Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory

240 Pages·2006·25.703 MB·English

by  Michael Bacharach, Natalie Gold, Robert Sugden

BEYOND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE

BEYOND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE
TEAMS AND FRAMES IN GAME THEORY
Michael Bacharach
Edited by Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD
Copyright © 2006 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton,
New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 3 Market Place, Woodstock,
Oxfordshire OX20 1SY
All Rights Reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bacharach, Michael.
Beyond individual choice : teams and frames in game theory / Michael Bacharach;
edited by Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-10: 0-691-12005-6 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN-13: 978-0-691-12005-8 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Game theory. 2. Economics, Mathematical. I. Gold, Natalie, 1976- II. Sugden,
Robert. III. Title.
HB144.B328 2006
330' .01 '5193—dc22 2005049608
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available
This book has been composed in Palatino
Printed on acid-free paper. °°
pup.princeton.edu
Printed in the United States of America
10 987654321
Contents
List of Illustrations v™
List of Tables ix
Foreword xt
Preface xiii
Introduction 1
Chapter 1
The Hi-Lo Paradox 35
Chapter 2
Groups 69
Chapter 3
The Evolution of Group Action 95
Chapter 4
Team Thinking 1 20
Conclusion 155
References 203
Index 211

Illustrations
FIGURE I.l. Heads and Tails 2
FIGURE 1.2. The Prisoner's Dilemma 3
FIGURE 1.3. Hi-Lo 5
FIGURE 1.4. Three objects 10
FIGURE 1.5. Three more objects 11
FIGURE 1.6. Four Cubes as an objective game 17
FIGURE 1.7. Four Cubes as a framed game 17
FIGURE 1.8. Three Cubes and a Pyramid as a framed game 20
FIGURE 1.9. Large and Small Cubes as perceived by a
non-noticer 20
FIGURE 1.10. Heads and Tails as a framed game 23
FIGURE 1.11. A game discussed by Schelling 26
FIGURE 1.1. Hi-Lo 35
FIGURE 1.2. Running a single 36
FIGURE 1.3. Who fetches which? 37
FIGURE 1.4. Vision 37
FIGURE 1.5a. Truth telling: With strong disbelief 38
FIGURE 1.5b. Truth telling: With weak disbelief 38
FIGURE 1.6a. Calling a catch: Without organisation 39
FIGURE 1.6b. Calling a catch: With organisation 40
FIGURE 1.7. Unlocking 41
FIGURE 1.8. Choose a card 43
FIGURE 1.9. A game with a weakly dominated
Nash equilibrium 45
FIGURE 1.10. The Stag Hunt 48
FIGURE 1.11. Hi-Lo with an inefficient saliency 56
FIGURE 1.a. A Stackelberg-nonsoluble game 66
FIGURE 2.1. Sources and effects of group identification 76
FIGURE 2.2. Turning out 85
FIGURE 2.a. Two-person Chicken game 92
FIGURE 3.1. Stag Hunt 99
FIGURE 3.2. Individual and group selection in Stag Hunt 106
FIGURE 3.a. The Prisoner's Dilemma 118
FIGURE 3.b. A typical Battle of the Sexes game 119
FIGURE 4.1. Offside trap 124
FIGURE 4.2. A Prisoner's Dilemma 132
FIGURE 4.3. Task 10 display 148
viii ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURE C.I. A Prisoner's Dilemma 168
FIGURE C.2. The vase-faces illusion 170
FIGURE C.3. A Prisoner's Dilemma with transformed payoffs 173
FIGURE C.4. Joe's problem (payoffs are shown for Joe!,
Joe and Joe) 195
2 3
Tables
TABLE P.l. The relationship between Bacharachs plan
and book as it now is xxi
TABLE 1.1. Payoff s for calling a catch 65
TABLE 4.1. Results of experiment 149