British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency

278 Pages·2009·6.4 MB·English

British Army Field Manual
Volume 1 Part 10
Countering Insurgency

Army Code 71876
October 2009
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i
FOREWORD
It is over eight years since the Army last published counterinsurgency
doctrine. Much has changed since then. This manual is a short guide to
insurgency, and the principles and approaches needed to counter it. It has
been written to complement allied and joint doctrine and the authors have
been careful to ensure that the principles and framework that are explained in
Part A are entirely coherent with those in UK joint doctrine and that of our
principal allies, in particular USA, Canada and Australia. For maximum effect
Part A should be read as a single continuous narrative while Part B can be
read in its constituent chapters.
AFM Countering Insurgency describes how the British Army plans and
conducts counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level. It explains that
efforts must be focused on securing the local population and gaining and
maintaining popular support. This is a task for the host nation, its security
forces, British forces and our allies, in concert with our partners across
government. The doctrine explains why this is not simply a military
undertaking but a battle of political wills with a number of lines of operation
acting in concert. It is axiomatic that security forces of all types lead in
providing an environment sufficiently stable to allow the other instruments of
governance can be brought to bear to improve the lives of the local
population. Providing effective security is a complex, dangerous, and bloody
business; it takes time and resources and it tests the resolve of all involved.
These are enduring characteristics of counterinsurgency.
Doctrine is ‘what is taught’, and to be effective it needs to be read and
understood. Pragmatism is needed, however, in its application. Every
counterinsurgency campaign is different from the last, but history and
experience show that a thorough knowledge of the doctrine and a clear
understanding of the operational environment are two essential prerequisites.
Doctrine provides commanders at the tactical level with the basis on which to
build this understanding, and requires them to use their experience and
judgement to develop the right approach to the particular circumstances in
which they find themselves. As such it is focussed at the brigade level and
below and educationally for the ICSC(L) student. While the authors of this
publication have consulted widely with experienced practitioners and
academic experts and endeavoured to include a broad range of ideas, it is not
a comprehensive textbook on insurgency or counterinsurgency. Nor is it
specific to a particular theatre of operation or a particular insurgent group. It
provides the key themes which have emerged in recent years and thus
reflects the contemporary situation. Given insurgency’s constant adaptation,
things will change and this publication will have to adjust accordingly. The
authors will track developments in order to keep it relevant and take account
of emerging views. In this respect your views and insights are important.
Comments on this publication are encouraged and should be sent to LWC-
[email protected].
CONTENTS
Page

i
Foreword

Part A – The Fundamentals

Chapter 1 – Introduction
1-1
Section 1 The Basics
Section 2 Definitions 1-5
Section 3 Operating Within A Sovereign Nation 1-6
Section 4 The Psychological Dimension 1-7
Section 5 Enduring Characteristics 1-8
Section 6 Building Host Nation Capacity and Capabilities 1-9
Section 7 Countering Insurgency 1-12
Section 8 The Importance of Time 1-15
CASE STUDY 1 : The Development of Doctrine for Countering
Insurgency; the British Experience

Chapter 2 – Insurgency
Section 1 Introduction and Definitions 2-1
Section 2 Causes, Aims and Elements 2-3
Causes 2-3
Aims 2-4
Mechanism for Motivation 2-5
Elements of an Insurgency 2-5
Section 3 Insurgent Vulnerabilities 2-7
Annex A The Categorisation of Insurgency 2-A-1

CASE STUDY 2: The Growth of Religious Extremism

Chapter 3 - The Principles of Counterinsurgency
Section 1 Introduction and Principles 3-1
Primacy of Political Purpose 3-2
Unity of Effort 3-3
Understand the Human Terrain 3-5
Secure the Population 3-8
Neutralise the Insurgent 3-9
Gain and Maintain Popular Support 3-11
Operate in Accordance with the Law 3-15
Integrate Intelligence 3-15
Prepare for the Long Term 3-17
Learn and Adapt 3-18
Section 2 Paradoxes 3-22
Chapter 4 - A Framework for the Conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations
Section 1 Introduction 4-1
The Joint, Operational Level Approach 4-2
Section 2 A Framework for Operations 4-3
Section 3 Shape-Secure-Develop 4-5
Shape 4-5
Secure 4-7
Develop 4-10
Section 4 Transition: The Transfer Of Security Sector 4-11
Section 5 Clear-Hold-Build 4-14
Section 6 Contesting Outlying Areas 4-21
Section 7 Best Practices in Counterinsurgency 4-21
ii
CASE STUDY 3: A Successful Campaign: Oman (Dhofar) 1965-1975

PART - B
Chapter 5 – Intelligence
Section 1 Introduction 5-1
Section 2 The Insurgent 5-2
Section 3 Intelligence Preparation of the Environment 5-4
Section 4 The Intelligence/Operations Cycle (F3EA) 5-6
Section 5 The Intelligence Staff 5-11
Section 6 Constraints 5-13
Section 7 Counter Intelligence And Security Intelligence 5-14

Chapter 6 – Influence Activity
Section 1 Introduction 6-1
Section 2 Influence Activities 6-2
Section 3 Manning, Staff Processes & Planning Considerations 6-8
Section 4 Delivering Influence At Formation/Unit Level 6-11
Section 5 Counter Influence 6-14
Annex A Influence Considerations for the Tactical Estimate 6-A-1
Annex B Illustrative Manning For Influence Activity Staff At 6-B-1
Divisional Level
Annex C Illustrative Staff Structure for Influence Activity At 6-C-1
Brigade Level
Annex D Influence Activity Coordination Boards at the 6-D-1
Brigade and Battlegroup Level
Annex E Operational Terminology 6-E-1

Chapter 7 - Planning Considerations For Counterinsurgency
Section 1 Introduction 7-1
Section 2 The Importance of Operational Design 7-2
Section 3 Operational Level Approaches at the Tactical Level 7-6
Section 4 Campaign and Tactical Plans 7-9
Section 5 Logistics 7-11
Annex A Command and control Structures 7-A-1
Annex B Measures of Effectiveness 7-B-1
CASE STUDY 4: An Unsuccessful Campaign; South Arabia and Aden,
1963-1967

Chapter 8 – Execution
Section 1 Introduction 8-1
Section 2 Shape 8-2
Reconciliation 8-3
Money on the Battlefield 8-3
Section 3 Secure 8-6
Section 4 Develop 8-8
Annex A – Key Leader Engagement 8-A-1
Annex B – Counterinsurgency Strike Operations 8-B-1
Annex C – Detention Operations 8-C-1

CASE STUDY 5: A Classic Campaign; Malaya, 1948-1960

Chapter 9 - The Special Forces, Air and Maritime Contributions
Section 1 Special Forces 9-1
Section 2 Airpower in Counterinsurgency 9-4
Section 3 The Maritime Contribution To Countering Insurgency 9-11

iii
Chapter 10 - Military Capacity Building
Section 1 Fundamentals 10-1
Principles 10-2
Section 2 Preparing for the Task 10-5
Planning 10-5
Selection of Personnel 10-6
Training 10-7
Section 3 Recruitment of Forces 10-9
Section 4 Training 10-10
Planning 10-10
Transition to Self Reliance 10-12
Section 5 Operations 10-13
Transition to Operations 10-13
Partnering 10-13
Transition to Self Reliance 10-15
Annex A Nomenclature 10-A-1
Annex B Overwatch 10-B-1

Chapter 11 – Learning and Adapting
Section 1 Introduction 11-1
Section 2 Approach to Training and Education 11-4
Section 3 Pre-Deployment Training 11-5
Section 4 Individual and Specialist Training 11-7
Section 5 Cultural Understanding 11-0
Chapter 12 – Legal Aspects of Countering Insurgency 12-1
Definitions 12-1
Legal Framework 12-2
Use of Force 12-5
Rules of Engagement 12-7
Detention Operations 12-8
Rule of the Legal advisor 12-10
CASE STUDY 6: A Complicated Campaign – Mozambique 1976-1992
CASE STUDY 7: A Potential Campaign – 2009 Onwards
GLOSSARY

iv
CHAPTER 1
THE FUNDAMENTALS
SECTION 1 – BASICS

1-1. Counterinsurgency is Warfare. Contents Page
Until recently, the word
counterinsurgency appeared to be Section 1 – Basics 1-1
synonymous with low-intensity Section 2 – Definitions 1-5
operations, or operations other than war. Section 3 - Operating Within A 1-6
It conjured up images of British soldiers Sovereign Nation
in the Malayan jungle, or on the streets Section 4 – The Psychological 1-7
of Northern Ireland. The U.S. military’s Dimension – Influence Activity
experience in Iraq 2003-2008, and the Section 5 – Enduring 1-8
British campaign in Helmand Province in Characteristics
Afghanistan since 2006 have Section 6 – Building Host 1-9
demonstrated that military operations Nation Capacity
against irregular insurgents can be as Section 7 – Countering 1-12
intense as combat in conventional Insurgency
warfare. The intensity of operations is Section 8 – The Importance of 1-15
not the issue at stake. Insurgency and Time
counterinsurgency are two sides of a
very complex form of warfare, where a group or groups resort to violence and take up
arms to achieve political objectives. Typical objectives are replacing an existing
government, securing the status quo and challenging a nascent or emerging state.
Today’s hybrid threats – any adversaries that simultaneously and adaptively employ
a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal
behaviour in the same battlespace to obtain their political objectives – are constantly
seeking to exploit what they perceive to be the vulnerabilities of regular forces. They
do this by using terrorism and subversion, by blending into the population amongst
which security forces operate, and by exploiting their most effective weapon which is
the influence that they can extend through the media. Counterinsurgency is warfare;
it is distinctly political, not primarily military; and it involves the people, the
government, and the military. The strength of the relationship between these three
groups generally determines the outcome of the campaign.
1-2. Principles. The ten principles for counterinsurgency, explained in Chapter 3,
are:
1. Primacy of political purpose.
2. Unity of effort.
3. Understand the human terrain.
4. Secure the population.
5. Neutralise the insurgent.
6. Gain and maintain popular support.
7. Operate in accordance with the law.
8. Integrate intelligence.
9. Prepare for the long term.
10. Learn and adapt.
1 - 1
1-3. Security. The principal security task is to secure the population from
violence. By securing the population and by stabilising the situation, governance can
be re-established for the benefit of the population. A stable, sustainable security
situation is a pre-requisite for improving both governance and the population’s
prospects. Securing the population has several essential elements. While it may be
possible to take some risk with each of them, experience shows that delay is
dangerous. The essential security elements of counterinsurgency are:
• Security for the Population. The success or failure of an insurgency is
largely dependent on the attitude of the population. Insurgents use force to bring
parts of the population under consensual or involuntary control; the host
government’s task is to secure the population from such influence. This requires
active security measures, which include controlling movement, imposing curfews
in times when the threat is high, conducting a census to establish who the people
are, introducing positive identification methods such as identity cards and
biometric measurement, and building security infrastructure such as gated
• Presence. In counterinsurgency, presence matters. The population has to
be secured where it lives, and it must be secured on a permanent basis. This
means that the military commander must establish and maintain a continuous and
effective presence on the ground. The accepted rule of thumb is 20 security
personnel (soldiers, police, para-militaries and auxiliaries) for every 1000 people
in the area of operation. If insufficient security personnel are available,
commanders may have to devise plans to reduce areas of operation to provide
the optimum force ratio. Experience shows that it is easier to deal with insurgents
when the security forces live amongst the population than when they have to
deploy to an area on a temporary basis.
• Continuity. The population is the one constant in the equation and so
continuity of approach to the population is essential. Continuity helps to avoid
mistakes being repeated, it allows relationships between the population and the
security forces to be developed and maintained, and acknowledging the need for
continuity addresses in part the fact that the long term solution to an insurgency
rests with the host nation, its government and its people. Continuity also helps
build confidence with allies. The use of purpose-designed standing HQs manned
on a trickle basis, together with individual officer and soldier tours of as long
duration as is acceptable will promote continuity.
• Intelligence. Intelligence is essential in any operation but especially so in
counterinsurgency. It ensures that the insurgents are correctly targeted and
neutralised by whatever means is most appropriate. Good intelligence also helps
avoid civilian casualties or infrastructure damage. Intelligence depends as much
on the tactical level pattern of life in each area of operations as it does on the top-
down feed of intelligence from operational and strategic levels. Intelligence has to
be integrated at every level of command and across and between agencies
engaged in counterinsurgency.
• ISTAR. Effective counterinsurgency depends on efficient and persistent
ISTAR coverage. Airborne surveillance offers considerable advantages both in
terms of the situational awareness that it provides to ground forces in their task of
securing the population, and in the deterrent effect on the insurgents. Airborne
platforms give the commander a distinct advantage over the insurgent; for that
reason, they are crucial in counterinsurgency.
1 - 2
• Embedded Training Teams. Host nation forces invariably require training
and development. Where British training teams are deployed, experience proves
that they are at their most effective when they are embedded with the unit or
formation that they are training, and when they bring with them the enabling
capabilities of ISTAR, joint fires, command and control, and CSS, particularly
medical and logistics. Training the host nation’s security forces and partnering
and mentoring them on operations is an essential part of achieving long-term
security which the host nation can sustain. Those selected to train host nation
security forces themselves require to be trained in cultural awareness and theatre
specifics so that they can fit in with their charges from the outset.
• Influence. Counterinsurgency is about gaining and securing the support of
the people both in the theatre of operations and at home. Influence activity
therefore underpins everything which British forces undertake because
counterinsurgency is as much about the battle of perceptions as it is about military
operations targeted against insurgents.
• Education. Those who have to put counterinsurgency doctrine into practice
have to know what the doctrine says. This requirement is not limited to UK
doctrine; commanders must also be versed in the doctrine of other nations with
which they are likely to operate. They need to have the knowledge and
confidence to adapt doctrine to meet the challenges that they face. Without
flexibility and pragmatism in its application, doctrine becomes dogma, “...to be
seized upon by mental emasculates who lack virility of judgment, and who are
only too grateful to rest assured that their actions, however inept, find justification
in a book, which, if they think at all, is in their opinion, written in order to exonerate
them from doing so.”1 Counterinsurgency warfare is complex and is not at all
suited to learning the basics in the heat of the campaign. That is the time to adapt
the approach to meet the demands of the situation based on a clear
understanding of the doctrine, approaches, and best practice. This places a clear
onus on the Army and Defence to provide comprehensive education for
counterinsurgency.
1-4. A Framework for Counterinsurgency. A number of conceptual frameworks
have been developed which provide a way of thinking about the principal themes or
tasks in counterinsurgency. The framework adopted in this manual is a general
model of Shape-Secure-Develop, which groups together the main tasks which forces
may be called upon to carry out during the campaign under each of its three
headings. The emphasis will shift between the three dependent on the security
situation and campaign progress. For example, if the threat is high, ‘secure’
operations may dominate. If the situation is more stable, ‘develop’ activity may be
the focus. It is important to note that Shape-Secure-Develop is a general model;
operational commanders may well develop an approach which reflects the specifics
of their campaign or the doctrine of a non-UK superior commander.
1-5. The Continuum of Operations. The campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and
elsewhere have shown that as the host nation builds up its own security capacity, UK
armed forces are required to operate effectively across the continuum of operations.
Combating insurgents can be, at times, as fierce, demanding, chaotic and violent as
warfighting. While this form of combat is undesirable, particularly if it takes place
among the population that the security forces are in place to protect, all forces should

1 J.F.C. Fuller, Reformation of War, London: Hutchinson 1923, p. 254.
1 - 3
be prepared for periods of intense fighting. No counterinsurgency exists at just one
point on the continuum of operations. Its intensity will vary in time and place. At any
one point in the campaign there might be a humanitarian crisis in one district, and a
violent outbreak by insurgents in another. At any one place in the theatre of
operations, in one week there might be an operation to clear, secure and hold a
village, and a development task to restore electricity and water supplies the week
after.
1-6. Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency. JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation
– the Military Contribution describes the relationship between stabilisation and
counterinsurgency. JDP 3-40 uses Figure 1.1 to illustrate the likely relationship
between stabilisation and counterinsurgency. It shows how a counterinsurgency
operation sits within the three major sectors of a stabilisation campaign:
Governance, Security, and Development. Although the provision of security
contributes to all three sectors, it will inevitably be the main effort, particularly in the
initial stages of a campaign. The size of the ‘COIN bubble’ will depend on the scale
of the insurgency and it will vary as the campaign develops. How it changes will
depend on the capacity of other government departments and intergovernmental and
non-governmental organisations. These depend, in turn, on the contribution that
security forces can make to developmental and governance activities. A key aspect
of all stabilisation tasks will be to prepare the host nation to take responsibility for its
own security, development and governance. Within this sector, the security forces
will inevitably have a significant role to play in training and mentoring, through
embedded partnering, the host nation’s security forces to provide security.

Figure 1.1 Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency

1-7. JDP 3-40 describes the military contribution to security and stabilisation, set
in the context of wider cross government efforts. The military contribution is in four
areas:
1 - 4