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Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, containment, and after
Michael P. Gerace
To cite this Article Gerace, Michael P.(1991) 'Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, containment, and after',
Comparative Strategy, 10: 4, 347 — 364
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Between Mackinder and Spykman:
Geopolitics, Containment, and After
MICHAEL P. GERACE
Framingham, MA 01701
Abstract This essay is about geopolitical frameworks for analysis in U.S. foreign
policy. The geopolitical frameworks of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman
have undergone a resurgence over the last decade and have evoked an equal measure
0 of criticism as well. Both critics and supporters, however, share certain assumptions
1
20 about Spykman that have become part of the conventional wisdom defining his rela-
t tionship to Mackinder and U.S. containment policy. The first assumption sees Spy-
s
gu kman as only modifying Mackinder's basic framework, while remaining compatible
u
A with its basic logic. The second, which builds on the first, is that Spykman's geopo-
8
1 litics (as understood) layed the foundations for U. S. containment policy through the
3
4 writings of Kennan, containment documents, and later policymakers.
:
8
1 Arguing from these assumptions, critics see the rimland concept as responsible
t: for problems of containment. Supporters, upholding the same assumptions, see the
A
] rimland as a passive contact zone around the littorals of Eurasia within which seapo-
o
r wers and heartland struggle for control. This view is said to have informed contain-
i
a
C ment by pointing to the seapower's ability to construct a system of alliances around
ty the rimland and thus bar the heartland from access to the sea.
i
rs Both views of Spykman are false because they are based on false assumptions.
e
iv Mackinder and Spykman are actually quite different. In Mackinder there is one
n
U pattern of conflict in history—that between seapower and heartland. In Spykman,
an however, there are two—that between seapower and heartland, and that between an
c
ri independent center of power in the rimland with both seapower and heartland allied
e
Am against it. These patterns alternate around the shifting distribution of power within
[
important regions of the rimland. It is this dualism in Spykman that is ignored.
:
By Conventional views of Spykman see only the first pattern in his framework, which
ed supports his link to Mackinder. Yet it was the second pattern that he saw as coinciding
d
a with major wars in modern times. The first is real, but is no longer the overriding
o
l
n theme that it is in Mackinder.
w
o
D With these differences established, the implications of each can be contrasted and
their substantive differences clarified. And the wide differences between the tradi-
tional interpretations of Spykman and the actual implications of his framework can
also be seen. Most notable is the issue of European unity. While containment policy
supported European federation, Spykman warned against it whether it was by federa-
tion or conquest. While Mackinder said nothing on unity, his framework is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with it.
The ideas behind containment were not geopolitical in the true sense of the term.
They were only outwardly so. To the extent that they were, however, they reflected
Mackinder and not Spykman. Reasoning from Mackinder's framework is consistent
with key aspects of containment, while reasoning from Spykman's leads to very differ-
ent conclusions. If these frameworks would lead to different implications for U.S.-
Soviet conflict, they would also lead to different interpretations on the end of this
conflict and what it means for U.S. foreign policy.
From Mackinder's perspective, the current process of European unity can be
seen as the fruition of U.S. containment policy and multilateral cooperation.
U.S.-Soviet conflict, as seapower-heartland conflict, reflected the only historical
347
348 M. P. Gerace
pattern. The dissipation of this conflict suggests no replacement. But from Spykman's
view, the decline in one pattern will simply be replaced by another in accordance
with new centers of power in the world. Thus European unity is not the fruition of
containment's success, but a development that will transform the basic pattern within
which the first pattern existed. While this first is real to Spykman, it is far less volatile
than the second. An irony here is that while the flaring up of U.S.-Soviet conflict in
the 1980s reassured Mackinder's relevance, the decline of this conflict may make
Spykman more timely than ever.
This article focuses on the geopolitical framework of Nicholas Spykman and his relation-
ship to U.S. foreign policy. The frameworks of Halford Mackinder and Spykman have
undergone a resurgence over the last decade and have evoked an equal measure of
criticism as well. Both critics and supporters, however, share certain assumptions about
Spykman that have become part of the conventional wisdom defining his relationship to
10 Mackinder and U.S. containment policy. This can be summarized as two related link-
0
2 ages. The first is that Mackinder's geopolitics is consistent with that of Spykman's.
t
s
u Spykman is seen as only modifying Mackinder's framework while remaining compatible
g
u
A with its basic logic. The second, which builds on the first, is that Spykman's geopolitics
8
1 (as understood) informed U.S. containment policy via the writings of Kennan and early
3
:4 containment documents, as well as the thinking of later U.S. policymakers. Critics take
8
1
this second link to be evidence that containment's problems are rooted in Spykman's
:
t
A geopolitics.
]
o
ir This article does not refute containment's problems, only that they are not rooted in
a
C Spykman's geopolitics. The ideas behind containment have totally ignored Spykman.
y
it The central purpose, however, is to show the dramatic differences between Spykman and
s
r
e Mackinder. Geopolitical interpretations of U.S. foreign policy are conditioned by the
v
i
Un framework one reasons from. If these frameworks have any validity (as I believe they
an do), then it will be fruitful to separate the two to show that the implications of Spyk-
c
i
r man's framework for U.S. foreign policy contrast sharply with traditional geopolitical
e
m
A prescriptions. Spykman cannot be spoken of directly, however, without first disentan-
[
y: gling him from the conceptual morass that obscures the dynamism of his framework.
B
d Thus the above linkages will be outlined before distinguishing Spykman from Mackinder
e
d
a and containment.
o
l
wn The view that containment's problems can be explained by their link to "classical"
o
D
geopolitics has been articulated most explicitly by G. R. Sloan. Sloan states that while
no direct link can be made between a theorist (e.g., Spykman) and a policymaker (e.g.,
Kennan), geopolitical concepts have influenced policymakers more generally as a
creed.1 Thus problems of containment, which he terms "indiscriminate globalism," are
said to stem from geopolitical doctrines.2
The contours of this linkage focus on the advent of a truly global containment. Its
universalization and failure to distinguish between vital and non-vital interests, which
led to unlimited foreign policy goals, are specifically related to geopolitics. Like others,
Sloan sees the Truman Doctrine as beginning the enormous expansion of U.S. foreign
policy and NSC-68 as the final stage in its globalist development.3
Sloan links this directly to Spykman's rimland concept by seeing Kennan's writings
and NSC-68 as reflecting it. He states that the "X" article is evidence of this because
"Spykman's emphasis on the importance of the United States maintaining a margin of
political and military superiority on the rimland was similar to Kennan's political objec-
tive of deterring Soviet expansionism."4 And NSC-68 sought to implement this by join-
Between Mackinder and Spykman 349
ing countries together as points to form a line to deny Soviet control of the rimland.5
Finally, the view that the Soviets had an expansionary advantage due to interior lines of
communication "represents a striking congruity with the theories of Lea, Mahan, and
especially Spykman. . . ."6 Sloan's criticisms of NSC-68 are quite similar to those of
others and these linkages are not exclusive to him either, but pervade the writings of
critics and supporters of containment and geopolitics alike.7
As noted, this linkage is built on the first between Mackinder and Spykman. Equat-
ing the two is prevalent on a far wider basis than the above link. The reason for this
seems to be due to the uneven treatment each has received. Mackinder has received a
tremendous amount of analysis and criticism since his writing, but Spykman has re-
ceived very little. Most analysis of Spykman is superficial and part of a larger work on
Mackinder or geopolitics in general.8 Thus he has never been comprehensively analyzed
and compared to Mackinder. Instead there is an utter similarity in most treatments of
him.
0
01 This understanding of Spykman asserts a compatibility between his framework and
2
t Mackinder's. The rimland, as the littoral of the Eurasian land mass, is seen as being the
s
u
g area that the heartland seeks to control, which puts it into conflict with the seapowers.
u
A
Spykman is seen as pointing to the danger of the heartland coming into control of this
8
1
3 area because it would result in the strategic encirclement of the United States.9
4
:
8 This link is made at a more theoretical level as well. Here Spykman's significance
1
t: amounts to an extension of the optimism about the fate of the seapowers against the
A
] heartland that Mackinder found in his last essay (1943). Mackinder was initially pessi-
o
ir mistic because the advent of railways would enable the heartland to gain wide access to
a
C
the sea and outcompete the seapowers. His midland ocean concept (explained below)
y
t
si offered a way to prevent this. Here the rimland is simply a more systematic elaboration
r
ve on this optimism. By allying with the littoral states of Eurasia and fostering their inde-
i
n
U pendence and industrial development, the seapowers could deny this area to the heart-
an land and, ideally, bottle it up in a landlocked fortress.10
c
i
er This interpretation of Spykman is patently false. It fits neatly, however, into argu-
m
A
[ ments that link it to problems of containment. First, it maintains the core importance of
:
By the seapower-heartland conflict as the overriding theme (as in Mackinder). The rimland
ed was just a tidier concept to describe the same process at work in Mackinder. Second, this
d
oa view sees the rimland as giving uniform political significance to the entire Eurasian
l
n
w littoral, which supports its link to "indiscriminate globalism." These are both false
o
D
views. They ignore the core importance that Spykman gives to the rimland, which
radically alters the significance of seapower-heartland conflict. They also ignore the
selectiveness with which Spykman accords importance to certain regions of the rimland
rather than the entire area.
Throughout the 1980s, however, there was a plethora of geopolitical works that
refined, revised, and employed Mackinder's framework. These works either sought to
clarify Mackinder or to apply his framework to U.S. national security policy. But like
critics, these works also accepted the equation between Mackinder and Spykman. Colin
Gray, for example, speaks of both in the singular when stating that his book employs
"Mackinder's and Spykman's framework of Heartland-Rimland."11 James Lowe states
that except for a minor misunderstanding, "there was actually no difference at all be-
tween the theories of Spykman and Mackinder" because Spykman's ideas are "pure
Mackinder. Straight from the Heartland."12 Despite Lowe's assertions this could not be
further from the truth.
With this link reaffirmed, however, familiar statements about the role of the rimland
350 M. P. Gerace
as providing a bulwark against Soviet expansion were made.13 This was generally ac-
companied by detailed regional analysis, such as with Soviet tactics in Western Europe.
The Soviet attempt to decouple the United States from the continent while pressuring
individual West European countries into a neutralist stance to undermine unity was often
the focus.14 Such analysis was prominent before Soviet control over Eastern Europe
collapsed. While not denying the excellence of this analysis or that there was a need for
a bulwark against Soviet expansion, the use of the rimland from Mackinder's framework
has obscured its true dynamism.
Zbigniew Brzezinski is quite similar to Gray in his geopolitical outlook. Brzezinski
sees U.S.-Soviet conflict revolving around the Soviet attempt to control Eurasia and is
played out in three central-strategic fronts—Western Europe, the Far East, and South
West Asia, with a fourth established in Central America.15 He is similar to Gray in his
analysis of Soviet tactics in these regions. Brzezinski argues, however, that the United
States needs to focus on new geopolitical imperatives beyond Europe and Japan because
0
01 its policy has been successful in these regions.16
2
st It is impossible to do justice to the complexity of these works here. The point is that
u
ug they all argue from the standpoint of Mackinder and either confuse him with Spykman or
A
8 simply do not bother to distinguish the two. The terms seapower, heartland, rimland,
1
43 and others are not empty labels of mere convenience. They are geopolitical categories
:
18 that have a specific significance within the framework of the theorist. The seapower-
t: heartland conflict in Mackinder is certainly different to that in Spykman, and the rimland
A
] concept is unintelligible within Mackinder's framework. Confusing the two has led to a
o
r
ai misunderstanding of Spykman by both critics and supporters. In terms of the more
C
y recent geopolitical works above, this means that their understandings of U.S.-Soviet
t
i
s conflict and support of certain aspects of containment, while consistent with Mackinder,
r
e
v contrast sharply with Spykman. West European unity is the most prominent example.
i
n
U How it is understood within Mackinder's framework differs dramatically from how it is
n
ca seen within Spykman's framework. And the implications for U.S. policy are thus differ-
i
r
e ent in each. Because the two theorists are assumed to be essentially the same, these
m
A
[ differences are ignored.
:
y
B Though not fully outlined here, the basics of Mackinder's framework are introduced
d
de before going to its specific aspects that bear on Spykman.
a
lo The principal conflict around which Mackinder's geopolitical framework is con-
n
w
o structed is that between seapower and heartland. These two categories of power are
D
defined in part by their geographic orientation toward sea or land power. Part of Mack-
inder's focus is on the shifting balance of power between them, which is explained by
new transportation technologies that present new opportunities for the power potential of
those geographically disposed to exploit them. His understanding of this shifting balance
forms the basis of his geopolitics and becomes his theory of history.17 He focuses on
three main epochs in history, with the third emerging during his writing due to the
advent of railways (as well as modern artillery and the internal combustion engine). New
opportunities were opened to land power against sea power.18
Of key importance during this epoch is the heartland concept, first described as the
pivot area of history. The heartland is a core, landlocked area that includes the USSR,
Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and Tibet.19 In the Middle Ages it was open to the horse
riding nomads who descended upon outlying areas. This put Europe under the long-term
dominance of land power to the east, while it was boxed-in by pirates on the sea to the
north and south.20 The advent of sailing ships liberated Europe from this as it prevailed
over the sea. In modern times the heartland's importance rose again on the crest of new
Between Mackinder and Spykman 351
land transportation, coupled with the fact that a single state could now organize this area.
Thus Mackinder saw Russia, with its pressure on neighboring Finland, Scandinavia,
Poland, Turkey, Persia, India, and China as the modern equivalent to the horse riding
nomads of history.21
The heartland is the strategic core of a larger unit, the Eurasian land mass, which is
demographically superior to and has a larger resource base than any other geographic
unit. With railroad tracks covering Eurasia, the heartland power could expand outward
and control its littoral. It would then have access to the sea on a wide basis with a
superior resource base. In his first version of this idea, Mackinder states that "the
oversetting of the balance of power in favor of the pivot state, resulting in expansion
over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit vast continental resources used for
fleet building and the empire of the world would be in sight."22 This possibility put the
seapowers, who depend on control of the seas for their survival, into conflict with
Eurasian contenders. Thus "West Europe, both insular and peninsula, must necessarily
0 be opposed to whatever power attempts to organize the resources of East Europe and the
1
0
2 heartland."23
t
s
gu This is the central conflict animating Mackinder's framework. The seapowers must
u
A prevent a power from organizing the heartland and Eurasia, and ultimately from gaining
8
1 unlimited access to the sea. Geopolitical views of U.S. foreign policy have largely been
3
4
: from this framework. Seeing postwar U.S.-Soviet conflict as seapower-heartland con-
8
1
: flict on a grand scale is generally faithful to Mackinder. The problem is in the oversim-
t
A plification of this relationship, which amounts to ignoring the differences of the smaller
]
ro categories that Mackinder designates between seapowers and heartland—the inner cres-
i
a
C cent and coastlands. These subdivisions were not prominent in his last essay, but were
y
it essentially consistent with it as will be shown. Spykman's entanglement with Mackinder
s
er is largely due to ignoring the meaning of these smaller categories.
v
i
Un The inner crescent—coastland division serves to establish the fault line that separates
an the heartland from coastal Eurasia. The significance of states within these categories is
c
ri different to Mackinder. France and Germany, for example, are in two different catego-
e
m
A ries. Mackinder saw Germany as a heartland power and France as a coastland power. It
[
y: is often stated that he saw Germany as a rimland power in his 1943 essay.24 Aside from
B
d the fact that Mackinder does not use the term rimland, the interpretive significance of
e
d
a the rimland as a concept is alien to his framework.
o
l
wn The usual assertion is that Mackinder sees Russia as the heartland power. This is an
o
D oversimplification. He considers Russia to naturally occupy the heartland, but he also
consistently sees three traditional centers of power in the heartland, all potentially domi-
nant. Brandenburg-Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia were "a vast triple base of
manpower, which was lacking to the horse raiders of history."25 While World War I
eliminated Austria as a contender and Russia already occupied the heartland, Germany
remained as its most serious challenger.
Mackinder states that Russia's significance emerged at the end of the Middle Ages
when the "Cossacks first policed the steppes" and it towered in the 19th century, but
Germany and Austria became determined to control the heartland by the end of the
century.26 It was not a foregone conclusion that Russia would be the sole inheritor of the
heartland. While he is wary of Russia's potential, he is constantly concerned about
Germany.
Within his framework Germany lies outside the pivot area proper, but is in the inner
crescent along with others such as Austria, Turkey, and China. The outer crescent in-
cludes Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada, and Japan. And
352 M. P. Gerace
France, Italy, Egypt, India, and Korea are "so many bridgeheads where the outside
navies would support armies to compel the pivot allies to deploy land forces and prevent
them from concentrating their whole strength on fleets."27 The bridgeheads are the
contact zones between seapowers and heartland. They are amphibious (like Spykman's
rimland), but are naturally allied to the seapowers (unlike the rimland).
Mackinder's understanding of Germany, whose key to world power was strictly on
land, is tied into the differences in these categories, which reflects his larger theory of
history. He sees the Germans as a people lying straddled across the division between
heartland and coastland, with the western Germans being historically and culturally
integrated into Western Europe and the eastern Germans being distinct and politically
similar to autocratic Russia.28 His cultural division of Western Europe from Eastern
Europe is at the same demarcation of the coastland from the heartland, with the Germans
being split between them.
This picture is extended back into history. The Germans are seen to be in a struggle
0
1 against the east while pursuing division in the west. Since the late Middle Ages, notes
0
2
t Mackinder, the Germans have taken three paths of invasion into Eastern Europe—along
s
gu the Baltic shore, up the Oder River, and down the Danube, creating "a great triple
u
A organization of German domination over a mainly Slavonic population. . . ."29 Thus the
8
1
3 primary significance of Bismarck was that he moved the center of power in the east
4
8: away from Russia to Prussia while keeping the west divided.30
1
: It should be clear that Germany is categorically similar to Russia as a contender for
t
A
] the heartland while being incomparable to France in Mackinder's framework. It is im-
o
ir portant to make these distinctions to clarify Mackinder's relationship to Spykman and the
a
C
interpretive differences of their frameworks. Mackinder's categories are not arbitrary.
y
t
i They reflect his understanding of the shifting balance between seapower and land power
s
r
ve as it has been played out in history. His framework reflects an arrangement of categories
i
Un with specific interpretive significance for the countries within them. His midland ocean
n
a concept is no substantial departure from this. It is a consistent extension of his earlier
c
i
er works with Germany, not the USSR, being its main concern.
m
[A The midland-ocean concept was designed to eliminate Germany as a threat, which
:
y Mackinder thought could be done "if it were controlled by strong embankments on
B
ed either hand—land power to the east, in the Heartland, and sea power to the west, in the
d
oa North Atlantic Basin."31 To implement this, he calls for cooperation among the United
l
n
w States, Britain, and France, "die first for depth of defense, the second as the moated
o
D forward stronghold . . . and the third as the defensible bridgehead."32 Then he calls for
these three to cooperate with Russia against Germany, which is often overlooked.33
Mackinder's vision of the postwar world was one in which the allies were intact and
the perennial German problem solved. The midland-ocean concept was designed to
accomplish this. Mackinder describes a "girdle" that is "hung around the north polar
regions" and includes the heartland and the midland ocean (the North Atlantic). The
Baltic, Arctic, Mediterranean, and Caribbean Seas are its subsidiaries, and the Pacific,
Indian, and South Atlantic are the "Great Ocean" that lies outside it.34 Instead of a
single seapower, North America, Britain, and France are bound together. And they are
called on to cooperate with one part of the heartland (the USSR) against another (Ger-
many).
The midland ocean powers and Moscow constitute the "fulcrum" of the new world,
while the outer world would be led by the United States, Britain, and China.35 This
fulcrum is a construct revolving around Germany with the rest of the world being
defined by its relationship to this as the outer world. In a sense, it is a global version of
Between Mackinder and Spykman 353
the cordon sanitaire. How can Mackinder's interpreters say that the midland ocean is
aimed at the heartland (implying Russia), on the one hand, and that it sees Germany as a
rimland power, on the other, while the substance of the entire essay is focused on tying
down the Germans?
With Germany being the central problem, then, the midland-ocean concept is not
exactly a precursor to NATO, which included West Germany and was designed to con-
tain the USSR.36 If one ignores the details and transfers the roles of seapower and
heartland to the United States and the USSR after World War II exclusively, the strategic
parallel is sound. But this is not the same thing as saying that Mackinder meant this and
making conclusions based on that assumption. Yet ignoring these details is at the basis of
the misinterpretation of Spykman.
Spykman accepts the seapower-heartland conflict in Mackinder, but alters its signifi-
cance. The inner crescent and coastlands are united into a single new category, the
rimland. The outer crescent is replaced by the offshore continents, but Britain and Japan
0
1 are excluded from this and seen as offshore islands. The Eurasian littoral is better
0
2
described as a rimland to Spykman because it is linked together in terms of seapower by
t
s
gu the string of marginal and mediterranean seas that separates it from the oceans.37
u
A
In addition to the polarity between seapower and heartland Spykman adds that be-
8
1
3 tween the New World and the Old, with its offshore continents. The significance of this
4
8: is that the New World—the Western Hemisphere—was geographically surrounded by the
1
: Old from the Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic Oceans.38 Spykman is interested in the power
t
A
potential of these two units and the factors that affect the balance of power between
]
o
ir them. His general assertions about this have been seen as pointing to the heartland's
a
C ability to control the rimland, which would result in the strategic encirclement of the
y
it United States.
s
r
ve This is incorrect, however. The problem of encirclement comes from rimland
i
Un powers, not the heartland. Spykman is concerned with the rise of independent centers of
n
a power on the rimland. He uses balance of power concepts to inform its immediate
c
i
er significance, where balanced power is divided power and unbalanced power is integrated
m
[A power.39 When unbalanced power exists within regions of the rimland (as with Germany
y: and Japan during World War II), then the problem of U.S. encirclement exists.
B
ed That Spykman did not attribute uniform political significance to the entire rimland is
d
oa evidenced by his view of the world as being characterized by the regional decentraliza-
l
n
w tion of power in the twentieth century. He states that when Europe was the center of the
o
D
world, balance of power in Europe affected all other regions. But then the United States
emerged as an independent center of power in the nineteenth century and Japan in the
twentieth. The result was that the relative importance of regions in the world shifted as
the others began to influence the European balance.40
Not only does this make the world politically interdependent, but the rise of these
regions indicates the location of important centers of maritime power. Spykman
thought they included the Atlantic coast of North America, the European littoral, and
the Far Eastern coastland of Eurasia, with a minor one in India that he thought might
increase in power in the future.41 Spykman views the interdependence of these regions
in terms of the relative integration or division of power within them, which determines
the balance of power among them. With the European and Far Eastern regions of the
rimland being the most important, it is the integration or division of power within them
(equal to the existence or absence of a dominant power) that bears on U.S. security
interests.
Spykman summarizes the importance of the rimland when he states:
354 M. P. Gerace
The power struggles of the Eastern Hemisphere have always been fought in
reference to the relations between heartland and rimland; the power constel-
lation within the rimland itself; the influence of maritime presence on the
littoral; and finally, the participation in that presence exerted by the Western
Hemisphere.42
These variations of interaction place the rimland in a central position. Spykman's
interpreters have seen the rimland as a passive area that seapower and heartland struggle
over, while Spykman sees it as the area from which geopolitical struggle emanates. He
states:
Looking at both directions, [the rimland] . . . must function amphibiously
and defend itself on land and sea. In the past, it has had to fight against the
land power of the heartland and against the seapower of the offshore islands
0
1 of Great Britain and Japan. Its amphibious nature lies at the basis of its
0
2
t security problems.43
s
u
g
u
A
Thus the rimland is composed of actors who are often in opposition to both seapo-
8
1
3 wers and heartland. Spykman states that during the Napoleonic Wars and the two World
4
8: Wars, Britain and Russia were "lined up together against an intervening rimland power
1
: as led by Napoleon, Wilhelm II, and Hitler."44 Mackinder notes the same three wars, but
t
A
] interprets them differently. The first was simply a dual between West and East Europe,
o
ir while the two World Wars were attempts by Germany to control the heartland.45 All three
a
C are geopolitically equivalent in Spykman.
y
t
si Spykman does not negate the existence of seapower-heartland conflict, but it is no
r
ve longer the overriding theme. He states that "there has never really been a simple land
i
Un power-sea power opposition. The historical alignment has always been in terms of some
n
a members of the rimland with Great Britain against some members of the rimland with
c
i
er Russia, or Great Britain and Russia together against a dominating rimland power."46
m
[A It is a common observation to note that Britain and the United States have never
:
y really been in direct conflict with Russia in modern times, but have been allied in major
B
ed wars. The false conclusion often drawn, is that this indicates where their "true" geopo-
d
oa litical interests lay. This leads to the view that U.S.-Soviet conflict after World War II did
l
wn not reflect genuine strategic dispositions, but was due to meddling in each others affairs,
o
D misunderstandings, etc.47 We do not get this understanding from Spykman. Rather,
sometimes the rimland is split between seapowers and heartland and sometimes both are
allied against the rimland. This is no small point. Much of the Spykman's thinking about
the rimland is centered on this basic dualism.
All geopolitical frameworks seek to indicate recurring patterns of conflict in history.
In Mackinder, there is only one—that between seapower and heartland. In Spykman,
however, there are really two—that between seapower and heartland with the rimland
divided between them, and that between a rimland power against both seapower and
heartland. The pattern that prevails depends on the distribution of power within the
rimland.
These patterns are not always as clear-cut as the above three wars, but Spykman's
framework captures shifts in geopolitical conflict in a way that Mackinder's cannot.
From Mackinder's framework, Germany in the two World Wars is analogous to the
USSR in the postwar period. All three reflect attempts by a heartland power to dominate
Eurasia, which put it into conflict with the seapowers. But in Spykman, the first two
Between Mackinder and Spykman 355
examples reflect a different pattern than the third. If Napoleonic France and Germany in
the two World Wars are equivalent examples of the pattern that emerges around a domi-
nant rimland power where seapower and heartland ally, the periods beginning with the
removal of these powers reflect a different pattern—that which emerges around a divided
rimland where seapower and heartland conflict.
Thus the breakup of the Quadruple Alliance after 1815 between conservative Aus-
tria, Russia, and Prussia against liberal Britain, and U.S., British, and French antago-
nism against revolutionary Russia in the interwar period are analogous to U.S.-Soviet
conflict after World War II. By the postwar period, the conflict would be global in scope
due to the sheer enormity of the antagonists, modern technology, and the fanatical messi-
anism of Soviet ideology. In all three examples, however, the wartime alliance dissipated
with the removal of the rimland power as a new geopolitical alignment emerged that
brought the allies into conflict.
To Spykman, then, the distribution of power within the rimland determines the pat-
0 tern that prevails. This, in turn, indicates the strategic interests of actors. With the
1
20 United States, his concern was its encirclement. He notes that U.S. history has largely
t
s been accompanied by balanced power in Europe and Asia, with the possibility of its
u
Aug encirclement arising only four times.48 The last was the German-Japanese alliance of
18 World War II, which presented "two gigantic empires controlling huge war potential"
43 that could reverse "the balance of power across the oceans."49 While powerful in and of
:
8
1 itself, the United States "would still find herself irresistibly encircled by a superior force
At: if she should ever be confronted with a united Eurasian rimland."50 It should be clear
o] that the rimland, not the heartland, presented the problem of encirclement for the United
r
ai States and only under certain conditions.
C
ty The position of Japan is somewhat ambiguous in Spykman's framework. On the one
i
s
r hand, Japan is geographically similar to Britain as an offshore island and seapower, but
e
v
i it is geopolitically different on the other. This is illustrated by the significance of both to
n
U
n the United States where U.S. "participation in a war to preserve the balance of power in
a
ic Europe against Germany means war in cooperation with the dominant naval power.
r
e
m Participation in a war to preserve the balance of power in Asia in this period in history
A
[
: means war against Japan, against the dominant naval power, a strategic problem of an
y
B entirely different nature."51
d
e
d The geopolitical difference between the two stems from the fact that a plurality of
a
o
nl states separates Britain from Russia, while Japan is pressed against the two mainland
w
Do powers. The British policy was aimed at avoiding the Japanese situation by maintaining
a balance in Europe, while there was a balance in the Far East maintained by Russia and
China on the mainland before Japan became a power.52 The rise of Japanese power and
the building of its empire meant the disruption of the balance.
Both seapowers lay across U.S. lines of communication. But the British policy of
balance prevented the emergence of a rimland power in Europe while its navy buffered
the United States from the continent.53 And "the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere
would mean the final destruction of the balance of power in the Transpacific Zone."54
While Japan is geographically similar to Britain, therefore, it is East Asia's geopolitical
equivalent to Napoleonic France and Germany in the two World Wars. Like the three
European examples, it was a major amphibious power that threatened the mainland
powers on land and the United States on the sea.
While allied regions of the rimland would leave the United States encircled, they
would also encircle the Soviet Union. Spykman notes that German-Japanese success
would have pushed the USSR back behind the Urals and Lake Baikal:
