Bomber Command: 1936-1968 An Operational & Historical Record

415 Pages·2005·15.92 MB·English

by  Delve

RAF Bomber Command
1936–1968
RAF Bomber Command
1936–1968
AN OPERATIONAL AND HISTORICAL
RECORD

KEN DELVE
First published in Great Britain in 2005 by
PEN & SWORD AVIATION
an imprint of
Pen & Sword Books Ltd
47 Church Street
Barnsley
South Yorkshire
S70 2AS

Copyright © Ken Delve, 2005

ISBN 1 84415 183 2

The right of Ken Delve to be identified as Author of this Work
has been asserted by him in accordance with the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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Contents
CHAPTER ONE Introduction and Overview
CHAPTER TWO Operations
CHAPTER THREE Operational Groups
CHAPTER FOUR Aircrew Training
CHAPTER FIVE Aircraft of Bomber Command
ANNEXES
A: AOC-in-C Bomber Command
B: Operational Squadrons, Second World War
C: Accuracy of Bomber Command night attacks on German cities
D: Order of Battle, 1 August 1939
E: Order of Battle, 16 June 1940
F: Order of Battle, 23 February 1941
G: Order of Battle, 13 February 1942
H: Order of Battle, 18 February 1943
I: Order of Battle, 24 February 1944
J: Order of Battle, January 1945
K: Bomber Command organisation, October 1944–April 1945
L: Bomber Command airfield maps 1939 and 1945
M: Aircraft in Squadrons, daily availability with crews
N: Available Bomb lift in tons, by aircraft type
O: Cumulative monthly totals of tonnage of bombs, sorties despatched, and
aircraft missing, February 1942–May 1945
P: Distribution of effort and casualties
Q: Progress of the Bomber Offensive against German industrial towns
schedule, by towns, of attacks and devastation resulting
R: Bomber Command nuclear weapons
INDEX
C O
HAPTER NE
Introduction and
Overview

During the Second World War Bomber Command flew around 390,000 sorties
for the loss of 8,953 aircraft on operational missions; that number does not
include another almost 1,400 that crashed in the UK whilst airborne on an
operational mission. The cost in aircrew lives was over 47,000, to which must be
added those killed in accidents or training – a further 8,000 plus; it is generally
accepted that the total of lives lost is around 55,000. What did the six years of
the bombing offensive achieve? Supporters and critics were active at the time
and in the 60 years since the end of the war the argument has raged even more
fiercely. As with all history the benefits of hindsight and access to previously
classified documentary sources has to be balanced by the researcher’s removal in
time and context from the period under study. To understand truly decisions,
policies, actions and attitudes is all but impossible. This book covers the entire
period of Bomber Command from its origin in 1936 to its demise – into Strike
Command – in 1968. Whilst all periods of the Command are covered it is
inevitable that the major focus is on the period of the Second World War. The
book has been divided into five main sections: an Introduction and Overview,
which sets the framework for the development of Bomber Command and
includes both policy and politics; an Operations chapter, which focuses on the
combat operations of the Command; a brief look at each of the operational
Groups; an overview of aircrew training; and, finally, an Aircraft chapter,
looking in chronological sequence at all operational aircraft types – and one
ballistic missile used by Bomber Command. The annexes provide a variety of
historical data.
It seems appropriate to open this overview with a few words from the most
famous of Bomber Command’s leaders, Sir Arthur Harris: ‘There are no words
with which I can do justice to the aircrew under my command. There is no
parallel in warfare to such courage and determination in the face of danger over
so prolonged a period.’ These words from Bomber Command’s wartime leader,
Air Marshal Arthur T. Harris are a fitting tribute to the sacrifice made by the
Command in six years of war. Only one force on the Allied side was
continuously involved with active operations against the German homeland –
RAF Bomber Command. The day the war started a Blenheim of 139 Squadron
flew a reconnaissance sortie to locate German shipping and for the next six years
the Command took the war to the enemy, at first with limited effect but from
1942 with increasing resources and greater accuracy, and with an ever greater
impact.
Origins and doctrine
Strategic bombing theory was developed in the latter years of the First World
War and was a combination of the German raids on England and the Allied,
especially Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air Force, bombing campaign, although
this was only just starting to get into its stride when the Armistice was signed in
November 1918. Despite the fact that strategic bombing had not really been
evaluated in the First World War it became a central tenet of air power theory in
the post-war period. In part this was because it was the one independent decisive
(potentially) role that the air forces could perform. For the RAF this was
enshrined as the Trenchard Doctrine: ‘the nation that would stand being bombed
longest would win in the end … to win it will be necessary to pursue a relentless
offensive by bombing the enemy’s country, destroying his sources of supply of
aircraft and engines, and breaking the morale of his people.’ This doctrine of a
war winning bomber force remained the focus of doctrine with the major air
forces throughout the 1920s. In May 1928 Trenchard, whose views still carried
great weight, circulated a forceful memo to counter: ‘an unwillingness on the
part of the other Services to accept the contention of the Air Staff that in future
wars air attacks would most certainly be carried out against the vital centres of
commerce and of the manufacture of munitions of war of every sort no matter
where these centres were located.’ He stated that the RAF doctrine was to ‘break
down the enemy means of resistance by attacks on objectives selected as most
likely to achieve this end’ it being better to attack munitions at source (the
factory) than on the battlefield – this would become a well-rehearsed argument
by Bomber Command throughout the Second World War. It would, he believed,
have greater effect for less effort, and would include dissuading workers from
working in the factories. ‘The Hague Convention allows for military targets,
including production centres. What is illegitimate, as being contrary to the
dictates of humanity, is the indiscriminate bombing of a city for the sole purpose
of terrorising the civilian population.’ Bomber Command would later take great
care to stress the military significance of its city targets, whilst the German
propaganda machine would refer to the Terrorflieger. The other Chiefs of Staff
in their respective memos were not convinced, and also expressed concern over
being bombed in return; it must be remembered that this was a period when the
independence of the RAF, in part budget-driven, was under threat and the
arguments, as such tri-Service ‘debates’ usually are, was writ large with vested
interest.
Bomber Command suffered 55,000 aircrew casualties in the Second World War; a number of squadrons
lost 1,000 aircrew during the war.
Bomber Command Badge: In front of a thunderbolt gules winged grey, an Astral Crown Or (elements of
this badge were subsequently used in the Strike Command badge). The thunderbolt represents Bomber
Command’s striking power and the Astral Crown is indicative of the success of its operations. Motto:
‘strike Hard Strike Sure’. The badge was approved in March 1947 by King George VI.
The debates were largely hypothetical at the time as the RAF’s bomber
strength in the early 1930s was pitiful with five night-and six day-bomber
squadrons, all with slow biplanes with very limited bomb loads, hardly the
material with which to deliver an aerial bombardment of any significance.
Although the stagnation of the 1920s, which in military terms had been a
dismal decade for all of Britain’s armed forces, had started to change in the early
1930s both doctrine and equipment were outdated and with little immediate
prospect of improvement. In terms of aircraft there was a glimmer of hope with
the issue of Specification B.9/32 for a ‘twin-engined medium bomber of good
performance and long range’, although the requirement for a 720 mile range and
1,000 lb bomb load was not particularly inspiring! Two of Bomber Command’s
early stalwarts – the Wellington and the Hampden – were a result of this
Specification. The following year saw Britain wake up to the realities of a
changing Europe. A Foreign Office appraisal of 1933 stated that Germany ‘…
controlled by a frenzied nationalism and resolved to assert her rights to full
equality, will proceed to the building of formidable armaments on land and
especially in the air.’ The Government suggested that the Services draw up
expansion plans; the Defence Requirements Committee sat from November
1933 to February 1934 and in its report gave priority to the establishment by the
RAF of a Home Defence force (including bombers) strong enough to counter
any attack. Expansion Scheme A was announced in July 1934 to provide the
basis for a deterrent force and a training establishment on which future
expansion could be based; under this scheme the RAF would be ready for war in
eight years (1942). The old One-Power standard, which had seen planning based