Chinese Intelligence Operations: Espionage Damage Assessment Branch, US Defence Intelligence Agency

190 Pages·1994·3.18 MB·English

by  Nicholas Eftimiades

Chinese Intelligence Operations

CHINESE
INTELLIE N C E
ΟΡERATIONS
NICHO LAS EFTIM IADES
NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS Annapolis, Maryland
First published in 1994 in Great Britain by
FRANK CASS & CO. LTD.
Newbury House, 900 Eastern Avenue, Newbury Park,
Ilford, Essex IG2 7HH, England
This Paperback Edition Published in 1995 by
Toppan Company, Limited, Tokyo, Japan, For Sale in
Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand,
Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea.
Copyright © 1994 Nicholas Eftimiades
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from
the British Library
ISBN 0 7146 4588 5/TIE 1198
The views expressed in this study are those of the author and
should not be construed as representing positions of the Depart­
ment of Defense or the U.S. government.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any
,
form or by any means, electronic mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Printed and bound by Antony Rowe Ltd, Eastbourne
Transferred to digital printing 2005
In memory of Dr. George S. Eftimiades,
who taught me about freedom and hard work,
and Harold C. Hinton, Ph.D., George Washington University,
who inspired me to be a sinologist

Contents
Foreword, ix
Acknowledgments, xi
Glossary, χιιι
PART ONE Introduction, i
1. China’s Use of Intelligence, 3
2. Framework for Analysis, 9
3. China’s Information Objectives, 12
PART TWO Ministry of State Security, 15
4. Organizational Structure, 17
5. Foreign Operations, 27
6. Domestic Operations, 44
7. Agent Recruitment Methods, 57
PART THREE China’s Intelligence Community, 73
8. Military Intelligence Department, 75
9. Departmental Structure, 78
10. Military Intelligence Operations, 90
11. Secondary Intelligence Organizations, 103
PART FOUR Conclusion, 111
12. Future Prospects, 113
Appendixes, 117
Notes, 141
Select Bibliography, 153
Index, 163
VII

Foreword
Confucius, the moralist and teacher of unsurpassed influence in
China for millennia, said, “Confronting a foreign invasion, one
should resort to deception, which may suffice in repelling the enemy. ”
Yet when his Western counterpart Socrates advocates wile and guile
in the name of national security, we are not sure how to respond.
This professed emphasis on covert operations—unfettered, to West-
ern eyes, by any ethical constraints—is distinctly Chinese, with deep
historical roots. In Chinese statecraft the use of spies is not incom-
patible with higher principles. Indeed, in his Art of War Sun Tzu gives
top priority to the employment of espionage for humanitarian rea-
sons, among others: in war, lack of the “foreknowledge” supplied
by secret agents would “entail heavy loss on the people.” In light of
China’s past one begins to understand the relentless endeavors of the
PRC government in pursuing its intelligence objectives, aided by a
vast network of chameleonic agents abroad and penetrative bureau-
cracies at home. Chinese government and society construe the notion
of intelligence in the broadest possible sense.
Nicholas Eftimiades’s remarkable sensitivity to China’s strategic
tradition sets his book apart from its competitors in this rapidly ex-
panding field. Adroitly avoiding the pitfall of mirror-imaging, he
provides a nuanced, systematic, and in-depth examination of the ex-
tensive modern-day Chinese intelligence machine and discusses a wide
range of policy-related issues of rising importance. The tone of the
book reflects not only insight into the past but also a keen awareness
of the present and the future. Eftimiades has actively explored valuable
sources newly made available by the increasing permeability of
Chinese society, enabling him to assess the strengths and weaknesses
of China’s intelligence services beyond the confines of conventional
wisdom. In addition, a delightful writing style unexpectedly accom-
panies the thoroughness of a rigorous analyst and the serious nature
IX