Britain's shield : radar and the defeat of the Luftwaffe

359 Pages·2010·3.75 MB·English

by  Zimmerman

First published 2001
This electronic edition published 2012
Amberley Publishing
The Hill, Stroud
Gloucestershire
GL5 4EP
www.amberley-books.com
Copyright © David Zimmerman, 2010, 2012
The right of David Zimmerman to be identified as the Author of this work has been
asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in
any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without the permission in writing from the Publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-4456-0061-1 (PRINT)
ISBN 978-1-4456-1249-2 (eBOOK)

To Elaine Zimmerman.
Thanks for everything, mom.
Love David
Contents
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Chapter One
The Origins of Strategic Air Defence and Aircraft Early Warning
Chapter Two
Tucker’s Acoustical Mirrors
Chapter Three
The Scientific, Political and Social Background to Radar
Chapter Four
The Discovery of Radar
Chapter Five
Committees and Politicians
Chapter Six
Orfordness and Bawdsey
Chapter Seven
The Tizard-Lindemann Dispute
Chapter Eight
Transforming the Air Defence System
Chapter Nine
Appeasement, Air Policy and Air Defence Research
Chapter Ten
Forging the Radar Chain
Chapter Eleven
The Phoney War
Chapter Twelve
The Battle of Britain
Chapter Thirteen
The Failure to Stop the Night-time Blitz
Conclusion
Note on Sources
Endnotes
Foreword
In the six years of the Second World War there were many great battles on land, sea and
in the air that led to the ultimate Allied victory. Of these the Battle of Britain in 1940
remains the most celebrated more than half a century after the end of the great conflict.
This battle is the centrepiece of David Zimmerman’s scholarly work, Britain’s Shield.
Anyone reading this book must be left gasping at the narrowness of the victory. In
that famous phrase of Churchill’s speech when he reminded us how much we owed to
the ‘few’, he was rightly paying tribute to the pilots of RAF Fighter Command, who,
against the overwhelming odds of the Luftwaffe bombers, scored that crucial victory
that led Hitler to cancel his invasion plans and thereby save Europe from Fascist
domination.
It is the essence of Professor Zimmerman’s work that he both destroys and
supports the many mythical beliefs that have become prominent about the events
leading up to that historic victory in the summer of 1940. The radar chain around the
coast was one essential component, for without that early warning system, Fighter
Command would, undoubtedly, have been overwhelmed. That fact is common
knowledge, but Zimmerman shows that it was the detailed integration of this early
warning with the command structure of the RAF fighter squadrons that led to the
ultimate success of fighter pilots. The filtering of the radar information, the allocation
of action to the appropriate fighter group and the radio telephonic communication
between fighters and ground control were essential elements in the critical years and
months leading to the first great clashes of the air battle in July 1940.
The close association of the radar scientists with RAF personnel is revealed as
another important element in the complex organisation leading to the ultimate encounter
of fighter and bomber. Indeed, nowhere is that better illustrated than in the failure of the
German command to recognize the importance of the radar chain. Goering refused to
accept the advice of his intelligence chief General Martini that the radar stations should
be destroyed. The relatively few attacks on the coastal radar chain reveal that had
Goering accepted Martini’s advice the outcome of the battle might well have been
victory to the Luftwaffe. Indeed, the close integration of the British and Allied scientists
with the operational commands, in contrast with that in Germany, was at that time and
throughout the war, a significant factor in conflict.
Another refreshing feature of Professor Zimmerman’s book is the description of
the evolution of the early warning system from the acoustic mirror and the abrupt
change to the development of the radar system in the 1930s. Shortly after Baldwin’s
warning that ‘the bomber would always get through’, Watson-Watt staged his famous
Daventry demonstration to show that radio waves could be detected after reflection
from a bomber. Wimperis, the scientific advisor to the Air Ministry, had recently
convened the committee with Sir Henry Tizard to advise about the possibility of
defence against the bomber. Zimmerman is the first historian to describe in detail the
years of political intrigue in which the Tizard Committee became involved in their
support of the development of radar.
The personnel conflict between Tizard and Professor Lindemann (later Lord
Cherwell) has often been described. Here we find the detailed scientific and political
facts underlying that conflict. Lindemann was Churchill’s wealthy friend and in his
intrigue against the government Churchill ruthlessly used Lindemann’s advice. It is
truly an amazing story and Zimmerman shows how narrowly Tizard and scientific
sanity prevailed over the machinations of the Churchill-Lindemann axis in those pre-
war years.
Zimmerman ends his book on a rather sad note – the failure of the RAF to defeat
the blitz on London and other cities, when the Luftwaffe turned to night bombing after
their defeat in the daytime battle of 1940. The sequence had been foreseen by Tizard
and RAF Command and development of the airborne AI (Air Interception) radar for
night fighters had commenced. The early prototypes rushed into action were a total
failure. Zimmerman places the blame on the failure to engage the British electronics
industries at this early stage. In fact, there were other fundamental problems that
required another two years to overcome. It was not until the spring of 1941 before the
scientific-industrial collaboration produced operational equipment that defeated the
night bombers.
Meanwhile, there had been tragic loss of life in London and in other cities and the
reader of this book may well feel regret that the RAF Commander-in-Chief and the
scientists, who had been the inspiration and core of the shield that saved Britain in
1940, were either dismissed or neglected.
Sir Bernard Lovell, 2001