beyond the second amendment: an individual right to arms viewed through the ninth amendment

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[Copyright©1992NicholasJ.Johnson.Originallypublishedas 24Rutgers L.J.1-81 (1992).
Permissionfor WWWuseatthissitegenerouslygrantedbytheauthor.For educationaluse
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BEYOND THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
AN
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO ARMS VIEWED
THROUGH
THE NINTH AMENDMENT
NicholasJ.Johnson[*]
 I. Introduction
 II.TheNinthAmendmentas aMeaningfulConstitutionalGuidepost
 III.A Focuson IndividualSelf-Defense
 IV.ConflictingConstitutionalVisions:LockeanandClassicalRepublican
 V.ConstitutionalStructureandAssumptionsabouttheRoleofGovernment:Dothey
SquarewithDisarmament?
o A.FearofGovernment
o B.ForcedRelianceonGovernment
o C.TheImpossibilityofTrustingCollectiveSecurityMechanisms
o D.ACoreVisionofAmerica
o E.TheDanger ofPurelyAbstractControlsonCollectivePower
o F.ConsentoftheGoverned
o G.ShouldGovernmentFeartheCitizenry?(p.2)
o H.TheFramers' Views AboutIndividualArms
o I.TheImplicationsofaDecisionthatCitizensCannotbeTrustedwithPersonal
Weapons
 VI.Personal Security,Utilityof FirearmsandThreats
o A.PersonalSecurityasa FundamentalInterest
o B.TheUtilityofFirearms forPersonalSecurity
o C.Threats
 VII.ArmedCitizens--DisarmedCitizens: Which Danger Should WeChoose?
 VIII.A NaturalRightsPerspective:TheFundamentalNatureofArms
 IX. We MayRecognizeaNinthAmendmentRightOnlyWhen We Treadonit:
Indications AboutIndividualArms
 X.TheInfluenceofElitismandCulturalBias ontheFirearmsDebate
o A.Elitism
o B.CulturalBias
 XI. LingeringConcerns AboutDisarmamentand FirearmsRegulation
o A.TheDangers DuringandBeyondthePeriodofVigorousDisarmamentEfforts
o B.DubiousLogic: WhatCriminalsChoose
 XII.ConclusionandanInvitationtoaRevealingComparison
I. Introduction
Traditionally,thedebateovertheindividualrighttopossessfirearms has focusedontheorigins
andmeaningoftheSecondAmendment.[1] Someconstitutionalscholarshavedismissedtheidea
thattheSecondAmendmentprotectsanindividualrighttoarms.Theyarguethatitonlyprevents
thefederal governmentfromdisarmingstates.[2]Otherscholars,(p.3)focusingonthelanguageof
theamendmentanditshistoricalcontext,concludethatitdoesindeedestablishanindividual
righttofirearms.Thisarticleexamineswhether, evenabsenttheSecond Amendment,the
Constitutionrestrainsgovernmentfromtakingawaywhat maybeindividuals'besttoolsofself-
defense.Thefootholdfortheanalysisis thecontroversialNinthAmendment.[3]
Predominantly, Iwilluseprinciplesthatcanbegleanedfromthemodelsoffered forinvigorating
theNinthAmendmenttoexposethearrayofdifficultquestions wemustfacebeforedisarming
citizens. InexploringthesequestionsIwillsuggestthatwecanindeedderiveanindividualright
toarmsfromtheNinthAmendmentandarerequiredtoabandonsomebasicbeliefsaboutour
Constitutionandtheroleofgovernmentifwedenytheexistenceofthatright.Ialsowillsuggest
thatabandoningthoseprinciples here makesadvocacyofotherNinthAmendmentrightshighly
problematic.[4] Inasmallerway, Ihopetorespondtothecalltoopenthedebateoverindividual
firearms tofrequentlydiscountedvoices.[5] Iwillassumeasanopposingpositionthealternative
to generaldisarmament.[6](p.4)
II. The Ninth Amendment as a Meaningful Constitutional
Guidepost
RecentNinthAmendmentliterature yieldstwonotablemodels forunderstandingand construing
it.[7]Thepredominantone,which Ihavelabeled the"deepstructures"model,focuses onbroad
constitutionalvaluesandthefundamentalstructureofourconstitutionaldemocracy.Thesecond
model,usedon amorelimitedbasis,stems fromaframeworkof"naturalrights."[8]
Thedeepstructures modelcontains anarrayofapproaches, whosenebulousandflexible
standardsaresimilartothosetheSupremeCourthasusedbothinincorporatingparts oftheBill
ofRights as restrictionsonstateactionandinestablishingunenumeratedrightswithout
explicitlyinvokingtheNinthAmendment.[9]Theseapproachessuggestthatunenumerated
rightsariseontheirown meritsthroughan examinationoftheirfitwith,andnecessityto,the
functioningofourconstitutionalstructure.
Onerenditionofthedeep structures modelpositsthattheSupremeCourtmightderivespecific
rightsfromthe NinthAmendmentbystarting"withthestronghistoricalargumentthat[the
amendmentwas]intendedtoapplyinasituation wheretheassertedrightappears tothe
(p.5)Courtasfundamentaltoafreesociety....[T]hetextualstandardshouldbetheentire
Constitution."[10]
Onecommentatoroffersanopen-endedtestof"reasonableness":
[Othercommentators]errinthinkingconstitutionaltheoryshouldlookforways
toclosetheninthamendmentandotheropen-endedprovisionsbyidentifying
"sources"towhichjudges andotherscan gotolocaterights forapplicationin
concretecases....
....
Applyingsomemeaningfultestofreasonableness wouldfindjudges andothers
conductingcase-by-casereviewoflegislationinchangingcircumstances. Forthe
reasonablenessofmeasuresisacontextualmatter. Becausewecannotcontrolthe
future,we cannot knowinadvanceofparticularcircumstances wheretheharm
visitedbygovernmentonsomeindividualor minoritywouldbejustifiedbya
credibleviewofthecommon goodwithinthesystem's capacities.Thus,a
reasonablenesstestis incorrigiblyopen-ended. Andtherighttobeharmed only
bygovernmentalacts thatarereasonablebysomehonesttestis theleastofthe
protections wecould expectundertheninthamendment.[11]
Anotherapproachis less supportiveofthedirectsubstantivevalueoftheNinthAmendment,
relyinginsteadonthehistoricalcontextoftheBillofRights.
WithorwithouttheNinthAmendment,wewould havetoapproachthetaskof
constitutionalinterpretationwithsomebasicunderstandingofthesources from
whichthedocumentderives(i.e.,boththehistoryoftheAmericanRevolutionand
theliberalandrepublican philosophieswhichhadinspiredthefounders),its
overallpurposeanddesign(i.e.,thepoliticalphilosophyofthe founding
generation), anditsviewsoftherelationofthe governmenttotheindividual(i.e.,
amoregeneralphilosophicalviewofthemeaningoflifeandtheplaceofthe
politicalcommunitywithinit).[12]
Sanford Levinsonsuggests thatourunderstandingoftheNinthAmendment might grow
from:(p.6)
closeattentiontothenarrativesbywhichweconstituteourownparticularistic
wayoflife.Suchlistening--andthecarefulinterpretationofwhatwehear will
enableusto graspthedeepstructures that constituteourpoliticalorder andto
understandaswellthatsometransitorypoliticalnotions,evenwhenembodiedin
legislation,couldbeinseriousconflictwiththesestructures.[13]
JusticeGoldberg'sconcurringopinionin Griswoldv.Connecticut[14]offersoneofthemost
extensivetreatments oftheNinthAmendmentinaSupremeCourtcase. Itsuggests thatjudges
mightderiverightsfromtheNinthAmendmentbylookingto"thetraditionsandconscienceof
ourpeople[todeterminewhetheraprincipleisso rooted]astoberanked asfundamental."[15]
Suchafundamentalright,whichcannotbedenied,is onewhich"lie[s]atthebaseofallourcivil
andpoliticalinstitutions."[16]
Takentogether,theseapproachespromptustoquestionwhetherourbeliefs andconvictions
aboutcoreconstitutionalconcernspermitustotakethestepswemusttakeandbelievethethings
wemustbelieveinordertoprohibitindividualpossessionoffirearmsforself-defense.
III. A Focus on Individual Self-Defense
Thecentralquestioninthisarticleis whethertheinterestofindividualcitizens inprotectingtheir
ownlivesfromphysicalthreats,collectiveandpoliticalimplicationsaside, establishesarightto
possessweaponsthatareusefulinrepellingthosethreats.[17]Thesearch foran(p.7)answercan
beginwiththesuggestionbypositiviststhatthesumtotalofindividualrightslies inthelanguage
ofselectedpartsoftheBillofRights.[18] Thereareatleasttwodifficultieswiththepositivists'
approach. First,theSupremeCourtalreadyhasestablishedunenumeratedrightsthrough
strenuousmanipulationoftheenumeratedguarantees.[19]Second,thereplainlyarenumerous
simpleactsofindividualautonomythatweundertakedailywhich arenotexplicitlyprotectedby
theBillofRights.Itis troublingtoconcludethattheseacts areprotectedonlybycreative
extrapolationofthemeagerprovisionsoftheexplicit guarantees. Itisthis rangeofactsthatthe
NinthAmendmentmight necessarilyprotect.Bycomparison,wegainsomeinsightintowhether
theNinthAmendmentmightaccommodatearight tofirearmsownershipforindividualself-
defense.
Inthedebates overratificationoftheBillofRights,delegates commonlyobjectedthatitwas
impossibletolisttherightsoffreemen.Speakers madereferencetovariouscommonactivities,
questioningwhethertherighttowearthehatofone's choosingwouldbeguaranteed,whether
onecouldeatatthetimeonechooses,orwhether onecouldundertakevariousotherindividual
activities withoutinterferencefromorregulationbygovernment.[20]
Ownershipoffirearms wascommonplaceduringtherevolutionaryperiod. Theiruseand
ownershipformanypurposes wasconsideredessentialandcompletelynoncontroversial.[21]
"ThroughouttheColonies,noimplements weremoreabundantthan firearms;nonewasmorein
use,moreusedup,moreindemand. Gunsmiths of Europeflockedto (p.8)theColonies,sureof
steadyemploymentatrepairing, andmakingand selling."[22] Whiletheconceptmaybedifficult
todigesttoday,"itwasconsiderednormalforeighteenthcenturycivilians tocarrypocketpistols
forprotectionwhiletraveling."[23]"Thesenseof groupself-preservationandself-defensewas
strong."[24] Firearmswerenotonlycommonplace,butalsotheywere, attimes,requiredtobe
kept.[25]
Ourcommonlawsupportsanindividualrighttoarmsforself-defense,unimpairedby
governmentalrestrictions. FourteenthcenturyEnglishweaponsrestrictionsincludedexplicit
exceptionsforbothselfdefenseandthedefenseofone'sdwelling.[26]In adetailedexamination
ofthe1780OpinionoftheRecorderof Londonon theScopeoftheRighttoHaveArmsin
England, DavidCaplanshowstheRecorderendorsingunequivocallyanindividualrighttoarms
forself-defense(p.9)"wherethereis notimetoinvoketheaidofestablishedauthority,"but
distinguishingunauthorizedexercisesbyassemblies ofarmed men.[27]
Atleastonemodernwriterhas movedtowardacknowledgingthisdichotomy:
Theframersdonotappeartohavedistinguishedsharplybetweenthe"personal
safety"reasonsforpossessingweaponsandthe"politicalsafety" reasons that
wereattheforefrontofthedebatethatledtotheadoptionoftheSecond
Amendment.Onelikelyexplanationisthat,atthetimeoftheAmendment's
adoption,America retainedapredominantlyruralculturewithafrontierethos,
andnoonehad anyreasontoexpectthatapopularlyelected governmentwould
haveanymotivetointerferewithits citizens'abilitytodefendthemselves against
thehazardsofeverydaylife.[28]
Fromthisperspective,evenifweaccepttheSecondAmendmentasprotectingonlyacollective
right,itremainspossiblethatanindividualrightto armstorepelimmediateandproximate
threatswasconsideredbytheframersasbasicas therighttodress warmlyagainstthecold.
JusticeHolmesimplicitlyacceptedsomeelementofthissentimentinoneoftheCourt's early
decisionsinthiscentury, Patsonev.Pennsylvania.[29]Heconcludedthat abanonaliens'
possessionoflongarms waspermissibleasahuntingcontrolmeasure,becausethebandidnot
extendtohandguns,whichmightbeneeded"occasionallyforself-defense."Thispassage
appearstorecognizesomelevelofindividualinterestinarms forself-defense,butitdoesnot
explicitlyinvoketheSecondAmendment.
Therewasseriousdebateoverwhetherlistingsomeofthemoreabstractconstitutionalrightswas
descendingintominutia. Agood exampleistheHousedebateinthe FirstCongress overthe
necessityofaconstitutionalamendmentprotectingtherightofpeaceableassembly.Ninth
Amendmentcommentator,CharlesCooper,notes theobjectionofCongressman Sedgwickof
Massachusettsthattherighttoassemblywas too "self-evident"and"inalienable"toeverbe
calledintoquestion. (p.10)Sedgwickcontendedthatadescentintosuch"minutiae"wouldleadto
atrivialandlengthyenumerationofotherobviousrights.[30]
AconnectionexistsbetweenindividualAmericansandarms that goes deeperthanthe mere
utilityoffirearms. Itappearstobeanalmostspiritualattachment.[31]Historically,ownership
andproficient,responsibleuseoffirearmswereconnecteddirectlytothedevelopmentofthe
character andself-disciplinethatwereconsidered necessarycharacteristics ofcitizensinafree
society.[32]
Plainly,theframers'attitudeaboutfirearmswasdrasticallydifferentfromsomewefindtoday.
Guns werenot consideredtheembodiment (p.11)ofevilwith"little,ifany, compensatingsocial
advantage."[33]Theywereuseful,vitaltoolsascommonas anyotheritemmanufacturedby
craftsmenoftheperiod. Oncewerecognizethisandappreciatethatfor manyAmericans,
firearms stillarecommonplace,usefultools withunmatchedutilityforself-defense,wemight
viewpossessionofarms forindividualdefensetobeas basicastherighttochooseaheavycoat
againstthecold.[34]Characterizedthis way, arighttoarms forselfdefensemightberetrieved
fromtheNinthAmendmentalongwiththerighttoengageinamyriadofotherbasichuman
activities.
Asabyproduct,thisindividualdefense focusoffersaprincipledbasisforprohibitingaccessto
highlydestructiveweapons.Prohibitionsmightfocusonwhethertheweaponcanbedischarged
incloseproximitywithoutinjuringtheuserand whetheritcanbeoperatedbyasingle
individual.Ifthe focusis directandimmediateindividualdefense,then wemightsensibly
differentiatebetweenlong-rangeorremotedeliveryweaponsofdestruction andpersonal
weaponrysuitableforindividualself-defense.
Itisalsopossiblethatapurelyself-defensebased righttoarmswouldachievesomeofthe
arguablynoblegoalsofacitizens'militia.Thepresenceofscoresofmillionsofindividual
Americansprotectingtheirprivateinterestsundoubtedlywouldbe adauntingprospectforan
(p.12)invaderoremergingdespottocontemplate,especiallyascomparedto thedeterrentvalueof
adisarmedpopulace.
IV. Conflicting Constitutional Visions: Lockean and
Classical Republican
Atonelevel,thecontroversyoverconstitutionalprotectionofindividualfirearms isaproductof
conflictbetweenthetwo primaryviewsoftherootsandpurposes ofourConstitutionandthe
relationshipbetween governmentandindividuals. TheClassicalRepublican visionemphasizesa
strongstatewithafocus onorder.The Lockeanvision,influencedbyEnlightenmentthought,
emphasizesindividuallibertyandthesubordinationofthestate.[35] Somearguethatthe
Lockeanvisionpredominantlyinfluencedtheframers'viewsof constitutionaldemocracy.[36]
Nonetheless, muchofthetraditionalSecond Amendmentdebatepresumes thatClassical
Republicanismwas thedrivingforcebehindtheframers'constitutionalvision.[37]Despitethe
disregardofthe Lockean (p.13)visioninSecondAmendmentdebate,itfigures prominentlyin
effortstorevivetheNinthAmendment[38]andsetsoneonthepathtodeterminingwhether
individualAmericanshavetherighttoownanduseguns fortheirpersonal defenseandsecurity.
ALockean focussubstantiallyaffectsourviewabouttheallocationandcontroloftoolsusefulin
exercisingand resistingpower.Thereisaninherenttensionbetweentheideasofindividual
libertyandorderthrough astrongstate.Thecoexistenceofthesetwoforcesattherootofour
constitutionalsystemsuggeststheymustexistinsomesortofequilibrium.[39] Weshould,
therefore,bereluctantto eliminateinstrumentsnecessarytothevitalityof eitherofthese
competingforces.Thequestioniswhethergunsinthehandsofindividualcitizens canbe
classifiedamongthoseimportantinstruments.
In addressingthis question,onemustconsidertheimportanceofforceas afactorinconflict
resolution.Theabilityto exertforcemay(p.14)impactthedegreetowhichindividualliberty
succumbstothecollectivewill.[40]Assumingthegoalof abalancebetweenindividualliberty
andcollectiveinterests,thereissomethingunattractiveaboutplacingallofthemosteffective
toolsofviolencewheretheyarelikelyonlytobeusedtofurthercollectiveinterests.[41]
Ifwerejectthis conclusion,thenweshouldexaminethedegreetowhichourdoingsoisaresult
ofmakingoneofthreeassumptions:1)theconstitutionalimportanceofthe Lockeanvisionof
individualrightsmust yieldtotheClassicalRepublicanvision;2)theconceptof Lockean
individualismmustdependonthebenevolenceand goodwillofthecollectiveinitsexerciseofa
monopolyonthetoolsof violence;or3)thereissomethinginherentinour constitutional
structurethatwillrestrainthecollective's monopolyonforceandpreventitfrombending
individualinterestsutterlyinthedirectionofthecollectivewill.Tothedegreewerely
particularlyonthelasttwooftheseassumptionswemayhavecause forconcern.
Theproblemisillustratedbyturningtheissueon its head.Thequestionthenwouldbewhether
theClassicalRepublican visionoflibertythrough astrongstatecouldsurviveif government
werepreventedfrompossessingandusingarms.Could governmentsuccessfullyrelyonthe
goodwillofarmedcitizens? Wouldunilaterallyarmed citizensconformbothtothedecisions
reachedinthedemocraticprocess andtotheauthorityexercisedbytheirrepresentatives?Given
suchanimbalanceintheabilitytouseforce,wemightexpectthatcollectiveinterestswould
readilysuccumbtoindividualinterestsininstancesofserious conflict.Animbalanceinthe
oppositedirection,then, couldhavean equivalentimpact. Ininstancesofsignificantconflict,the
unrestrained government powerresultingfrom adisarmedcitizenrycouldpermitcollective
intereststoutterlydominateindividualinterests.Undersuch circumstances,the Lockeanvision
ofgovernment'sroleseemstoevaporate.[42](p.15)
Thereis anunacknowledged kinshipbetween SecondandNinthAmendmentscholars.Eachhas
produced Lockeansupportforarmedselfdefense.[43]ProfessorBarnettuses Locketoadvocate
aNinthAmendmentrighttoassociationalfreedom.[44]Particularlypertinentforthesepurposes,
ProfessorBarnettnotes:
ALockean approachproceedstoidentifymorefundamentalbackgroundrights
thatdonotevaporateuponthecreationofagovernmentortheexpressionofa
majoritywill. Locke calledtheserights "propertyrights;"thatis,rights toacquire,
useandtransferownershipofresourcesintheworld.Suchrightsaretheprincipal
means bywhichlife,liberty,andthepursuitofhappinessarefacilitatedin the
socialcontext.Suchrightsincludenotonlytherighttoexternalresourcesbutalso
therighttoone's person.[45]
TakinganaturalrightsviewoftheNinthAmendment,ProfessorMooredraws substantiallyon
Locke,citingmanypassages, whichsimultaneouslysupportaninvigorated NinthAmendment
and,thoughitwasnot Moore'sintent,layafoundationforordirectlysupportanindividualright
toarms.Notablyhequotes Locke'sobservationthat:
[G]overnmentistheproductoffreecontract,thatthegovernors ofapeoplehold
theirauthorityonlyintrust,thatwhensuchtrustisviolated,apeoplecanrightly
exercisetheirstrength--thoughonlyunderthe greatestprovocation--toundo
tyranny.[46]
His selectionfrom Locke'schapterentitled"OfSlavery"inthe SecondTreatiseonCivil
Governmentis alsonoteworthy:
This freedomfromabsolutearbitrarypowerisso necessaryto,andcloselyjoined
with,aman'spreservation,thathecannotpartwithitbutbywhatforfeitshis
preservationandlifetogether.Foramannothaving(p.16)thepowerofhis own
lifecannotbycompactorhisownconsent,enslavehimselftoanyone,norput
himselfundertheabsolutearbitrarypowerofanothertotakeawayhis lifewhen
hepleases.[47]
LockeansupporthasfiguredprominentlyinSecondAmendmentcommentators'work.Stephen
Halbrook,for example,cites Locke'sSecond TreatiseonCivilGovernment asdirectsupportfor
arighttoindividualself-defense:"[i]tbeingreasonableandjustthat Ishouldhavetherightto
destroythatwhichthreatensmewithdestruction."[48]HalbrookarguesthatLockestrongly
opposedadisarmedpopulace:
Itcannotbesupposedthattheyshouldintend,had theyapowersotodo,to give
toanyone,or more, anabsolutearbitrarypowerovertheirpersonsandestates,
andputaforceintothemagistrate'shandtoexecutehisunlimitedwillarbitrarily
uponthem.Thiswere[sic]toputthemselvesintoaworseconditionthaninthe
stateofnature, whereintheyhadalibertytodefendtheirrightagainsttheinjuries
ofothersandwereupon equalterms offorceto maintainit,whetherinvadedbya
singlemanor manyincombination. Whereas,bysupposingtheyhavegivenup
themselves totheabsolutepowerandwillofalegislator,theyhavedisarmed
themselves, andarmedhim,tomakepreyofthemwhenhepleases.[49]
TheLockeanviewthat coreindividualrightsexistwithoutbeingcreatedbythestateoffersa
comfortablepathwaytoameaningfulNinthAmendment. ItisnotsurprisingthatLockeendorsed
anindividualrighttosecurityagainstphysicalthreats.AnyefforttoinvigoratetheNinth
AmendmentthroughJohnLocke's politicalphilosophymusteitheracknowledgethatan
individualrighttoarmsstandshighamongprotectedrightsorfindefforts toexcludeit
troublesome.(p.17)
V. Constitutional Structure and Assumptions about the Role
of Government: Do They Square with Disarmament?
A. Fear of Government.
Theideathattheframers fearedanddistrustedthepowersitedinthefederalgovernment
specifically,andperhaps collectivepower generally,isvitalto givingmeaningtotheNinth
Amendment.[50]Acknowledgingthisshouldengenderdifficultywithdisarmament,for
disarmingmeansentrustingexclusivelyto governmentsomeofthemostimportanttoolsfor
maintainingindividualsecurity.Itmeans trustinggovernmenttouseits exclusivepowerto
benevolentlyandcompetentlyprotectitscitizenry.[51]Ourpoliticalhistoryshowsthatplacing
blindtrustingovernmentmaybedangerous.[52]Anotherchoice,whollyabandoning
(p.18)(p.19)theideathatdistrustofgovernmentisnecessaryandproper,seemsequallyill-advised.
This distrustis,afterall,independentlyimportanttoinvigoratingtheNinth Amendment.[53]
B. Forced Reliance on Government
Disarmament maypush ustotheunprecedentedstepofforcingindividuals torelysolelyon
governmenttoprotect afundamentalhumanconcern.Traditionally, wehavebelievedthatthe
Constitutiongives governmentcertainoptionstoexertpowerandrestricts thewaysthatpower
canbeexercised. ItishighlycontroversialtosaythatanythingintheConstitutionguarantees
citizensbenefitsfromgovernment,includingindividualprotection.Disarmamentwouldhaveus
takethemoretroublesomeleappast guaranteedbenefitsdirectlytoforceddependency. Whilewe
maybeatapointwheresuchdependencyisencouragedbymanyandwouldbeforcedbysome,
weshouldacknowledgethatsuchdependencyis amajordeparturefromtheframers'design.
Whenweconsidertheimpositionofthesamelimitationsonotherbasichuman concerns or
currentlyperceivedconstitutionalrights,theproblemisexposed. Woulditsatisfyustobeforced
torelyon governmentforoureconomicsecurityintheformofadolecheck,asystemwherethe
accumulationofprivatewealthwasprohibitedin favorof collectivemeasures?Shouldthe
governmentdirectlycontroltheenginesofcommerce,forcingustotrustourrepresentativesto
administerthoseengines effectivelyandbenevolently? Woulditsatisfy(p.20)us tohaveonly
governmentoutletsastheforumsforexerciseof our FirstAmendmentrights? Would webe
satisfiedifgovernmentownedthemedia,butwasfirmlycommitted,throughthebestrhetorical
guaranteeswecouldimagine,toadministeringitinourbestinterests? Wouldweconsiderforced
exclusiverelianceonpubliceducation,publichousing,orpublicfooddistributionacceptable?
Giventhelessthanperfecttrackrecordofcollectiveattemptstosolveindividualproblems, and
theviableargumentsthat governmentinvolvementhasexacerbatedthoseproblems,it maybea
severe mistake forindividualstorelycompletelyoncollectivemeasuresto satisfytheirbasic
needsandrepugnantthat theybeforcedtodoso.[54] Wemayfinditdifficulttoexplainhow
forced relianceon governmentforindividualsecurityisconstitutionallymorepalatablethan
forced relianceforlesssubstantialhumanconcerns.Thedifficultyismagnifiedwhenwe
considerthatthecollectivecommitmenttoprotectingindividualsfromphysicalthreats isonly
discretionary.[55]
Severalwritershavetakenanaturalrights viewof theNinthAmendment,arguingthatthe
foundersconceivedofahostofindefeasiblenaturalrightsthatcouldnotbetakenawayevenby
anexerciseof majoritywill"withoutviolating[them]."[56]From atleastonenotable
perspective, forcingindividuals torelyon governmenttopreservetheirlives violates oneofthe
fundamentalnaturalrightsofman.[57]Proceedingfromanaturalrightsview,theNinth
Amendment(p.21)supportsnotonlyanindividualrighttoarms,butalsotheargumentthatthe
rightcannotberestricted bycollectiveactioneven intheformofaprohibitiveconstitutional
amendment.[58]
Alternatively,Dr.Lund contendsthat"thebasicpostulateofliberaltheory[is]thatcitizensonly
surrendertheirnaturalrightstotheextentthattheyarerecompensedwithmoreeffectivepolitical
rights."[59]Ifthissentimentinfluencesourviewofwhenindividualoptionscanberestricted,
thendisarmamentmaybeinappropriatesolongas thereisnoconstitutionalrighttoprotectionby
thestatefromviolentthreats.[60]
Evenifaconstitutionalrighttoprotectionbythestatewereestablishedas acounterweighttoan
individualrighttoarms, wewouldhaveto considertheeffectivenessofsucha guarantee.
Experienceshowsthatin virtuallyanylarge-scale, collectiveeffort,therearejaggededges
aroundthemoldcausingmanypeople,oftentheunpopularorpowerless,to fallawayasdross.
Certainly,particularindividualsandcommunities haveexperiencedan allocationofcollective
resourcesthatdisfavorsthem. In manyinstances,thetacitresponsemightbethattheyalready
takemorethantheyputintothecollectivepotand theyoughttodo more forthemselves.
Inthis analysis,thatresponsechanges andraises withittheproblemofinevitablylimitedpublic
resources. Weshouldexpectthoseindividualsattheendoftheline forallocationofother
governmentresources alsotobethelastinlinefor securityservices.[61]Moreover,in(p.22)any
granddesigntoprotect adisarmedcitizenry,thesystemsimplywillbreakdown. Whenthat
occurs,evenaconstitutional guaranteeofprotectionbythestatewillbemeaningless.[62](p.23)
Someofusarecomfortablewithforcingindividuals tocedefirearms exclusivelytocollective
control.This stanceforcesanarrayofuncomfortableassumptions.Itimpliesthatanindividual's
interestinself-preservationis notsoimportantthatitcannotbeignoredintheinterestoforderor
makinggoverningeasier.Itassumesthatunarmed individualsareatnodisadvantageagainst
armedaggressors. Itdemands thatagents of governmentcanandwillbesummonedand arrive
theinstantaviolentthreatarises.Itpresumesthat onlyagents of governmentcanbequalifiedto
resistviolentaggressioninkindand mustdosoon behalfofcitizenswhocannotdefend
themselves. It relieson government'scompetenceandbenevolence,andon thefuture's
predictability,ensuringthatcollectivemeasures willbesufficienttoresist thethreatsthatarise.
Perhapsmoretroublingthanalloftheseistheassumptionthatthemosteffectivemodeofself
defensepermittedunder aconstitutionwrittenbyrevolutionaries,whodistrusted governmentand
believedininnumerableindividualrights,istheFirstAmendmentrighttoscream911.
C. The Impossibility of Trusting Collective Security Mechanisms
Simplyas amatteroflogistics,itmaybeimpossibleforcitizens confidentlytoputtheirtrustin
collectivesecurityresources.Exclusiverelianceoncollectivesecuritymechanismsexacerbates
aninherentproblem:violentthreatstoindividualsdonotcomepre-announced.Consequently,
collectivesecurityresourcescannotbepresentattheinstantneeded.[63]Thesituationwouldbe
muchliketellingaclimberthatallropeswillbecollectivelycontrolled. Ifhebegins tofall,then
heneedonlycall,andan agentof governmentwillbedispatchedtobringtheropethatwill
preventhis injuryordeath.Unfortunately,oncetheneedfortheresourcearises,assistancewill
inmanyinstancesbetoo late. (p.24)Takingtheanalogyfurthertoincorporatetheadditional
problemoflimitedresources byassumingthatthereareatanyonetimeonehundredactual
climbers,thousandsofpotentialclimbers andonlyfiveropeadministrators,togetherwiththe
acutenatureoftheneed,weshouldquestionthewisdomofthedecisionwhichprohibitedself-
helpandindividualownershipofropes.
D. A Core Vision of America
We might alsoconsiderwhetherthetypeofsocietythatwouldjustifyand benefitfrom
disarmamentwasthetypeanticipatedbythefounders.Thequestiondoesnotsuggestthatwe