British Aristotelianism and the New Science. Essay Review

14 Pages·2016·0.4 MB·English

JOURNAL OF
INTERDISCIPLINARY
HISTORY OF IDEAS
2015
Volume 4 Issue 8
Item 7
– Section 4: Reviews –
A Matter of Method: British Aristotelianism
and the New Science. Essay Review
by
F.G. Sacco
c b n a
JIHI2015
Volume4Issue8
Section1:Editorials
1.Introductiontothespecialissueon“GastronomyandRev-
olution” (M.Albertone–L.Frobert–E.Pasini)
Section2:Articles.SpecialIssue:Gastronomyand
Revolution
2.Nourrirlesenfants,nourrirlepeuple.L’alimentationentre
identiténationale,luttepolitiqueetactionrévolutionnaire.
Commentaireauséminairesur“GastronomieetRévolution”
(M.Margotti)
3. Wheat versus Maize. Civilizing Dietary Strategies and
EarlyMexicanRepublicanism(S.Bak-GellerCorona)
4. Food and the Futurist ‘Revolution’. A Note (R. Ibba –
D.Sanna)
5. Food and Cooking in Revolutionary and Soviet Russia
(D.Steila)
Section3:Notes
6.AResponsetoDoina-CristinaRusu(M.Thick)
Section4:Reviews
7.AMatterofMethod:BritishAristotelianismandtheNew
Science.EssayReview(F.G.Sacco)
8.BookReviews(S.Gino,R.Gronda)
Section5:News&Notices
9.ActivitiesoftheGISI|LesactivitésduGISI(2015)
.....................................................
A Matter of Method: British Aristotelianism and
the New Science. Essay Review
F.G.Sacco
Essay Review of Steffen Ducheyne, The Main Business of Natural Philosophy:
IsaacNewton’sNatural-PhilosophicalMethodology,Dordrecht:Springer,2012,
p.XXV+354(ISBN9789400721258,€259);MarcoSgarbi,TheAristotelianTradi-
tionandtheRiseofBritishEmpiricism:LogicandEpistemologyinBritishIsles
(1570-1689),Dordrecht:Springer,2013,XII+260pp.(ISBN9789400749504,€209).
1
ThebooksofSteffenDucheyneandMarcoSgarbisharesomethingmore
thanthepublisher.BothdealwithBritishempiricismanditsAristotelian
background. The existence of such a background as claimed by Sgarbi, chal-
lengesthetraditionalprevalenceofPlatonismandanti-Aristotelianismin17ᵗʰ-
century Britain. Ducheyne, on the other hand, claims the Aristotelian roots
of Newtonianmethodology.AccordingtoDucheyne,Newtonianmethodwas
very different from hypothetico-deductive methodology. Newton’s use of hy-
pothesis was part of a more general methodology divided in two phases: the
construction of a model and its application including the formation and the
testingoftheories(p.56-57).Inthiscontext,thenatureofhypotheseschanges
withrespecttothemechanicalphilosophy.
Newtonwasinvolvedinthequestforademonstrativeandrigorousmethod
tillthe1680s,adecadethatrepresentsaturningpointinhisphysicalandmethod-
ologicalwork.AfterthecorrespondenceonplanetarymotionwithRobertHooke
JournalofInterdisciplinaryHistoryofIdeas4(2015),8,p.7:1–7:12.Nonpeer-reviewed.
in1679-1680,Newtonradicallychangedhisideasoncelestialmechanics.Atthe
sametime,hismethodologyreachedthestagelatermaintainedinthePrincipia.
“AlthoughinhisearlyopticalworkNewtonhadclearlyformulatedanidealof
establishingdemonstrativecauses,aclearformulationofthemethodbywhich
toarriveat“deductionsfromphenomena”wasstilllacking.Itwasonlybythe
timeofthePrincipiathatNewtoncouldanswerthisissueinasufficientlyde-
tailedway”(p.184).Newton’smasterpieceof1687isatthecentreofDucheyne’s
work.InthePrincipiathenewmethodoperatedinawaythatNewtonwasnot
abletoreproduceintheOpticks.BookIandIIofthePrincipiaoffertheempiri-
calfoundationtothediscussionofKeplerianlaws.Newtonian’smodelforthe
explicationofcelestialmotionsaccordingtoKepler’slawsisbasedonthenew
laws of mechanics developed with empirical evidence in the first two books.
Thefirstphaseofthemethod,viz.theconstructionofthemodel,iscompleted
withtheelaborationofamodelforKeplerianlaws.InbookIIIthesecondphase
beginswiththeapplicationofthismodeltothemovementsofcelestialbodies
andtheformationofthetheoryofuniversalgravitation.Theremainingofthe
Principiaessentiallyconsistsinthelastphaseofthemethod,i.e.theapplication
ofthetheory.UnlikeCartesianvortexes’hypothesis,Newtonianmodelisfirmly
basedonthelawsofmotions.Newtonrefusedadhocfactorstoexplaindiscrep-
anciesbetweenthephenomenaandthemathematicalresultsderivedfromideal
conditions.Thankstothegoodapproximationbetweenthelawsofmotionsand
thecelestialtrajectoriesdescribedbyplanets,whichentailedtheabsenceofany
relevantresistancecompatiblewiththepresenceofadenseether,Newtoncould
concludefortheinexistenceofCartesianvortexes.
According to Ducheyne, the Principia’s methodology is consistent with a
non-mathematical concept of gravity, since it is related to a non-mechanical
idea of causes. Unlike Cartesian hypotheses, causes in Newtonian model are
not only explanatory but also true because they supply the necessary expla-
nationsoftheobservedphenomena.ForDucheyne,Newton’sassumptionofa
causalapproachistheproofofthenon-mathematicaloriginsofhismethodol-
ogy.“Fromaconceptualpointofviewthemathematicalaccountofanalysisand
synthesisisincompatiblewithNewton’sconceptionofanalysisasdiscovering
causes and of synthesis as assuming these causes to explain other phenom-
ena. In the mathematical tradition analysis consists of reasoning from what
is sought to what is known. In Newton’s natural-philosophical view, analy-
7:2 F.G.Sacco
sis consisted in reasoning from what is known, the effect, to what is sought,
the cause” (pp. 7-8). According to Ducheyne, the theory of regressus demon-
strativus developed by British Aristotelians shares common features with the
Newtonianmethodofdeductionfromphenomenaandrepresentsthebestcan-
didatetoexplaintheoriginsofNewtonianmethodology.Botharecomposedof
twoconsecutivephases:analysisorresolutio,proceedingfromtheeffectstothe
causes,andsynthesisorcompositio,proceedingfromthecausestotheeffects
(p. 4). Furthermore, Ducheyne’s thesis is supported by the evidence of New-
ton’sdirectstudyofarelevantAristoteliantextbook,suchasSamuelSmith’s
Aditus ad logicam (p. 16). Thus, Aristotelian influence, along with Isaac Bar-
row’smathematicalwork,supportedtheNewtonianquestforademonstrative
methodinnaturalphilosophyandhisrefusaloftheBaconianlegacyembraced
bytheRoyalSociety’svirtuosi.
WhatDucheynedescribesasthe“NewtonianStyle”,followingI.BernardCo-
hen(1982),doesnotworkinNewtonianoptics.SincethebeginningoftheNew-
tonianresearchesonlightandcolours,discrepanciesbetweenmethodological
demands and epistemological results emerged. Unlike Principia’s laws, New-
ton’s definition of white light as the heterogeneous mixture of coloured rays
could not be deduced from experiments. According to Newtonian methodol-
ogy,fromthebrilliantexperimentofdoublediffractionrealizedinthesecond
halfof1660sonecanonlydeducethat,afterthedecompositionofwhitelight
by the first prism, the singular coloured rays refracted by the second prism
maintain their colours. “Since heterogeneity of light cannot be derived from
phenomena, it qualifies as being a hypothesis according to Newton’s criteria.
Ultimately,Newtonhadonlyprovidedasufficientcauseforprismaticdisper-
sion,notanecessaryandsufficientone”(p.196).ButforDucheynethisisnot
incompatiblewithNewtonianstyle,becauseNewton’sinferencefromtheob-
servableimmutabilityofrefractedcolouredraystotheirstatebeforediffraction
isconsistentwithhisthirdregulaphilosophandi,theso-calledanalogyofnature,
andwithNewton’suseoftheso-calledtransductionortransdictiveinference
intheanalysisofbrief-scaleattractiveforcesinthePrincipia.AsMandelbaum
(1664,p.87)andMcGuire(1970,p.4)pointedout,sinceitenablestoovercome
thelimitsofexperienceandsenseperceptioninferringtheunknownstatusof
unobservable entities, the Newtonian third rule is not an induction rule. This
isthecaseforNewtonianconclusionsonthestateoflightraysbeforethefirst
AMatterofMethod:BritishAristotelianismandtheNewScience.EssayReview 7:3
diffractionintheexperimentumcrucisof1672.Attributingtocolouredraysthe
propertyofimmutabilitybeforethediffraction,Newtonoperatedaninferential
processsimilartothatdescribedinthethirdruleofthePrincipia.
ThusDucheynecanconcludethattheepistemologicalproblemsofNewton’s
optical works are due to the state of the discipline and not to the high de-
mandsofhisjuvenilemethodology.DespiteNewtonianmethodologyevolved
tillthematureformulationofthePrincipia,theepistemologicalproblemsatthe
heartofhisconstructionremainedinTheOpticks,resistingtothePrincipia-style
methodizing.AccordingtoDucheyne,thisisbecauseopticsdidnotreachthe
status of physico-mathematics acquired by mechanics and remained a mixed
science(p.220-1).
Ducheyne’sanalysisofNewtonianopticsrigorouslyreflectsNewton’spoint
ofview.Inhisreconstruction,littlespaceisconcededtothedisputesfollowing
theappearanceofTheNewTheoryofLightandColoursin1672.Thereasonsof
RobertHookeandChristianHuygensarenotadequatelydiscussed,despitethe
emergenceofthemostevidentlimitsofNewton’searlyopticalworkisdueto
Hooke’scriticism.AsNiccolòGuicciardini(2009,p.21)observed,themethod-
ologicalprogrammeoftheNewTheorywas“aratherextremistmethodological
position”.But,unfortunately,thewaythisinitialpositionevolvedtillthePrin-
cipia’smethodologyisnotadequatelyhighlightedbythebook.
2
Sgarbi’sTheMainBusinessofNaturalPhilosophyisastudyoftwobooks,
orratherone,thePrincipia.Itoffersarigorousandinsightfulanalysis
ofthestructureofNewton’smasterpiece,butdoesnotnoticetheexistenceof
a long and complex work of elaboration and revision of Newtonian work, so
relevantfortheunderstandingofhistheories.Thisisprobablyduetotheau-
thor’s questionable decision to restrict the analysis to the “method of justifi-
cation”, excluding the “method of discovery” (p. 63). Nevertheless, Ducheyne
7:4 F.G.Sacco
seems to believe that logical and methodological (British) Aristotelianism in-
fluencedNewtonianscience.
Despitesomeinitialcaveats,SgarbimaintainsasimilarbeliefaboutBritish
experimentalphilosophyofthe17ᵗʰcentury.TherelationshipbetweenPaduan
Aristotelianismandthenewscienceisatopicwidelydiscussedbyhistoriansof
science.IntheintroductiontoTheAristotelianTraditionandtheRiseofBritish
Empiricism,SgarbiinclinesforamoderateversionofJohnRandall’scontinuist
thesis(Randall1961),because“Randall’sargumentwasnarrowerandlessam-
bitious”thanhiscriticsrealized:“Heaimedsimplytodemonstratecertaincon-
ceptualanalogiesbetweenthethoughtofsomePaduanAristoteliansandthat
oftheearlyscientists,intheiruseofparticulartermssuchas‘analysis’,‘synthe-
sis’,‘induction’etc.”(p.4).BuildingonRandall’smoderateprogramme,Sgarbi
statesthathisbook“aimstoinvestigatehowthemapofPaduanAristotelianism
wasreplacedandabsorbedintothemovementknownas‘BritishEmpiricism’,
andnotintomodernscience”(p.6).Butbytheendofthebookreadersappre-
hendthat“theemergenceofexperimentalphilosophymarkednotthedefeatof
BritishlogicalAristotelianism,butastrongempiricistturnintheelaboration
ofanewepistemology.TheheirstothistraditionwereLocke’sprecursors,who
madesensationandinductiontherealinstrumentsoflogic:BritishAristotelians
nolongerindulgedinhypotheticalandmetaphysicalspeculationsthatwereof-
tenuntestableorinexplicable,ratheremphasizedthatexperience,acquiredby
observationandexperiment,wasthegroundofscience”(p.233).Thisharmo-
nizingviewofthelateScholasticismandthenewscienceisgroundedonthe
empiriccharacterofBritishAristotelianismandsupportedbythedecisiveme-
diationofthePaduanAristotelianHarveyandthe“latent”AristoteliansBacon
andHobbes(p.197).
TheinsufficiencyofthetraditionalviewofBritishempiricismischallenged
byshowingthelargediffusionofAristotelianphilosophyin17ᵗʰ-centuryBritain.
ThebookcarefullyfollowstheriseandfallofRamistlogicinBritishuniversities
andtheaffirmationofPaduanAristotelianismfromtheendofthe16ᵗʰcentury.
Sgarbi’s analysis is not limited to Oxford and Cambridge, but takes into ac-
countalltheuniversitiesoperatinginearlymodernBritishIsles.Achapteron
Zabarelladoctrineofinduction,analysisandsynthesis,precedestheaccurate
reconstructionofthedefeatoftheprevailingRamisminBritishuniversitiesby
meansofthedisseminationofPaduantextbooks,suchasGiulioPace’sbilingual
AMatterofMethod:BritishAristotelianismandtheNewScience.EssayReview 7:5
(GreekandLatin)editionofAristotle’sOrganonof1584,hisInstitutioneslogicae
(1597)andhisLogicarudimenta(1612).Thankstotheirpropaedeuticsimplicity,
Pace’sworkswereabletoanswerthedemandofnewtextbooksrequestedby
thereformsoftheuniversitystatutes,suchastheLaudianstatutesof1636.Fur-
thermore,asSgarbiaccuratelypointsout,PaduanAristotelismreachedBritish
Isles also by means of the works of German scholars, such as Bartholomäus
Kekermann.ContinentaltextbooksofferedtoBritishscholarsanewapproach
to the traditional peripatetic questions, and favoured the formation of a local
tradition of Aristotelian thought with new features. Only in an initial phase
British Aristotelianism took the shape of a simple repetition of the thesis of
Zabarella.Incontrast,Smith,EdwardBrerewood,JohnSandersonandRichard
Crakanthorpeemphasizedtheroleoftheempiricalpartofthemethoddevel-
opingZabarella’stheoryofinduction.
InthehandsofthePaduanprofessorofnaturalphilosophy,theAristotelian
epagôgê was not a real syllogistic demonstration, but only a clarification of
thingsalreadyknownbysensation.Unlikedemonstrativesyllogism,forZaba-
rellainductiondidnotdemonstrateunknownthingsbymeansofpriorknowl-
edge, rather it was a “process by which particulars are comprehended under
thegeneraluniversalconcept,butproperlyitdoesnotcreatenewknowledge
beyond what the mind has already acquired by sensation” (p. 69). Following
Zabarella,agenerationofBritishAristoteliansemphasizedthesensibleorigin
ofknowledgeandtheprimacyofanalysisonsynthesis.Sinceanalysisdidnot
havethedemonstrativenatureofsynthesis,itproceededfromtheeffectstothe
causes, and produced the fundaments of any possible knowledge. Then anal-
ysis would be possible without synthesis, not vice versa because analysis is
the base of synthesis. This empirical foundation of knowledge is stressed by
Robert Sanderson, the author of Logicae artis compendium (1615), a treatise
read and annotated by Newton along with Smith’s Aditus ad logicam (1613).
For Sanderson induction is the last step of a complex process of knowledge-
acquisitionstartingfromsensesperception.Itconsistsinasufficientenumer-
ations of particular experiences and establishes a universal conclusion. Both
Sanderson and Crackanthorpe were aware of the dangers of this kind of in-
duction, because even a single case could invalidate it. Their development of
Paduantradition,stressingtheimportanceofsensation,observationandinduc-
tion,waslargelydominantinBritishuniversities.Thelargediffusionofthenew
7:6 F.G.Sacco
textbooks suggests the influence of this empirically-oriented Aristotelianism
on British modern empiricism. But this goes beyond the chronological limits
ofthebook.Sgarbidoesnotrenounce,however,totakeintoaccounttherela-
tionshipbetweentheprevailingAristotelianismandthethoughtsofthesome
Englishreformersofscientificknowledge,FrancisBacon,WilliamHarveyand
Thomas Hobbes. Thus, the accurate reconstruction of a neglected ancestor of
modernBritishempiricismturnsintoareappraisaloftheoldcontinuisttheses.
ForSgarbi,Bacon’sinterestforinductionandhisreformsisnothingelsebutthe
effectsoftheinfluenceoftheBritishscholarsforthelogicaltools.“IfBaconfo-
cusedonaninductivemethodologyforscience,itwaspreciselybecauseofthe
greatattentionwhichcontemporaryAristotelianspaidtotheproblemofinduc-
tionandexperience”(p.168).InSgarbi’seyes,Bacon’scriticismoftraditional
inductiondoesnotentailarejectionofAristotelianlogic.Onthecontrary,Ba-
conaccepteditbutinsistedforastrongreform(p.170).HiscriticismofAris-
totelian logic was not against Brerewood’s, Sanderson’s and Crackanthorpe’s
work,butonlyagainstZabarella,whoseconceptofinduction“wasnotreally
aprocessofdiscovery,butratherofnotificationofsomethingalreadyknown
bysensation”(p.172-3).TheinfluenceofAristotelianismonHarvey’smethod-
ologyislessproblematic.Harvey’sdebtwithPaduantraditioniswellknown,
butitissignificantthattheprefacetoDegenerationeanimalium(1651)restored
theoriginalPaduanAristotelianismagainstitsBritishdevelopments.Accord-
ingtoSgarbieventheanti-scholasticHobbescouldnotavoidtheinfluenceof
thenewBritishlogicaltextbooksonasignificantpartofhislogicaltheory.Al-
thoughSgarbirecognizestheexperimentalcharacterofthenewscienceandthe
unfamiliarityofAristotelianphilosopherswithmechanicalartsandtheirinter-
vention in nature, he affirms that “the dissemination of the works of Bacon,
HarveyandHobbesdidnotmaketheendoftheAristoteliantradition;rather,
withtheirlatentAristotelianismtheypromotedtheintegrationofAristotelian
philosophyandthenewscience”(p.197).
Asinothersimilarreconstructions,suchasAnsteyandVanzo(2012,pp.509-
514),inSgarbi’sviewBacon’sworkisnotawatershedseparatingthenewphi-
losophyfromtheoldscholastic,ratheritisthenecessarylinkbetweenthem.
Thus, in contrast with Ducheyne’s view, Sgarbi arguments for a wide influ-
ence of British Aristotelian methodology on the whole experimental philoso-
phy,fromBaconiansvirtuositotheyoungNewton.ThecontrastbetweenBa-
AMatterofMethod:BritishAristotelianismandtheNewScience.EssayReview 7:7
con’s Aristotelian background claimed by Sgarbi and Bacon’s idea of science
drawn by scholars such as Mary Hesse (1968), Paolo Rossi (1984) and Brian
Vickers (1992; 2007) is evident. But whatever interpretation one chooses, it
is difficult to ignore the substantial inefficacy of Bacon’s method along with
thegeneralinsufficiencyofhistoricalpositivistreconstructionwhichidentifies
modernsciencewiththeinductivemethod.Ifwelookbeyondtheirdeceptive
methodologicalstatements,notanyoftheexperimentalphilosophersgathered
intheRoyalSocietyreallyadoptedBacon’scumbersomemethodology,neither
didtheyfaithfullyfollowhisinductionorhistables.Onthecontrary,Bacon’s
workpassedthroughaprocessofselectivereading,influencedbydifferentcul-
turalaimsandsocialbackgrounds.AsMichaelLynch(2001)observed,theresult
ofthisprocesswastheexistenceof“differentstylesofBaconianism”.Inshort,
everyexperimentalphilosopherselectedhisownBacon.
3
Inearlymodernnaturalphilosophy,methodologicalstatementsoften
donotdescribetherealpracticeofnaturalphilosophers;insteadtheyare
adecisiveargumenttosustainsomehypothesesandprinciples.Inthisrespect,
Newton’sexperimentumcrucis issignificant.Intheletterof1672totheRoyal
Society,thenewtheoryoflightandcoloursappearsastheresultofarigorous
inductionorratherdeductionfromthephenomenaobservedintheexperiment
ofthedoublerefraction.Onthecontrary,Newtonianunpublishedopticalpa-
pers suggest a different genesis of his revolutionary ideas. Between 1661 and
1664,asthenotesoncoloursinQuaestionesquedamphilosophicaeshow,New-
tonopticalinquiriesstartedwiththediscussionofCartesianandAtomistichy-
pothesis.¹Atthisstagetheyoungstudentmadeafirststeptowardsadifferent
¹ TheQuestionesquaedamphilosophicae,likemostofNewton’sunpublishedpapersarenowavail-
ableathttp://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk.
7:8 F.G.Sacco