Table Of ContentCHRISTIAN
HERMENEUTICS
Paul Ricoenr and Rejig//ring
ofT heology
JAMES FODOR
C L A R E N D O N P R E S S O X F O R D
Christian Hermeneutics
Christian Hermeneutics
Paul Ricceur and the Refiguring of Theology
JAMES FODOR
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Christian hermeneutics : Paul Ricaeur and the
refiguring of theology / James Fodor.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Ricaeur, Paul—Contributions in hermeneutics. 2. Hermeneutics—
Religious aspects— Christianity—History of doctrines— 20th
century. 3. Hermeneutics. I. Title.
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To my parents,
William and Madeline Fodor,
for their constant and quiet support.
Preface
The trouble with theology, many people think, is not so much that it is
boring and irrelevant (although it can certainly be that!), or that it is
unnecessarily abstruse and filled with technical jargon (although, again, it
frequently suffers from those maladies), or even that it lacks significance
and value. Indeed, theology is meaningful and helpful to a good number
of folk; some may find theology interesting, edifying, even absorbing. The
trouble with theology, rather, is that in the estimation of most people it
has nothing to do with truth. Theology may serve any number of other
wise useful, and perhaps even indispensable, functions for a particular
group of people, namely, Christians, but it is thought to have no bearing
at all on truth. For when Christians invoke language about God it seems
that their discourse is simply idling. It does not really engage, make
contact with, or refer to anything. Theological language, in short, appears
to have gone on holiday.1
This all too common appraisal of theology’s apparent disconnection
with truth conveniently sets forth a number of interrelated issues that
constitute the focus of this investigation, namely, the conceptual affili
ations between reference, truth, and language. By exploring the ways in
which the referential dimensions of language bear upon the truthfulness
and/or integrity of theological discourse, I will endeavour both to clarify
some of the confusions and to dispel some of the erroneous assumptions
surrounding the issue of theology’s relation to truth. The prime issue
under consideration will centre on ‘the referential import’ of theological
truth claims. Do theological affirmations actually refer to anything? Or are
they simply projections of our wishes, desires, longings? What are theo
logical claims about? In other words, to what do they refer and thus in
what sense can they be said to be true? How might the notion of reference
help us assess the truthfulness of theological claims?
Implicit in all these questions is the rather widespread belief (reflected
in the view expressed above about the seeming incompatibility between
theology and truth) that truth involves some sort of correspondence be
tween language and reality, that words—if they are to be received as
true—must somehow correlate with or correspond to an extra-linguistic
viii Preface
state of affairs. This way of putting the matter will, no doubt, strike the
reader as philosophically naive and conceptually unsophisticated, but it
more or less captures the basic intuition, embraced by many, that truth
and reference are intimately related notions. My aim is not to defend or
endorse, let alone fully articulate, any particular philosophical theory of
truth, reference, or language—as if such theories must be formally estab
lished before any theological work can proceed. My objective, rather, is to
show how the notions of truth and reference might help elucidate the task
of theology, despite the fact that in recent times their indissociable con
nections have come under increasing criticism. Indeed, the guiding as
sumption throughout is that even though truth is not reducible to or
finally explicable in terms of reference, these notions are nevertheless
mutually illuminating because inextricably intertwined in the history of
Western philosophy and theology.
In undertaking this investigation, I have principally drawn on the
hermeneutical reflections of Paul Ricoeur, whose abiding interest in mat
ters ontological has served as both an impetus and a guide. Of necessity,
a good portion of this inquiry will be devoted to an exposition of Ricoeur’s
hermeneutics; nevertheless, my primary intent is not to offer a com
mentary on his work but to explore the possibilities of a Ricoeurian
hermeneutic for theology. Such a theological appropriation will no doubt
generate tensions and difficulties of its own, but in a sense this is unavoid
able. For the only way to remain faithful to Ricceur’s hermeneutical
insights is precisely by reappropriating them differently. Ricoeur’s
hermeneutical approach, then, serves more as a beacon by which to gain
an orientation than as a model to slavishly imitate.
Work on this project began several years ago in the form of a doctoral
dissertation at the University of Cambridge. Its original orientation was
more directly philosophical, so much so that the theological contours
appeared, in comparison, subdued, tentative, and not very sharply de
fined. Indeed, I more or less plunged into the philosophical and linguistic
debates over reference, truth, and meaning without really being all that
clear about what was at stake theologically, or exactly why the issue of
reference should matter to Christian life. The intervening time, however,
has afforded an opportunity to circumscribe the theological issues with
greater attention and care. My revisions have, I hope, produced a more
focused and theologically engaging study.
This project was greatly assisted through the generous financial sup
port, warm friendship, and intellectual guidance of the following persons,
communities, and institutions. I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness
