Table Of Contentchutte
Ofelia Schutte
BEYOND NIHILISM
Nietzsche
without
Masks
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
Chicago and London
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS. CHICAGO 60637
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS. LTD .• LONDON
© 1984 by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved. Published 1984
Paperback edition 1986
Printed in the United States of America
95 949392 91 90 89 88 87 86 65 4 3 2
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA
Schulte. Ofelia.
Beyond nihilism.
Includes bibliography and index.
I. Nietzsche. Friedrich Wilhelm. 1844-1900. J. Title.
83317.S47 1984 193 83-9240
IS8N 0-226-74140-0 (cloth); 0-226-74141-9 (paper)
For my mother, Ofelia, and my aunt, Arminda
Contents
Preface ix
Introduction
1 Truth and the Dionysian 11
2 Nietzsche's Critique of Metaphysics 38
3 Models of Existential Continuity 57
4 The Will to Power as Metaphor 76
5 Beyond Good and Evil 105
6 The Overcoming of Morality by the Higher Man 133
7 Nietzsche's Politics 161
Conclusion 189
Chronology of Nietzsche's Major Works 195
List of Abbreviations 196
Notes 197
Bibliography 219
Index 223
vii
Preface
This study represents an attempt to read Nietzsche without masks.
In saying this, I am well aware of Nietzsche's love of masks. Here
the masks I am calling into question are not so much Nietzsche's
as our own. His work may be understood in spite of masks be
cause his use of masks is generally explicit. Our masks, on the
other hand, are less easy to detect. We do not hide behind a
Zarathustra or a Dionysus, but sometimes we hide behind con
ceptual frameworks, abstractions. These are to us what Zara
thustra was to Nietzsche. If the deception on Nietzsche's part is
to speak through a unique figure situated six thousand feet beyond
man and time, ours is to fail to speak sufficiently as individuals.
We rely on systems of thought through which others can speak.
Yet we value such systems. We value the type of communication
they enable us to establish, the facilitation of dialogue and dis
cussion, and the commonly accepted criteria to which we may
appeal if disagreements arise among us. Nietzsche would say that
as long as we are not free to transcend our conceptual systems
we have not yet fully understood him. As for us, we want both
our intellectual systems and Nietzsche. Is there any way of me
diating these differences, so that we can obtain a philosophical
understanding of him without at the same time losing the rich,
engaging aspects of his thought?
In my interpretation of Nietzsche I have placed a fairly strong
weight on the significance of his metaphors. In my view, the
metaphor is not a mask concealing the real Nietzsche (if one may
speak of such a character). On the contrary, the metaphor is one
place where Nietzsche's views are most likely to be found. His
metaphors need not lead any interpreter astray. They can easily
be understood and valued precisely for what they are, namely,
figures of speech. Nietzsche's metaphors are potential bearers of
truth. While a poetic view of truth and philosophical truth are not
always compatible, my task is to determine where Nietzsche suc
ceeds in integrating poetry and philosophy. I am interested in the
ix
X PREFACE
type of contribution Nietzsche can otTer to a broad concept of
philosophical inquiry.
In addition to weighing Nietzsche's poetry favorably, I have
approached him philosophically through the mediation of the con
cept of the Dionysian. If Nietzsche's Dionysian perspective is
understood, everything he writes can be seen as part of a clearly
identifiable perspective on existence. Aspects of his thought which
at first appear obscure begin to lose their enigmatic character. All
those truths whose authority is sustained through mystery lose
their importance, while some of his more simple and direct state
ments stand out as the more profound. In some ways the knowl
edge we gain is not flattering to Nietzsche. It especially shatters
the imagery of elevation and heightened awareness in which
Nietzsche very often clothes his views. Yet he challenged us to
understand him as a spokesman for the pagan god Dionysus. He
invited us to search for the thoughts behind his thoughts. My
study is a response to this challenge.
The interpretation I have offered is sympathetic to Nietzsche's
ontological views but critical of his moral and political theory.
Because of this critical element it differs from those philosophical
readings which offer a primarily favorable view of his thought.
Nietzsche's unsystematic method and enigmatic teachings (the
Obermensch. the will to power) are bound to generate contro
versy regarding how he ought to be read. The philosophical com
munity (especially in phenomenology and analytic philosophy)
has tended to vic'.\' Nietzsche':; \vork in a positive light. This
happens because. as philosophers. we reconstruct Nietzsche's
theories in terms of our traditions and interpretative frameworks.
We choose from among his many statements what is most illu
minating or sensible. Scholars influenced by Heidegger or Kauf
mann tend to follow this approach. Moreover, as long as the
Nietzsche scholar addresses such issues as Nietzsche's theory of
time or of language, his work remains enlightening. It is when we
get to questions of power and violence that serious problems arise.
Nietzsche has received negative criticism from thinkers (both
conservative and leftist) interested in the philosophy or history
of culture. From a conservative standpoint he is criticized for
either directly or indirectly advocating an end to morality. In this
vein Stern has called attention to Nietzsche's role in German
culture as an ideologist of power and violence. Leftist critics (such
as Lukacs) charge that Nietzsche's defense of a high culture vi-
Preface xi
olates both the moral dignity and the political interests of the
working class. To these concerns I have added the issue ofNietz
sche's perspective on women, which is of special interest to many
readers today. One of the main targets of those who criticize
Nietzsche's views on morality and culture is his concept of justice
(including social justice). He destroys the notion of justice based
on respect for persons. This allows him to establish an authori
tarian system of values which in turn defends the right of the
strong to overpower the weak. When Nietzsche is read from the
standpoint of the history of culture, he does not fare as well as
when his work is studied in connection with specialized issues in
epistemology, ontology, literary theory, or existential psychology.
My study of Nietzsche's metaphysics and morality shows that
these cannot be separated (except arbitrarily) from his theory of
culture. It is possible to portray his views on culture favorably if
only one draws attention to the role he gives to the artist or the
creator of values. On the other hand, systematic studies of Nietz
sche make little note of his views on slavery. He endorsed slavery
and exploitation as structures which could be used to further the
self-enhancement of artists and geniuses. To many of us who
appreciate Nietzsche's other insights on creativity and art, his
statements on slavery are not appealing. Therefore, they tend not
to be discussed. Reading Nietzsche without masks, I take it,
means that as philosophers we have a responsibility not to cover
up for him, especially when issues of justice and injustice are at
stake. His positive contributions to knowledge should be distin
guished from the justification of cruelty which he offers in the
name of the superior culture and the superior man. Moreover, it
is not enough to have some books eulogizing Nietzsche while
other books portray him as a proponent of violence. We need an
interpretation that can speak both to the positive and to the neg
ative aspects of his thought.
Although I have refrained from looking the other way when
Nietzsche defends cruelty, my main goal has been to trace the
implications of the more creative and constructive aspects of
Nietzsche's thought. Whenever possible I have read him as con
tributing to a standpoint beyond nihilism. Yet, as the study pro
gresses, the contradictions between Nietzsche's intent to overcome
nihilism and his exaltation of nihilism become more accentuated.
The reason for this increasing tension is that we are following the
actual implications of his views. The conclusions I have reached
