Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience

127 Pages·2011·0.96 MB·English

by  Olga Oliker

Building Afghanistan’s
Security Forces in
Wartime
The Soviet Experience

Olga Oliker
Prepared for the United States Army
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
ARROYO CENTER
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States
Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Oliker, Olga.
Building Afghanistan's security forces in wartime : the Soviet experience / Olga Oliker.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
eISBN 978-0-8330-5171-4
1. Afghanistan—History--Soviet occupation, 1979-1989. 2. Military assistance,
Soviet—Afghanistan. 3. Internal security—Afghanistan. 4. Afghanistan—History,
Military—20th century. 5. Soviet Union—History, Military. I. Title

DS371.2.B84 2011
958.104'5—dc23
2011033719
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Preface
Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsur-
gency campaign being waged by U .S. and coalition forces in Afghani-
stan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in large measure, on the
effectiveness of the assistance provided to the Afghan National Army,
Afghan National Police, and other security forces. In the 1980s, the
Soviet Union also carried out a massive counterinsurgency effort in
support of Afghanistan’s then-government. At that time, too, the devel-
opment of Afghanistan’s security forces was a central component of
counterinsurgency efforts. To this day, the memory and lasting impact
of that experience continue to affect Afghan attitudes about security
assistance and security force requirements. Although there are many
differences between current events and the Soviet experience, there are
also striking parallels. Both the parallels and the differences can pro-
vide insights for those seeking to help rebuild Afghanistan today.
This monograph examines Soviet approaches to SFA in Afghani-
stan from the 1920s to 1989, with particular attention to the 1980s. It
complements work by the author, Terrence Kelly, and Nora Bensahel
that separately documents the U.S. and international approaches to
building the Afghan National Security Forces from 2001 to 2009. The
findings of this monograph, which presents research completed in the
summer of 2010, should be of interest to U.S. military and civilian
officials involved in preparing and executing SFA, both in Afghani-
stan and beyond. It should also be of interest to those inside and out-
side the U.S. government who seek a deeper understanding of histori-
cal reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and the key challenges that
iii
iv Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience
those efforts face, as well as to students of the Soviet experience in
Afghanistan.
This research was sponsored by the Director of Strategy, Plans,
and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, and carried
out within RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources
Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is
a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the
United States Army. For comments or further information, please con-
tact the author, Olga Oliker (telephone [phone], extension 5382;
email [email protected]).
The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project
that produced this document is ASPMO09157.

For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the
Director of Operations (telephone [phone], extension 6419; FAX
310-451-6952; email [email protected]), or visit Arroyo’s web-
site at http://www.rand.org/ard.html.
Contents
Preface ............................................................................. iii
Figures .................................. ........................................... ix
Table ................................................................................ xi
Summary .........................................................................xiii
Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxiii
Abbreviations ................................................................... xxv
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction ....................................................................... 1
The Limited Contingent .......................................................... 1
Purpose and Research Approach ................................................. 2
CHAPTER TWO
Historical Overview: 20th-Century Security Aid to Afghanistan
Before the Soviet Invasion ................................................. 3
1920–1978 .......................................................................... 3
The Saur Revolution ............................................................... 6
Events Leading Up to the Soviet Invasion ...................................... 9
Afghan Security Forces on the Eve of the Soviet Invasion ...................15
A Decision to Invade? .............................................................17
CHAPTER THREE
The Soviet Advisory Mission in the 1980s: Senior Leadership and
Reporting Channels ........................................................19
v
vi Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience
CHAPTER FOUR
MoI and KhAD Security Forces During the 1980s .......................25
The Sarandoy ......................................................................25
KhAD ..............................................................................32
CHAPTER FIVE
The Afghan Military ............................................................37
The Military Advisory Mission ................................................. 42
Training of Afghan Military Personnel .........................................45
Aviation ............................................................................ 48
Border Forces ......................................................................51

CHAPTER SIX
Militias and Other Forces ......................................................53
Citizen Militias ....................................................................53
Border and Tribal Militias ...................................................... 54
CHAPTER SEVEN
Afghan Security Forces Challenges and Responses .......................59
Force Size and Desertion .........................................................59
Efforts to Increase Numbers and Improve Morale ............................65
Equipment ........................................................................ 68
Division of Labor Among Afghan Security Forces ............................70
Transferring Control ..............................................................71
CHAPTER EIGHT
The Soviet Decision to Withdraw and the Legacy of Soviet
Efforts to Build Afghan Security Forces ................................73
Dissenting Voices..................................................................73
Preparing to Leave ................................................................74
The Withdrawal and After .......................................................76
Evaluating Soviet Efforts in Hindsight .........................................79
Contents vii
CHAPTER NINE
Conclusion: Parallels, Disconnects, and What the
International Security Assistance Force Can Learn
from the Soviet Experience ...............................................83
Overall Approaches .............................................................. 84
Recruiting and Retention ....................................................... 86
Policing ............................................................................ 86
Counterinsurgency and Military Training .................................... 87
Interaction Between Afghan and Foreign Forces and the Challenges
of Transferring Lead Responsibility ....................................... 88
Afghan Capabilities .............................................................. 90
What ISAF Can Learn from the Soviet Experience ......................... 90

References .........................................................................95

Figures
4.1. MoI Number of Personnel over Time ............................ 26
4.2. KhAD Number of Person nel over Time ..........................33
ix