Table Of ContentCHOOSING WAR
CHOOSING WAR
Presidential Decisions in the Maine,
Lusitania, and Panay Incidents
Douglas Carl Peifer
1
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Peifer, Douglas Carl, author.
Title: Choosing war : presidential decisions in the Maine, Lusitania,
and Panay incidents / Douglas Carl Peifer.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2016. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016003097 | ISBN 9780190268688 (hardcover : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Presidents—United States—Decision making—Case studies. |
War and emergency powers—United States—Case studies. |
United States—Military policy—Decision making—Case studies. |
McKinley, William, 1843–1901—Military leadership. |
Wilson, Woodrow, 1856–1924—Military leadership. |
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (Franklin Delano), 1882–1945—Military leadership. |
Maine (Battleship) | Lusitania (Steamship) | Panay (Gunboat)
Classification: LCC JK558.P45 2016 | DDC 355.02/720973—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016003097
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
To
Lovers of history and international affairs
J. Carl and Doris Peifer, world travelers.
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction: Naval Incidents and the Decision for War 1
PART ONE: The Maine Incident
The Incident 15
Context: The Cuban Insurrection, American Perceptions, and the
Cleveland Administration’s Policy 23
The Immediate Reaction: The Public, the Press, Congress, and the
Business Community 43
The President Decides, Congress Assents, and a New Era Is Born 53
Aftermath, Consequences and Reflections on the Maine Incident 61
PART TWO: The Lusitania Crisis
The Incident 67
Context: American Neutrality, August 1914– May 1915 91
The Immediate Reaction 119
Wilson’s Response and Bryan’s Departure 127
Aftermath, Consequences, and Reflections
on the Lusitania Crisis 135
viii • Contents
PART THREE: The Panay Incident
Background to the American Presence in China 149
The Incident 155
Context: Isolationism, Foreign Policy, and the Sino- Japanese War 167
The Immediate Reaction: The Public, the Press, and Congress 193
FDR’s Options and Response 201
Aftermath, Consequences, and Reflections on the Panay Incident 213
PART FOUR: Anticipating the Unexpected
Categorizing Naval Incidents 235
Valuing the Particular 243
Notes 249
Bibliography 305
Index 325
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My thanks go out to the many individuals who read portions of the book, de-
bated the intricacies of coercion theory and naval diplomacy with the author,
and engaged in the disciplinary jousting that distinguishes historians from
social scientists studying the same topics. Special thanks go to John Geis,
Gerhard Weinberg, Elizabeth Peifer, Mark Duckenfield, John Schuessler,
Kevin Holzimmer, Nikolas Gardner, Robert Hanyok, David Alvarez,
Alexander Lassner, and the anonymous outside readers who offered valuable
insights. I very much value their comments and criticism even if I did not
always heed all suggestions. Any errors or interpretive differences should be
laid at my doorstep. I have been greatly enriched by the experience of work-
ing in a multidisciplinary, inter- service, and inter- agency setting where I could
discuss and debate issues with fellow historians, international relations schol-
ars, active- duty military officers from all the services, and international fellows
from around the world. I am also deeply appreciative of the assistance rendered
by Helen Lehman and Josephine Turner at the Muir S. Fairchild Research
Information Center; David Colamaria of the Naval History and Heritage
Center, the staff at the Library of Congress and the National Archives, and
colleagues David Alvarez and Robert Hanyok from H- Net. Special thanks are
due to Nancy Toff at Oxford University Press for her thoughtful editorial sug-
gestions, which undoubtedly made the book more readable, organized, and
focused.
My thanks go out to my family for their support and indulgence as I focused
on presidential decision making, naval incidents, current affairs, and naval in-
cidents past and present. As a fellow historian, mother to our four boys, and
wife, Beth gave generously of her time and intellect as I subjected her to late-
night discussions of the Maine, the Lusitania, the Panay, and the fruitful ten-
sions between social scientists, historians, academics, practitioners, and policy-
makers. Justin, James, Killian, and Fritz bring joy, energy, and a pride into my
scholar’s life.
Description:Throughout US history, presidents have had vastly different reactions to naval incidents. Though some incidents have been resolved diplomatically, others have escalated to outright war. What factors influence the outcome of a naval incident, especially when calls for retribution mingle with recommen
