe
one hand, and on the other hand the assurances given bythe Serbian
Governmentofreadinesstoconductsuchinvestigations (SerbianBook,
Nos. 5 (p. 371) and 30, para. 5 (p. 385) ; RussianBook, No. 6 (p. 268) ;
British Book, No. 30 (p. 27); French Book, No. 15 (p. 148)),
it is obvious that, in regard to the murder itself, the Serbian Govern-
ment had at any rate committed no flagrant breach of the duty of
a neighbouring State to assist in the apprehension of criminals. It
is the general account of Serbian propaganda in Austrian Book, No.
19 (p. 461 etseq.) which constitutes Austria's real case against Serbia.
The distinction is well stated in Nos. 17 (p. 378) and 25 (p. 382) of
the Serbian Book. It wasaquestionof a fundamentalantagonismof
aims and ideals and a long-nursed sense of wrong.
Such cases are very difficult, but they are not new. It was not
the first time that Austria-Hungary had deliberately placed herself
across the path of a nationaUst movement. In comparing the feverish
atmosphere of the Austrian and Serbian Books a calm view of the
issues may perhaps best be attained by reference to a correspondence
which has now passed into history. From 1817 to 1848, Metternich
was writing of the poHcy of the Piedmontese Government in its rela^
tiontoItahannationahsmandAustrianrule inLombardyand Venetia,
in the same strain as Count Berchtold writes of Serbia. The same
epithets are applied to the leaders of Itahan nationahsm they are
;
" poisoners," " highway robbers," " pickpockets." Take a few
sentences at random. " The scheming policy of the Turin Cabinet.'^
" There is no doubt that the Turin Cabinet cherishes ambitious pro-
jects which can onlybe.carried out at the expense of Austria." " The
causes (of complaint against Austrian administration in Italy), even
had they been a hundred times more serious than they are, would
not have justified the least of the plots hatched by the Piedmontese
conspirator. In reality, in the struggle in which we are engaged, it
fM .f?fi4.Q 6 2
THE EUBOPEAN WAR.
-Vi
ifssaecentkoistotnaodmqiuareessckttsiuonandgaeoifrntoshutertvahedeimleioxnfiisaststserinasctteiavnoefcefAaruuelsnttsdr,eirabenudtptooowfettrhh.ee^amtdteacpikJesinedwAehiinncchge
of the Italian nation' the blow which he strikes at respect tor tJie
sacredness of treaties and the manner in which he thus attacks at its
base the maintenance of general peace and of all mternational re^-
tions " " The word ' nationahty ' and the words Eespect due to
nationahties ' as apphed to the Itahan Peninsula are words devoid ot
practical sense." History has given its judgment on this correspond-
eSnecrebi;anitquisesntoitonfoirs uosnltyoagirveeheoanrsealonofthaenporledsednrtacmoant;roivterissye,noiuhgeh
that we recognise the plot.
The intention of Austria under these circumstances is undisputed.
It is stated in the preface (pp. 443-7) and in No. 6 of the Austrian
Book (p. 450) precisely as it was stated by M. Jules Cambon on
July 24 (French Book, No. 30, pp. 161-2) and by Sir M. de Bunsen
on "July 27 (British Book, No. ^1, p. 38). War was to be made
inevitable all means of retreat were to be cutoff.
;
There is one furtherpoint to notice. The British Book, the French
Book, and the Serbian Book agree in the picture they draw of the
mystery surrounding the Foreign Office at Vienna during this period.
On the whole the German and Austrian Books bear out this impres-
sion. It seems that the deliberate intention was to take both Serbia
-and Europe by surprise.
IV.
Events subsequent to the Presentation of the Austrian Note.
We have no space to deal with the complex negotiations which
fiU the bulk of the Books. We can only consider three points as illus-
trations of the way the Books may be compared.
1. The character of the negotiations with Russia immediately
following on the rupture with Serbia.
2. The view of the negotiations implied bythe titleof theGerman
Book "How Russia betrayed Germany's confidence."
:
3. The question of Belgian neutrahty.
Itwillbeobservedthatweomitanydirecttreatmentoftheposition
of Great Britain and France in relation to the outbreak of the war.
The case for these two Powers has been often stated and is now before
the world. A re-statement couldcarry no added conviction. On the
•other hand, of the above three points the first two have received no
-adequate treatment from the historical point of view, partly because
the Austrian Book has only recently been published while the third
;
point touches so nearly the heart of the present struggle that a brief
statement on it may not be out of place.
V.
'The Character ob' the Negotiations with Russia, immediately
following the Rupture with Serbia.
Austria knew, at the time when she presented her Note to Serbia,
that she was risking a conflict with Russia. The fact is stated in so
manywordsinAustrian Book, No. 26(p.501). Indeed, it was one of
;
PREFACE. • Vll
the commonplaces of European diplomacy and witness is borne to it
throughout all the Books mthout exception. There is no sign in the
Austrian correspondence that Austria was under any illusion as to the
danger of Eussian intervention. But to judge from Count Pourtal^s"
airy words to the Serbian Minister at Petrograd on July 24 (Serbian
Book, No. 36, p. 389) and Herr von Tschirsky's equally confident
remarks to Sir M. de Bunsen at Vienna on July 26 (British Book,
No. 32,p. 28), Germany wascountingonRussian weakness or timidity
to avert this danger. No such illusion, however, even if it was-
originally genuine, could have survived the events which immediately
followed.
The point on which all the Books show striking unanimity is the
absolute openness of Russia's attitude from the beginning. The steady
consistency of that attitude gives the Russian Book its unity and its
force. M. Sazonof's conversations on July 24 with the German
Ambassador (German Book, No. 4, p. 427 ; Austrian Book, No. 16,.
p. 459 ; French Book, No. 38, pp. 167-8), and with the Austrian
Ambassador (Austrian Book, No. 14, pp. 457-8 ; Russian Book,
No. 25, p. 275) ; his instructions to M. Kudacheff on the same day
(British Book, No. 13, p. 19) and the official announcement in the
Russian Press on July 25 (Russian Book, No. 10, p. 269) were-
calculated to remove any possible doubt in the mind of the German
and Austrian Governments.
The way in which Austria met this open attitude is curious. If
there is one point on which the German and Austrian Books lay
extraordinary emphasis it is the assurances given by Austria that she
contemplated no attack on the territorial integrity or sovereignty
of Serbia. But the nature of her communications to Russia on the
subjectisworthexamining. OnJuly24 CountBerchtold saysAustria^
wants nothing but the maintenance of the statiis quo (Austrian Book,.
No. 18,p.461) ; onJuly25 he mentionsanindemnity (No. 20,p. 499)
on the same day he declares that neither the territorial integrity nor
the sovereignty of Serbia will be touched, but " we wiU proceed to
extreme measures for the enforcement of our demands " (No. 26,
p. 502) ; on July 27 the assurance that no territorial demandswillbe
made on Serbia is made conditional on the " locahsation "of the war
(No.32,p. 506). Clearly, thismethodof defining policywasnotcalcu-
latedtoallaythe apprehension franklydeclared by M. SazonofonJuly
24 (Austrian Book, No. 14, p. 458) : "You will always be wanting to
intervene again, andwhat a fife you willlead Europe ! " The general
impression produced by Austria's assurances in this matter, whether
that impression was just or unjust, may be seen from the doubt
expressed in British Book, No. 79 (p. 61), whether she would consent
to convert those assurances into " a binding engagement to Europe."
There is another point which indicates the distrust awakened,
not unnaturally, in the mind of Russian statesmen by Austria's steps
afterherrupturewithSerbia. Points 5and6 of theAustriandemands
on Serbia relate to theparticipationofAustrianofficialsinoneformor
another in the measures to be taken by the Serbian Government
against the anti-Austrian propagandaonSerbianterritory, andagainst
thoseimplicatedintheactualplotforthemurderoftheArchduke. In
VUl THE EUEOPEAN WAE.
theannotationsontheSerbianreplypublishedbothintheGermanand
AustrianBooks, thefollowingcommentaryismadeontheSerbianreply
tothesedemands: "IftheSerbianGovernmentmisunderstandusonthis
pointthey must do so deliberately, for the distinction between enquSte
judiciareandsimplerecherchesmustbefamihartothem" (p.513). Now,
the Serbian Governmentwere not the only people who misunderstood
these demands, for they raised the immediate apprehensions of M.
Sazonof SirE. Grey and M. Bienvenu-Martin (Austrian Book, No. 14,
,
p. 458 ; British Book,No. 5, p. 13 : French Book, No. 25, p. 156 ; and
Austrian Book, No. 11, p. 456). Such general misapprehensions are
alwayspossible,butthestrangething is that Count Berchtold, asearly
asJuly25, founditnecessarytooffer a specialexplanationonthis very
point to the Russian Government (Austrian Book, No. 27, p. 503).
This explanation was given to the Russian Government " in strict
eonfideiice." In other words, Russia is informed in confidence of
a point on which the Serbian Government certainly had a right to
a fullexplanation. Austriamightperhapsreasonablyhave considered
it incompatible with her dignity to make the explanation to Serbia
direct, but it could have easily been made indirectly through Russia.
As a matter of fact it was made too late to influence the Serbian reply
and under the seal of secrecy and, moreover, both the explanation
;
itself and the annotation on the Serbian reply are hard to reconcile
"
with the statement about " supervision made by Herr von Jagow
on July 29 (French Book, No. 92, p. 204). The whole circumstance
appearstorequireexplanation,especiallyasitisduplicatedbyasimilar
"confidence" in the case of Great Britain, which may also be noticed.
On July 24 Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count MensdorfE in
LondonthattheNoteto Serbiawas not an ultimatumbuta " demarche
with a time limit" (Austrian Book, No. 17, p. 460), and that this
fact should be communicated to Sir E. Grey. Sir E. Grev
received this information (British Book No. 14, p. 20) and
telegraphed it to Paris and Petrograd. It was c6riveyed to
M. Sazonof on the morning of July 25 (British Book, No. 17,
p. 21). He replied that this did not tally with the information
which came to him from Germany. We know from German Book,
No. 1 (p. 424), French Book, No. 28 (p. 159) and British Book, No. 9
(p. 16) what kind of languagethe German Ambassadorsatthe capitals
of the Entente Powers were holding on July 24. The reassuring
Communication thus made to Great Britain can therefore only be
explained, inthelight ofthe other communications sentto SirE. Grey
fromVienna on July 23 (Austrian Book, No. 9, p. 454)andon July28
(No. 39, p. 516), as an attempt to keep Great Britain quiet. Any
reassurancedesignedreallyto preserve peace should clearlyhave been
made at Petrograd. But while Count Berchtold was doing his best
to reassure Sir E. Grey by urgent telegrams on July 23 and 24, he
contented himself with writing a despatch (for such it appears to be)
to Petrograd on July 25, containing arguments for the education of
M. Sazonof (Austrian Book, No. 26, pp. 501-3): Again it must be
said that these proceedings were not calculated to promote a
Irank exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd.
The real inference from this correspondence seems to be—and
lies very near the heart of the calamities from which Eurone nniwt
is
