Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, 1865-1921 (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

266 Pages·2006·6.06 MB·English

by  Charles H. Stewart

BUDGET REFORM POLITICS
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS
Editors
Professor James Alt, Harvard University
Professor Douglass North, Washington University in St. Louis
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BUDGET REFORM POLITICS
The design of the appropriations process
in the House of Representatives,
1865—1921
CHARLES H. STEWART III
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© Cambridge University Press 1989
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1989
This digitally printed first paperback version 2006
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
Stewart, Charles Haines.
Budget reform politics : the design of the appropriations process
in the House of Representatives, 1865-1921 / Charles H. Stewart III.
p. cm. - (Political economy of institutions and decisions)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-521-35472-2 hard covers
1. Budget - United States - History. 2. Budget - Law and
legislation - United States - History. 3. Government spending policy -
United States - History. I. Title. II. Series.
HJ2050.S74 1989
353.0072'2 - dcl9 88 - 38677
CIP
ISBN-13 978-0-521-35472-1 hardback
ISBN-10 0-521-35472-2 hardback
ISBN-13 978-0-521-03115-8 paperback
ISBN-10 0-521-03115-X paperback
Contents
List of tables and figures page vii
Series editors' preface ix
Acknowledgments xi
PART I
ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF BUDGETING
Introduction 3
1 Understanding budgeting and budget reform in Congress 13
2 Setting the historical stage 53
PART II
SPENDING REFORM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1865-1921
Introduction JJ
3 The politics of budgetary structure, 1865-1885 79
4 Adaptation and adjustment to decentralization: post-1885
spending decisions 133
5 The reappearance of formal reform, 1885—1921 172
PART III
CONCLUSION
6 Budget reform then and now 219
Appendix: summary of budget reform attempts in the
House, 1865-1921 237
References 241
Index 2.50

Tables and figures
TABLES
3.1 Regional definitions in roll call analyses page 94
3.2 Effect of party, region, and committee membership on
vote to suspend the rules to pass the rivers and harbors
appropriations bill, 45th Congress, 1878 95
3.3 Voting for passage of the rivers and harbors bill under
suspension by voting to uphold the question of
privilege, 45th Congress, 1878 97
3.4 Proposals for restructuring appropriations jurisdictions,
46th Congress, 1879-1881 99
3.5 Votes to pass the rivers and harbors bill in the House,
45th-49th Congresses, 1878-1887 100
3.6 Effect of party, region, and committee on vote to give
the Commerce Committee privileged position to report
the rivers and harbors bill, 46th Congress, 1879 103
3.7 Effect of committee membership, region, urban
character of state, and party on vote to remove the
Agriculture Department appropriation from the
Appropriations Committee, 46th Congress, 1880 no
3.8 Vote to give agricultural appropriations to the
Agriculture Committee by vote to give public buildings
appropriations to the Public Building Committee and
party, 46th Congress, 1880 112
3.9 Effect of committee membership, region, and party on
vote to remove the public buildings appropriation from
the Appropriations Committee, 46th Congress, 1880 113
3.10 Effect of committee membership, district location, and
party on vote to refer internal improvements report to
the Committee on Levees and Improvements of the
Mississippi River, 48th Congress, 1884 118
vii
Tables and figures
3.11 Effect of party, region, and committee on vote to retain
HAC jurisdiction over spending, 49th Congress, 1885 125
4.1 Average growth of annual spending bills, FY 1871-
1922, controlling for military activity and prices 136
4.2 Changes in spending levels at various stages of the
appropriations process, FY 1871—1922 143
4.3 Structure of spending decisions concerning seven annual
appropriations bills overseen by legislative committees
after 1885, FY 1871-1922 155
4.4 Structure of spending decisions concerning three annual
appropriations bills overseen by the Appropriations
Committee after 1885, FY 1871-1922 164
4.5 Structure of spending decisions concerning the
fortifications bills, FY 1871-1922 166
4.6 Average effects of changes in prices, gross domestic
product, and partisan control of the House on
committee spending decisions, before and after 1885 167
5.1 Effect of committee membership, region, and party on
vote to call up reform of Appropriations Committee
jurisdiction, 66th Congress, 1920 207
5.2 Vote to consider H.Res. 527 by vote on H.Res. 324 208
FIGURES
2.1 Percentage of House seats replaced, 3oth~9ist
Congresses, 1847-1969 55
2.2 Party control of the presidency, House, and Senate,
37th-7oth Congresses, 1861-1921 59
2.3 Origins of gross domestic product, 1874-1929 61
2.4 Persons engaged in production by sector, 18 69-19 29 62
2.5 Consumer prices in the United States, 1850-1930 63
2.6 Composition of federal revenues, FY 1850—1930 6y
2.7 Composition of federal spending, FY 1850—1930 68
2.8 Summary of federal government finances, FY 1850—
1930 69
3.1 Enactment of the Holman Rule, 1875-1921 88
4.1 Aggregate spending contained in seven annual
appropriations bills overseen by legislative committees
after 1885, FY 1871-1922 135
4.2 Appropriations for the Agriculture Department, FY
1871-1900 139
Vlll
Series editors' preface
This Cambridge series, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions,
is built around attempts to answer two central questions: How do in-
stitutions evolve in response to individual incentives, strategies, and
choices; and how do institutions affect the performance of political and
economic systems? The scope of the series is comparative and historical
rather than international or specifically American, and the focus is pos-
itive rather than normative.
Charles Stewart's work has two important features. One is his use of
rational models of congressional changes in budget procedures between
the Civil War and the end of World War I. Linking congressmen's career
objectives to their local constituencies, he applies the modern Congress
model in which a decentralized electoral process leads congressmen to
prefer particularistic, localistic policy production over national-interest
legislation. He shows that this demand for localistic policy leads to in-
stitutional or structural fragmentation, and conflicts with existing lead-
ership and committee structures as well as with the centralizing demands
of war and other crises. The political economy of this conflict, which
produces opportunities for countervailing reforms, explains the evolution
of budget procedure in the long run.
The other prominent feature of the book is Stewart's careful quanti-
tative modeling of budget and spending decisions and outcomes with
explicit reference to the impact of institutional constraints. Analyzing the
devolution of budget powers of 1885 and its attendant surges in spending,
he argues that rather than devolution of power causing spending, both
follow from broader social and economic changes that increased demand
for spending.
Stewart's original fusion of quantitative and historical analysis shows
both how institutional procedures changed in response to legislator pref-
erences and broader social and economic developments and how these
procedures shaped congressional policy.
ix