Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief

263 Pages·2007·4.775 MB·English

by  John Bishop

Believing by faith
This page intentionally left blank
Believing by faith
An Essay in the Epistemology and
Ethics of Religious Belief
John Bishop
CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD
1
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxfordox26dp
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford.
ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship,
andeducationbypublishingworldwidein
Oxford NewYork
Auckland CapeTown DaresSalaam HongKong Karachi
KualaLumpur Madrid Melbourne MexicoCity Nairobi
NewDelhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto
Withofficesin
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile CzechRepublic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
SouthKorea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
OxfordisaregisteredtrademarkofOxfordUniversityPress
intheUKandincertainothercountries
PublishedintheUnitedStates
byOxfordUniversityPressInc.,NewYork
JohnBishop2007
Themoralrightsoftheauthorshavebeenasserted
DatabaserightOxfordUniversityPress(maker)
Firstpublished2007
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,
storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,
withoutthepriorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,
orasexpresslypermittedbylaw,orundertermsagreedwiththeappropriate
reprographicsrightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproduction
outsidethescopeoftheaboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,
OxfordUniversityPress,attheaddressabove
Youmustnotcirculatethisbookinanyotherbindingorcover
andyoumustimposethesameconditiononanyacquirer
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData
Dataavailable
LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData
Dataavailable
TypesetbyLaserwordsPrivateLimited,Chennai,India
PrintedinGreatBritain
onacid-freepaperby
BiddlesLtd.,King’sLynn,Norfolk
ISBN978–0–19–920554–7
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgements xi
1 Introduction: towards an acceptable fideism 1
Themetaquestion:whatistheissueaboutthe‘justifiability’of
religiousbelief? 4
Faith-beliefs 6
Overviewoftheargument 8
Glossaryofspecialterms 18
2 The ‘justifiability’ of faith-beliefs: an ultimately moral issue 26
Astandardview:theconcernisforepistemicjustifiability 26
Theproblemofdoxasticcontrol 28
Theimpossibilityofbelievingatwill 29
Indirectcontroloverbeliefs 30
‘Holdingtrue’and‘takingtobetrue’ 33
Asecond—direct—locusofdoxasticcontrol 35
Moraldoxasticresponsibilities 41
Themoralsignificanceoffaith-beliefs 47
Linkingmoraltoepistemicjustifiability:reinstatingthestandard
view? 48
3 The epistemic justifiability of faith-beliefs: an ambiguity thesis 53
Plausibilityofrequiringepistemicformoraljustifiabilityundera
realistinterpretationoffaith-beliefs 53
Interpretingthelinkprinciple:epistemicentitlementasrequiring
evidentialjustification 55
Evidentialistrequirementsspecifiedbyanimplicitevidentialpractice 65
Rationalempiricistevidentialpractice 66
Applyingrationalempiricistevidentialpracticetotheistic
faith-beliefs:anambiguitythesis 68
vi contents
4 Responses to evidential ambiguity: isolationist and Reformed
epistemologies 77
Twostrategiesfordefendingthemoralprobityoftheisticfaith-belief
inthefaceofevidentialambiguity 78
Appealingtoaspecialtheisticevidentialpractice/improved
epistemologies 79
Anisolationistepistemology 79
Reformedepistemology 86
Conclusion:theneedforafideistresponsetoambiguity 99
5 Faith as doxastic venture 101
Agendaforadefenceofdoxasticventure 102
Thenatureoftheisticfaith 103
Thedoxasticventuremodel 106
Thepsychologicalpossibilityofdoxasticventure 111
AJamesianaccount 112
‘Passionally’causedbeliefs 113
6 Believing by faith: a Jamesian position 122
AninitialhypothesisforaJamesianthesisonpermissibledoxastic
venture 123
Thenotionofa‘genuineoption’ 125
A‘degreesofbelief’challenge 128
Evidentiallyundecidableforcedoptions 129
Permissibledoxasticventure:supra-notcounter-evidential 135
Howtheisticreligioncouldpresentessentiallyevidentially
undecidablegenuineoptions:thenotionofahighest-orderframing
principle 137
Restrictingthesis(J)tofaith-propositions:thesis(J) 145
i
7 Integrationist values: limiting permissible doxastic venture 151
Cancounter-evidentialfideismbenon-arbitrarilyexcluded? 151
Acoherencerequirementandintegrationistvalues 155
Moralintegrationoffaith-commitments 163
Implicationsforreflectivefaith-believers 167
Coda:AreflectiononAbrahamasforebearinfaith 170
contents vii
8 Argumentsfor supra-evidential fideism 174
Theimportanceofdefendingtheepistemicpermissibilityof
faith-ventures 176
Strategiesforsupportingfideism 178
An‘assimilationtopersonalrelationscases’strategy:experimental
venturesininterpersonaltrust 180
The‘assimilationtopersonalrelationscases’strategy:caseswhere
‘faithinafactcanhelpcreateafact’ 182
Aconsequentialiststrategy 185
AnoteonPascal’sWager 187
Thetuquoquestrategy 189
Ishard-lineevidentialismself-undermining? 190
Attitudestopassionaldoxasticinclinations 194
Epistemologicalexternalismagain:apresumptioninfavourof
fideism? 196
Scepticismaboutpassionaldoxasticinclinationsasguidestotruth:
howpassionsmaybeschooled 197
Thesignificanceofscientifictheoriesofpassionalmotivationsfor
faith-commitment 204
Animpasse? 206
9 A moral preference for modest fideism? 208
Implicationsofaccepting(J+)fororthodoxandrevisionarytheistic
faith-ventures 209
Theapparentfideist/evidentialistimpasseanditsimplications 211
Beyondimpasse?Directmoralevaluationofthefideist/evidentialist
debate 215
Self-acceptanceandauthenticity 216
Hard-lineevidentialismasgroundedindoctrinairenaturalism 220
Coherenceamongstmoralandreligiouspassionalcommitments 225
Conclusion 227
Bibliography 230
Index 237
This page intentionally left blank
Preface
This is not the book I originally intended to write. My initial motive
was to write on alternative concepts of God—alternative, that is, to the
prevailingclassicaltheisticconceptofGodasthesupernatural,omnipotent,
omniscient,omnibenevolentCreatorexnihilo(whomIhavethesomewhat
irreverent habit of referring to as the ‘omniGod’). People have too readily
assumed that rejecting belief in omniGod excludes any kind of continuing
theistic commitment. Yet believers could reject classical theism as an
inadequate theory of the nature of God as revealed in the theistic religious
traditions while still maintaining their faith: one should not, after all,
confuse God’s reality ‘in itself’ with a theory of the nature of God’s
reality. To continue to believe in God while an ‘omniGod atheist’ will,
however, be an intellectually respectable position only if one has some
idea of a viable alternative theory of God’s nature. And it was my
intention to explore further the possibility of concepts of God that were
both clearly distinct from the classical theistic conception and religiously
adequate for (at least some form of) theistic religious tradition. I thus
set out to write a book inquiring into the question whether it could
be justifiable to believe in God according to some alternative concept,
expanding on a discussion already published (‘Can There Be Alternative
Concepts of God?’ Nouˆs, 32 (1998): 174–88). I found, however, that I
lacked a clear enough understanding of what it would be for any theistic
commitment—revisionary or classical—to be ‘justifiable’. My attempts to
getthis question out of the way in ashort preliminary chapter increasingly
became both long-winded and unsatisfying. The present book is the result
of my desire to do the best I can to deal with this dissatisfaction.
Not, of course, that I am now fully satisfied! I have, however, come to
a settled view on the following key points.
First, philosophers of religion have not fully appreciated a significant
distinction betweenthebelief-state ofholding aproposition tobetrueand
the action of taking it to be true in (practical) reasoning. The evaluation
of the justifiability of religious beliefs should not therefore be confined to