Britain and the Netherlands: Volume VI: War and Society. Papers Delivered to the Sixth Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference

262 Pages·1977·15.84 MB·English

by  C. S. L. Davies (auth.)

BRITAIN
AND
THE NETHERLANDS
BRITAIN
AND
THE NETHERLANDS
Volume VI
WAR AND SOCIETY
PAPERS DELIVERED TO THE
SIXTH ANGLO-DUTCH HISTORICAL CONFERENCE
EDITED BY
A.C. DUKE AND
C.A. TAMSE
•
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.Y.
Published with the support ofa grant from the
Prince Bernard Foundation in Amsterdam.
Respectfully dedicated to
J. S. BROMLEyand E. H. KOSSMANN
@ 1977 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Martinus Nijholl. The Hague. Netherlands in 1977
Softcover reprint of the hardcover lst edition 1977
AII rights reserved, including the right to tram/ate or to
reproduce this book or parIs Ihereo[ in any [orm
ISBN 978-94-017-0002-3 ISBN 978-94-015-7518-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-7518-8
Contents
Preface Vll
1 The English People and War in the Early Sixteenth
Century by C.S.L. Davies, Wadham College, Oxford 1
2 Holland's Experience of War during the Revolt of the
Netherlands by A.Th.van Deursen, Vrije Universiteit,
Amsterdam 19
3 The Army Revolt of 1647 by J.S. Morrill, Selwyn College,
Cambridge 54
4 Holland's Financial Problems (1713-1733) and the Wars
against Louis XIV by J. Aalbers, Rijksuniversiteit,
Utrecht 79
5 Municipal Government and the Burden of the Poor in
South Holland during the Napoleonic Wars by S.
Schama, Brasenose College, Oxford 94
6 The Sinews of War: The Role of Dutch Finance in
European Politics (c. 1750-1815) by M.G. Buist, Rijks-
universiteit, Groningen 124
7 Britain and Blockade, 1780-1940 by G.F.A. Best,
University of Sussex 141
8 Away from Impressment: The Idea of a Royal Naval
Reserve, 1696-1859 by J.S. Bromley, University of
Southampton 168
9 Problems of Defence in a Non-Belligerent Society:
Military Service in the Netherlands during the Second
Half of the Nineteenth Century by F.C. Spits, Rijks-
universiteit, Utrecht 189
10 World War II and Social Class in Great Britain by A.
Marwick, The Open University, Milton Keynes 203
11 The Second World War and Dutch Society: Continuity
and Change by J.C.H. Blom, Universiteit van Amsterdam 228
Index 249
Preface
War has ever exercised a great appeal on men's minds. Oscar
Wilde's witticism notwithstanding this fascination cannot be attri
buted simply to the wicked character of war. The demonic forces
released by war have caught the artistic imagination, while sages
have reflected on the enigmatic readiness of each new generation to
wage war, despite the destruction, disillusion and exhaustion that
war is known to bring in its train. If there never was a good war and
a bad peace why did armed conflicts recur with such distressing
regularity? Was large-scale violence an intrinsic condition of Man?
The answers given to such questions have differed widely: it has
even been suggested that the states of war and peace are not as far
removed from one another as is usually supposed. The causes of
war and the interaction between war and society have long been the
subject of philosophical enquiry and historical analysis. Accord
ing to Thucydides no one was ever compelled to go to war;
Cicero remarked how dumb were the laws in time of war, while
Clausewitz's profound observation concerning the affinity between
war and politics has become almost a commonplace.
War being the severest test a society or state can experience
historians have naturally been concerned to investigate their rela
tionship. Moreover the preparation of war, the organization of the
armed forces and financial resources, warfare itself and its reper
cussions are so many expressions of a society's character and pol
itical structure. War being too serious a matter to remain the pre
serve of military historians 'War and Society' was certain, sooner
or later, to provide a fitting theme for an Anglo-Dutch Conference.
Since their inception in 1959 these conferences have happily
demonstrated (by the harmonious co-operation of British and
Dutch scholars) that war has no exclusive claim to creativity. But
it was not until the meeting held in September 1976 in the congenial
surroundings of Kasteel Oud-Poelgeest, close to Leiden, that the
interrelationship between war and society in the two countries be
came the chief concern of the participants.
The organizing committee at Leiden enhanced the interest of the
week's intensive exchanges with memorable visits to the towns and
viii PREFACE
fortresses which have played a signal part in the defence of the
Netherlands since the birth of the United Provinces. In particular
Naarden, the scene of so notorious a massacre in 1572 and still pre
serving its impressively symmetrical fortifications, epitomized the
horror and the power of war in early modem society. Both then and
later war has been associated with so many changes in state and
society and, in its tum, been influenced by political and societal
circumstances that the eleven contributors had no difficulty in
finding important and interesting subjects. These cover political,
social, financial, psychological and juridical aspects of war be
tween the sixteenth and twentieth centuries.
Since 1959 the Anglo-Dutch Conferences have served to foster
closer ties between British and Dutch historians and stimulated
original lines of approach. In his introduction to the first volume of
Britain and the Netherlands the late Pieter Geyl doubted whether
English historians would emulate their colleagues in the Nether
lands and take the trouble of learning Dutch. Could he see the
present prosperity of Dutch historical studies in British universities
he would be agreeably surprised. In the Netherlands too the interest
in British history has deepened, so that a generation of historians
are growing up on both sides of the North Sea conversant in the
history of the other country. In particular the substantial studies on
Dutch history by young British historians, one of whose number
contributes to the present volume, would have given immense satis
faction to Geyl. Future conferences will surely fortify the remark
ably close relationship which exists between historians in the two
countries and so realize more fully the vision of the original be
getters of the 'Anglo-Dutch'.
Once more the Conference acknowledges with pleasure its
generous benefactors. The Dutch Ministry of Education, the Leids
Universiteits Fonds and Shell Nederland n.v. all gave assistance.
Deeply appreciated, too, was the warm hospitality provided by the
Rector Magnificus of Leiden University, the Department of
Military History of the Royal Netherlands Army, the Burgo
masters and Councillors of Dordrecht and Oudewater and the
Dijkgraaf and the Hoogheemraden of the Hoogheemraadschap
Rijnland at Leiden. The Prins Bernard Fonds, which has a dis
tinguished record as a patron of the Humanities and Arts in
the Netherlands, was graciously disposed to make a subvention
towards the publication of the papers delivered to the Sixth Anglo
Dutch Historical Conference.
A.C.D.
July 1977 C.A.T.
1. The English People and War in the Early
Sixteenth Century
C.S.L. DAVIES
WAR is not the first subject to come to mind when thinking about
the Early Tudor period. The Reformation, with its far-reaching
effects on political institutions, on the economy, on the whole
nature of society, compels attention; while from the perspective of
European history, England plays only a marginal (though vital)
part in the Habsburg-Valois struggle. Only from the angle of
Scottish history (and perhaps, too, that of England's dependency
Ireland) does England in the first half of the sixteenth century
appear largely as a military power; and Irish and Scottish history
have been unreasonably neglected by historians of England.
War, though, mattered enormously to Henry VIII. Only eighteen
at the time of his accession, he set to work feverishly to build up
England's military strength. Having inherited five ships from his
father, he built no fewer than eighteen more within six years of his
accession, including the monstrous, unwieldy, and in the event
largely useless Henry Grace a Dieu; not content with this, at least
three large ships were bought from Genoa, and one from LUbeck.
Europe was scoured for weapons; handguns from Italy, armour
from Innsbruck, great guns from Brabant, including Hans Poppen
ruyter of Mechelen's 'Twelve Apostles'. In 1512 an army was sent
to invade Guienne from northern Spain, in alliance with King
Ferdinand. In 1513 Henry himself led an army of some thirty
thousand men into France, capturing Therouanne and Tournai,
and put to flight a French column at the so-called Battle of the
Spurs.1
The campaign was followed by elaborate ploys and counter-ploys
of rather showy diplomacy, first the universal peace of London in
1518, then the Field of Cloth of Gold in 1520. Notwithstanding all
this parade of peace, invasions of France were launched again in
C.G. Cruickshank, Army Royal (Oxford, 1968).
1
2 THE ENGLISH PEOPLE AND WAR
1522 and 1523, the second under the Duke of Suffolk getting to
Montdidier within sixty miles of Paris, mainly because the French
wisely refused to give battle, before being forced to turn back by
cold and shortage of food. Further attempts to win glory in the
1520s came to grief on lack of opportunity and the unresponsive
ness of the English tax-payer. During the 1530s Henry, under the
influence of the realist and cautious Thomas Cromwell, conducted
a much more defensive policy. In 1544, however, there came another
attempt to gain military glory; an attack on Paris on two fronts, by
Charles V and by Henry. In the event, the Emperor was glad to
conclude the peace of Crepy, and Henry contented himself with the
capture of Boulogne.
All this effort was largely useless. Tournai, captured with such
eclat, was returned to France in 1518; Boulogne was recovered by
the French in 1550; the town in any case, under the terms of the
treaty of 1546, was due to be returned in 1554. Finally, in 1558 the
French captured the last remaining English footholds on the con
tinent, the garrisons at Calais and Guisnes.
All this had cost a good deal in lives and money. The greatest
campaign, that of 1544, involved an army of some forty-eight
thousand men, of whom about eleven thousand were Germans or
Netherlanders, while the remaining thirty-seven thousand were
English. This was almost certainly the largest English army sent
abroad until that date, or at any time subsequently until the reign
of William III. One historian has made a rough calculation that the
proportion of men under arms (about ten per thousand of the
population) was a good deal higher than was normal in France or
Spain (about two to four men per thousand).2
The build-up of the Navy, in part at least a belated response to
the much greater French threat since the acquisition of Brittany in
1491, was still more spectacular. During Henry VIII's reign the
fleet expanded from some five ships to about forty-five, while to the
single dockyard at Portsmouth were added those at Deptford and
Woolwich in the Thames Estuary and Gillingham on the Medway.
Moreover, whereas before 1509 naval administration had been
usually handled by one full-time official, the Clerk of the Ships, the
foundations were now laid for an organized naval administration,
2 For the size of the 1544 expedition, see Letters and Papers Foreign and
Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII [hereafter L.&P.], (ed. J.S. Brewer et al., 21
vol., London, 1862-1910), XVII, pt. ii, no. 526; XIX, pt. i, nos. 273-6. The
figures are discussed in Appendix A of my D.Phil. thesis (Oxford, 1963), on
Supply Services of English Armed Forces, 1509-50. For rough comparisons, see
R. Bean, 'War and the Birth of the Nation State', Journal of Economic History,
XXIII (1973), 211.
IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 3
complete with a regular financial allocation.3 Fear of invasion was
responsible, too, for the building of an impressive series of small but
efficient fortifications along the south coast, the rebuilding of the
fortifications at Hull from 1541 and Berwick from 1558, and, at
huge cost and to no effect in the long run, the pouring in of money
to the defence of Calais and Guisnes, and those short-Jived English
possessions, Tournai (1513-18) and Boulogne (1544-50). 4
The most important theatre of war was, however, Scotland.
James IV invaded England in 1513 in fulfilment of the traditional
Franco-Scottish alliance while his brother-in-law Henry VIII was
in search of glory on the battlefields of northern France. James was
left dead on the battlefield, Queen Catherine writing exultantly to
Henry 'your Grace can see how I can keep my promise, sending you
for your banners a King's coat'. 5 For the next fifteen years Scotland
underwent the trials of a royal minority; and the situation recurred
in 1542 when, shortly after losing a battle to the English, James V
died, and Scotland passed to a seven-day old girl. Henry promptly
secured from the Scottish prisoners in England a promise to work
for the marriage of Queen Mary to the English heir, Prince Edward.
The marriage was accepted by a Scottish Parliament, then repudi
ated in favour of a French (and Catholic) alliance. Attempts, by
military force and diplomacy, to force the Scots to keep to the
engagement, known in Scottish history as the 'rough-wooing',
dominated English politics between 1542 and 1550. They involved
a mass invasion and burning of Edinburgh by Edward Seymour,
Earl of Hertford, in 1544; and another invasion by Seymour (now
Duke of Somerset and Protector to his nephew, King Edward VI)
in 1547, producing an English victory at Pinkie, followed by the
establishment of a string of English garrisons through the Low
lands. English intervention prompted the arrival of a French army
in 1548, and Queen Mary was spirited away to marry the Dauphin.
The object of the war having disappeared, peace was concluded in
1550. English efforts had failed; except in so far (and it is a significant
3 M. Oppenheim, The Administration of the Royal Navy, 1509-1660 (London,
1896); C.S.L. Davies, 'The Administration of the Royal Navy under Henry
VIII', English Historical Review, LXXX (1965), 268-86.
4 For Hull, see L.R. Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military Engineer (Oxford,
1967); for Berwick, B.H.St.J. O'Neil, Castles and Cannon: a Study of Early
Artillery Fortifications in England (Oxford, 1960); for Calais and Guisnes, H.M.
Colvin, in The History oft he King's Works (ed. H.M. Colvin, London, 1963), III
n
(pt. 1485-1660, 337 seqq. The fortification of Calais cost about £150,000 from
1538-53; Tournai, during five years of English rule, £40,000; and Boulogne
from 1544 to 1550 £120,000 (ibid., 361, 381, 392). These were substantial sums:
the royal income at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign was about £160,000 p.a.
5 L.&P., I, pt. ii, no. 2268.
4 THE ENGLISH PEOPLE AND WAR
and incalculable exception) that it had prompted French inter
vention on such a scale as to produce a Scottish reaction, and the
eventual establishment, with the Scottish Reformation, of a regime
generally well-disposed to England.
War mattered and it was waged on a large scale. On the other
hand, it was intermittent. The only permanent large-scale force was
the Navy; and to some extent the garrisons at Calais and Guisnes
though these were always rundown during peacetime.
Military expenditure was a major portion of royal finance, and
the whole history of taxation, forced loans, the acquisition and sale
of royal lands, debasement of the coinage, with their multifarious
effects, would require separate treatment. So, too, would the effect
of war on the economy, and its technological spin-off in ship
building, gun foundries; the effect on the balance of payments; on
commercial strategy, of the large-scale import of munitions; the
disruption of trade in wartime, both from enemy action and from
the 'call-up' of merchant ships and seamen for royal service. All
this, though important, affected the average Englishman at one re
move. I would prefer to concentrate on his involvement in, and atti
tudes towards, war.
England itself was in the fortunate position of not being directly
affected by war at its most brutal and characteristic, for there were
few incursions on English soil. Of course, along the Scottish border,
raiding was endemic, part of the way of life. From time to time there
was a threat of large-scale Scottish invasion, most notably in 1522;
but more commonly the North probably suffered more from the
effect of provisioning large English armies sent to invade Scotland
than from actual Scottish attack. The French burnt Brighton, then
a small village, in 1514. More seriously in 1545 the fleet stood by
and over a hundred thousand men were mustered on land to repel
a French invasion. In fact the French did little more than land a
raiding-party on the Isle of Wight; and after a brief naval engage
ment off Shoreham, the French fleet was dispersed by an outbreak
of plague. What England was spared was vividly illustrated by
English tactics elsewhere. Lord Dacre, defending himself in 1514
from accusations of lethargy, reported on the effectiveness of his
raids into the Scottish borders, listing the townships burnt and the
general devastation: 'whereas there was in all times passed four
hundred ploughs and above, which are now clearly wasted and no
man dwelling in any of them'. The Earl of Surrey in 1522, tried in
vain to provoke the French to fight by wholesale burning of villages.
Most striking of all, in 1544 Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford, on
Henry's orders, burnt Edinburgh, Leith, and several other towns