Table Of Content’
Berkeley s Argument for Idealism
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’
Berkeley s Argument
for Idealism
Samuel C. Rickless
1
3
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For my father
Elwood Abraham Rickless
and my father-in-law
Norton Nelkin
would that I could bring you the joy that you brought me
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Preface
IwasfirstexposedtoGeorgeBerkeley’sidealismasateachingassistantin
Robert Adams’s upper division history of modern philosophy course at
UCLAin1993.Thecourserepresentedanextraordinarylearningexperi-
ence for me, and I am deeply grateful to Bob for bringing the work of
seventeenth-andeighteenth-centuryphilosopherstolifeinawaythatwill
neverbeequaled.Bobtreatedeveryphilosopherhediscussed(Descartes,
Spinoza,Malebranche,Locke,Leibniz,Berkeley, Hume,andKant)with
respectandadmiration:helaidoutthearguments,discussedtheirstrengths
and weaknesses, and then encouraged his students (and his TA) to think
through them on their own. I hope that this book, even if only in small
measure, lives up to the ideals of interpretation and understanding that
RobertAdamsembodies.
The first course I taught on the history of philosophy was a standard
surveyofBritishEmpiricismfromLocketoHume.Itbecameobviousto
methatagreatdealofphilosophicalcommentarytreatsBerkeleyasaway-
stationbetweenLockeandHume,andtreatshisidealistandanti-materi-
alistargumentsasmomentarilymesmerizingbutultimatelyeitherblatantly
fallacious or just plain silly. On Berkeley’s behalf I thought this a trifle
unfair, but by and large I found Locke’s materialism so attractive that it
didn’tseemworthittoquibblewiththemostlynegativecommentaryon
Berkeley’spleasure–painargument,hisargumentfromperceptualrelativity,
andhisMasterArgument.AfterafewyearsofworkingonwhatItookto
be the clearest reconstruction of Berkeley’s reasons for accepting an
idealisticmetaphysics,Icametobelievethatmostscholarshadmisidenti-
fiedthecentral argumentsoftheThree DialoguesBetweenHylasandPhilo-
nous (1713), that a correct reconstruction of these arguments reveals that
Berkeleyalmostcertainlywrotethefirstofthesedialoguestoshoreupthe
sketchy arguments for idealism that appear in the first four sections of
ATreatiseConcerningthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge(1710),andthatthe
mostimportantconceptualtoolattheheartofBerkeley’scaseforidealism
is the distinction between mediate and immediate perception first dis-
cussedinhisAnEssayTowardsaNewTheoryofVision(1709).
viii PREFACE
Inthesummerof2007,IsatdowntowritewhatIthoughtwouldbea
longarticleorshortbookreconstructingBerkeley’sargumentforidealism.
ByApril2008,IhadadraftofthemanuscriptthatwaslongerthanIhad
expected.Atfirst,IthoughtIhadaccuratelyidentifiedwhatItooktobe
the main fallacy in the argument. But after benefiting from very helpful
and constructive feedback from numerous sources over several years,
I realized that what I took to be a fallacy was in fact a useful illustration
rather than an invalid argument. This opened up the possibility that
Berkeley’sargumentisvalid,evensound.Inowtakethispossibilityvery
seriously,andIhopethatyou,dearreader,willdosotoo.
My intellectual debts in the service of this project are many. I have
presentedsomeoftheideasinthisbooktodifferentaudiences:theHistory
of Philosophy Roundtable at UCSD (on various occasions), a faculty
colloquiumatUCSantaBarbara(May2006),theThirdBiennialMargaret
Dauler Wilson Conference (UCSD, June 2006), the Southwest Seminar
in Early Modern Philosophy (UCSD, February 2007), a meeting of the
International Berkeley Society at the Eastern APA (December 2007), an
InternationalBerkeleySocietyconference(Newport,June2008),afaculty
colloquium at Cornell University (September 2009), an International
Berkeley Society conference commemorating the 300th anniversary of
the publication of the Principles (Neuchâtel, April 2010), the Thomas
Rukavina Lecture on the History of Philosophy at Gonzaga University
(April 2010), a colloquium at Charles University (Prague, July 2010), a
colloquium at UCSD (April 2011), an International Berkeley Society
conference (Zürich, June 2011), and an Author Meets Critics session on
Georges Dicker’sBerkeley’sIdealism: A Critical Examination attheCentral
APA (February 2012). I thank all the organizers of these events and the
members of the audiences for their questions and comments, particularly
Timo Airaksinen, Tony Anderson, Dick Arneson, Margaret Atherton,
Bertil Belfrage, Laura Berchielli, Dominique Berlioz, Talia Bettcher,
MarthaBolton,SethBordner,ShoshanaBrassfield,WolfgangBreidert,Tad
Brennan, David Brink, Dick Brook, Janet Broughton, Tony Brueckner,
Geneviève Brykman, Craig Callender, John Carriero, Sébastien Charles,
AndrewChignell,JonathanCohen,SteveDaniel,GeorgesDicker,Matti
Eklund, Kevin Falvey, Keota Fields, Gail Fine, Melissa Frankel, Dan
Garber, Carl Ginet, Richard Glauser, Petr Glombicek, Sean Greenberg,
Rick Grush, Heta Gylling, Jani Hakkarainen, Matt Hanser, Michael
Hardimon, Marc Hight, Benjamin Hill, James Hill, Harold Hodes, Paul
PREFACE ix
Hoffman,TomHolden,MatthewHoltzman,LaurentJaffro,NickJolley,
Monte Johnson, Dan Kaufman, Nancy Kendrick, Mark Kulstad, Sukjae
Lee,TomLennon,RuthMattern,EdMcCann,JeffMcDonough,Gene-
vieveMigely,DickMiller,AlanNelson,LarryNolan,WalterOtt,George
Pappas, Silvia Parigi, Ville Paukkonen, Kenny Pearce, Derk Pereboom,
Luc Peterschmitt, Wayne Pomerleau, Lewis Powell, Timothy Quandt,
David Raynor,Michael Rescorla,John Russell Roberts, ThomasRuka-
vina, Don Rutherford, Nathan Salmon, Katia Saporiti, Erik Schmidt,
Daniel Schulthess, Claire Schwartz, Robert Schwartz, Lisa Shapiro, Gila
Sher, Sydney Shoemaker, Nicholas Silins, Pietr Szalek, Tom Stoneham,
ErinTaylor,ClintonTolley,JohnTroyer,JimVanCleve,EricWatkins,
John Whipple, Catherine Wilson, and Ken Winkler. My apologies to
thosescholarswhosecontributionstothisprojectImayhaveinadvertently
omitted. For corresponding with me about various issues related to the
project, IthankMargaretAtherton,Martha Bolton,SethBordner,Steve
Daniel, Georges Dicker, Melissa Frankel, Richard Glauser, Marc Hight,
JamesHill,LaurentJaffro,GeorgePappas,KennyPearce,DavidRaynor,
Katia Saporiti, and Catherine Wilson. Had it not been for their probing
questions and generous comments, this book might never have seen
the light of day. I am particularly grateful to those philosophers whose
views are criticized in the pages of this book but who have shown me
nothing but grace, kindness, and good humor, namely Martha Bolton,
SteveDaniel,GeorgesDicker,GeorgePappas,TomStoneham,andKen
Winkler.
Igratefullyacknowledgepermissionfromthepublishertousematerial
fromthefollowingpublication:
Chapter3:“TheRelationBetweenAnti-AbstractionismandIdealism
inBerkeley’sMetaphysics,”BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy
20(2012):723–40.
CompletingthisprojectwouldnothavebeenpossibleifIhadnotreceived
the support of students, colleagues, friends, and family. I am grateful to
ErinFrykholm,whoasagraduatestudentservedasmyresearchassistantin
summer 2005, tracking down sources and summarizing secondary litera-
ture.TheUCSDphilosophydepartmentandadministrationgrantedmea
two-quartersabbaticalleaveinfall2007andwinter2008,mostofwhich
Iusedtowritethefirstdraftofthemanuscript.Insummer2007,myfamily
Description:Samuel C. Rickless presents a novel interpretation of the thought of George Berkeley. In A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713), Berkeley argues for the astonishing view that physical objects (such as tables and chairs) a
