Beyond Nunn-Lugar - Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia (2002)

266 Pages·2002·0.69 MB·English

by  Strategic Studies Institute

BEYOND NUNN-LUGAR:
CURBING THE NEXT WAVE OF WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION THREATS FROM RUSSIA
Edited by
Henry D. Sokolski
and
Thomas Riisager
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
April 2002
*****
Theviewsexpressedinthisreportarethoseoftheauthorsanddo
notnecessarilyreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheDepartmentof
the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This
reportisclearedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.
*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be
forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College,122ForbesAve.,Carlisle,PA17013-5244.Copiesofthisreport
maybeobtainedfromthePublicationsOfficebycalling(717)245-4133,
FAX [phone], or via the Internet at Rita.Rummel@
carlisle.army.mil
*****
Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic
dissemination. SSI(cid:146)s Homepage address is: http://www.carlisle.army.
mil/usassi/welcome.htm
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail
newslettertoupdatethenationalsecuritycommunityontheresearchof
our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming
conferencessponsoredbytheInstitute.Eachnewsletteralsoprovidesa
strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are
interestedinreceivingthisnewsletter,pleaseletusknowbye-mailat
[email protected][phone].
ISBN 1-58487-086-9
ii
CONTENTS
Introduction
HenryD.Sokolski • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • v
Acknowledgements • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • xi
Chapter 1. Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the
Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats
from Russia
Working Group on U.S.-Russian
NonproliferationCooperation• • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Chapter 2. The Foundations of Russian
Strategic Power and Capabilities
StephenJ.Blank• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 25
Chapter 3. Russian Rule and the Regional Military
Industrial Complexes
ArielCohen• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 57
Chapter 4. The Health and Future
of Russia(cid:146)s Population
MurrayFeshbach • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 83
Chapter 5. New Metrics for Denuclearization
ThomasB.Cochran • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 99
Chapter 6. Demilitarizing Russian Weapons
Scientists: The Challenge
MarkKramer • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 115
Chapter 7. Defense Conversion: How Far
Can Russia Expand Small and
Medium Enterprises?
MatthewPartan • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 195
Chapter 8. Turning the Next Generation
of Russians Away from Weapons Work
ThomasRiisager • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 241
AbouttheContributors • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 259
iii
INTRODUCTION
Althoughthepresentbookneverintendedtobequiteso
timely, Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of
WeaponsProliferationThreatsfromRussiaisonebookthat,
comingsosoonaftertheevents ofSeptember 11,2001,and
shortly before President Bush(cid:146)s Russian summit, should
find a ready audience. The essays in the book were
originally commissioned by the Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center (NPEC) as part of a year-long study on
the future of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation.
What makes the book different from other studies of
U.S.-Russian cooperation is its reliance on competitive
strategies.1
Originally devised as a business management tool and
subsequently used by the Pentagon to guide its military
planningagainsttheSovietUnion,theanalyticalapproach
based on competitive strategies requires analysts to
evaluate long-term trends, 10 to 20 years out. Rather than
beginning with one(cid:146)s own aims and strategies, however,
competitive strategies demands that analysts first
understand the objectives, strengths, and weaknesses of
competitors and other key parties. A key objective of
competitive strategies is to detail how best to pit one(cid:146)s
strengths against a competitor(cid:146)s enduring weaknesses in a
series of moves and countermoves. The goal is to devise
strategies that force one(cid:146)s competitor to spend more time
and resources shoring up his weaknesses than in taking
offensive action.
Although businesses and other organizations generally
use competitive strategies analysis to secure advantage
over their challengers, it also can be used to help them
identify beneficial opportunities for cooperation. To date,
this has not been the approach U.S. officials have taken on
nonproliferation cooperation with Russia. Instead, they
have assumed that the specifics of cooperation should be
v
determined by whatever goals and strategies Russia and
the United States share. This book takes a very different
approach. The authors first focus on how Russia(cid:146)s and
America(cid:146)s proliferation-related strategies and goals differ.
They then identify each nation(cid:146)s relevant strengths and
weaknesses and determine where these might best be
mated to produce new forms of cooperation.
An example of what this kind of analysis is capable of
producingcanbefoundinthefirstchapter,thefinalreport
of the competitive strategies working group on U.S.-
Russian nonproliferation cooperation. Here the different
goals of each nation regarding medical and health services
are identified. Russia still has a good number of biological
weapons-related experts that it has yet to find civilian
employment for, but a relatively poor level of medical
services. It also has a population whose health is seriously
deterioratingandaRussianpresidentwhowantstochange
this.Finally,althoughtheavailabilityofmedicalservicesis
very low, Russia still has a fairly competent, functioning
public health system.
In contrast, provision of medical services in the United
States is quite high, but America(cid:146)s public health system is
barely functional. Unlike Russia, it has few, if any,
biological weapons experts, but it is very concerned about
being able to detect the use of biological weapons and the
spread of dangerous diseases and pathogens within
America and from other nations (including Russia).
After reflecting on these issues and the commissioned
researchofhealthdemographerMurrayFeshbachreported
in Chapter 4 ((cid:147)The Health and Future of Russia(cid:146)s
Population(cid:148)),theworkinggroupfocusedontheprospectsfor
U.S.-Russian cooperation on health monitoring both to
enhance the health of Russia(cid:146)s population and to increase
the chances of detecting the spread of dangerous diseases
caused by either nature or the hand of man. One of the
nation(cid:146)s leading health surveillance experts, Dr. Alan
Zelicoff of Sandia National Laboratory, was brought in to
vi
brief the group about a health monitoring system already
operating in New Mexico known as Rapid Syndrome
Validation Project, or RSVP.
RSVP uses computers, touch-screen entry, and the
Internet to enable physicians to make speedy reports to
publichealthauthoritieswhentheyencounterpatientswho
haveaparticularsetofsymptoms.Aphysician(cid:146)sreportcan
befiledinlessthanaminute,assumesnopriorknowledgeof
exotic diseases, and can address over 90 percent of the
diseases a biological-weapons attack might spread. The
system is also cheap to deploy(cid:151)an entire global system of
10,000 reporting stations could be put in place for between
10 and 20 million dollars.
After learning this and more about RSVP, the working
group recommended that the U.S. Government support
RSVP(cid:146)s deployment in Russia as a cooperative threat
reduction effort and that the United States use biological
weapons experts at Russia(cid:146)s former biological weapons
research laboratories to set up and run the system. NPEC
staff subsequently briefed this recommendation to U.S.
officials in the Departments of Defense and Energy. As a
result, both departments agreed early in 2002 to fund
deployment of RSVP in Russia and several former Soviet
Republics.
The working group also made several other
recommendations. One set had to do with how best to
accountforRussiannuclearweaponsmaterialsandtohelp
pay for reducing the threats they and other Russian
strategic weapons activities present. Discussion of this set
of recommendations, which focused on allowing Russia to
earn money storing U.S.-origin spent fuel from East Asia
and Europe in exchange for better data on its nuclear
inventory and the use of profits to help pay for important
Nunn-Lugar programs, also can be found in Chapter 1. In
making these recommendations, the working group
benefitedfromtheanalysesofArmyWarCollegeresearcher
Dr. Stephen Blank ((cid:147)The Foundations of Russian Strategic
vii
Power and Capabilities,(cid:148) Chapter 2); of Heritage
Foundation(cid:146)s Russian Studies Director Dr. Ariel Cohen
((cid:147)Russian Rule and the Regional Military Industrial
Complexes,(cid:148) Chapter 3); and of the Natural Resource
Defense Council(cid:146)s Dr. Thomas Cochran ((cid:147)New Metrics for
Denuclearization,(cid:148) Chapter 5).
Finally, the working group made a set of
recommendationsregardingthenextgenerationofRussian
strategic weapons workers. This set of recommendations,
which focused on increasing the quantity and quality of
RussianandWesternstudentexchanges,turnedheavilyon
theanalysisfoundinChapter6byProfessorMarkKramer
of Harvard University ((cid:147)Demilitarizing Russian Weapons
Scientists: The Challenge(cid:148)); in Chapter 7 by Centra
Technologies(cid:146) Matthew Partan ((cid:147)Defense Conversion: How
FarCanRussiaExpandSmallandMediumEnterprises?(cid:148));
and Chapter 8 by this book(cid:146)s coeditor and NPEC(cid:146)s
Wohlstetter Fellow, Thomas Riisager ((cid:147)Turning the Next
Generation of Russians Away from Weapons Work(cid:148)).
None of these chapters makes for breezy reading.
However, given how high the costs of U.S.-Russian
nonproliferation cooperation failure might be(cid:151)terrorist
accesstoweaponsmaterialsandthefurtherproliferationof
strategic arms to unstable, hostile states(cid:151)they are all too
timely and deserve to be read with care.
HENRY D. SOKOLSKI
Executive Director
Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center
viii
ENDNOTE - INTRODUCTION
1. Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Prevailing in a Well-Armed World,
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2000, pp.
1-26.
ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Becausethisvolumeistheresultofayear-longstudyof
the future of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation,
morethanjustauthorsandeditorswererequired. First,the
project itself had to be funded. Here, as has been the case
sincetheinceptionoftheNonproliferationPolicyEducation
Center (NPEC), the Smith Richardson Foundation
underwrote nearly the entire effort. The balance was
secured from the U.S. Air Force(cid:146)s Institute of National
Security Studies. Without the generous support of these
two foundations, there would have been no project. In
addition, the current and previous chairman of the Army
War College(cid:146)s Department of National Security and
Strategy(cid:151)Professors Robert (cid:147)Robin(cid:148) Dorff and Joseph
Cerami(cid:151)playedacriticalroleinsecuringthesupportofthe
U.S.ArmyWarCollege(cid:146)sStrategicStudiesInstitute,which
in turn was responsible for this book(cid:146)s publication and
postingitontheinternet.Withouttheirhelp,therewouldbe
no book.
The actual work of the book was done by those NPEC
commissioned to write papers and by those who
participatedinaseriesofworkshopsatwhichthesecritical
essayswerediscussed. Theauthors(cid:146)essaysareinthisbook.
As important as their contributions were, those of the
workshops(cid:146)groupleaders(cid:151)Dr.JacobKippoftheU.S.Army
Training and Doctrine Command, Dr. Bill Green of the
National Security Studies Program at the University of
California at San Bernardino, and Dr. Mark Kramer of the
Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard were equally
important. These scholars kept all of the participants
focused on the project(cid:146)s key issues.
Finally,aspecialwordofthanksisduetoTomRiisager,
the center(cid:146)s Wohlstetter Fellow and research coordinator,
who ran the project and marshaled the book into its final
form. Tom worked long hours(cid:151)many more than could be
xi
reasonablyasked. Withouthiseffortsandcloseworkwith
Ms. Marianne Cowling of the Strategic Studies Institute,
this edited volume would not have been possible.
xii