Table Of ContentCOERCIVE AND DISCURSIVE COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS IN
THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
ENVIRONMENT & POLICY
VOLUME 23
The titles published in this series are listed at the end a/this volume.
Coercive and Discursive
Compliance Mechanisms in
the Management of Natural
Resources
A Case Study from the Barents Sea Fisheries
by
Geir HfJnneland
The Fridtjoj Nansen Institute,
Lysaker, Norway
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-94-010-5783-7 ISBN 978-94-011-4044-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-4044-7
Printed an acid-free paper
AII Rights Reserved
© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2000
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 2000
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
incIuding photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
'If! should consider a future in fisheries ... , the Coast
Guard is absolutely necessary, but what's the problem, is
marine science ... ; this is the most insecure profession you
have today .. .it's way out of [invective] [ ... ]; if violations
are committed, then it's on this foundation.'
(Norwegian captain reflecting on his own compliance with
regulations in the Barents Sea fisheries)
'Norwegians are energetic, tough, live under harsh
conditions; to survive, you cannot tolerate the slightest
deviation from the law; it's different in Africa, where
bananas just fall down from the trees; therefore, I respect
Norwegian law; I understand that it's necessary [to
comply with it]; I respect the people of Norway. '
(Russian captain reflecting on his own compliance with
Norwegian rules in the Barents Sea fisheries)
3arex,
KTO BMope!
(For those at sea!)
Contents
List oft ables ............................................................................................................ xi
List off igures ........................................................................................................ xiii
Preface .................................................................................................................... xv
1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1
THEORETICAL CONTEXT - THE DEBATE TO BE ADDRESSED ................................... 2
EMPIRlCAL BACKGROUND - THE BARENTS SEA AND ITS FISHERMEN .................... 5
EMPIRlCAL CONTEXT - THE ISSUES TO BE RAISED ................................................. 8
METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................. 10
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK ........................................................................... 12
2 THE INTERACTION OF RESEARCH PROGRAMMES IN SOCIAL
SCIENCE STUDIES OF THE COMMONS ..................................................... 15
LAKATOS AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES ......................................... 15
Two TRADITIONS IN THE STUDY OF COMMON-POOL RESOURCES ........................ 18
The tragedy oft he commons and related models .......................................... 19
The critics: towards a model ofc o-operative action .................................... 20
A GROWING LITERATURE ON THE COMMONS? .................................................... 23
The two traditions: major differences in basic assumptions ......................... 24
Hard cores and protective belts -assumptions and prescriptions ................ 27
The demand for coherence and novelty: progressive or degenerating
programmes? ................................................................................................ 29
CONCLUSION: SCIENTIFIC GROWTH AS INTERACTION BETWEEN THEORETICAL
TRADITIONS ........................................................................................................ 31
3 A MODEL OF COMPLIANCE IN FISHERIES -THEORETICAL
FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION ................................... 37
BACKGROUND: THE STUDY OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................... 38
SOURCES OF COMPLIANCE .................................................................................. 40
FIRST-ORDER AND MANAGEMENT-INDUCED COMPLIANCE ................................. 42
Two COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS: COERCIVE AND DISCURSIVE MEASURES ......... 44
MANAGEMENT LEVELS AND SUBSYSTEMS OF COMPLIANCE ............................... 45
AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH ............................................................................... 49
viii
4 THE BARENTS SEA FISHERIES - RESOURCES, JURISDICTION
AND MANAGEl.\1ENT ........................................................................................ 55
THE BARENTS SEA FISH RESOURCES .................................................................. 55
Pelagic species: capelin and herring ........................................................... 56
Groundfish: cod, haddock and others .......................................................... 57
THE FISHING INDUSTRIES OF NORTHERN NORWAY AND NORTHWESTERN
RUSSIA ............................................................................................................... 59
THE LEGAL SETTING ........................................................................................... 61
NORWA v'S FISHERY RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES ....................................... 65
THE RUSSIAN-NORWEGIAN FISHERY MANAGEMENT REGIME ............................. 68
NORWEGIAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT .............................................................. 71
RUSSIAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT .................................................................... 73
5 COMPLIANCE IN THE BARENTS SEA - A PRELIMINARY
DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................... 79
FISHING ACTIVITY IN THE BARENTS SEA ............................................................ 79
VIOLATION RATES IN THE BARENTS SEA FISHERIES ........................................... 80
Do VIOLATION RATES REFLECT ACTUAL COMPLIANCE? ..................................... 86
FIRST-ORDER COMPLIANCE ................................................................................ 88
COMPLIANCE AS A RESULT OF COERCIVE MEASURES ., ....................................... 90
"INDIRECT COERCION" IN THE SVALBARD ZONE ................................................ 90
LEGITIMACY AND DISCURSIVE MEASURES ......................................................... 91
AN OBSERVER'S ACCOUNT OF CO-OPERATIVE ACTION IN THE SVALBARD
ZONE .................................................................................................................. 95
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 97
6 HOW FISHERMEN ACCOUNT FOR COMPLIANCE ••••••••••••.••••••••• 105
THE INTERVIEW SETTING .................................................................................. 105
A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE COAST GUARD ...................................... 109
LEGITIMATE REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES ................................................. 112
PARTLY ILLEGITIMATE RESEARCH RESULTS ..................................................... 113
STRICT ENFORCEMENT ..................................................................................... 115
SELF-INDUCED COMPLIANCE ............................................................................ 116
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 118
7 CO-MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNITIES IN THE BARENTS
SEA FISHERIES •••••••••.••••••••••••••.•••.•••••••••••••••.•••••••.•••••.•.••••••••••••••••••.•••.•••••••••.•• 125
THEORETICAL REVISIT: CO-MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNITIES ........................ 125
CO-MANAGEMENT IN NORTHWEST RUSSIAN FISHERIES ................................... 127
CO-MANAGEMENT IN NORWEGIAN FISHERIES .................................................. 132
THE BARENTS SEA FISHING COMMUNITIES ...................................................... 135
CO-MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE .............................................................. 137
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 139
ix
8 INVESTIGATION REVISITED ............................................................. 143
METHODOLOGY REVISITED: THE STORIES FISHERMEN TELL.. ........................... 143
The fisher representatives ........................................................................... 144
The Norwegianfishermen ........................................................................... 145
The Russianfishermen ................................................................................ 147
Themes from the Barents Sea fisheries ....................................................... 149
HYPOTHESES REVISITED: DISCOURSE OR GUNS? .............................................. 152
Major hypotheses and conclusions oft he investigation ............................. 152
Statistics: excluding coercion as the only explanation for compliance ...... 154
Interviews: further support oft he legitimacy argument ............................. 155
Observation: towards a theory of "seafaring communities " ...................... 156
Conclusions sustained ................................................................................ 156
EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXT REVISITED: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SCIENTIFIC
DEBATE ............................................................................................................ 159
Observations ofa general nature in the study ............................................ 159
Rational choice: basically irrelevant investigation .................................... 160
Co-operative action theory: empirical "novelties" and defence of "hard
core" ........................................................................................................... 160
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS ................................................................... 165
CO-MANAGEMENT BEYOND "USER-GROUP PARTICIPATION" ............................ 165
CO-MANAGEMENT - A SYSTEM-CENTRIC PERSPECTIVE? .................................. 166
IMPLICATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHOICES
MADE ............................................................................................................... 168
REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 173
INDEX ................................................................................................................. 181
List of tables
Table 2.1: The negative and positive heuristic of the tragedy
of the commons and co-operative action theory 30
Table 2.2: Relative expression of progressiveness
between the tragedy of the commons and the
co-operative action programmes 31
Table 2.3: Negative and positive effects of the interaction
between the existing two research programmes
as contrasted to an imaginary scenario of two research
programmes which both contain an inherent demand for
empirical investigation of the dynamic between
individual and collective action 34
Table 3.1: Sources of compliance and their assumed
manipulability 43
Table 3.2: Main sources of compliance and compliance
mechanisms in the instrumental and normative
perspectives 45
Table 3.3: Coercive and discursive measures that can be
applied within the three subsystems of compliance 49
Table 3.4: Sources of compliance and compliance mechanisms
activated at each level of the management regime 51
Table 5.1: Number of inspections carried out by the Norwegian
Coast Guard during the period 1986-92 81
Table 5.2: Percentage of inspections resulting in reaction 81
Table 5.3: Percentage of inspections resulting in reaction other
than lacking reports and violations not detrimental
to the resource basis 82
Table 5.4: Percentage of inspections in the NEZ/the Grey Zone
resulting in oral warning, written warning and arrest 83
Table 5.5: Percentage of inspections in the Svalbard Zone
resulting in oral warning, written warning and arrest 83
Table 5.6: Percentage of inspections in the NEZ/the Grey Zone
reSUlting in a reaction to four different types of
violations 84
Xl
xu
Table 5.7: Percentage of inspections in the Svalbard Zone
resulting in a reaction to four different types of
violations 84
Table 5.8: Sources of compliance and compliance mechanisms,
activated at each level of the management regime
(based on statistics and observation) 97
Table 6.1: Sources of compliance and compliance mechanisms,
activated at each level of the management regime
(based on interview data) 119
Table 7.1: Represented user groups in the three main decision-
making bodies in Northwest Russian fisheries 130
Table 7.2: Represented user groups in the two main decision-
making bodies in Norwegian fisheries 133
Table 8.1: Major themes within each category of interviewees 151
Table 8.2: Sources of compliance and compliance mechanisms,
activated at each level of the management regime
(based on statistics, interviews and observation) 158
