Table Of ContentCHINA’S PERCEPTION OF THE STRATEGIC
ADVANTAGES OF FIRST STRIKE, PREEMPTION,
AND PREVENTIVE WARS
Report
Submitted23June2014
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TableofContents
Section Page
ListofTables 10
AbouttheAuthor 11
Acknowledgements 12
ChineseDynasticChronology 14
ExecutiveSummary 15
ChapterOne
Introduction 31
I.TheLogicofFirstStrikeandPreemption 37
II.TheLogicofPreventiveWar 40
III.TheAssumptionsoftheStudy 42
IV.TheMethodologyoftheStudy 46
ChapterTwo
TheConceptualFrameworkandHistoricalCasesof
PreemptioninHistory 52
I.TheConceptualFramework 52
I.A.FailuretoAnticipateanAttack 53
I.B.FailuretoDetermineWhenanAttackWillOccur 54
I.C.FailuretoAnticipateWhereanAttackWillOccur 56
I.D.FailuretoAnticipatetheMeansofanAttack 58
I.E.ANoteonStrategicWarning 61
II.TheDecisiontoResorttoaSurpriseAttack: Controllingthe
Adversary’sSenseofVulnerability 65
II.A.Barbarossa: TheGermanInvasionofthe
SovietUnionin1941 67
II.B.TheJapaneseAttackonPearlHarborin1941 71
III.OtherAspectsofaSurpriseFirstStrike 73
IV.TheConsiderationofMilitarySuperiority 75
V.TheFirstStrikefromtheVictim’sPerspective 77
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TableofContents
Section Page
VI.HistoricalCases 84
VI.A.Copenhagen,1801and1807 84
VI.B.Mers-‐el-‐Kebir: TheUKAttacksFrenchFleet,
July1940 91
VI.C.Nomonhan,orKhalkinGol,May-‐September1939 94
VI.D.TheWinterWarwithFinland 100
VI.E.BessarabiaandBukovina 104
VI.F.IsraelLaunchestheSix-‐DayWarin1967 106
VII.TheMajorLessonsfromtheCasesofFirstStrike
andPreemption 113
ChapterThree
China’sPerceptionofFirstStrikeandPreemption 116
I.TheChinesePerceptionofFirstStrikeandPreemption 121
I.A.China’sWillingnesstoExecuteaFirstStrikeis
HeavilyInfluencedbyChineseStrategicCulture 123
I.A.1.StrategicOpportunityCreatedbyShi
andtheOpponent 127
I.A.2.TheImportanceofDeceptionandFirstStrike
inChineseStrategicThought 154
I.A.3.TheEmpiricalSituation: Pre-‐Crisis,Crisis,War 165
II.HistoricalEvidenceofFirstStrikeandPreemption 169
II.A.EarlyChineseHistorythroughtheMingDynasty 170
II.B.TheSino-‐DutchWar,1661-‐1668 187
II.C.TheKMT/CCPCivilWars:TheNorthernExpedition
andEncirclementCampaigns 190
II.D.BythePLA 198
II.D.1.Tibet,1950 199
II.D.2.Korea,1950 203
II.D.3.India,1962 211
II.D.4.Laos,1964-‐1972 222
II.D.5.NorthVietnam,1965-‐1968 223
II.D.6.SovietBorderDispute,Damansky/Zhenbao
Island1969 230
II.D.7.SouthVietnam,1974 233
II.D.8.Vietnam,1979and1988 235
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TableofContents
Section Page
III.LessonsandComparisonwithEuropeanCases 241
III.A.ChineseEmphasisonPsychologicalWarfare 242
III.B.ChineseMotivationsforWar 245
III.C.TheCriticalRoleofDeception 247
III.D.TheImportanceofSurprise 251
III.E.TheLackofAppreciationofthe“FogofWar” 252
III.F.PerceptionofNuclearWeapons 252
III.G.TheChineseConceptionofPedagogicalWar 254
ChapterFour
TheLogicofPreventiveWarandHistoricalCases 257
I.MajorThemeofWesternMilitaryHistory 257
II.TheoriesofPreventiveWar 262
II.A.TheImportanceofHardPowerandRelativeVersus
AbsolutePower 264
II.B.Gilpin’sPowerPreponderance 268
ImplicationsfortheSino-‐AmericanRelationship 269
II.C.OrganskiandKugler’sPowerTransitionTheory 270
ImplicationsfortheSino-‐AmericanRelationship 275
II.D.RaslerandThompson’sModifiedPower
TransitionTheory: 276
ImplicationsfortheSino-‐AmericanRelationship 278
II.E.Copeland’sModifiedPowerTransitionTheory 279
ImplicationsfortheSino-‐AmericanRelationship 280
II.F.TraditionalBalanceofPowerTheory 281
ImplicationsfortheSino-‐AmericanRelationship 282
II.G.Mearsheimer’sOffensiveRealism 289
ImplicationsfortheSino-‐AmericanRelationship 299
II.H.OffensiveRealismBasedonHumanEvolution 301
ImplicationsfortheSino-‐AmericanRelationship 306
III.HistoricalCases 308
III.A.GermanStrategicMotivationsagainstRussia 308
III.B.RussianStrategicMotivationsagainstGermany 310
III.C.BritishStrategicMotivationsagainstGermany 314
III.D.IsraeliStrategicMotivationsagainstEgyptin1956 321
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TableofContents
Section Page
IV.TheMajorLessonsfromtheHistoricalCasesof
PreventiveWar 323
ChapterFive
China’sPerceptionofPreventiveWar 327
I.PreventiveWarLogicinChineseThought 327
II.HistoricalCases 333
II.A.PreventiveWarLogicintheWarringStates
Period 335
II.B.PreventiveWaragainsttheMongols 339
II.C.ThePreventiveWarMotivationofthe
BoxerRebellion 342
III.LessonsandComparisonwithEuropeanCases 345
IV.ScenarioOne: ImplicationsofSlowedEconomicGrowth
forPreventiveWar 351
V.ScenarioTwo: ImplicationsofContinuedEconomicGrowth
forPreventiveWar 355
ChapterSix
TwelveImplicationsforUnitedStatesDefense
Decision-‐Makers 359
I.SurpriseSucceeds 359
II.PreventiveWarLogicIsaConsistentConsiderationin
InternationalPolitics 363
III.UnitedStatesDefenseDecision-‐MakersMustBeAlert
tothe“FogofPeace”and“MirrorImaging” 364
IV.TheChineseExecuteFirstStrikesandPreemption
FrequentlyinWar 366
V.UnitedStatesExpectationShouldBeThatChinaWill
EscalateFirst,EitherinaPre-‐CrisisorCrisisPeriod,orinWar 368
VI.Surprise,FirstStrike(KineticorNon-‐Kinetic),and
PreemptionAreKeyAspectsofDeceptioninWarfareand
AreSeenAsStrategicAsymmetries 376
VII.FirstStrike,Preemption,andPreventiveWarAre
AttemptedWhenChinaistheWeakerortheStrongerPower 377
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TableofContents
Section
Page
TwelveImplicationsforUnitedStatesDefense
Decision-‐Makers:Continued
VIII.TheChineseViewofPreventiveWarIsThatItisa
ViableStrategicChoice 378
IX.SignificantDangersfortheU.S.andStabilityinAsiaWill
Result 379
X.China’sStrategicConsiderationsAreInformedbyTheir
PerceptionsofU.S.andIndianPower 380
XI.ChinaFacesaMultipleFrontPreventiveWar 381
XII.TheChineseAttitudetowardPreventiveWarWillEvolve
asChinaBecomesMorePowerful 383
ChapterSeven
Conclusions 386
Bibliography 431
10
ListofTables
TableOne 62
TheCasesandtheFourAspectsofSurpriseAttack
TableTwo 300
TheoriesofPowerPoliticsandTheirPredictionsforHegemonic
Struggle
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