Table Of Content
: At the White House 241
World War
Part :
december – august
2 4 2 churchill’s war
Contents
13: At the White House .................................................... 243
14: Some Chicken .......................................................... 267
15: The Completest Intimacy ............................................. 291
16: Poor Winston.............................................................315
17: Churchill Up and Churchill Down................................. 337
18: Humiliation Valley .................................................... 363
19: Three Men and a Baby................................................ 397
20: Molotov and the Mongolian Smile ................................. 421
21: One Thousand Bombers............................................... 437
22: The Blame for Tobruk ................................................. 465
23: The Knight’s Move..................................................... 483
: At the White House 243
:
At the White House
T
he tide had begun to turn before Japan’s fearsome plunge into
the war. In North Africa, General Auchinleck’s forces had raised
Rommel’s siege of Tobruk; a German retreat was beginning both
there and at Moscow, where the pitiless Russian winter had fallen with
unequal cruelty upon the opposing armies. At sea too the war of the Atlan-
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tic supply line had eased. More ships were arriving, and the rst convoys of
war goods had reached North Russia without loss. Only the British public,
an amorphous, half-blind animal that has not always been proven wrong in
its instincts, seemed perplexed by Pearl Harbor – ‘rather breathless,’ as a
secret study found, ‘with confused reactions.’ Contempt for the Japanese
gave way to dismay at their strength, which the ‘idiotic press’ had under-
rated. There was however satisfaction that America was now in the war.
The prime minister shared that satisfaction. No matter whether Roosevelt
declared war on Germany or not, the P.M. knew enough from the Black
Jumbos to recognise that Hitler was both honour- and treaty-bound to de-
clare war on Japan’s enemies. (A rush magic received from Bletchley Park
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the next day, the eighth, con rmed it. The top item in the secret box that
evening was a white teleprinter message from the air ministry, an intercept
of a ‘most immediate’ cypher message sent earlier that day by General
Oshima to Tokyo. Having received the radio report that hostilities had bro-
ken out between Japan and America, he had at once called on Ribbentrop;
the latter said that although he had not yet secured Hitler’s sanction, ‘the
immediate participation in the war by Germany and Italy was a matter of
course’ in consequence, and in front of Oshima he had at once telephoned
the Italian foreign minister Count Ciano. Churchill ticked this in red ink).
Churchill had spent the last hours at Chequers that Sunday night rush-
ing out messages to sundry leaders, with ambassadors Harriman and Winant
2 4 4 churchill’s war
assisting. He dictated words of encouragement to Chiang Kai-shek, of emo-
tion to Harry Hopkins, of allure to Eamon de Valera: ‘Now is your chance,’
he cajoled the Irish leader. ‘Now or never! A nation once again! I will meet
you wherever you wish!’ (Churchill had secretly offered the six counties of
Northern Ireland to Eire as a reward for joining his war).
Ambassador Winant, at his request, repeated this very private message
to Roosevelt, adding that it was for Washington to decide when Britain
should actually declare war on Japan. Winant left Chequers at midnight-
thirty. He cabled to his president: ‘The prime minister is calling Parliament
to meet at three o’clock this afternoon.’ Should the P.M. ask for a declara-
tion of war at that time or simply say that he would ask for a declaration
within an hour after the Americans declared war, ‘which he has pledged to
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do’? Drawing attention to the awkward transatlantic di erence in time,
Winant suggested that the president might want to address the Joint Ses-
sion of the U.S. Congress prior to a British declaration of war.
Roosevelt too did not care for any appearance of being dragged in by the
British: ‘I think it best on account of psychology here,’ he replied, ‘that
Britain’s declaration of war be withheld until after my speech at : Wash-
ington time.’ He added, ‘Delighted to know of message to De Valera.’
By two a.m. – it was now Monday, December – Churchill had re-
ceived word from Tokyo that Japan had formally declared war on both Britain
and the United States. He sent word up to Invergordon, directing Eden to
call him back as soon as he arrived there, and went to bed.
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At that moment in Hawaii, res were ravaging the naval base and dock-
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yards at Pearl and the hulks of those American battleships still a oat. Nearly
three thousand servicemen had died. Unaware of these horrors, Churchill
could think only of his joy that the British empire’s isolation was at an end.
Silly people might cavil at the vacuous Americans, might mock at their
distant blather, at their vulgar ostentation and their softness and their wealth.
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That night, he was conscious of the maternal American blood owing in his
veins. They had won after all. He cared no longer how many years the war
might last. Britain and her peoples would emerge, mauled perhaps and
mutilated, but victorious. Light-headed with sensations such as these, he
allowed his valet to undress him, and pulled the bed sheets over his head.
His thoughts were upon President Roosevelt as he awoke. How useful it
would now be that Eden and Cadogan were in Moscow, at Stalin’s table,
while he, the prime minister, was in Washington: they could conduct a glo-
bal three-power conference in cypher to settle all their problems. The most
: At the White House 245
urgent would be to ensure that Roosevelt, now that he was in the war,
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applied his country’s resources to defeating Germany rst.
washington, still favouring the British government with little frankness,
admitted during the night that they had lost two battleships at Hawaii, and
that this left the Pacific Fleet with six effective battleships. Such losses
seemed eminently tolerable: such are the fortunes of war. Winston’s mind
was set on Washington. With fond, fleeting memories of his Atlantic meet-
ing lapping around his memory, he was driven out of the Chequers estate
and returned to Downing-street. It had been a most memorable weekend.
The cabinet, meeting at : , accepted his suggestion that he visit Wash-
ington forthwith, and he put it to His Majesty, without whose permission
he could not leave the kingdom. ‘The whole plan of Anglo-American de-
fence and attack has to be concerted in the light of reality,’ he wrote, justifying
the journey. ‘We also have to be careful that our share of munitions and
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other aid which we are receiving from the United States does not su er
more than is, I fear, inevitable.’
That afternoon he addressed the Commons, with his shoulders bowed,
and his features wearing the well-practised expression of grim piety. Fit-
ting the mood of the House, he made his speech matter-of-fact, almost
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dull; it was poorly constructed, and indi erently delivered. He inspired
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hope only when he reassured the Members: ‘Some of the nest ships in the
Royal Navy have reached their stations in the Far East at a very convenient
moment. Every preparation in our power has been made and I do not doubt
that we shall give a good account of ourselves.’
Aboard the battleship that was to bear him to Murmansk, Eden had
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been taken sick – struck down perhaps more with morti cation than by
any more conventional virus.
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At ve o’clock Sir Alexander Cadogan again ’phoned Downing-street
from Scotland, to protest about the trip to Washington. Churchill told him
that the cabinet had now agreed to it. Cadogan, the permanent head of the
F.O., pointed out that both the P.M. and his heir-apparent would thus be
out of the country. ‘That’s all right,’ rejoined Churchill. ‘That’ll work very
well. Anthony will be just where I want him, and I can communicate with
him in Moscow!’
Shortly, a message arrived from Roosevelt, reporting that both Houses
of Congress had voted to declare war on Japan. ‘Today,’ F.D.R. told the
P.M., grimly clinging to his earlier metaphor, ‘All of us are in the same boat
2 4 6 churchill’s war
with you and the people and the empire, and it is a ship which will not and
cannot be sunk.’
The prime minister broadcast on the B.B.C. at nine p.m. Like the M.P.s
earlier that day, the radio listeners were also disappointed. At least one
gained the impression that he was ‘dead tired and not quite sober.’
truly the peoples were in the hands of their popular dictators. While
Churchill had been told of the loss of only two battleships at Pearl Harbor,
the American public learned of only one. At : p.m. on December ,
Churchill’s delegation in Washington reported to the admiralty however
that the U.S. navy’s Admiral Stark was privately calling it ‘a major disaster’
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which ‘was much more serious than thought yesterday’ –the Paci c Fleet
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was e ectively down to only two battleships. Three had in fact been sunk,
and three more seriously damaged. Stark, no friend of Britain, now planned
to transfer substantial forces to the Pacific. Admiral Ghormley in London
disclosed that Stark had ordered the Yorktown carrier battle group to pre-
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pare to transfer from Norfolk, Virginia, to the Paci c Fleet; and that he had
authorised the U.S. commander-in-chief Atlantic to withdraw all capital
ships and carriers from Iceland if he desired. This seriously threatened the
naval balance of power. Britain now had twelve operational battleships, the
United States only eight; against these Japan and Germany could already
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set nineteen, and the French eet of Strasbourg, Provence, Jean-Bart, Richelieu
and Dunkerque might one day also come under Axis control.
On December Churchill realised, after consulting various sources,
that the American battleship losses were far worse than Washington had
admitted – that only one, or at best two, of the eight had survived. Half of
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the U.S. air force in the Paci c had also been destroyed. The Japanese were
now lords of that ocean: ‘The American public,’ Halifax concluded in his
secret diary, ‘has not tumbled to this yet.’ Attending Buckingham Palace
for his regular Tuesday luncheon with His Majesty, Churchill passed on the
doleful truth. ‘The prime minister came to lunch,’ the king wrote, record-
ing the dreadful news: ‘In Pearl Harbor U.S. Battleships were sunk &
seriously damaged ...which means that the U.S.A. has already lost com-
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mand of the sea in the Paci c.’ This created a very alarming situation for his
own Prince of Wales and Repulse. Even though unaware of the ‘BJs,’ the king
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was incredulous that the U.S. eet had remained in harbour when Japan
was already on a war footing. ‘W[inston],’ he concluded, ‘told me he is
anxious to go to Washington to arrange various matters with F.D.R.’
: At the White House 247
A powerful wanderlust, coupled with a desire to hobnob again at the
highest levels, had seized the prime minister. Eden tried again to dissuade
him, but failed. ‘I still rather wish,’ he wired to the P.M., ‘that you could
postpone a fortnight till my return.’
Eden was out of sight however, and out of Churchill’s mind. ‘Now that
we are, as you say, “in the same boat,”’ he telegraphed to Roosevelt, ‘would
it not be wise for us to have another conference?’ He proposed to arrive by
warship at Baltimore or Annapolis, the closest ports to Washington, bring-
ing Beaverbrook, Pound, Portal, and Dill with him.
It is plain from Roosevelt’s presidential papers that he did not warm to
the idea. For over a year he had swooned in ill-concealed envy of Winston’s
rising star. The famous cherubic features were on every newspaper’s front
page. Now that his, Roosevelt’s, hour had struck, he did not want this im-
portunate Englishman strutting onto his stage: not yet. He too now tried to
persuade Winston to postpone the trip. In fact he asked Lord Halifax to
notify the P.M. that for security reasons he did not like the idea of Washing-
ton as the location either. He proposed Bermuda instead, and not before
January . Churchill however was determined. They had to meet.
at ten that evening, December , Churchill welcomed a dozen of his ad-
miralty and other colleagues in the underground Cabinet War Rooms to
survey the changed position. They discussed how to redress the balance of
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naval power in the Paci c. The Japanese threat to Australia and New Zea-
land could no longer be ignored. How best to use Britain’s only capital
ships in the region, Prince of Wales and Repulse? Churchill suggested they
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join the remnants of the U.S. Paci c Fleet at Hawaii, a gesture of both
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symbolic and military signi cance, and prepare to take o ensive action against
Japan itself. Alternatively, the admiralty might consider a plan to employ
Prince of Wales, Repulse, and Centurion as what he called ‘rogue elephants.’
Meanwhile Churchill would inform Eden that ‘in view of the changed cir-
cumstances’ Russia would no longer get the ten R.A.F. squadrons on offer.
He sent the bleak telegram to Eden, now ploughing into the long Arctic
night toward North Russia, at once. It told him much of what had hap-
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pened – that since Roosevelt now had only two battleships left in the Paci c
against ten Japanese, he was recalling all battleships from the Atlantic; that
‘according to American sources’ (evidently Winston’s euphemism for the
BJs) ‘we are going to be heavily attacked in Malaya and throughout [the] Far
East;’ that he intended to reinforce Malaya with aircraft from the Middle
2 4 8 churchill’s war
East where, Auchinleck assured him, the tide had now turned; and that
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Eden should not now o er the ten R.A.F. squadrons to Stalin. ‘Hope you
are better,’ he continued. ‘We are having a jolly time here.’
after the Pearl Harbor disaster American signals Intelligence belatedly
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got o its high horse; in a long talk with Captain Hastings, ‘C’s’ liaison
ffi fi
o cer in Washington, Admiral Noyes professed himself satis ed with what
the British codebreakers were sending him. Churchill however suspected
that Roosevelt was concealing from him the true scale of the débâcle. Even
on the twelfth Admiral Ghormley supplied an account that spoke only of
two battleships sunk and ‘several’ more as well as three light cruisers dam-
aged; since the message also lamented three thousand ‘casualties’ there were
grounds not to believe what Washington was saying. A month later, Admiral
Conrad Helfrich, commander-in-chief of the Dutch navy, would express
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disquiet at the Americans’ furtiveness: ‘Why not let their ghting allies
know their exact losses – which the enemy already know?’ If, he said, seven
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out of eight battleships of the Paci c Fleet and aircraft had in fact been
knocked out at Pearl Harbor ‘why try to keep it a secret from the British
and the Dutch?’
Seven out of eight? ‘Surely this is untrue,’ an anguished Churchill de-
manded of the First Sea Lord. ‘What have you been told? I have not pressed
for information but I could certainly do so.’ Pound replied that the U.S.
navy department had agreed to release the real facts, and that the damage
was ‘considerably more’ than Colonel Knox, their secretary of the navy,
had given out to the press.
admiral tom Phillips had sailed from Singapore with Prince of Wales and
Repulse and four destroyers on the evening of December , intending to
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maul Japanese invasion convoys o Songkhla or in the Gulf of Thailand.
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Early on the ninth he was advised that no ghter cover could be provided as
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the Japanese had destroyed all air elds in northern Malaya. While he had
scanty Intelligence data on the Japanese warship movements, he had none
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on their air forces. The codebreakers at Singapore had identi ed an aircraft-
carrier squadron in the Saigon area, but he pressed on, believing he had the
advantage of surprise. After enemy planes sighted his force Phillips turned
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back brie y toward Singapore; at midnight he received a signal reporting
that the Japanese were also landing at the port of Kuantan, miles north
of Singapore. Tragically, the signal turned out to be incorrect; although
: At the White House 249
[Facsimile of a magic intercept]
2 5 0 churchill’s war
Churchill had also spoken to the king about Japanese troop landings at
Kuantan, there were none. Phillips had however already changed course
to intercept.
Seven thousand miles away in London, Churchill had retired for the
night after the meeting in the underground Cabinet War Rooms.
Awakening the next morning, December , he worked on his boxes of
papers until interrupted by a ’phone call from Admiral Pound. A signal had
come in from the Eastern Fleet an hour earlier, he said, reading ‘Most Im-
mediate. H.M.S. Prince of Wales and H.M.S. Repulse sunk by torpedoes at
about ,’ and giving the position. Japanese shore-based torpedo planes
had sunk Repulse at : p.m.; Prince of Wales, her steering crippled like
Bismarck’s by one torpedo, had foundered, plunging Admiral Phillips and
of his sailors to the deep, forty-seven minutes later. A further signal
made plain that it would be impossible to keep this grim news secret for
long.
Churchill was dazed by the awful news. Even to himself, he probably
never admitted his own rôle in forcing through the plan to send these ships
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down to Singapore without a balanced supporting eet. He certainly kept
quiet about it later, when writing his memoirs. ‘K.B.O.,’ he once more
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apostrophised to his sta : ‘Keep buggering on.’
R
If one item in this increasingly senseless war heralded the end of Brit-
ain’s Asian empire it was this naval disaster. The fall of Singapore, the loss of
Malaya, and the rise of the nationalist sentiment that was to sweep the Brit-
ish out of all their possessions in the Far East over the next decade could
not have followed in such swift train but for the loss of these two ships,
which Churchill coldly ascribed to ‘chance.’ A telegram arrived on his desk
from King George VI, touring the Welsh war industries. The news had
shocked him too: ‘For all of us,’ he wrote, ‘it is a national disaster, & I fear
will create consternation in Australia. The lack of details makes the fact
harder to bear, coming as it does on top of yesterday’s bad news re the U.S.
battleships [at Hawaii]. I thought I was getting immune to hearing bad news,’
the monarch concluded pointedly.
Resolving anew to leave these questioning climes for Washington as soon
as possible, Churchill hurried over to the House and made a clean breast of
the warships’ loss. ‘No details are yet available,’ he added, ‘except those
