Table Of ContentUnited States Army in Vietnam
Military Communications
A Test for Technology
by
John D. Bergen
Center of Military History
United States Army
Washington, D.C., 1986
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Bergen, John D., 1942-
United States Army in Vietnarn. Military cOl11ll'1unications,
a test for technology.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Vietnamese Conflict, "l961-1975-Communications.
1. Title.
DS559.8.C6B47 1985 959.704'38 85-26647
Civil 1 Pub 91-12
First Printing
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
United States Army in Vietnam
David F. Trask, General Editor
Advisory Committee
(As o( "13 April "1985)
Roger A. Beaumont Maj. Gen. Edward j. Huycke
Texas A&M University Deputy Surgeon General,
U.S.A.
Col. Roy K. Flint
U.S. Military Academy Archer jones
North Dakota State University
Maj. Gen. Robert H. Forman
U.S. Army Training and
Jamie W. Moore
Doctrine Command
The Citadel
Col. Louis D. G. Frasche
james O'Neill
U.S. Army Command and General
National Archives and Records
Staff College
Service
john H. Hatcher
The Adjutant General Center Charles P. Roland
University of Kentucky
L. Eugene Hedberg
American Enterprise Institute Donald W. Smythe
for Public Research john Carroll University
U.S. Army Center of Military History
Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft, Chief of Military History
Chief Historian David F. Trask
Chief, Histories Division Lt. Col. Richard O. Perry
Editor in Chief john Elsberg
iii
· . . to Those Who Served
Foreword
The United States Army in Vietnam series is a comprehensive collection of
historical studies that record the Army's role in the Vietnam War. Included are
volumes describing combat operations; the Army's role in pacification, logistics,
engineer operations, medical support. and training; relations with the media; and
activities at the Department of Army level.
In this volume the author develops the thesis that burgeoning technology in
communications faced a severe test in Vietnam. He analyzes the advantages and
drawbacks of new communications systems and the effects these systems had
on decision making and on command. In so doing, he describes the difficulties
that communications systems had in keeping pace with the information explo
sion and shows that command and control do not necessarily improve with en
hanced communications. The study illustrates that the communicator's mission
of "getting the message through" was not only critical to the success of combat
operations but also as challenging as combat itself.
The author's clear understanding and description of these issues make this
a valuable work for those responsible for the future success of command, con
trol, communications, and intelligence. At the same time it serves as a primer
for readers not fully aware of the vital part communications play in every phase
of warfare.
Washington, D.C. WILLIAM A. STOFFT
24 October 1985 Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
vii
The Author
John D. Bergen received his commission in the U.S. Army upon graduation
from the United States Military Academy in 1964. He received a Master of Arts
degree in Literature from Indiana University in 1971 and a Master of Military Arts
and Science degree from the Command and General Staff College in 1975.
Mr. Bergen's military career included assignments as adviser to a South Viet
namese signal battalion, instructor in the Department of English at the Military
Academy, and commander of the 51st Signal Battalion in Korea. During a tour
as a military historian at the Center of Military History he completed the
manuscript of this volume. He then served as an Army staff planner and strategist
and as speechwriter to the secretary and deputy secretary of defense.
In February 1985 Mr. Bergen left public service to accept the position of staff
vice president at RCA.
viii
Preface
The Vietnam War was a conflict of great diversity and contrasts. The United
States and South Vietnam, the most technologically advanced nation in the world
and a tiny developing country, fought side by side against an enemy who sought
to undermine American technical superiority and destroy South Vietnamese
development. Events taking place in the remote villages and hamlets of South
Vietnam had tremendous political significance thousands of miles away in the
cities and towns of the United States. The contrasts were most profound on the
battlefield. Supersonic fighter planes streaking overhead at speeds of hundreds
of miles per hour gave fire support to infantrymen hacking their way through
the jungle at the pace of a few miles a day. Only communications could link the
strategic and tactical, fighter pilot and infantryman, American and South
Vietnamese.
The diverSity of America's Vietnam experience complicates the telling of the
story of communications in the war. The setting of critical events and decisions
changed back and forth from Southeast Asia to Washington. Issues surfaced and
were resolved, only to resurface years later. Telling the signal story in a logical
manner, without redundancy or constant shifts of time or setting, dictated a loose
chronological structure with geographic and thematic chapters interspersed at
appropriate points in the narrative.
The story begins during the closing days of World War 11 with the 055 agents
who gathered intelligence in Indochina. It continues through the period after the
Franco-Viet Minh War, when American advisers assumed responsibility for
assisting the army of the new Republic of Vietnam, an era of great opportunity
to forestall the Communist insurgency before it could gain momentum.
Once the Communists launched a full-scale insurgency in 1960, American com
municators and advisers tried to help the South Vietnamese defend against the
insurgents. But the United States had little experience in counterinsurgency
warfare, and the book describes the trial and error that characterized the early
counterinsurgency and pacification efforts. It also discusses the communications
that the United States began installing in Thailand and South Vietnam during
the early 1960s to support America's increasing strategic commitment to Southeast
Asia.
Once American troops were actually committed in 1965, those strategic net
works provided an austere communications base for U.S. forces. The book
discusses in detail the planning for a full-scale American presence and the emer
gency measures taken to provide communications to the first tactical units rushed
to South Vietnam. The description of the American buildup ends with a sum-
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