Table Of ContentBURMA
VICTORY
Osprey Publishing
BURMA
VICTORY
I , K C
MPHAL OHIMA AND THE HINDITS
M 1944 M 1945
ARCH TO AY
DAVID ROONEY
C
ONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1.
BACKGROUND
Chapter 2.
THE TIDDIM ROAD BATTLES
Chapter 3.
20TH DIVISION’S WITHDRAWAL TO SHENAM
Chapter 4.
THE BATTLE OF SANGSHAK
Chapter 5.
THE ROLE OF THE AIR FORCES
Chapter 6.
THE BATTLE OF KOHIMA
Chapter 7.
THE CHINDITS
Chapter 8.
THE BATTLE FOR IMPHAL
Chapter 9.
ADVANCE TO RANGOON
Chapter 10.
VICTORY AND THE AFTERMATH
CHRONOLOGY: MARCH–JUNE 1944
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
GLOSSARY
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
LIST OF MAPS
Burma: The 1942 Retreat
North-East India
The Tiddim Road Battles, March to April 1944
The Japanese Attack, March 1944
20th Division’s Withdrawal to Shenam, March 1944
Sangshak, 19–26 March 1944
The Battle of Sangshak, 19–26 March 1944
Airstrips during the Imphal Siege
Kohima, 6–18 April 1944
Kohima: Dispositions at 6 April 1944
Kohima: Dispositions at dawn, 18 April 1944
Chindit Operations, March to July 1944
The Attack on Indaw, March 1944
Imphal
The Shenam Saddle, 1 April to 9 June 1944
Imphal: The Northern Sector, 12 April to 22 June 1944
The Advance to Rangoon, January to June 1945
INTRODUCTION
This book aims to tell the story of the campaign of Fourteenth Army in Burma and, in particular, the
two great battles of Imphal and Kohima, in which the Japanese forces suffered the greatest defeat in
their history. The book is intended, not for the military history expert, but rather for the general reader,
for a younger generation, perhaps the grandchildren of the veterans who fought there, so that this story
of bravery and suffering will not be lost. In Britain the memory of this campaign has been kept alive by
the admirable work of the Burma Star Association, but it must be remembered that these victories
belong above all to the fighting soldiers of the Indian Army, the members of so many proud Indian
divisions – 5th, 17th, 20th, 23rd and others – and their unique blend of Indian regiments with British
county regiments.
A number of excellent books have been written about the Burma campaign, but many of them are
extremely detailed and rather confusing to the beginner. I should like to pay tribute to these books and
to the work of their authors, and to say that I have drawn heavily on them in obtaining material for this
story, which I hope may act as an introduction to the study of the Burma campaign and may encourage
the reader, having been given a clear outline, to study these other books in greater detail.
The battles of Imphal and Kohima were extremely complex, and the terrain in Burma is confusing.
To prevent the reader from getting lost, therefore, a sketch map appears at the beginning of each
chapter or section of a chapter, and every place-name occurring in the text can be found on the relevant
map. Similarly, some books are difficult to follow; out of the blue a name is mentioned – British,
Indian, Japanese or Gurkha – but the unfortunate reader is given no indication as to the who and why.
So a brief biographical note on almost all the principal characters has been provided. When a name
first appears in the text, the rank is given, but thereafter just the surname. The list is alphabetical and is
thus quite easy to refer to. The notes have been deliberately kept brief, and refer to the rank of the
person at the time. This is not in disrespect of men who subsequently gained higher rank, but is
intended simply to assist in the swift identification of those who took part in these battles. Full details
of ranks, honours and awards are readily available in the books listed in the bibliography.
Similarly, in some chapters where the name of a regiment appears frequently, the full title has been
abbreviated so as to assist the flow of the narrative; I hope this will not offend the sticklers for correct
titles, whose views I entirely understand. Occasionally the term ‘British forces’ is used, and is meant to
include British, Indian, Gurkha and African units.
The bibliography contains a short list of the main books dealing with the Burma campaign, together
with a brief comment which may be useful to those readers not familiar with this area of military
history.
My research into the battles of Imphal and Kohima led inevitably to the Chindit campaign and its
eccentric leader, Major-General Orde Wingate. This is a highly controversial field which I have only
touched on briefly, but it raises serious issues which deserve further study; notably how far the Chindits
in Operation Thursday influenced the outcome of the two battles and, even more importantly, the
attempt by the official establishment to denigrate Wingate and all that he did.
Here I should like to pay tribute to Louis Allen, who kindly offered me help and advice, and to his
outstanding book Burma, The Longest War, which has changed everyone’s perception of the Burma
campaign. The result of a lifetime of dedicated study, his book is a mine of information which enables
readers to understand the campaign from both the Japanese and British angles. I should also like to
express my gratitude to all those who have helped and advised me during the preparation of this book:
my former colleague at RMA Sandhurst, David Chandler; the staff at the Cambridge University
Library; the Public Record Office, Kew; the Imperial War Museum; the National Army Museum.
Most of all I wish to thank my good friend, the Reverend Peter Kane, former Lieutenant-Colonel in
the Gurkhas, and a loyal Chindit, whose knowledge and help was invaluable. Phil Dewey, The Royal
Norfolk Regiment, generously provided photographs taken during a recent pilgrimage to Kohima and
Imphal; Tony Mills, former editor of Dekho, kindly helped in the initial stages of this project; Douglas
Williams, author of 194 Squadron, The Friendly Firm, provided valuable information on the role of the
RAF; Bill Clarke of the Cambridge Burma Star Association, gave early encouragement. Finally, I am
grateful to our daughter Kathy Rooney for her help with the script, and to my wife for her endless help
and support. I have received much assistance in this project, but the responsibility for any mistakes is
entirely mine.
David Rooney
Cambridge, 1992
It is encouraging to know that my book is still of interest after 20 years. When I wrote the book, my
aim was to tell the story of the campaign simply and clearly. Also, I ensured that all the places in the
text appeared in a clear map in the same chapter to ensure the story could be followed. Today, poor or
inadequate maps – for example on Afghanistan – detract from otherwise good books.
Since it was written many excellent books have been written about the Burma campaign, notably
Robert Lyman’s Slim Master of War, and Japan’s last Bid for Victory, and also Fergal Keane’s Road of
Bones. I was pleased that both of these authors said that my book had encouraged their interest in the
Burma campaign.
David Rooney,
Cambridge, 2013
CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND
After Christmas 1943 a visitor who had spent the holiday with friends in Imphal described the area as
idyllic – like Shangri La – a wonderful climate, beautiful scenery, a happy smiling people, a profusion
of the most wonderful plants and trees, with endless flights of wild fowl, and with the rivers and
streams teeming with fish. Yet, within the space of a few weeks, Imphal and neighbouring Kohima
were to witness some of the most savage fighting of the Second World War, and afterwards the two
small towns were to resemble the battlefields of the Somme.
Retreat, 1942
The backdrop to these battles lay in the humiliating defeat and retreat of the British forces when the
Japanese invaded Burma in January 1942, and also in the strategic situation in southern China where
the Japanese faced the corrupt regime of Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese had been fighting in China
since 1931 and they had driven the Chinese defenders into the west and north. By 1939 Japan held the
whole of the Chinese coast, with Chiang Kai-shek bottled-up in Chungking in the far south-west, and
Mao Tse-tung, after the Long March, similarly beleaguered in north-west China, where he was actively
indoctrinating the peasants in the theory and practice of Communism.
The Burma Road, from Rangoon through Mandalay and Lashio to Kunming, provided Chiang Kai-
shek with his only link to the outside world. He depended substantially on American help, and he had
an effective lobby in Washington which cultivated the idea of China as a valiant ally fighting against
the Japanese. He succeeded to the extent that a strong faction among the American Chiefs of Staff put
support for Chiang among their highest priorities. They were prepared to provide large sums of money
and millions of dollars worth of equipment to keep China in the war and, further, to develop south-
west China as a base from which US aircraft could bomb Japan, and Chinese forces with American
backing could eventually defeat the Japanese ground forces. Thus the overland route – the Burma Road
– and, equally, the airlift from 1942–1944 by American airmen over the mountains to Chungking,
known as ‘The Hump’, remained a major factor in US policy and was to have a direct impact on the
battles at Imphal and Kohima.
The Japanese occupation of Indo-China in July 1941 prompted America to increase its Lend-Lease
aid for China through Rangoon and up the Burma Road. Inefficiency, theft and corruption accounted
for the two-thirds of those supplies that failed to reach Chungking, and the vast stocks which built up
at Rangoon proved to be a tempting target for the Japanese when, after their lightning strikes at Pearl
Harbor, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaya, they invaded Burma in January 1942.
Burma was ill-prepared in every way for the Japanese assault. Administratively it was linked to India,
but during the 1930s it had been granted a new constitution and a legislature in response to Burmese
demands for more political progress. However, these measures did little to satisfy Burmese demands,
and the Japanese had no difficulty in gaining support for their underground movement led by Colonel
Suzuki. He organized the Burma Independence Army which gave considerable help to the Japanese
during their advance.
In Burma, almost impenetrable mountains in the north dominate the country, and from this bastion,
formidable ranges sweep southwards penning in the great Irrawaddy and Chindwin rivers which join
just south of Mandalay, and flow southwards past Prome to the sea near Rangoon. The rivers
dominated the strategy of the Burma campaign and provided the main highways and lines of
communication – the primitive railway and the few metalled roads merely following the river valleys.
Partly because of the terrain, defence had been gravely neglected: the government had no overall
defence plan; few properly trained troops; and few aircraft, tanks or guns. The British Indian 1st
Burma Division, prepared for little more than internal security activities, proved to be quite inadequate
against experienced and battle-hardened Japanese divisions. Similarly, 17th Indian Light Division was
rushed into the breach in January 1942, having been trained and equipped for rapid movement in the
western desert of North Africa. At the last moment – 20 February – the British 7th Armoured Brigade
arrived, and though ill-equipped for jungle warfare, fought all the way to the borders of India. Wavell
and Alexander, like their troops, were thrown into an almost impossible situation. Against such
inadequate defences the Japanese attacked initially with two experienced divisions, the 33rd and 55th,
and later added three more.
British forces were rapidly driven out of Burma in 1942, but it should be remembered that although
it was a major defeat and a country bigger than France and Belgium was lost to the enemy, the British
troops involved were two small and inadequate divisions, not trained or equipped for the task that
faced them. It was from such a situation that the myth of the invincible Japanese arose.
General Slim, who had fought in Africa and the Middle East, arrived in Burma from Iraq on 13
March 1942, to take command of the two battered divisions, which were given the title Burma Corps,
though he was provided with no proper headquarters and just had to do his best in a hopeless situation.
Slim suffered with his men in the retreat, but won their respect and affection. Later, he was to rebuild
their confidence and prowess, and lead them to victory at Imphal and Kohima. Initially he had the
advantage that he was in no way responsible for the disgraceful inadequacies of the Burma defences.
On his arrival he reported to General Alexander at Prome, nearly 150 miles north of Rangoon which
had already fallen. Slim had been charged by General Wavell in India to ensure that his forces were not
cut off completely by the Japanese, to protect the road from Assam into Burma via Imphal and to keep
contact with the Chinese forces in north-eastern Burma. The Chinese constituted a new factor that
Slim had to grasp very rapidly.
As the Japanese advance continued, Slim became closely involved with the Chinese forces under their
colourful commander General ‘Vinegar Joe’ Stilwell. He had been US Military Attaché in China until
1939, and in January 1942 became Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek, and commander of the Chinese
forces in north Burma. On his appointment, Stilwell arranged that the supplies from the USA for the
proposed 30 Chinese divisions should be under his control, and should be diverted through Calcutta
when Rangoon fell. He also arranged for enough aircraft to lift this huge volume of supplies to China
over ‘The Hump’.
Slim and Stilwell arrived in Burma at about the same time and faced similar daunting problems. By
the middle of March the Japanese had inflicted a crushing defeat on 17th Division at the Sittang
Bridge, had taken Rangoon and were driving rapidly north. At the eastern end of the front a Chinese
division was bravely attempting to hold the Japanese at Taungoo. Stilwell, who nominally had other
divisions under his command, tried to get two more divisions to come forward and support the
