Buses (London) : a bus strategy for London [consultation paper]

30 Pages·1991·1.7 MB·English

by  Great Britain. Department of Transport

ABUS STRATEGY FORLONDON
CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
1:
WhyBuses Matter
1. Busesattractlesspublicattentionthanalmostanyotherformoftransport. Aproposal
to build a new motorway, railway line or airportwill securebanner headlines and arouse
intensepublicdebate. Thecapitalcostofsuchschemes,theirenvironmentalimpactandtheir
transport benefits are all on a large scale. Local bus services do not require major new
infrastructure ofthis sort. So, they seldom make front-page news. And, outside the bus
industry,broadquestionsofbuspolicyarouselittlepublicinterest. Peopletaketheexistence
ofbus servicesforgranted. Thisis amistake.
2. InBritainasawhole,busandcoachpatronagestartedtogointodeclineshortlyafter
the Second World War. In 1952, buses and coaches accounted for 41% ofall passenger
transport; by 1982, thisfigurehaddroppedto8%. Inmileagetermsthedeclinewasfrom
50billionpassengermilesto25billion. TheGovernmentconcludedthaturgentactionwas
neededtostemthedeclineintheindustry. Itthereforesetaboutthederegulationofthebus
market. Theaimofderegulation-forbuses, as elsewhere- istoensurethatcompaniesare
free to provide the goods or services the public wants at a reasonable price. Artificial
constraints onthe ability ofbus operatorstotailortheir services to theircustomers’ needs
was, intheviewoftheGovernment, aseriousobstacletostemmingthelong-termdeclinein
buspatronage. The 1985TransportActimplementedthisbusderegulationpolicyintherest
ofEnglandandWales. Forreasonsexplainedatparas28-32below, theLondonbusmarket
wasnotripeforderegulationin 1985.
3. LocalbusesinLondon carry4millionpassengersaday, whichisaboutthesameas
Network SouthEast and LondonUndergroundcombined, Londonhad the same picture of
declining demand between 1952 and 1982 as the rest ofthe country. Between 1982 and
1987-88, however, demandforbus services in London rose from 1,041 million passenger
journeysto 1,240million. Butgrowthindemandforbuseswasmuchlowerthanthegrowth
in demand for London Underground and Network SouthEast services. And in 1989-90
demand suffered a slight downturn again. A decline in the London bus market is not a
prospectthatcanbeviewed with equanimity by anyone whohas London’s best interest at
heart-
4. Buses serve a different marketfrom rail andunderground. The tables atAnnex A
look at the use made ofbuses by different types ofpeople and how different modes of
transportareusedbypeople livinginLondon. They show that;
mostuse ofbusesis madebypeople aged 11-19 or over 60;
women makemoreuseofbusesthan mendo;
buses are used mainly forlocaljourneys, withan averagetrip length of2-3
miles;
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unlikerail, busesareusedmainlyforpurposes otherthantraveltowork..
5. Asabroadgeneralisation, busesareusedmostbypeoplewhodonothaveaccessto
cars, forjourneyswhichcouldnotbeundertakenbyotherformsofpublic transport. They
arealso used morebypeopleon low incomesthanbythose onhigherincomes. For such
people making suchjourneys, thereis norealalternativetothebus. This isthetraditional
reason why it has beenjudged essential to maintain bus services. It is still a valid and
compellingreason for doing so.
6. ButtherearethreefurtherreasonswhytheGovernmentisparticularly concernedto
safeguardthefutureofbusesinLondon.
7. First,intheshorttomediumterm,greateruseofthebusistheonlywayofachieving
anysignificantincreaseinthetotalcapacityofLondon’stransportsystem. TheGovernment
has plansfornew roads andnewrailways, includingamassiveprogramme to increasethe
capacityofUndergroundstations andtoconstructnewrailwaylinesincentralLondon, but
suchinfrastructuretakestimetobuild. Evenoveralongerperiodoftime, itisnotpossible
to rely on new roads and railways to accommodate all the growth forecast for transport
demand inLondon.
8. Second, buses are more suitable than other forms of transport for the important
network of non-radial routes which feed and link the suburban centres. The rail and
undergroundnetworkstendnottoprovidesuchlinks, anditisforthemostpartuneconomic
tobuildnewrailwaysto doso. Itisimportantthatsuchconnections areavailablebecause
ofLondon’s largeareaandthesizeandimportanceofmanyofthesuburbancentres. Buses
alsoplay animportantroleinprovidingfeederservicesintotheextensiverailnetwork.
9. Third,busesarethemostfuel-efficientformofpassengertransportcurrentlyavailable
inLondonandemitlesscarbondioxideintotheatmospherethanothermodes. Thetableat
AnnexBcomparestheC02emissionfortravelbybuseswiththatfortravelbycar, taxi,rail
andunderground. Availableevidencesuggeststhat,foraverage loadings, apassengermile
travelledbybusemits less C02 thanapassengermiletravelledby car, taxi, tube ortrain.
This means that ajourney by bus contributes less to global warming. Forjourneys that
cannotbemade onfootorbybicycle, thebusistheenvironmentallyfriendly option.
TheWavForward
10. The Governmentbelieves thatbus services in London dfi have apromising future
lut, like bus services elsewhere, thatfuturehastobe worked for. Itis notsomethingthat
he Government, theoperators orthepubliccantakeforgranted.
m11. ThefiitureofbusesinLondondependsontheirabilitytowinandretain passengers
competitionwith othertransportoptions. They mustcontinue to cater for their existing
market, buttheymustalsowinnewbusiness.
customerspraretqiuciurleamre,ntosp.erTahtoerysnneeeeddthtehefrfereedeodmomtoteoxptlaoirloerthbeusscsoeprevifcoersinmnoorveaticloonseinlybutso
routes,typesofserviceandvehicle,andfarelevels.TheGovernmentbelievestheyalso need
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tolookagainatthequalityoffacilitiesforbususersinLondon. Aboveall, theyclearlyneed
toimprovejourneytimesandwaitingtimes, andthereliability ofbus services.
13. Bus operators need Government action to open up the marketby deregulation and
privatisation to provide the opportunities for greater competition between operators and
betweenbusesand othertransportmodes. Governmentactionwillalsobeneededtoimprove
trafficconditionsforbusesinLondon.
14. Thispaper sets outatenpointplanto achievetheserequirements:
(1) deregulationoftheLondonbusmarketassoonaspossibleinthenextSession
ofParliament;
(2) safeguardingthefutureofconcessionarytravelinLondonandencouragingthe
provisionofpre-paidtickettypes;
(3) future tendering programme: before deregulation, improving the route
tenderingsysteminLondon;andafterderegulation, ensuringthatbusservices
areprovidedonuneconomicbutsocially necessary routes;
(4) privatisationofLBLsubsidiaries;
(5) improvementoftraffic conditions forallusers;
(6) makingbuspriority measures morewidespreadand effective;
(7) encouraging LT to ensure that LBL enters a deregulated market with a
satisfactory bus fleet;
(8) encouragingprovision ofproperwaitingfacilities;
(9) encouragingpromotionofbusservicesandensuringprovisionofreliableand
comprehensivepassenger information;
(10) researchintothewaysinwhichdifferentapproachestobus operationimpact
oncongestion.
The elementsofthisplan arediscussedin Chapters2 and3 ofthispaper. Therestofthis
ChapterdiscussesthepositionoutsideLondonandaddressessomewiderissuesaboutfuture
responsibilities in London. Chapter4 summarises the proposals and invites comments on
themby 7 May.
TransportAct 1985 : DeregulationoutsideLondon
15. The Transport Act 1985 abolished outside London the previous system of Road
Servicelicensing(underwhichoperatorsneededalicenceforeachroutetheyran, andother
operatorsandlocalauthorities couldobjecttothe grantofalicence). Itintroduced instead
a new system whereby operators were simply required to register with the Traffic
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Commissionerfortheirareathe servicesthey intendedtooperate. Sixweeks’ noticeis all
thatisrequiredtointroduceorchange services. Quality controlsonoperatorlicensingand
vehiclesafetywere maintained.
16. Local authorities then had to establish what extra socially necessary services they
wished to subsidise. In place of the previous blanket network subsidy paid by local
authoritiestooperators,competitivetenderingforspecificroutesandserviceswasintroduced.
Thesemeasuresensuredthattherewascompetitionforsubsidisedservicesundercontractas
wellascompetitionontheroadforcommercialservices.
17. Deregulation was not introduced in London at the same time because London
Transporthadonlyrecentlybeentransferredfromlocalgovernmentcontroltonationalised
industry status, and it was felt that time was needed to prepare London buses for full
deregulation.
ResponsibilityforResidualCentral Functions inLondon
18. TheintroductioninLondonoftheregimeoutlinedaboveshouldbringgreatermarket
freedom, which should benefit operators and passengers alike. But the Government
acknowledgesthattherewillbeacontinuingneedforsomeagencyoragenciestodischarge
responsibihties which the market has insufficient incentive to discharge or which would
benefitfromcentral co-ordination. Thesemayinclude someor all ofthefollowing:
registeringservices (thiswillprobablybedonebytheTraffic
CommissiotierasoutsideLondon);
identifying services which are socially necessary, but which have not been
registeredbybusoperators;
awardingcontractsbycompetitivetenderfortheoperationofsuch services;
ensuringtheprovisionandmaintenanceofbus stops, stationsand stands;
ensuringdisseminationofinformationaboutbus services inLondon;
facilitatinguseofbuspassesorthroughticketing arrangements;
facilitatingandifnecessaryimplementingaLondon-wideconcessionaryfares
scheme (forfurtherdiscussionofthispoint, seeparagraphs46-53 below).
isnecessarytodecidewho shouldassumeeachoftheseresponsibilities.
L LondonTransport(LT)atpresentprovidesaLondon-widebusnetwork, andawards
3ntractsbycompetitivetenderforsome35%ofitsroutemileage. Itprovidesandmaintains
3ps, stations and stands. And itproduces passenger informationbothfor display atbus
)ps and forjourney planning in advance, such as maps showing both bus routes and
.R/tubestations. Itisthereforewell-placedtotakeon some oralloftheabovefunctions,
fit did so, thetransition to deregulation would be achieved with minimum disruption to
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informationflowandwithasmoothtransitionfromtheexistingtenderingregimetothenew
one. However, itwouldalsobepossibletotransferexpertstafffromLTtoan alternative
successor body if necessary. Moreover, LT’s retention of the responsibilities above -
particularlytheallocationofsubsidytoprivatecompanies-couldbeinconsistentwithitsrole
as a trading body and transport provider in its own right. In particular, there could be
conflicts of interest between LT’s role as an operator of rail services (and potential
competitor) andasprocurerofsociallynecessary servicesandcontroller ofbusfacilities.
20. Alternatively, these functions could be devolved to the individual boroughs. This
wouldensuredecisionson non-commercialroutesandprovisionofinformation weretaken
at a local level, butpossibly atthe expense ofabroader overview. Although average bus
journeys areless thanthree miles, there willbe many cases where atripto hospitalorthe
nearestmajorsupermarket crosses atleastoneboroughboundary. Itmay be thatthe only
waytoensureacomparablelevelofsocialprovisionacrossLondonisthroughaLondon-wide
body. Moreover,theboroughshaveverylittleexperienceofpublictransportadministration
orprovision.
21. AnalternativeoptionwouldbetocreateaPassengerTransportAuthority (PTA)for
London, along the lines ofother metropolitan areas. These PTAs are responsible for all
aspectsofpublictransportintheirareas-notjustforbuses. However, asbothBRandLT
are nationalised industries, and as such areunderthe directcontrol ofthe Government, it
wouldnotbeappropriate forthemtocomeunderPTA control. Moreover, althoughthere
areargumentsinfavourofco-ordinatedlocalcontrol, the creation ofanew local authority
supervisorybodywithnoprevioustransportexperiencentightleadtoLTmanagementbeing
distractedfromthemajorchallengesfacingtheminrelationtoLondonUndergroundandthe
DLR. London Underground, in particular, has simultaneously to invest in essential
infrastructure and in further improvements in safety standards, and to provide additional
transportcapacitytocopewithanupsurgeindemandfortubetravel. TheGovernmentdoes
not, therefore, believethatthe creationofa PTAisnecessary or desirable. Its creation is
not a logical consequence ofderegulation ofthe bus market. And a new body (with 33
members) couldbe large andunwieldy to establish - possibly delaying changes to thebus
marketwhichare, intheGovernment’sview, urgentlyneeded.
22. Avariant ofthe PTA option wouldinvolvesetting up a new London bus authority
which would represent the boroughs as a ‘bus-only’ PTA, leaving the tube and other LT
functions separate and responsible to central government. Creating a London-wide bus
authority composed of representatives of the individual boroughs could exploit the local
knowledgeavailabletoeachborough,whileintroducinganoverallLondon-wideperspective.
The identification of socially necessary bus routes will need to take account of the
underground, DLRand otherfacets ofpublictransportprovisionin London. Itwouldbe
necessaryto ensureappropriate meansofcommunicationbetweenanew bus authority and
both BR and LT, for instance on information provision, and, in the case of LT, the
concessionary fares scheme.
23. AfurtherpossibilitywouldbeanewLondon-wideagencyformedundertheauspices
oftheDepartmentofTransportspecificallytocarryoutthefunctionsdescribedabove. This
optionwouldplacedirectresponsibilityforthese aspects oftransportprovision muchmore
clearlywithcentralGovernmentthanelsewhere, andwouldentail aclear splitbetweenbus
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andrailway markets, aswouldthenon-PTAborough-basedoptions.
24. TheGovernmentwouldwelcomecommentsonthesealternatives. The Government
recognises that the boroughs will have a particular interest in how and by whom these
functionswillbe carried out. Inparticular, they willhave views on how bestto identify
socially necessary routes. They will continue to have responsibility for London’s
concessionarytravel scheme, whichisdiscussed separatelyfurtheroninthepaper.
Fundin
g..
25. The funding options depend on the body or bodies which are chosen to carry out
whatevertasksarecentralised. Fundingofsociallynecessarybusescouldcomefromcentral
government via a departmental agency, from LT via Government grant, or from local
authorityfundsiftheborough, PTAorbus-only(ielocalauthority)optionswerepreferred.
It might be sensible for individual boroughs to be able to buy in additional services, as
districtcouncils outside London can supplement services provided at the county council’s
behest. Concessionaryfareswill, asnow, befortheboroughs collectivelytodetermineand
finance. Totheextentthatacentralauthorityprovidesfacilitiesforoperatorssuchasstops,
stands and information, the costs ofthose services couldberecoveredfromthe operators.
Thescaleofthecontributionfromeachoperatorwouldhavetobearareasonablerelationto
the amountofusethey made ofthe differentfacilities. On the other hand, it is obviously
desirable to keep the administration of any fee as simple as possible. Costs could be
recoveredviaalevyperbusoperatedorperbusorpassengermilerun,onanyroutewhich
picksuporsets downpassengerswithinthe greaterLondonarea. Provisionforsuchafee
couldbemadeinlegislation.Paymentforuseofbusstationscouldberecoveredatthestation
as aseparatefee. However,this isafurther matteronwhichwewouldwelcometheviews
ofinterestedparties.
ConsumerRepresentation
26. The London Regional Transport Act 1984 established a consumer watch-dog, the
LondonRegionalPassengersCommittee(LRPC),torepresenttheinterestsoftransportusers
inrelationtotransportprovidedbythenationalisedindustriesBRandLT. Ithasavoiceon
mattersrelatingto allLT servicesandtoBRservicesintheLondon area.
27. Afterderegulation the LRPC’s role inrelation to LUL, DLR and BR services will
remainasnow. Itsroleinrelationtobuses will change. Itwillnothaveastatutoryrole in
respect of commercial bus services. Independent bus operators will not be formally
accountabletoitforanyaspectoftheircommercialbusservicesprovidedpost-deregulation.
ButtheLRPC will have a continuing role in relation to LT’s remaining activities, which
could be extended tocover any otherpublic authority whichtook on the central fiinctions
described above. This would mean that the LRPC could take up with that authority
complaintsaboutthequalityofbusstations; stands;information;tenderedservices; orabout
an area of London apparently lacking socially necessary bus services. Passengers on
commercial services will be protected by the operation of the normal competition and
consumerprotectionlegislation as itappliesnow orinthefuture outsideLondon.
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CHAPTER2: PROMOTING COMPETITION
Point 1 : Deregulation
Background
28. The Government has long been committed to the deregulation of bus services in
London. In 1985, London’sbus marketwasnotreadyforderegulation. London Transport
(LT)dominatedthemarkettosuchanextentthatcompetitorscouldhavefoundno foothold.
AndLThad, itself, onlyjustpassed outofGLC control. Itneededtime totransform itself
into amorecommercially orientatedoperation.
29. Itwas, therefore, cleartotheGovernmentthatthebus marketinLondonhadtobe
preparedforderegulation. Inpursuitofthis, thefollowingmeasures have beentaken:
LT’s bus operations have been vested in its subsidiary, London Buses Ltd
(LBL);
LBL, in turn, has established 12 bus operating subsidiaries and one coach
operator;
LBL has decentralised its engineering function and delegated management
responsibility - egforrecruitmentandpay -tothe subsidiaries;
the 12bus-operating subsidiaries competewith one another and withprivate
sectorcompaniestooperatetenderedbus services onLT’sbehalf.
30. Until1985/6virtuallyallLT’sbusserviceswereprovideddirectlybytheirownbuses.
Even now the majority are provided by the operating companies owned by LBL. The
Government gave its full supportto LT’s bus tendering programme when it began in that
year. Theprimeaimwastoprocurebus servicesby competitivetendering andby so doing
achieveimprovementsinserviceperformanceandreductionsinoperatingcosts. Thesecond
aim was to encourage other operators to enter the London bus market in advance of
deregulation.
31. TheGovernmentwelcomestheprogressthathasbeenmadeto date. Just overone-
thirdofLT’sroutenetworkhasbeenputouttotender.Operatingcostspermilehavereduced
by20% inrealtermssince 1985/6overLBLasawhole; androutesonthetenderedservices
(whetherprovidedbyLBLorbyindependentoperators)operateatalowercostpermilethan
the remaining LBL services. They have a higher quality of service measured in terms of
percentageofscheduledmileageoperated, averagewaitingtimeetc, althoughsomeofthese
differencesreflectthe differenttypesofrouteoperated aswellas genuine improvementsin
efficiency. Oftheroutestendered,LBLcompanieshavewon60% but17otherindependent
operatorsnowprovide76servicesonLT’sbehalf. So,thereisno,wapoolofprivate sector
operatorswhohavepractical experience ofoperatingbus servicesinLondon and areready
totakeadvantageoftheopportunitieswhichderegulationoftheLondonbusmarketwillopen
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up. Itisthus clearthattenderinghasledtoprogress onboththekey objectivessetoutin
paragraph 30 above.
32. However, althoughthisprogressismostencouraging, thereisalimittowhatcanbe
achievedbythisprocess.IfLTsimplycontinuedlettingroutecontractsuntilallLondon’sbus
routesweretendered, thenfurtherimprovementswouldresult.ButtheGovernmenttakesthe
viewthatthepresentsystemisplanning led, andthatcentralplanning, howeverexpertly it
may be conducted, is not an acceptable substitute for the free play of market forces.
Decisionsonbusroutesarebesttakenbycompanieswhoknowthattheirsuccessdependson
meetingtheir customers’requirements. Andsuchdecisionsarebesttakenbythosecloseto
thelocalmarket,ratherthanbyremotecentral-planners. TherewasacaseinLondonrecently
ofabusoperatorwantingtoenterthemarketandofferinnovativeserviceswhowasthwarted
by theregulatoryregimeandthekeyrolewhichLT playsinthatregime, despite apparent
passenger enthusiasm for his services. The Government is anxious to free the market to
preventrecurrences ofthis sort offirustrationofenterprise. The Governmentbelieves that
deregulation in London willbring a more flexibleresponseto passenger demand for new,
more frequent or more accessible services. Outside London, deregulation has led to an
increase in bus mileage of the order of 19%, at 50% less cost in real terms to local
authorities. Some ofthe increase in mileagemay bedueto the increased use ofsmaller,
more frequentminibuses. Itistoo soontotelltowhatextentthehistoricdownwardstrend
in bus patronage has been stemmed, but it has certainly not been exacerbated. The
Governmentbelieves thatLondon, too, isnowreadytotakethenextstep.
HowWill DeregulationBeIntroduced?
33. Althoughitisimpossibletogivefirmdatesordetailedplansinadvanceoflegislation,
thispaper sets outhowthe Governmentenvisages the arrangements working inLondonin
therun-uptoandafterderegulationday. Itishopedthatthiswillhelpoperatorsprepareand
planforderegulationwithmorecertaintythanhashithertobeenpossible. TheGovernment
will ensure in deregulating London bus servicesthatthe capital benefits from any lessons
which arebeing learntfromexperiences inotherareas.
34. ThebasicpowersneededtoderegulatetheLondonbusmarketarepresentinsection
46 ofthe TransportAct 1985. This empowers the Secretary ofState to repeal the special
provisionswhichcurrentlyapplytoLondon,therebybringingthecapital’sbusmarketwithin
the same deregulated regime as the rest of the country. However, the Government has
decidedthatitcannotrely exclusively ontheseextantpowers. There aretwo mainreasons
for this. First, the powers in the Transport Act 1985 cannot be used to put London’s
concessionaryfares schemeon asecurefooting: thispointisdiscussedatparagraphs46-53
below. Second,LThasvariousstatutoryduties,notablyitsgeneralduty"toprovideorsecure
theprovision ofpublicpassengertransportservicesfor GreaterLondon", whichwouldnot
sitcomfortably witha deregulatedbusmarket. Italsohas aduty todetermine thegeneral
levelandstructureoffares, thegeneralstructureofroutesandthegenerallevelofprovision
intermsoffrequency ofoperationofits services. These dutiesobviously conflictwiththe
deregulated market. The Government has concluded, therefore, that the way for the
deregulationoftheLondonbusmarketshouldbepavedbytheintroductionofnewprimary
legislation. Busderegulationis animportantchangeforany city, andparticularly important
forLondon, wherethereareintensepressuresontheexistingtransportsystem. Itisclearly
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importantthatwegetderegulationright. Introducingnewprimarylegislationallowsustodo
so.
35. We envisage introducing legislation as soon as possible in a new Parliament. The
approximatetimetableforthatandtheassociatedeventswouldbeasfollows:
Atorbeforebeginning ofyear: IntroductionofBill
Year 1
March Tendering moratorium: no newtenders advertisedfrom
now on; existing contracts extendedto April ofYear2
July Royal Assent
StartoflastLTroutecontractsofferedunderoldsystem
(pre-March)
August Deadline for Registration of routes by incumbent
operators
September DeadlineforRegistrationofroutesbynewoperators,or
ofnewroutes
FromSeptember Central authority to identify uncommercial routes and
putthem outtotender
Boroughsto agreenew concessionary faresscheme
Year2
By March Tendering of non-commercial routes is completed and
operatorsarrangevehicles, publicity etc
April DeregulationDay;
LBLservicesceasetobeeligibleforGovernmentgrant;
LT controlofbus faresends;
OldLTroute contractsterminate;
Startofsocialcontracts;
Startofnew concessionaryfares scheme
Year3
June PrivatisationofLBLsubsidiariescommences, oncethey
haveproducedtheLmst setofannual accounts covering
afullyear’s operation inthederegulated market
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DeregulatedRegime
36. Atpresent, operators of local services otherthan London Transport’s must obtain
LondonLocal ServiceLicencesfromtheTraffic Commissioner,ratherasoperators outside
Londonhadbeforederegulationtoobtainroadservicelicences.Afterderegulation,asoutside
London, bus operators would be able to run services anywhere they thought there was
sufficientdemand, subjecttotheirsatisfyingcertainbasicconditions(eghavingavalidPSV
operator’s licence) andproviding theyregistered each service in advance withthe Traffic
Commissionerfortheirarea.
37. He would not be able to restrict or refuse their operations except where he had
determinedtrafficregulationconditions. Suchconditionscanimposearangeofrestrictions,
egoverthesitingofbusstopsorthelengthoftimeabusmaystandataparticularstopping
place. Any such conditions mustapply equallyto allbus operators. OutsideLondon such
conditionscanonlybeimposedforsafetyorcongestionreasonsandattherequestofatraffic
authority. In recognition of the particular congestion problems facing London, the
MetropolitanPolice,theboroughs,theTrafficDirectorandanycentralbusauthoritywould
bedeemedtobetrafficauthoritiesinrelationto servicesstoppinginLondon, andwouldbe
ableto requestthe introductionoftrafficregulation conditions. As outsideLondon, there
wouldbearightofappealtotheSecretaryofStateforbothoperatorsandtrafficauthorities
againstdecisions ontrafficregulation conditions.
38. Inaddition, underSection 6 oftheRoad Traffic RegulationAct 1984, the London
boroughshavethepowertoissuetrafficregulationordersrestrictingorprohibitingtheuse
ofparticularclassesofvehiclesontheirroads. Thesepowersmaybeused, inconsultation
withthepolice, to avoidrisks ofdangeror damage, to facilitate thepassage oftraffic, to
preserve the amenities ofan area, orto prevent use ofa road by traffic in an unsuitable
manner. UnderSection 122oftheAct, localauthoritiesmustinmakinganordergive due
considerationtomaintainingaccesstopremisesandtheimportanceoffacilitatingthepassage
ofpublic servicevehicles.
RegistrationofCommercialServices
39. Again followingthe pattern set intherest ofthe country, the normal requirement
wouldbeforoperatorstogivetheTrafficCommissioner6weeksnoticeofalterationsto, or
withdrawalof,theirservice. Intheimmediaterun-uptoderegulationtransitionalprovisions
would be needed. They would be very much the same as those which operated outside
London. For example, althoughLondonLocal Service Licences would continue to apply
untilderegulation day, all suchlicences mustterminateonthatday; licences dueto expire
betweenpassmgoftheActandderegulationdaywouldbeallowedtocontinueuntilthatday
andprovisionswouldbeneededtoensurethatallrouteswhichweretorunfromderegulation
dayonwards wereregistered 8/9 monthsbefore, unlessthecentralbus authority supported
Aeirlate additiontothenetwork. This freezeisnecessaryto allowtime forthreethings.
First thebusauthoritymustmakeanassessmentofthecommercialnetworkandoftheextent
towhich&erearesociallynecessaryrouteswhichtheoperators arenotproposingtoserve.
Second, thoseroutesmustbeputouttotender. Third, thesuccessfulbiddermustbegiven
timeto orgamsetheservicetostartonderegulationday.
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