Table Of ContentCHANGE, CAUSE AND
CONTRADICTION
Change, Cause and
Contradiction
A Defence of the Tenseless Theory of
Time
Robin Le Poidevin
Lecturer in Philosophy
University of Leeds
Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 978-1-349-21148-7 ISBN 978-1-349-21146-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-21146-3
© The Scots Philosophical Club 1991
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1991 978-0-333-54286-6
All rights reserved. For information, write:
Scholarly and Reference Division,
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010
First published in the United States of America 1991
ISBN 978-0-312-05786-2
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Le Poidevin, Robin, 1962-
Change, cause, and contradiction: a defence of the tenseless
theory of time I Robin Le Poidevin.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-05786-2
1. Time. 2. Change. 3. Causation. 4 . Contradiction. 5. Tense
(Logic) I. Title.
BD638.L37 1991
115-dc20 90-19925
CIP
Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Preface
X
Introduction 1
Synopsis 8
1 Tense and Change 13
1.1 Two accounts of change 13
1.2 The problem of temporal ontology 17
2 Tense and Contradiction 24
2.1 McTaggart's paradox 24
2.2 Objections and defence 27
2.3 The radical solution 33
3 Temporal Solipsism 36
3.1 Prior's doctrines 36
3.2 'Pathological' cases of diachronic identity 40
3.3 Instants and anti-realism 44
3.4 A paradox of cardinality 48
3.5 The propositional theory of instants 53
4 Temporal Parts 58
4.1 The objections 58
4.2 Understanding temporal parts 60
4.3 The problem of the temporal determinant 67
5 Tenseless Change 76
5.1 Constraints on an account 76
5.2 First attempts 77
5.3 The causal constraint 79
v
vi Contents
6 Causation and Simultaneity 83
6.1 The principle of reciprocity 83
6.2 Historical antecedents of R 84
6.3 The proof of non-simultaneity 86
6.4 Modal properties of R 92
6.5 Time without change 94
7 Causal and Temporal Asymmetry 99
7.1 The priority of time 99
7.2 Causal priority and counterfactuals 103
7.3 Causal priority and probability 110
7.4 Ehring's condition 116
8 A Causal Account of Change 123
8.1 The account 123
8.2 Change and the causal theory of time 129
8.3 Backwards causation 137
Notes 143
Bibliography 148
Index 154
For Kate
Acknowledgements
I have used the quotation from Aldous Huxley's Point Counterpoint,
which appears at the beginning of this book, with kind permission
from Mrs Laura Huxley, Chatto & Windus, and Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc.
I would also like to thank the editor of Ratio for permission to use
material from my article 'The Principle of Reciprocity and a Proof of
the Non-simultaneity of Cause and Effect'.
ix
Preface
This book was written while I was Gifford Research Fellow in the
University of St Andrews, from 1988 to 1989. While I was there I
was able to try out my ideas on time in seminars, undergraduate
lectures, and a short series of public lectures. I also enjoyed the
company and good advice of my colleagues in the Department of
Logic and Metaphysics: Peter Clark, Bob Hale, Stephen Read,
Roger Squires and Leslie Stevenson. I particularly miss informal
lunchtime discussions with Peter Clark, who unfailingly provided
answers to my naive questions on the philosophy of physics. I
would like to thank the Gifford Lectureship Committee for giving
me the opportunity of pursuing research in such a congenial
environment. I would also like to thank the editors of Macmillan
Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Alan Millar and Andrew
Brennan, for encouraging me to prepare the book for publication.
I owe a special debt to Murray MacBeath, who read the entire
manuscript in draft and made many detailed and enormously
helpful comments, on the basis of which I was able to attempt the
impossible and prepare a final version. (I should perhaps point out
that he was not able to comment on Chapter 7.4, which had not yet
been written. It may well be that he would have had objections to
it.)
Many of the ideas presented here, especially those of Chapters
2, 3, 4 and 6, are taken from my Cambridge Ph.D. thesis. To Hugh
Mellor, who supervised the thesis from 1985 to its completion, I
owe a very large debt. His numerous writings on time and caus
ation were - and still are - a constant source of inspiration. Over
the years he has (with characteristic vigour) taught me, not only
the truth about time, but about how good metaphysics can be
done. I also had the privilege of being examined by two other
sources of inspiration: Jeremy Butterfield and Bill Newton-Smith,
who made a number of penetrating criticisms. The influence of
their work on time will be evident throughout the following pages.
I would also like to thank Edward Craig, my first supervisor in
Cambridge, both for his patience with my first attempts at research
and for detailed comments on an earlier version of Chapter 6,
which appeared in Ratio. During my research I was supported,
X
Preface xi
during 1987-88, by a Quatercentenary Research Award from Em
manuel College. I am very grateful to the Master and Fellows for
this generous assistance.
Moving further back in time, my first tutors at Oxford, David
Charles and Stephen Williams, occupy a special place in the causal
chain leading to this book. I never wrote a single page without
thinking how they would respond to it. Without their constant
encouragement, I would never have embarked upon research in
the first place.
Besides these, I have greatly benefited from talks on a range of
subjects with Matthew Buncombe (especially on backwards and
simultaneous causation), Neil Cooper, Tim Crane (who also gave
technical assistance with the wordprocessing), Dorothy Emmet,
Adrian Moore, W. Z. Souffl~, Richard Swinburne, Nigel Warbur
ton, and Bernhard Weiss. I have also discussed many of the topics
in this book (though not just those topics) with my wife, Kate
Meakin. I dedicate the book to her.
