Bloody Beaches: The Marines at Peleliu

52 Pages·8 MB·English

by  Marine Corps Historical Center

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Bloody Beaches:
The Marines at Peleliu
by Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret)
n D-Day 15 September
1944, five infantry bat-
talions of the 1st Ma-
rine Division's 1st, 5th,
and 7th Marines, in
amphibian tractors (LVTs) lumbered
across 600-800 yards of coral reef
fringing smoking, reportedly
smashed Peleliu in the Palau Island
group and toward five selected land-
ing beaches. That westward anchor
of the 1,000-mile-long Caroline ar-
chipelago was viewed by some U.S.
planners as obstacles, or threats, to
continued advances against Japan's
Pacific empire.
The Marines in the LVTs had been
told that their commanding general,
Major General William H. Rupertus,
believed that the operation would be
tough, but quick, in large part be-
cause of the devastating quantity and
quality of naval gunfire and dive
bombing scheduled to precede their
assault landing. On some minds were
the grim images of their sister 2d Ma-
rine Division's bloody assault across
the reefs at Tarawa, many months
earlier. But 1st Division Marines,
peering over the gunwales of their
landing craft saw an awesome scene
of blasting and churning earth along
the shore. Smoke, dust, and the geys-
ers caused by exploding bombs and
large-caliber naval shells gave op-
timists some hope that the defenders surviving strongpoints or weapons
would become casualties from such which appeared at the beach as the
On the Cover: "Down from Bloody preparatory fires; at worst, they following troops landed. And just
Ridge Too Late. He's Finished —Washed would be too stunned to respond ahead of the armored tractors, as the
Up—Gone As we passed sick bay, still quickly and effectively to the naval gunfire lifted toward deeper
in the shell hole, it was crowded with hundreds of on-rushing Marines targets, flew a line of U.S. Navy
wounded, and somehow hushed in the about to land in their midst. fighter aircraft, strafing north and
evening light. I noticed a tattered Marine Just ahead of the first wave of south along the length of the beach
standing quietly by a corpsman, staring
troops carrying LVTs was a wave of defenses, parallel to the assault
stiffly at nothing. His mind had crum-
armored amphibian tractors (LVTAs) waves, trying to keep all beach
bled in battle, his jaw hung, and his eyes
mounting 75mm howitzers. They defenders subdued and intimidated
were like two black empty holes in his
were tasked to take under fire any as the Marines closed the defenses.
head." Caption by the artist, Tom Lea.
1
The Divisions and their Commanders
he Peleliu operation was to be conducted by two
divisions, one Marine and one Army. In the Pacific
area since mid-1942, the 1st Marine Division was
a veteran, combat-tested organization which launched the
first offensive landing in the Pacific War when it attacked
Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942. After a period in Austra-
lia of rest, recuperation, and training of newly joined Ma-
rines, the division made its second amphibious assault on
26 December 1943 at Cape Gloucester on New Britain Is-
land. When the division landed on Peleliu, its regiments
(1st, 5th, and 7th Marines, all infantry, and 11th Marines,
artillery) contained officers and enlisted Marine veterans
of both landings as well as new troops. Before World War
II ended, the 1st Division was to participate in one last bat-
tle, the landing on Okinawa.
Major General William H. Rupertus, the 1st Division
commander, had been with the division since early 1942.
As a brigadier general, he was the assistant division com-
mander to Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift during
the Guadalcanal campaign. He took command of the divi-
sion for the Cape Gloucester operation. General Rupertus
was commissioned in 1913 and served as commander of
a Marine ship's detachment in World War I. During subse-
quent years, he was assigned duty in Haiti and China. Fol-
lowing the Peleliu campaign, he was named Commandant
of the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico. General Ruper-
tus died of a heart attack on 25 March 1945, while still
on active duty. MajGen William H. Rupertus
The Army's 81st Infantry Division—the Wildcats —was It saw action in France at the Meuse-Argonne in World War
formed in August 1917 at Camp Jackson, South Carolina. I, and was deactivated following the end of the war. The
division was reactivated in June 1942. It went to several
Pacific training bases before its first combat assignment,
MajGen Paul I. Mueller USA
the landing on Angaur. After securing Angaur, it relieved
units of the 1st Marine Division on Peleliu. When Peleliu
was secured, the Wildcats began training for Operation
Olympic—the assault on Japan proper. The Japanese sur-
rendered unconditionally after suffering two atomic bomb
attacks. As a result, instead of invading Japan, the 81st oc-
cupied it. On 10 January, the 81st Infantry Division was
once more deactivated.
Major General Paul J. Mueller, USA, the commander of
the 81st Division, was a graduate of the famous West Point
Class of 1915. He commanded an infantry battalion in
France in World War I, and during the interwar period he
had a succession of assignments to infantry commands,
staff billets, and schools. In August 1941 he assumedcom-
mand of the 81st Infantry Division at Fort Rucker, Alaba-
ma, and moved his division during its training period
successively from Florida to Tennessee to California before
its commitment to the battle for Angaur and Peleliu. Gener-
al Mueller served on active duty until 1954, when he re-
tired. He died in 1964.
-
2
cave and tunnel defenses. The
at
— Japanese had made the most of what
this terrain provided during their ex-
tensive period of occupation and
defensive preparations.
The second imponderable facing
the Marines was the plan developed
by Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, the
officer who was to command the
force on Peleliu, and his superior,
Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue,
back on Koror. Their concept of
defense had changed considerably
from that which was experienced by
General Rupertus at Guadalcanal and
Captions by the artist, Tom Lea
"Going In—First Wave For an hour we plowed toward the beach, the sun above Cape Gloucester, and, in fact, negat-
us coming down through the overcast like a silver burning ball Over the ed his concept of a tough, but quick
gunwale of a craft abreast of us I saw a Marine, his face painted for the jungle, campaign.
his eyes set for the beach, his mouth set for murder, his big hands quiet now in Instead of relying upon a pre-
the last moments before the tough tendons drew up to kill." sumed moral superiority to defeat the
Meanwhile, to blind enemy observa- As seen from the air on D-Day, 15 September 1944, Beaches White 1 and 2, on
tion and limit Japanese fire upon the which the 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, landed. Capt George P Hunt's
landing waves, naval gunfire was Company K, 3/1, was on the extreme left flank of the 1st Marine Division.
shifted to the hill massif northeast of Department of Defense Photo (USN) 253745
the landing beaches.
That "massif," later to be called the
•1
Umurbrogol Pocket, was the first of
two deadly imponderables, as yet
unknown to the division commander
and his planners. Although General
Rupertus had been on temporary It.
duty in Washington during most of
his division's planning for the Peleliu
landing, he had been well briefed for
the operation.
The first imponderable involved
the real character of Umurbrogol,
which aerial photos indicated as a
rather gently rounded north-south
hill, commanding the landing
beaches some 2,000-4,000 yards dis-
tant. Viewed in these early photos,
the elevated terrain appeared clothed
in jungle scrub, which was almost en-
tirely removed by the preparatory
bombardment and then subsequent
heavy artillery fire directed at it. In-
stead of a gently rounded hill, the
Umurbrogol area was in fact a com-
plex system of sharply uplifted coral
ridges, knobs, valleys, and sinkholes.
It rose above the level remainder of
the island from 50 to 300 feet, and
provided excellent emplacements for
3
fire capability. More disturbingly, as
the leading waves neared the
beaches, the LVTs were hit by heavy
enfilading artillery and antiboat gun
fire coming from concealed bunkers
on north and south flanking points.
The defenses on the left (north)
flank of Beach White 1, assaulted by
the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieu-
tenant Colonel Stephen V. Sabol),
were especially deadly and effective.
They disrupted the critical regimen-
tal and division left flank. Especial-
iy costly to the larger landing plan,
these guns shortly thereafter knocked
out tractors carrying important ele-
ments of the battalion's and the regi-
ment's command and control
personnel and equipment. The bat-
talion and then the regimental com-
mander both found themselves
ashore in a brutally vicious beach
fight, without the means of commu-
nication necessary to comprehend
their situations fully, or to take the
needed remedial measures.
The critical mission to seize the
"The Point" dominating the division
left flank had gone to one of the 1st
Regiment's most experienced compa-
fly commanders: Captain George P.
Hunt, a veteran of Guadalcanal and
attackers at the beach, and then to fronting the landing beaches (White New Britain, (who, after the war, be-
use bushido spirit and banzai tactics 1 and 2, Orange 1, 2, and 3), the trac- came a long-serving managing edi-
to throw any survivors back into the tors passed several hundred "mines," tor of Life magazine). Hunt had
sea, Peleliu's defenders would delay intended to destroy any craft which developed plans involving specific as-
the attacking Marines as long as they approached or ran over them. These signments for each element of his
could, attempting to bleed them as "mines" were aerial bombs, set to be company. These had been rehearsed
heavily as possible. Rather than de- detonated by wire control from ob- until every individual knew his role
pending upon spiritual superiority, servation points onshore. However, and how it fit into the company plan.
they would combine the devilish ter- the preliminary bombardment had Each understood his mission's criti-
rain with the stubborn, disciplined, so disrupted the wire controls, and cality.
Japanese soldiers to relinquish Peleliu so blinded the observers, that the D-Day and H-Hour brought heav-
at the highest cost to the invaders. defensive mining did little to slow or ier than expected casualties. One of
This unpleasant surprise for the Ma- destroy the assaulting tractors. the company's platoons was pinned
rines marked a new and important As the tractors neared the beaches, down all day in the fighting at the
adjustment to the Japanese tactics they came under indirect fire from beach. The survivors of the rest of
which were employed earlier in the mortars and artillery. Indirect fire the company wheeled left, as
war. against moving targets generates planned, onto the flanking point.
Little or nothing during the trip more apprehension than damage, Moving grimly ahead, they pressed
into the beaches and the touchdown and only a few vehicles were lost to assaults upon the many defensive
revealed the character of the revised that phase of Japanese defense. Such emplacements. Embrasures in the
Japanese tactical plan to the five Ma- fire did, however, demonstrate that piliboxes and casements were
rine assault battalions. Bouncing the preliminary bombardment had blanketed with small-fire arms and
across almost half a mile of coral not disposed of all the enemy's heavy smoke, then attacked with demoli-
4
.
1
'V
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94913
The skies over the landing beaches of Peleliu are blackened bined naval and aerial prelanding bombardment, as amphib-
with smoke rising from the ground as the result of the corn- ian tractors rush shoreward carrying the assault waves.
tions and rifle grenades. A climax clothing on fire and ammunition ex- munications got through to bring in
came at the principal casement, from ploding in their belts. That flight had supporting fires and desperately
which the largest and most effective been anticipated, and some of Hunt's needed re-supply. One LVT got into
artillery fire had been hitting LVTs on Marines were in position to cut them the beach just before dark, with
the flanks of following landing down. grenades, mortar shells, and water.
waves. A rifle grenade hit the gun At dusk, Hunt's Company K held It evacuated casualties as it depart-
muzzle itself, and ricocheted into the the Point, but by then the Marines ed. The ammunition made the differ-
casement, setting off explosions and had been reduced to platoon ence in that night's furious struggle
flames. Japanese defenders ran out strength, with no adjacent units in against Japanese determined to recap-
the rear of the blockhouse, their contact. Only the sketchy radio com- ture the Point.
The Changing Nature of Japanese Tactics
apan launched its December 1941 surprise the lessons of defeat by modern infantry weapons in the
J attacks in the expectation that its forces could hands of the determined Allies.
quickly seize a forward line of Pacific and Asian em- To Americans, these Japanese misconceptions were
pire. Thereafter, it expected to defend these territories stub- alarming, but cost-effective: It was easier, and less costly,
bornly enough to tire and bleed the Allies and then to to mow down banzai attacks than to dig stubborndefenders
negotiate a recognition of Japanese hegemony. out of fortified positions.
By spring of 1944, the lessons had permeated to the
This strategic concept was synchronized with the fanat- highest levels of Japan's army command. When General
ic Japanese spirit of bushido. Faith in their army's moral Hideki Tojo instructed General Inoue to defend the Palaus
superiority over lesser races led the Japanese to expect 19th- deliberately and conservatively, he was bringing Japanese
century banzai tactics to lead invariably to success. Expec- tactics into support of Japanese strategy. Henceforth,
tations and experience meshed until their 1942 encounters Japanese soldiers would dig in and hunker down, to make
with the Allies, particularly with Americans in the Solo- their final defenses as costly as possible to the attacking
mons. Thereafter, it took several campaigns to internalize Americans.
5
and toward the edge of the clearing
looking east over the airfield area.
On the division's right flank,
Orange 3, Major Edward H. Hurst's
3/7 had to cross directly in front of
a commanding defensive fortification
flanking the beach as had Marines in
the flanking position on the Point.
- Fortunately, it was not as close as the
Point position, and did not inflict
- —
such heavy damage. Nevertheless, its
enfilading fire, together with some
natural obstructions on the beach
caused Company K, 3/7, to land left
of its planned landing beach, onto
the right half of beach Orange 2,
_,:'
3/5's beach. In addition to being out
of position, and out of contact with
Marines and corpsmen scramble ashore and seek any cover they can to escape the
incoming murderous enemy mortar and artillery fire. Behind them, smoking and the company to its right, Company
abandoned, are amphibian tractors which were hit as they approached the beach. Kf, 3l/7?, became intermingled with
The next afternoon, Lieutenant
Colonel Raymond C. Davis' 1/1
moved its Company B to establish
contact with Hunt, to help hang onto
the bitterly contested positions.
Hunt's company also regained the
survivors of the platoon which had
been pinned at the beach fight
throughout D-Day. Of equal' impor-
tance, the company regained artillery
and naval gunfire communications,
which proved critical during the se-
cond night. That night, the Japanese
Caption and photograph by Phillip D. Orr
organized another and heavier— two Situated in a cave overlooking the airfield is this heavy caliber Japanese antiboat
companies —counterattack directed gun. It had a field of fire which included the invasion beaches and the airfield.
at the Marines at the Point. It was
Damaged heavily in the D-Day bombardment, this Japanese pillbox survives on
narrowly defeated. By mid-morning,
the southern promontory of White Beach. Now vacant, its gun lies on the beach.
D plus 2, Hunt's survivors, together
Caption and photograph by Phillip D. Orr
with Company B, 1/1, owned the c.
?-
Point, and could look out upon some
500 Japanese who had died defend-
ing or trying to re-take it.
To the right of Puller's struggling i_. ..
3d Battalion, his 2d Battalion, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz
commanding, met artillery and mor-
tar opposition in landing, as well as
machine-gun fire from still effective
beach defenders. The same was true
for 5th Marines' two assault battal-
ions, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W.
Boyd's 1/5 and Lieutenant Colonel
Austin C. Shofner's 3/5, which hi r - I. - -' -
fought through the beach defenses
6
Naval Gunfire Support for Peleliu
n their earlier operations, especially at Guadalcanal,
the primary experience of 1st Division Marines with
naval gunfire was at the receiving end. On New Bri-
tain, the character and disposition of Japanese defenses did
not call for extensive pre-landing fire support, nor did sub-
sequent operations ashore. The naval gunfire to which the
Guadalcanal veterans were exposed frequently and heavi-
ly damaged planes and installations ashore. Its effect upon
dug-in Marines was frightening and sobering, but rarely
destructive.
During the planning for Peleliu, the division staff ini-
tially had no trained naval gunfire (NGF) planner. When
one arrived, he was hampered by the cumbersome com-
munications link back to higher headquarters, Lieutenant
General Holland M. Smith's Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(FMFPac), in Honolulu, which would provide the essen-
tial targeting information for the division's NGF plan. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95115
FMFPac also would plan and allocate the available gunfire effect of inadequate NGF was that the flanking positions
resources to the targets deemed important by the division north and south of the landing beaches were not taken out.
staff's planners. The preoccupation of FMFPac with the on- The selection of naval gunfire targets could certainly have
going Marianas campaigns, as well as illness on the staff been done with more careful attention. Colonel Lewis B.
of Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, Commander, Naval Puller, the 1st Marines commander, had specifically asked
Gunfire Support Group, further limited and constrained the for the destruction of the positions dominating his land-
preparations. Heavy ammunition expenditures in the Man- ing on the division left flanks. Failure to do so was paid
anas reduced ammunition availability for Peleliu. for in blood, courage, and time during the critical battle
Surprisingly, during the delivery of U.S. preparatory for the Point.
fires, there was no Japanese response. This prompted 01- Subsequent to D-Day there were numerous instances of
dendorf to report all known targets destroyed, and to can- well-called and -delivered naval gunfire support: night il-
cel preparatory fires scheduled for D plus 3. An lumination during the night of 15-16 September, the des-
unintentional benefit of this uncoordinated change in naval truction of two major blockhouses earlier reported
gunfire plan may have resulted in there being more shells "destroyed," and effective support of the Ngesebus landing
available for post-landing NGF support. But the costliest toward the end of the battle.
Company K, 3/5, a condition fraught Gormley's unit was to tie into Hurst's deemed essential.
with confusion and delay. Major right flank, and re-orient southeast Following close behind Sabol's
Hurst necessarily spent time regroup- and south as that area was unco- 3/1, the 1st Marines' Colonel Puller
ing his separated battalion, using as vered. He was then to attack landed his forward command group.
a coordinating line a large anti-tank southeast and south, with his left on As always, he was eager to be close
ditch astride his line of advance. His Hurst's right, and his own right on to the battle, even if that location
eastward advance then resumed, the beach. After Hurst's battalion deprived him of some capacity to de-
somewhat delayed by his efforts to reached the opposite shore, both velop full supporting fires. With
regroup. were to attack south, defending limited communications, and now
Any delay was anathema to the di- Scarlet 1 and Scarlet 2, the southern with inadequate numbers of LVTs for
vision commander, who visualized landing beaches. follow-on waves, he struggled to
momentum as key to his success. The At the end of a bloody first hour, ascertain and improve his regiment's
division scheme of maneuver on the all five battalions were ashore. The situation. His left unit (Company K,
right called for the 7th Marines closer each battalion was to Umur- 3/1) had two of its platoons desper-
(Colonel Herman H. Hanneken) to brogol, the more tenuous was its ately struggling to gain dominance at
land two battalions in column, both hold on the shallow beachhead. Dur- the Point. Puller's plan to land Major
over Beach Orange 3. As Hurst's ing the next two hours, three of the Davis' 1st Battalion behind Sabol's
leading battalion advanced, it was to division's four remaining battalions 3/1, to reinforce the fight for the left
be followed in trace by Lieutenant would join the assault and press for flank, was thwarted by the H-hour
Colonel John Gormley's 1/7. the momentum General Rupertus losses in LVTs. Davis' companies had
J.
7
the Marines' map, which had been
reported destroyed by pre-landing
naval gunfire. As a similar situation
later met on Puller's inland advance,
the blockhouse showed little evi-
dence of ever having been visited by
heavy fire. Preparations to attack
and reduce this blockhouse further
delayed the 7th Marines' advance,
and the commanding general fretted
further about loss of momentum.
On the enemy's side, Lieutenant
General Sadae Inoue, a fifth genera-
tion warrior of stout military repu-
tation, commanding the 14th
Infantry Division, fresh from the
Kwangtung Army in China, met in
Tokyo in March 1944 with Japanese
Premier Hideki Tojo, who was also
Minister of War. Tojo had conclud-
ed that Japan was no longer able to
hold the Palaus against growing Al-
lied naval dominance in the Western
Pacific. Instead, he had decided to sell
the Palaus to the United States at the
highest possible cost to Americans in
blood and time. He ordered Inoue to
D— DAY take his division to the Palaus, to take
After Rectifying 3/5)
command of all Japanese forces
Front Lines
there, and to defend the Palau Islands
Regimental Boundaries
Phase Lines as long as possible, denying its use
Main Counterattack to the Americans—and killing as
Secondary Counterattacks
many as possible in the undertaking.
or Strong Pressure
As his division sailed to the Palaus,
Inoue flew ahead, reconnoitered his
to be landed singly and his battalion a few of his troops were driven left- new locale by air for two days, and
committed piecemeal to the action. ward by the still enfilading fire from concluded that Peleliu (with satellite
On the regiment's right, Honsowetz' the south flank of the beach, and air strips on Angaur and Ngesebus)
2/1 was hotly engaged, but making landed on Orange 2, in the 5th Ma- was the key to his defenses. Earlier
progress toward capture of the west rines' zone of action. Gormley's bat- U.S. attention to Peleliu during the
edges of the scrub which looked out talion was brought fully together Task Force 58 March strikes seemed
onto the airfield area. He was tied on behind 3/7 however, and as Hurst's to confirm that judgment. To defend
his right into Boyd's 1/5, which was leading 3/7 was able to advance east, Peleliu, Inoue immediately settled
similarly engaged. Gormley's 1 / 7 attacked southeast upon a commander, a mission, and
In the beachhead's southern sector, and south, against prepared po- a force level. Peleliu had for some
the landing of Gormley's 1/7 was sitions. time been under occupation and ad-
delayed somewhat by its earlier loss- Hanneken's battle against heavy ministrative command of a rear ad-
es in LVTs. That telling effect of ear- opposition from both east and south miral, who had used his forces'
ly opposition would be felt developed approximately as planned. construction resources and capabili-
throughout the remainder of the day. Suddenly, in mid-afternoon, the op- ty to build blockhouses and many
Most of Gormley's battalion landed position grew much heavier. Hurst's reinforced concrete structures above
on the correct (Orange 3) beach, but 3/7 ran into a blockhouse, long on ground, while improving existing
8