Table Of ContentThis article was downloaded by: [LSE Library Services]
On: 26 December 2014, At: 22:34
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Australian Journal of International Affairs
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20
Choosing partners in Asia
G. John Ikenberry a b
a Political Science , University of Pennsylvania
b Non‐resident Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution
Published online: 20 Mar 2008.
To cite this article: G. John Ikenberry (1998) Choosing partners in Asia, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52:3,
229-232, DOI: 10.1080/10357719808445253
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357719808445253
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the
publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations
or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any
opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the
views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be
independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses,
actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever
caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 3, 1998
Choosing Partners in Asia
G. JOHN IKENBERRY
(Political Science, University of Pennsylvania and Non-resident Senior Fellow
at the Brookings Institution)
Japan or China—which should be America's main strategic partner in Asia? This is the
vexing question provoked by President Bill Clinton's recent trip to China. Since the 1940s,
American relations in Asia have been organised around a series of bilateral security alliances,
4
1 creating a 'grand crescent' of anticommunist regimes and American military bases extending
0
2 from the Aleutian Islands through Japan, South Korea and Taiwan into Southeast Asia. Japan
r
e has always been the centrepiece of mis alliance structure. The end of the Cold War and the
b
m steady rise of China call all of this into question. Is the United States-Japan alliance the key
e
c to stability in the region or is it a Cold War relic that stands in the way of the creation of
e
D a new regional security order, organised around Chinese and American partnership?
6
2 Clinton's trip to China in June-July 1998 raised this issue of shifting strategic partner-
4
3 ships, but it certainly did not settle the matter. Indeed, what is most striking is how little
2: debate has occurred over how individual bilateral relations add up to an overall regional
2
at order. There is a 'China track' and a 'Japan track' but little long-term strategic debate about
s] how to reconcile and integrate the engagement of China and the maintenance of Japan's
e
c 'civilian power' role in the region.
vi
er These thorny issues have only implicitly been raised—it is the symbolic content of
S
y Clinton's trip, not its intellectual or policy content, that raises the issue and triggers the
ar debate. But symbols matter, and are closely read in both Beijing and Tokyo. And questions
r
b of a gradual shift in American long-term relations with Japan linger in the air.
Li
E Clinton has clearly given Beijing the impression that his trip marked a great symbolic and
S
L strategic shift in American foreign policy: a new 'strategic partnership' between the US and
y [ China that may eventually replace the US-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of America's
d b policy and presence in Asia. In reality, thankfully, American policy has not yet reached such
e an historic juncture. The eagerness of China for such a partnership reflects wishful thinking,
d
oa perhaps, but also President Clinton's symbolic and rhetorical indulgence of the Chinese: an
nl unprecedented 9-day trip in the People's Republic, no stop off in Tokyo to consult with
w
o America's major ally in the region, and the President's praise of Chinese economic
D
responsibility and simultaneous criticism of Japan's handling of its economic situation on
Chinese soil. The Chinese have reason to anticipate—and the Japanese to fear—a new
geopolitical reality in Asia: the world's most powerful country and most populous country
together creating a new political framework for the region, which they jointly dominate. In
practical terms, this means that the Chinese will be ceded hegemonic authority throughout
East Asia.
Such a strategic shift in American policy would be a tragic mistake. To be sure,
engagement of China is absolutely vital—and inevitable. A billion people with nuclear
weapons—this is a reality that should not be trifled with. Containment, a fantasy of some
Cold War ideologues, is not even an option. China has launched itself on a path of greater
engagement and integration into the world political and economic order—indeed, it has been
knocking on the world's door since the rise of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. It is firmly
0004-9913/98/030229-04 © 1998 Australian Institute of International Affairs 229
G. JOHN IKENBERRY
in China's interest to do so, even without American encouragement. Moreover, Chinese
constructive participation is needed in a multitude of areas: arms control, environment,
currency stabilisation and the lifting of trade and labour standards.
Extending to the Chinese the respect that is long overdue, bringing them into the 'club'
of great powers, inviting their participation in the major multilateral institutions—these are
all important steps, as they are for Russia, India and other large countries on the 'edge' of
the capitalist-democratic world system. But the Chinese are not yet a superpower they have
a famously weak and inefficient military, they have a per-capita income of a developing
country, and they have a limited and regional foreign-policy agenda. They surely will become
a superpower, but to build a new strategic partnership around the historical eventuality today,
risks a great deal and achieves very little.
To demote Japan to secondary partnership in Asia, or even to allow the Japanese to feel
that they are in a secondary partnership position, would be to exchange a dependable and
capable ally for an uncertain Chinese partnership—a partnership that would almost certainly
4
1 entail the eventual diminution of America's presence and clout in Asia. It would seriously
0
2 jeopardise relations with Japan, risking the fruits of 50 years of steady dialogue, institution
r
e building, gradual economic opening and the slow emergence of Japan as a special type of
b
m 'civilian' great power. To turn Japan into a secondary power—a sort of junior partner—rather
e
c than a strategic partner and major entree for American power and diplomatic presence in the
e
D region, would fuel Japan's own search for greater security and status. Do they need to acquire
6
2 nuclear weapons to be taken seriously and accorded their proper role in Asia and beyond?
4 American foreign policy towards Asia should be geared, above all, to answering that question
3
2: with a resounding no.
2
at Beyond this, junior status for Japan neglects its under-appreciated capabilities and
]
s international importance. This is true in four respects. First, Japan is still the world's second
e
c
vi most powerful economy and it is destined to eventually get back on track. It represents 60
er per cent of the entire Asian regional gross national product. It spends more on research and
S
y development per capita than any other country in the world. It looks bleak today, but it has
ar the assets to look vigorous tomorrow. China could grow for many decades before it even
r
Lib comes close to matching these economic achievements. Japan has become the hub of the
E Asia-Pacific economy, expanding and diversifying its imports and exports into the region.
S Japanese foreign investment has been critical in turning the Southeast Asian countries into
L
[ open and trade-oriented economies. It is among the world's leaders in development aid. The
y
b rise of Japanese overseas business has also had a constructive impact within Japan, adding
d
e voices of support for economic openness. Japan today might be a bit like Britain in the early
d
a 1980s: in due course, the pressures of economic stagnation resulted in the rise of political
o
nl leadership that pushed for reform and eventually returned the country to an upward growth
w
o path. Japan's recession will end. Today and for many decades, it will be Japan, not China,
D that is needed to help fund and lead the great multilateral economic institutions, the United
Nations and the other major world institutions. The shine is off the Japanese economy, but
it is still vast and vital to the success of America's global economic leadership.
Second, the US-Japan security alliance is one of the most protean bilateral treaties in
history. We continually underestimate the 'work' that this treaty does for the US. Like the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Europe, the bilateral security treaty with Japan
provides a basis for America to be a player in the region. It extends American power into
the region. It allows the US to justifiably claim that it is an 'Asian Power'. Japan is provided
security protection and, in return, it covers the overwhelming costs of the military forces,
which allows the US to maintain a higher aggregate military capacity at a cheaper price.
Compare the alternatives.
But the alliance does more still. It 'binds' the two countries together, reducing the level
230
Choosing Partners in Asia
of conflict, uncertainty and insecurity that might otherwise exist if the two major powers were
left floating unattached. The alliance provides 'voice opportunities' for both governments to
actively lobby and influence the other. It mutes the intensity of trade and economic conflict
while also providing mechanisms for the US to push Japan actively towards reform. The
alliance also lowers the pressure, which would otherwise exist, for Japan to go nuclear. In
this sense, the alliance is also good for China. It is in America's interest to show the world
that great powers can exist without wielding nuclear weapons. Japan's 'peace constitution'
is a standing reminder to the rest of the world that greatness and American partnership is
possible without resorting to the old military great-power tactics. Japan provides an important
voice for nuclear non-proliferation, as demonstrated in the recent episode with India and
Pakistan. No 'strategic partnership' with China could make up for the arms race and security
dilemmas that would follow from a nuclear Japan cut loose from the US.
The recent nuclear tests in India and Pakistan raise the stakes in the debate over 'partners'
4 in Asia. To give primacy to China—a 'nuclear' great power—at the expense of Japan—a
1 'civilian' power—sends a signal to other would-be regional powers that the US should not
0
r 2 want to send. The message is that the surest route to great power status, and perhaps a
be 'permanent seat' on the UN Security Council, is through acquiring the bomb. This logic has
m
reportedly informed India's thinking, and Clinton's cultivation of a strategic partnership with
e
ec China only makes it seem a more credible view. China, after all, has reserved the term
D
'strategic partnership' for only three countries—Russia, France and the US. All three are
6
2 nuclear powers. Rather than indulge this logic, the US might better serve its non-proliferation
4
3 goals by redoubling its commitment to elevate Japan to Security Council membership.
2:
at 2 Third, a lot of attention is given to China's bold experiment: can it move towards
] capitalism and also gradually evolve its political system in a more democratic direction while
s
e simultaneously holding the country together and pursuing a constructive and accommodating
c
vi foreign policy? This is a big question. The world hopes so. But Japan is also undergoing an
r
e equally profound experiment: can it move from a state-led, export-oriented development path
S
y towards a more Western-style open economy, pluralistic political system and consumer
r
ra society, while gradually assuming greater international responsibilities? Japan was the first
b
Li Asian country to reach the ranks of the advanced industrial world. The question today is
E whether it can manage the transition towards a more liberal society with a more balanced
S
L external orientation. The US has huge stakes in the answer to this question. China's transition
[
y is more dramatic, but the fate of Japan's transition is more profound. The US needs a
b
d constructive engagement strategy for this process. Without overly interfering in Japan's
de internal politics, the US needs to maintain the sort of strategic partnership that will allow
a
o Japan the space and time to work through the great debates that lie between its present
nl predicament and its next phase of political development. Now is not the time for a sharp
w
o departure of America's policy in Asia.
D
Finally, when the US thinks about choosing partners in Asia, it is important to remember
what types of partnership have worked best in the past. One great lesson is that it is easier
to do business with democracies—which Japan is and China is not. In the long-term,
democracies are more predictable and steady. They tend to be more active participants in
multilateral diplomacy and better able to make and keep commitments. Building a new
security framework in Asia, and involving China in it, will eventually be necessary; but it
would be foolish to risk a steady and predictable relationship on the conceptually appealing
and politically more dazzling idea of a 'new order' in Asia. The alliance with Japan (and
South Korea as well) is consistent with new types of regional forums for security and
political consultation. Japan is also interested in more intensified dialogue with China. But
as these dialogues and initiatives move forward, it is important to remember first principles.
To cast our strategic fate with China today is to be guided by an overly optimistic
231
G. JOHN IKENBERRY
timetable for Chinese arrival as a global power and an overly pessimistic assessment of
Japan's future. The US should be practising gaiatsu (outside pressure) with Japan, encourag-
ing it to move in an open and democratic direction, but this is best accomplished when it
takes the form of encouraging an old friend rather than rattling the basic foundation of the
relationship, however unintended this might have been. American foreign policy should be
able to accomplish more than one objective in Asia: it can both build closer relations with
China, and maintain its alliance with Japan. Strategic dialogue with China and strategic
partnership with Japan can coexist. In the end, however, it is more comforting to think that,
20 years from now, there will be a vibrant US-Japan alliance than a loose security
partnership with China and ambiguous security ties with Japan. The US came to the 'dance'
with Japan. If it wants to switch partners between songs, the risk is that it will leave the dance
floor alone.
4
1
0
2
r
e
b
m
e
c
e
D
6
2
4
3
2:
2
at
]
s
e
c
vi
r
e
S
y
r
a
r
b
Li
E
S
L
[
y
b
d
e
d
a
o
nl
w
o
D
232
